



71577
181
v.13
1956

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XLIII

JANUARY, 1956

PART I

CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	- - - - -	2
NOTICES	- - - - -	3
IN MEMORIAM :		
LORD ALTRINCHAM	- - - - -	4
SIR RONALD STORRS, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.	- - - - -	4
GENERAL SIR MOSLEY MAYNE, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.	- - - - -	5
FROM TARSUS TO LAKE VAN. By FREYA STARK, C.B.E.	-	7
THE MALAYAN SCENE. By W. C. S. CORRY, C.B.E.	- -	20
POLITICS AND ALPHABETS IN INNER ASIA. By PAUL B. HENZE	- - - - -	29
AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By LOUIS DUPREE	- - - - -	52
REVIEWS :		
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 61	Israel and her Neighbours, 74	
Asia East by South : A Cultural Geography, 62	Himalayan Barbary, 75	
Far Eastern Governments and Politics : China and Japan, 64	Golden Interlude, 76	
The Struggle for Asia, 65	India : New Patterns, 77	
Turkey, 66	One Man's Journey, 78	
Abode of Snow, 67	Michael Symes' Journal, 78	
The Marching Wind, 68	The End of Extraterritoriality in China, 79	
Science, Democracy and Islam, 69	Biography of Huang Ch'ao, 79	
Forgotten Kingdom, 70	The Nine Songs, 81	
Crescent and Green, 71	In Two Chinas, 81	
Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 72	My Boy Chang, 82	
State and Economics in the Middle East, 73	The Chinese Gentry, 83	
	The Sixth Column, 84	
	Land of the Sherpas, 84	
	The World of Dew, 84	

Published by
THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
2, HINDE STREET, LONDON, W.1
TEL: WELBECK 4823

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL 1955-56

President :

THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D.

Hon. Vice-Presidents :

THE MOST HON. THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

LT.-GENERAL SIR ADRIAN CARTON DE WIART, V.C., K.B.E.,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

THE RT. HON. LORD HAILEY, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.

GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Chairman of Council :

ADMIRAL SIR CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B.

Vice-Chairman :

C. A. P. SOUTHWELL, ESQ., C.B.E., M.C.

Vice-Presidents :

BRIGADIER S. H. LONGRIGG, O.B.E.,
D.LITT.

LT.-GENERAL H. G. MARTIN, C.B.,
D.S.O., O.B.E.

DR. E. J. LINDGREN, M.A.

V. PURCELL, ESQ., C.M.G., LITT.D.

DR. L. LOCKHART, PH.D.

SIR HUGH DOW, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

SIR CLARMONT SKRINE, O.B.E.

G. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

Hon. Treasurer :

MAJOR EDWARD AINGER.

Hon. Secretaries :

W. H. INGRAMS, ESQ., C.M.G., O.B.E., Near and Middle East.

COLONEL H. W. TOBIN, D.S.O., O.B.E., Central Asia.

GROUP-CAPT. H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD, O.B.E., Far East.

Hon. Librarian :

COLONEL F. M. BAILEY, C.I.E.

Secretary Emerita: Miss M. N. KENNEDY.

Members of Council :

THE RIGHT HON. LORD BIRDWOOD,
M.V.O.

V. L. WALTER, ESQ., C.B.E.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR LESLIE
HOLLINGHURST, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C.

LT.-COLONEL E. H. GASTRELL, O.B.E.

F. B. SADLER, ESQ.

SIR JOHN TROUTBECK, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.

LT.-COLONEL A. C. GALLOWAY, C.I.E.,
O.B.E.

Local Honorary Secretaries :

Bahrein: SIR CHARLES DALRYMPLE
BELGRAVE, K.B.E.

E. Canada: R. S. HOOTON, ESQ.

Hong Kong: PROFESSOR F. S. DRAKE.

India: W. H. T. HARRIS, ESQ.

Kuweit: D. C. FITZPATRICK, ESQ.

Lebanon: MRS. K. JOLY.

W. Pakistan: W. A. BROWN, ESQ.,
M.B.E.

Syria: SIR EDWIN CHAPMAN ANDREWS,
K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

Secretary :

MRS. K. G. PUTNAM, M.B.E.

NOTICES

Indexes, Royal Central Asian Society Journals, 1903-1950.

A bound copy of the above is now available in the library for the use of members.

Members and subscribers normally residing overseas are particularly requested to let the office know when they expect to be in England, so that they may be sent current lecture notices.

The Hon. Secretaries wish to acknowledge with thanks the following additions to the library :

Historical Abstracts Bulletin. Vol. I, No. 2, June; No. 3, September, 1955.

A Selected Bibliography—Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917, by Richard A. Pierce. Published by the Institute of Slavic Studies. University of California, August, 1953.

Middle East Resources, Problems and Prospects. Addresses presented at the Eighth Annual Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, sponsored by the Middle East Institute. Published and presented by the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.

The B.B.C. Handbook for 1956, being a complete guide to the organization and work of the Corporation.

Pamphlet by Professor Dr. G. H. van der Kolff on the Relations between Western Agricultural Enterprise and Native Husbandry, being the text of an address given on the occasion of the International Days for African Studies, International Fair of Ghent, September, 1954.

Guide Historique de Chiraz, in Persian, dated September, 1948. Presented by Oliver Haward.

Government of Bahrain. Annual Report for year 1954.

Central Asian Review. Vol. III, No. 3. 1955.

Mr. Douglas Carruthers has very kindly presented the following :

The Desert Route to India. No. LXIII. 1928. Issued by the Hakluyt Society.

Northern Najd, by Carlo Guarmani. Translated from the Italian by Lady Capel-Cure.

Unknown Mongolia, by Douglas Carruthers. Published 1913. Vols. I and II.

Messrs. Robert Hale wish us to point out that *Moslems on the March*, by F. W. Fernau, reviewed in the R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, Vol. XLII, Part I, 1955, has now been published by them in London, price 16s.

The Rev. C. Perowne has presented a number of slides, pictures taken at the beginning of this century in Russia by his father, the late Colonel J. T. Woolrych Perowne.

IN MEMORIAM

LORD ALTRINCHAM

LORD ALTRINCHAM, a member of the Society since 1945, devoted a lifetime of service to the Commonwealth in many distinguished and varied rôles. Like so many brilliant men whose deaths we have mourned lately, he started his career under Lord Milner in South Africa. A period of journalism was interrupted by the 1914 War. He had a courageous and distinguished war record, becoming, as an amateur soldier, G.S.O.1 of that most professional of bodies, the Guards Division. His next important rôle was as Chief of Staff to the Prince of Wales in his great tours of the Empire, to the success of which he contributed services both imaginative and discreet. Then followed the Governorship of Kenya, a period as a Member of Parliament, and finally Minister of State in the Middle East at the end of the war.

Such is the record. What manner of man was Ned Grigg? He was, above all, a great enthusiast, with considerable ability, unflagging industry and wide imagination. He was a scholar, widely read, and the possessor of a ready pen. He was no tepid and cautious man of moderate views. He was explosive, self-confident, and not a ready listener. But he was altogether likeable. He had gaiety, vitality, and a great laugh. He did not fit into any set pattern of politician or civil servant or intellectual; and perhaps his special and distinctive personality was a handicap to his attaining the very highest office. But he was a notable servant of the British Commonwealth who, in many different places at vital moments, performed most honourable and loyal service.

A.

SIR RONALD STORRS, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.

SIR RONALD STORRS was one of the great English proconsuls of our time in the Middle East, described by Lawrence as "the most brilliant of them all." By his diplomatic skill, his genial persuasiveness and his mastery of the apt word, he was one of the architects of the Arab revolt in the first world war. For 25 years he was in office in the Middle East, but he belonged to it for 50 years. He had a great love for it, above all for Jerusalem, the Holy City. "There is no promotion," he wrote, "after Jerusalem." It was as Military Governor and then as District Commissioner for the Jerusalem region, 1917-1926, that he most truly fulfilled himself. The governorships of Cyprus and Northern Rhodesia, which followed, were steps in an official career which he did not welcome. Essentially the artist, he loved to collect beautiful things and to make every place where he bore rule more beautiful. In addition, he had a deep sense of history and a lifelong interest in antiquity. He was an ardent member of the Royal Central Asian Society and the Palestine Exploration Fund and a patron of the British School of Archæology in Jerusalem.

The will to please was strong in him; and in Palestine and Cyprus he cast himself in the part of mediator between rival nationalists. But circumstances were too hard for him in those countries. He was an artist in words, as he proved in his brilliant book *Orientalisms*, which is the story of his life until the end of his governorship of Cyprus. The book contains masterpieces of gentle irony. If he was critical of a person or a policy, his sharp weapon was the apt quotation from his opponent; and he would use the double adjective with telling effect. He was steadfast in friendship to Lawrence, to Samuel, to Amery, and to a hundred less famous colleagues. A word, too, must be said of his scholarship and his love for the classics, of which the greatest for him were the Bible, Homer, Horace and Dante. And he was an enthusiastic member of the Horatian Society. With him something gay has gone out of the life of all who knew him.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

GENERAL SIR MOSLEY MAYNE, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

GENERAL SIR MOSLEY MAYNE died in London on December 18, at the age of 66.

“Mo” was commissioned in 1908, and went out to India. In 1910 he transferred to the 13th Duke of Connaught’s Lancers of the Bengal Cavalry. He was soon to prove himself an all-rounder—leader, Staff Officer, cavalryman, polo player. Mother India was a big place; but she knew how to rear in every generation a chosen few whom everyone throughout her length and breadth knew and loved. His charm and worth ensured that Mo was pre-eminently one of these few.

It was not long before he saw service with the 13th B.L. : he and they were in action on the day when the 21st Lancers charged once more at Shabkaddar as they had charged at Omdurman—here to get involved in difficult country and to have their C.O. and others knifed by tribesmen hidden in high crops.

Later, Mo served as Adjutant of his Regiment in the 7th Cavalry Brigade in Mesopotamia, and afterwards on the Staff. He was twice wounded. On one occasion his aircraft was hit while on reconnaissance and crashed on landing. A strut was thrust into his back, an injury from which Mo afterwards suffered greatly.

Between the wars his was the usual progress of the officer earmarked for higher things. At the beginning of the second World War he raised and trained the 9th Infantry Brigade. After commanding his brigade at the Battle of Keren in April 1941, he went on to command the 5th Indian Division at Amba Alagi, the final battle of the East African Campaign, and afterwards for a year in the Western Desert.

On promotion to Lieutenant-General he raised and commanded the Indian Corps in the Middle East with the task of planning in co-operation with the Russians the defence of North Persia against a German advance from the Caucasus which then threatened. The Russians rewarded him by holding him in close arrest for three days. In October 1953 he became

G.O.C. in C., Eastern Command, India, in which capacity he had the immense task of administering the base and lines of communication of the Allied Forces engaged in Burma. In April 1954, now a full General, he came to London as Military Adviser to the Secretary of State for India. At the end of 1946 he retired, full of honours.

With his wife Phyllis, Mo then went out to Kenya. Phyllis was in bad health, however, so they soon returned and in 1949 Phyllis died. Their only son had been killed in Italy six years earlier. Mo might well have become that most pitiable of all objects, a lonely old man. His immense sense of duty saved him. On January 1, 1950, he became Chairman of S.S.A.F.A. He was to be very much a working Chairman.

During his three years in office he visited 66 county branches at home and the overseas branches in Singapore, Malaya and Hongkong. At the same time he worked a revolution in S.S.A.F.A.'s finances. In 1949, as the result of inflated wartime budgets, S.S.A.F.A.'s annual deficit had grown to nearly £70,000, while the credit balance in its National Fund had fallen to £34,000 odd. In three years the deficit had been reduced to less than £3,000 a year, while the National Fund had risen to £100,000.

It was at this stage, however, that Mo had most regretfully to resign his Chairmanship of S.S.A.F.A. He found himself suffering increasingly from blackouts—the legacy of a fall at polo 25 years before.

His activities were still endless, however. "It is astonishing," I once heard him remark, "how many jobs one is offered when people realize that one doesn't expect to be paid." In winter 1944-45 he went out East again to visit both the Regiments of which he was Colonel—Mahrattas in India, Cavalry in Pakistan. He stayed some months and met a host of old friends.

Mo had one last problem near to his heart. It was concerned with the service held annually on the day after the "Cup Final" at the Cavalry War Memorial in Hyde Park. Within the Memorial are inscribed the titles of all the Indian Cavalry Regiments of the first World War. Yet there has never been an organized—as opposed to individual—attendance of officers of the late Indian Cavalry at this Ceremony. At the time of his death Mo was in correspondence with the organizers of the Ceremony to get this altered. He himself could ask for no better monument than that this change should be made in memory of him.

The Royal Central Asian Society thereby lost one of its most distinguished members.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL H. G. MARTIN.

FROM TARSUS TO LAKE VAN

By FREYA STARK, C.B.E.

An illustrated lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 9, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: The particularly large attendance here this afternoon indicates, it is quite obvious, that I have no need to introduce our speaker and that we are all looking forward to hear what she has to say. Of the many distinctions that Freya Stark has achieved, I would mention only that she was awarded the C.B.E. for her work during war-time, and that in 1951 she was the recipient of the Sykes Award, and we are very glad that she is numbered among the winners of that particular Award of our own Society.

I FEEL, when I stand up here, that I am offering you something that corresponds to the Widow's Mite—a poor little thing in itself, but a great effort for me! For lectures are more frightening than most things, and it is many years since I have stood on this platform. But there are two societies—the R.G.S. and this one of ours—to which I would like to show my gratitude whenever I can: they adopt and help us travellers when we begin to think in terms of journeys; they are, if I may say so, almost more like one's family than like a learned body merely; one goes away and comes back, and finds them always there, always helpful, understanding and kind; and I am glad to be able to come here today and to say this.

The journey today was made from Tarsus to Iraq by way of Lake Van—a roundabout way, which could be done now by air within a week, with quite comfortable hotels dotted about here and there if one knows where to find them. It could also be done on horseback—as it was done, about a century ago, by Mr. Ainsworth and by Von Moltke, the commander, later, in the Franco-Prussian war. He came to know this district intimately when attached to the Turkish army as a young man, from 1835 to 1839. His book is still the best I know on all the region round Malatya, and he is, I believe, the only European to have negotiated the Euphrates gorges on a raft in flood-time. I cannot help thinking that a great deal of German prestige in Turkey derives from him, and from the extremely tough group of young Prussian officers who were with him; and I should put the book into the hands of any young man seconded to the East as a model of how to make oneself popular and indispensable.

Mr. Hill and I undertook this journey with no idea of such adventures. It was a touristy trip in a hired Land-Rover, and its interest—apart from the beauty of the country and its history—lay chiefly in the geography of the two great rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, that come to within a few miles of each other here where the middle stream of the one almost touches the sources of the other. They then separate, to meet at last in the far waters of the Shatt al-Arab to enter the Persian Gulf together.

However simple, this journey requires a lot of negotiation to get the

necessary Turkish permits for the frontier districts—and these were obtained with great kindness and perseverance by our Ambassador and his staff in Ankara, to whom I am very grateful indeed. The district of Lake Van was made more difficult than usual at this time by two British travellers who had been there just before (without any Embassy encouragement), had forgotten their bathing suits when they bathed in the lake, and otherwise outraged local feeling, and had finally insulted the Governor and been expelled: all these things make travel harder for those who come later!

Any Asiatic traveller in this audience will recognize the photograph of a road that climbs towards the plateau: there always seems to be one, leading beyond the mountain rim of the horizon—zigzagging, trodden only by the feet of mules or camels, or built, as it is now, for cars. It still swings its fine, adventurous corners over the hills, whose shoulders grow wider and higher as one reaches the flat expanses, which thin ridges of watersheds divide. This particular road is climbing up the Mediterranean side of Turkey. The lands that drain to Iraq and the Gulf are beyond it, across the horizon, among gentler slopes that sink down to the deserts of Syria.

I had already been travelling for three months in Turkey, and this was a sort of detour on the way home. Mr. Hill and I met at Mersin early in June, and set off, east of Tarsus, across the Cydnus river, now the Tarsus Chay, that might still carry Cleopatra's barge here in flood-time, though it has lost the clear water for which it was renowned. It no longer flows near the city and there are no ancient landmarks in the fertile plain around it—recently drained and rich now with cotton and corn. But a little way beyond it one reaches the historic highroad between East and West—the road of all the armies, from the Cilician to the Syrian gates. One comes on ancient sites like Misis—clinging, with splendid bridge, to the river crossing—and to many castles that have dominated the important highway.

What building is left to show is chiefly Armenian in most of these castles. The kingdom of the Lesser Armenia had its capital at Sis—now Kozan—not far away, and these hills were held in a turbulent way throughout the Crusades, until A.D. 1375, by Armenian kings. They looked down from their strongholds on the ruins of a more peaceful age in the plains or valleys below. At Anavarza, under the great cliff fortress, the Roman city is laid out in a square, with its streets at right angles and a gate in its southern wall still standing. The Turkish villagers who have inherited all this history are tough and friendly people who gave us our lodging for the night.

From here we crossed the Jihan river, the ancient Pyramus. It has broadened out from its narrow gorges and is served, at Selamiye, by a ferry running on a steel cable—a more modern piece of machinery than some of the Tigris or Euphrates ferries, but not as modern as the tractors which are towed across. These oil tractors are the most typical sight in the Turkish landscape of today.

The reason why we used the old ferry instead of the fine new bridge farther down was that I wished to visit Castabale, where Alexander is said

to have met Parmenion shortly before the battle of Issus. There is a good deal of uncertainty as to the exact line of his march just here, owing to the fact that the river estuary has changed its bed and the town of Mallus—where he crossed—has disappeared. The fertile lands of Adana and Tarsus were then waste marshes, where, as late as 1818, Captain Beaufort records that he put up some “hunting tigers.” Alexander would naturally use his cavalry to secure the higher ground and the valleys that come down here like the spokes of a fan: from Castabale—now a hamlet called Budrum—one looks across the Jihan down a wide-open passage between the hills towards the Syrian gates; and it is here that Parmenion is said to have “met the king, having been sent ahead to reconnoitre the road through the mountain pass . . . to Issus.”

Budrum is much older than its castle, and one can still see pieces of the more ancient walls. One can still walk through the cornfields down the colonnaded street of the Roman city which Pompey visited, and look out across the river towards the lands of Issus which Alexander must have scanned with a careful eye as he rode along. At any rate, Parmenion must have done so, even if Quintus Curtius is wrong about Alexander.

It was only because I happened to know that the name of Castabale had turned to Budrum that we were able to find it, for the nearest little town, which is Osmaniye, seemed unaware of its existence. One soon discovers that a great deal of time must be allowed for detective work on the spot, even when the actual district of a site has been arrived at. There are castles all over these hills, and one is as good as another to the present inhabitants.

We now drove from Osmaniye on a good and recognized highway, and could indeed have gone by train. Our next halt was Marash, a step up towards the plateau from the hot Cilician plain. All this is very ancient ground, and the lions over the citadel of Marash—removed to Istanbul—have the inscription of a dynasty that goes back about a thousand years B.C. in a language akin to Luvian, which itself has given us examples from the second millennium, and a very famous one—the Phaestōs disc—inscribed with movable types, presumably the earliest forerunner of printing known to be in existence. All the gently undulating country around Marash is dotted with tumuli, in which sherds of obsidian and earthenware are found.

The closer historical interest of this region belongs to the border wars between Muslim and Byzantine. The city itself was rebuilt in the seventh century A.D. by the Caliph Mu'awiyah, and given double walls and a ditch by Harun ar-Rashid. Godefroy de Bouillon took it during the first Crusade and handed it to the kings of Armenia. It was also the birthplace of Nestorius.

It has survived all this history as a charming and prosperous Turkish county town, with good new buildings on the more level ground, and many older streets uphill and down, overgrown with vines or shaded by the overhanging bay windows that make one think of England in an incongruous way. Brightly coloured wooden toys and tools are made here and hang against dark booths in the old bazaars.

The road goes on, and so does the railway, climbing yet another terrace

towards the plateau of Anatolia. The air gets thinner, and snow appeared—in early June—on the mountains that hemmed the Jihan gorges on our left. For the first time in Turkey I saw people loading hay—the sign of a mountain country where cattle must be kept indoors in winter. The flowers were beautiful: long stretches of anchusa, light blue and dark, and slopes of mullein; and clumps of trees sparsely scattered—walnut and oak and willow.

Over a very small and imperceptible rise, we crossed into the Gök Su valley and noticed its waters running towards the east; we were over one of the great watersheds of Asia, and everything now sloped to the Euphrates.

The landscape suddenly grew very wild and desolate. The villages were perched high up, in safety and in the sun, above eroded ravines whose colour depended not on vegetation but on rock: all sorts of tilted strata were tossed about here in confusion, cut through like layers of cake by the melting snow-streams, and overlaid here and there by shapeless grey slopes of clay. The little clumps of walnut or poplar, clinging to some protected corner, looked unnaturally brilliant. The poplar is grown everywhere in these uplands, in watered patches, with the tree stems packed close together to make them straight enough to be laid side by side and bedded down with earth to roof the little one-roomed cottages. As we came to the higher lands we found the huts as Xenophon describes them, half buried in earth against the winter snow.

Malatya is a new and prosperous town, with airfield and railway, and factories where they weave very pretty cottons—its well-being enhanced by its having been the birthplace of Mr. İnönü, the ex-president. It was only founded a century ago, in 1840, when both Ainsworth and von Moltke describe it as the headquarters of the Turkish army of the south; and if it looks old-fashioned in my picture, it is only because the photographer likes to choose things as different as he can from what may be seen at home. This is a point of view always very difficult to explain to anyone in the East, where they hope to see one travelling thousands of miles to photograph factories exactly like those one can find without any trouble in Europe. This is why I take more pictures of women than of men, for they still wear their graceful cotton veils and look different from our peasants, and more feminine, as they work in their fields or bring their bright tinned pans of yaourt to market.

But the old Malatya, the ancient Melitene, was founded by Vespasian on or near a site called Melidea (in an inscription of the eighth century B.C.). It became the headquarters of the Fulminata legion and was always an important strategic point on the eastern road; and it still exists, leading a placid village life in crumbling walls among Seljuk mosques and minarets and tombs.

Beyond it, a few miles away, Euphrates comes curving down with its chief tributary, the Tokhma Su, out of the west. When one sees it, one forgets that other rivers exist. It spreads here among wide and fertile cornlands, and then makes eastward to join its eastern arm, the Murad Su. The two great streams together flow through their narrow opening to the south in what one might think an impossible direction, so solid is the

mountain wall they pierce. The banks, covered with cultivation or easy slopes of yellow mullein flowers, disappear into liver-coloured steep gorges that darken the waters to their own gloomy shade. The new iron bridge crosses here, where a ruined khan shows that the old road ran before it. There is a cuneiform inscription somewhere about seen by von Moltke, and the rapids where he twice risked his life cover some miles of river below, till the stream breaks through the defiles into the sloping cornlands of Syria.

We left all this and continued along the highroad that leads to the plain of Mush, with the Murad Su, the Eastern Euphrates, on our left. A fine railway bridge casts its shadow, like a pattern of history, upon it. And we came out again into wide, easy and fertile country, where El Aziz, with an aerodrome and new streets, is becoming important, while the old city of Harput still makes a home among its ruins for officials who like to live a quiet life up in the cooler air.

On this side of the Euphrates we are back in the atmosphere of the Crusades. The Christian armies used to come raiding, up from the Syrian marches; the fortress of Harput, in A.D. 1122-23, was the prison of Jocelyn of Courtenay and of Baldwin II, king of Jerusalem. It looks out over a rough, uncomfortable landscape of stony, waterless ravines with mountain-cradled plains beyond them, nearly 5,000 feet above sea-level—far, one would think, from any help for a Frankish crusader. But Baldwin escaped, and swam the Euphrates by night on inflated goatskins, and reached his kingdom; and Jocelyn with his company, including 80 ladies—shut up in a safer castle at Palu—found Armenians there ready to help him and seize the fortress. They held it for a time until the Lord of Mosul recaptured it and killed Jocelyn and his knights and threw the 80 ladies from the cliff. The place is on the Murad Su, on the south-western edge of the plain of Mush, and the railway reaches it, almost as surprisingly as the Crusaders. We found it by dint of some enquiry at El Aziz, and climbed over the castle rock, where little is left of the Crusaders or their enemies, but the cuneiform inscriptions of an earlier age remain.

From the rock one can watch the Euphrates feeling its way for many miles in a straight line both east and west along the Taurus rampart. This is one of the most exciting river stretches in the world from a geographical point of view: the steep, unbroken wall holds in the stream until it meets the western Euphrates arm; they then turn both together through their defile; and on the south of the watershed, where this bend occurs, separated only by a narrow ridge, the Tigris is born. Any break in the wall would have let the two rivers meet, and the history of modern Iraq and ancient Babylonia would not have been; for that low land is only preserved by the fact that the floods of the two rivers are not simultaneous. The snows of the far Euphrates' sources melt a few weeks later than those of the Tigris. I looked with awe in the sunset at this accident of geography, following the rivers in my mind through the miles of their courses and the ages of their history to the meeting at last, near the Persian Gulf, by the tree where tradition places their Garden of Eden.

The next day, having slept in our tents by a wayside *chaykhana*, we left the Euphrates and climbed by a good road across the barrier to the

Göljuk lake out of whose waters the Tigris is born. These high lakes, both Göljuk and Van, have a pale, thin colour, a sort of electric blue that looks as if some mineral had made it rather than any reflection of the sky. Van is, in fact, full of alkaline salts, and was considered particularly good water for fullers and dyers, both by Strabo and in the Middle Ages.

The Tigris oozes out from the low eastern rim of Göljuk, not directly, but seeping through the hillside into a shallow valley, which soon narrows and dips steeply down like a funnel with the railway and the road running above the river far below. There are few villages and very rare fields, but suddenly, at a bend, the smoke of a factory chimney appears—the copper smelting of Maden, mentioned by von Moltke a century ago. A rather grim little mining town clusters about it, and the waste metal pours away over a cliff in sullen red-hot streams.

The valley goes on, opening out and gentler, and the road leaves it to loop down through wide nomad lands that dip with many ridges to Diyarbekr and the great Assyrian plain.

The people change here. We had travelled hitherto among Turks whose westernized clothes have become regrettably like our own; only sherbet-sellers, with their polished trays and flagons crowned with bells, looked a little different. But now we were coming into the Kurdish districts, where flowered, padded shirts and loose white trousers are still worn and the turban has not quite given way to the cap.

Diyarbekr stands in the plain on a bend of the Tigris—the ancient Amida and still important. Its position keeps it so, with the cornlands of Assyria stretching away before it towards the dusty Mesopotamian plains, and the highlands of Asia at its back. A continuous stream of history has left a deposit of all the ages in its walls—old khans for the Baghdad caravans, and columns of every sort, with Corinthian capitals on Byzantine shafts, added to and put together by later Islamic dynasties. The huge black walls tell the same history—the typical Saracen work on Byzantine and earlier foundations. In the eleventh century the city wall was 60 feet high and 30 feet broad, with a tower every 100 yards and an outer wall 30 feet high with a space of 15 yards for suburbs in between; and now one can still walk for miles along the ramparts and recapture the picture of confusion and darkness when, somewhere on the bend where the Tigris sweeps down, the Persians climbed up to a neglected postern by night, and the city was taken in the middle of the fourth century A.D., as Ammianus Marcellinus describes it. Other sieges and massacres, none so vividly recorded, swept over the frontier city and left it triumphantly Muslim down to the present age, when airfield, factories and railway, and a luxury hotel, have broken down a part of the walls and spilt over the flat country around.

Here Ali, our driver, with his Land-Rover left us. We had enticed him with much diplomacy so far from his home, and he now handed us on to a far less reliable colleague while he returned to Mersin by the shorter route of the plain.

We turned east across Tigris, over the beautiful rolling cornlands and grassy, eroded valleys, among old mounds of Assyria covered with white hollyhocks in flower, towards the Kurdish hills. All this country is the

borderland of the Parthian and the Persian wars with Rome. The town of Silvan has been suggested—wrongly, it appears—as the site of Tigranocerta, and the stones in which the Muslim inscriptions are embedded come from older walls. But the stamp of all this country is that of the great Seljuk age, when Baghdad held the riches and civilization of the eastern marches and a merchant could trade and find agents from Cairo to Afghanistan. Silvan was called Miyafarriqin, famous for a mosque built in A.D. 1227, less than thirty years before the destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols. Its stone arches surround a central dome with the solidity and dignity of the Seljuk architecture; and the details of its carving seemed to me to be very much in the style of the old mosque in Mosul, now fallen to ruin.

Nothing could have been kinder than the way in which we were allowed to go about and take photographs. The Turks everywhere showed us what they could and helped us; and I would like to thank them for their courtesy and honesty, as so many travellers have done before me.

Another fine Seljuk monument stood on our road—the bridge over the Batman Su, a tributary of the Tigris. A whole series of these bridges must have carried the north-bound caravans in the prosperous days of the Abbassid rule. One is left, half embedded in sand and quite dry, a little north of Bagdad; and traces of those across the Tigris itself have been found, though washed away by floods. This one is intact, with its date—corresponding to A.D. 1147. A new bridge is going up close beside it and will spoil its solitary beauty, impressive in the landscape as it now stands. Soon after crossing it, the road forks and the left-hand turn is taken, towards Bitlis and the hills. The tumbled landscape brought down by these streams drops behind one, and the oak-tree slopes of Kurdistan begin.

There used to be a trade in woollens, tobacco, acorns, gum tragacanth, and in the knotty wood of the walnut trees that grow to a great size here. But now Bitlis seems to have declined and is living on agriculture in a small way, until the road which is being widened, and the traffic through to Lake Van which is to become a centre for this eastern region, sets it up again. At present it lives a small but apparently contented life under the wall of its Armenian castle, with its river tumbling through it under many stone bridges, like the landscape of a willow-pattern plate. The Armenian character of the town is shown by the pointed stone roofs, typical in the eastern provinces. We were to see more of them round Van.

We now followed up the river called by some travellers the Bitlis Chay and by others recognized as the eastern arm of the Tigris. I have never been able to discover where the real difference between a main river and a tributary lies when one comes to the little streams that trickle near the source. This eastern arm rises in the swamps of Mush, above Bitlis, and comes into the Tigris below the Batman Su, which is a far more important stream with a better right, as it seems to me, to be counted as a Tigris source. But the naming of rivers is a chancy affair. We are at any rate nearer the mark than the Ancients were, who knew Lake Van as Thospites, Arsene, Artissa or Arethusa, and thought the Tigris rose beyond it and flowed through two lakes—the fish of lake and river not mixing—and

finally, according to Pliny, descended into an underground passage to reappear at a place called *Nymphæum*.

We left this river valley and climbed up to the high land that slopes in a very gentle gradient to Van—a lake blue with the same metallic pallor as *Göljuk* and 93 miles long. Its northern shore rises to grassy slopes of dead volcanoes. *Suphan* was in the north-east, climbed first in 1838; and *Nimrud Dagh*, a broken cone filled with water, was at the north-western end. The landscape, with very few trees, rolls away from them across the steppes towards *Ararat* and the *Murad Su* out of sight.

On the southern shore the Kurdish mountains shut the lake in as with a high, unbroken wall from the lowlands of Iraq. A wild, steep, nomad country of narrow passes, deep gorges and rare villages lies between. There is a feeling of strange remoteness about this sheet of water. *Xenophon* does not mention Van, though he must have marched close by—a day or two's march away—across the plain of *Mush*. The remoteness seemed even more noticeable because of the cheerful life that went on around the lake shores—the steamer touching at village jetties, the slips for boats and the hotel at *Tatvan*; it was as if one had landed on the moon and found it busy with its own affairs. The hotel, run by the shipping company for tourists, was clean and comfortable, and next day we found a little steamer setting off and spent the better part of the day coasting along the southern shore.

The island of *Ahtamar*, which my companion was anxious to see because of an early Armenian cathedral, was there in sight. Even the cathedral was visible, and the mainland very near; but neither then nor later were we able to hear of any conveyance to take us. The Governor of Van, most courteous and obliging in spite of his poor experience with the two British travellers before us, was yet adamant about this island. “The English who come here,” he said, “are interested only in Armenians.” I told him that this exclusiveness had gone out with Mr. Gladstone, but it was no use; the island remained out of reach, and we had to content ourselves with the monuments of *Urartu*, a more ancient people, who left their tunnellings and inscriptions about the regions of Van during the first millennium B.C.

They built their moles and palaces against the rock that lifts itself like a long ship out of the lakeside meadows, and has the ancient *Urartian* stones on one side and the medieval city on the other, with minarets like half-ruined factory chimneys and Ottoman mosques, all deserted. In the first world war the Russians descended on Van and occupied it for some years, and, when they left, the Armenians had to pay for the temporary friendship; and the city, which was chiefly inhabited by them, became deserted. A new Van is still growing and building in clumps of trees some miles away. The church of *Ahtamar*, which was at one time the rival of *Etchmiadzin*, chief of all the Armenian churches, had been a political centre (so the Governor told me), and the aura of suspicion still hangs about the now innocent ruins and destroys the itinerary of the innocuous tourist. Luckily no such taboo exists for the rock of Van, which is full of interest—a sort of island of history. It has an inscription of *Xerxes* carved high out of reach, first copied by *Schultz* in 1827, who was murdered by

Kurds; and a late fortress spreads its long, rough walls, partly mud built, over the rocky backbone. These late fortresses are depressingly shoddy, though romantic from a distance.

On the south-western face of the rock, half-way down the precipice and reached by steps cut in the sheer face, are the rooms of the ancient kings, hollowed out of the stone, with their doorway and narrow, dizzy ledge covered by the cuneiform script. I am ignorant of the language but have been told that this, too, is Urartian. From this safe but, from a supply point of view, rather difficult retreat the king looked out over the swamp to Van. The lake at that time probably reached the rock where the mole still shows; and perhaps the rock-cut rooms were built so high to be out of the way of the midges. They last for two months in summer, the people said, and though they did not bite, they defeated us by their numbers. In our little hotel by the lakeside we were obliged to put out the lamp and shut all doors and windows; one felt them milling round in soft, woolly waves if one put out an arm in the darkness, and found them stacked dead in heaps nearly a foot high against the door in the morning. The emperor Trajan was forced to give up the siege of Hatra because of "flies," which I now feel certain must have resembled the midges of Van.

Layard, when he was excavating at Nineveh, came up into this country through the mountains, and describes Suphan Dagh, the mountain of Van, and the Kurdish horsemen with their long spears and flowing garments, memories which "bring back in after years indescribable feelings of pleasure and repose." The life has not changed so very much, though the spears and the flowing garments have gone, and motor transport has brought a greater security. The men in my taxi, I noticed when driving back to Diyarbekr, are still searched for firearms before they reach the town; and the ox-cart still rolls through the ruts on its solid wheels, carrying jars of water of a primeval pattern.

Though the men have bowed to modernity, the women look uncompromising enough! They are very different from the Turkish village women who bake their flat loaves of unleavened bread in the plains of Tarsus; or even from the softer type—Arab-Mediterranean—that one finds about the villages of Diyarbekr. There is a sort of Elizabethan magnificence about the Kurdish ladies, with everything bright they can think of plastered upon them, and their flat headdresses set with as many gold coins as their husbands can afford.

A group of them were standing in the Governor's anterooms when we called on him in Van, and, as it seemed my only opportunity, I did something I have never done before and asked if his A.D.C. could order them to let me take a picture. The husbands were approached, and the wives submitted—not too unwillingly. I hope the prints I sent may have reached and pleased them.

Villages grow scarce and farther apart as one leaves the slopes of Van. We drove across nomad-land, high rounded downs of summer pasture, towards the Persian border in the south, and reached Hoshab, the last village. The road winds on beside its river to the frontier hills of the horizon. And the castle is now a ruin, though it was still garrisoned in the last century. It has a gate with barbaric heavy carving, and a keep that

looks fine at a distance, and probably there are very ancient stones in its foundations, for this was the frontier of the highland dynasties from very early times. The bridge over the Hoshab—the Fair Water—is the best bit of building there, though late, done solidly by the Ottomans in black and white stone.

The most interesting monuments left today on the shores of Van belong to a medieval dynasty that flourished in the fifteenth century with its chief city at Akhlat on the northern shore. An English mercenary captain, Russel Baliol, had been sent in the eleventh century to besiege it; and it was old already when the Saracens took it in the ninth century from the Byzantines. In the thirteenth century it was held by princes of the house of Saladin and stood three sieges; was lost, but returned to them as the dowry of a Georgian princess; and it then flourished, so that its ruins can still be seen, cut into the rocky sides of a ravine and scattered on the lake shore. The Emir Bayindir's tomb there is dated 1471 (by our calendar). Old tombstones in a cemetery, and other of these circular tombs, are scattered over the slopes. They are not very beautiful, except for the delicate stone carving of the conical roofs; but they are characteristic, and the shape with varied detail runs through the eastern Turkish districts, south as far as Nigde in the Taurus—presumably taken on by the Seljuks from Armenia.

There is, in any case, a provincial feeling about the ruins of Akhlat with their careful but unimaginative carving, like a dress from which the Paris touch is absent.


A new centre is now growing east of the ravine, and of the castle and its mosque that lie walled in ruin, mixed up with a small village on the lake shore. The new Akhlat has hopes for the future. A university for these regions was planned, either at Akhlat or Van, and the waters stored in the crater of Nimrud Dagh were to be used for industry, so the mayor of the little place told us, a young Turk full of energy and charm. While he spoke, one felt again the remoteness of Van—as if all these everyday thoughts and plans were being elaborated in a different planet from ours. I think the height, the pale, unusual colour of the water, the wide, treeless space and the dead volcanoes created this atmosphere, for it is quite a get-at-able place, with air service and buses and a railway station not too many hours away. But it has a feeling of great age about it. As we drove back to Tatvan on the western shore I saw a lump of shining black rock by the roadside, which looked like obsidian; and I have since read that the district of Van was visited for this product long before the age of metal.

I had planned to ride down the Tigris into Iraq, but we were now short both of time and money. We pooled our resources to let Mr. Hill continue his quest for Armenian churches, as his need was greater than mine, and I took a passage back in a car by the Bitlis valley through Diyarbekr to the south. I was glad to get an idea of this country of the Persian and Parthian wars with Rome, which I did not know.


Mardin is as beautifully built a city in white stone as Diyarbekr is in black, the stone being soft to cut and hardening afterwards. The tradition has gone on unbroken, so that sometimes only the weathering helps to distinguish the old carving from the new. It is a busy, cheerful town, with



VAN. KURDISH WOMAN




DIYARBEKIR ULU CAMI COURT: DETAIL




DIYARBEKIR S.W. WALL




ABASSID BRIDGE E. OF SILVAN ON BATMAN SU: 1147 A.D.




HOSHAB CASTLE, AND BRIDGE



BITLIS CASTLE



MARDIN GATE OF SELJUK MADRASEH



LAKE VAN: AHLAT; TOMB

a high, flat citadel behind it; and the plain slopes away from it to the pink, dusty haze of Assyria and the desert beyond out of sight. In the hotel was a coat of mail just found on the citadel in the ground; it was finely hammered out with three rings held in each loop together to make it stronger, but a great triangular tear showed where the enemy spear or mace came through.

There are some American missionaries in Mardin, but they were away. The only Christian I saw was the Chaldæan pastor, living with his family in the middle of the town beside his church, behind a good stout door that could be closed in time of trouble. All was very peaceful, however, though the Chaldæans of Mardin have diminished. They have a strong tradition, for the Jacobite rite originated here, and their church is very old, though the present building is too much restored to show it. A stone with the date upon it was stolen, the pastor told me, by the Germans when they were hospitably lodged there during the first world war. The finest monument of the city is the Kasimiriye madresseh of the late fourteenth century, with its mosque and court and hospital and splendid doorway. It has the fluted domes characteristic of its period, and one finds them also in other buildings about here, such as the tomb now used as a petrol station at the edge of the town.

I was rather carefully looked after by the Mardin police, who found me wandering about happily with a camera. They explained that I must be accompanied to be saved from harm, and we visited the madrasseh together. I was pleased by this time to have accumulated enough Turkish to explain so much Seljuk history to my policeman that he was delighted to get rid of me at the end. He politely allowed me to photograph the stucco carving of the hall where the police station garages its cars—an interesting bit of Byzantine-Arab transition.

This whole area, of the Turkish-Syrian-Mesopotamian border, must be of the greatest importance to anyone who is interested in this transition of architecture, and the neighbourhood of Mardin, which was visited and described by Gertrude Bell, is not yet thoroughly well known.

In it, some 6 kilometres east of the Nusabın road, in the hills, is Deir Zafirán, a good model of Justinian Byzantine, still kept in repair and used by the Chaldæans, who keep alive a school. An older church, Mar Ja'kub, is visible here against the skyline cliffs above. I was too short of money to spend another night upon the way and get up to it, and had by this time decided to return to this country so that I did not mind so much. The lower monastery was good enough.

Its outer moulding is curved into arches typical of the Byzantine in north Syria. What interested me particularly was the external band of rich carving which runs all round the top of the square church. This fashion for external decoration must have begun, one would imagine, in a country where the winters are short and the weathering not too bad. There is nothing even as slight as a Greek pediment to protect it. The church has a flat roof, like a cube; but its interior is domed and cruciform, with rich Byzantine moulding running round it, carved with all sorts of fancies and the extraneous basket ornaments they loved.

I was sorry to leave it so soon. In fact, I was sorry now to leave every

place I came to except Nusaibin, where the inn was so squalid that no amount of history could make up for it. There *is* history enough in the ancient frontier city of Rome that begged to be allowed to defend itself with its own resources when they handed it over to Persia. Nothing is left of all its power except five marble columns where the storks build their nests, and the church where St. Jacob lies in his crypt below. An old woman came to open it, the only Christian left, they told me, in Nusaibin. The building here, too, is a cube outside, with an internal dome. It has a double nave—the second added later to the first one—and arches of the Mesopotamian type that begin to show a pointed apex. A Byzantine moulding ran round in darkness too great for my camera to deal with. The outside moulding was as rich though not so deep. Bits of old stone capitals or slices of columns are scattered here and there at doorposts or under windows in the mean streets of Nusaibin. It was a relief to photograph the Bekchi in his garden, where his plants were all well cared for and still alive—the only place in Nusaibin that did not remind one of decay.

It was cheerful again to drive across easy sloping wheatlands to Dara. Here the ruins are scattered, with only a hamlet at one end of them to interfere with what they have to say. The walls were badly built and in great haste, after Amida had fallen. They were intended to hold the Byzantine border against the south, and the clerics and all the people helped in their building. When Justinian devoted himself to the fortification of the empire, he reinforced them, and made Dara one of the vital frontier fortresses, though one would think it poorly placed strategically, with the higher land all round it at the back. It did, however, withstand a Persian siege.

Not much of the masonry is left entire, except the tombs of the necropolis cut solid in rock, and Justinian's great reservoirs for water. All round the old frontier fortress the stony lands slope to the south, rich with corn. I took the train at Nusaibin and saw the corn sacks of a record year stacked at the Syrian stations as I passed: they were sometimes heaped up as far as the sight could carry. Here were the riches of Assyria, and Parthia, and Baghdad.

Already there was a desert touch in the lands of Nusaibin and Dara. The women were walking in the sunset from their flat-roofed villages to the wells—square stop-holes in the ground, closed and padlocked with a metal trap-door. They wore rich clothes—maroon or magenta silk trousers and purple velvet sleeves, and the Kurdish or Mosul striped silk for their turbans. Already Arabic was understood and spoken, as it generally is south of Diyarbekr. It was pleasant to come back to the beautiful desert speech.

“May Allah make it pleasant to you. May He give you health and rest. May Allah keep you in all your journeys. May you reach their end in safety and peace,” they said as they handed the pitcher to drink from.

This journey was at an end. The Taurus express, caught at Nusaibin, grew less and less like an express as it moved farther and farther from the Taurus. The restaurant car was taken from it; the beer came to an end; the ice was melted; the water nearly gone.

Next day I met the Tigris again in Baghdad, a familiar stream—very

different from its mountain waters as they tumble out of the hillsides west of Van.

The CHAIRMAN: I regret that time does not permit our putting the questions which I feel sure many of us would like to put. But I would say that we have spent a wonderful hour listening to the address we have been given by Freya Stark and seeing the delightful slides which illustrated it. On your behalf I thank her very much for all the trouble she has taken in preparing her address and in coming here to talk to us. (Applause.)

IMPORTANT

The Annual General Meeting of the Society will take place on Wednesday, June 13, at the Rooms of the Royal Society, Burlington House, at 4.15 p.m., followed by tea and a lecture.

The Annual Dinner will take place on Wednesday, July 11, at 7.30 at Claridges. Further details will be announced later.

THE MALAYAN SCENE

By W. C. S. CORRY, C.B.E.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 26, 1955, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Corry, who has very kindly come here this afternoon to speak on what he calls the Malayan Scene, has had some 30 years' experience in Malaya in the Civil Service. He has now retired and, amongst other things, he looks after the Malayan students here in London. Last year he was out in Malaya as a member of a Commission of the Federation of Malaya.

I AM more diffident about addressing you on the subject of the Malayan Scene today than I would have been a year ago, because I left it in October 1954, and a very great deal has happened in the Peninsula during the past twelve months. I am sure you would like to have as up-to-date a picture as possible; indeed, the modernity of the picture in this rapidly changing scene is the measure of its value. I am obliged to rely on letters from friends, newspapers and periodicals for the latest facts. Perhaps, however, you may be kind enough to consider that a background knowledge of the country acquired in thirty years' residence there is of some value in interpreting the facts to you, even if some of the latest ones have been acquired at second-hand.

Let us first of all look at the picture from the standpoint of a year ago in the autumn of 1954. When we speak of the Malayan Scene we include Singapore, which was separated politically from the rest of the Peninsula after the war. As you know, the Federation of Malaya is composed of nine Malay principalities and the Settlements of Malacca and Penang—in fact, all the country south of the Siamese frontier with the exception of the Island of Singapore. This entity as at present constituted came into being under the Constitution of 1948.

It is most pertinent to remember that during almost the whole of the period since, the country has been at death-grips with militant Communism, whose objective was the overthrow of that Government and the substitution for it of a Chinese-dominated Communist Republic dependent on Peking.

The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya in 1948 was born out of the reaction of Malay nationalism to the British Government's immediate post-war scheme to set up a Malayan Union in the Peninsula. It was a compromise between the demands of British influence in the East and Malay Nationalist, but conservative, sentiment. It suffered from the inherent weakness that the other domiciled races—and notably the Chinese—had not been consulted in its formulation, and we can appreciate the extent of this weakness when we reflect that slightly more than half the population is non-Malay. But in 1947 the Malay claim to special consideration for the sons of the soil was still historically valid in our eyes, and in any case, conservative though it was (its enemies called it reactionary), this constitution did contain within itself the promise of progress in a

liberal direction, in particular by the introduction at a future date of democratic elections to the State and Federal legislatures.

The war against militant Communism is on its Malayan stage, a part of the world-wide struggle between the Totalitarian and the Free Worlds. In Malaya, fortunately, the issues were clearer-cut than elsewhere—notably in Indo-China. Racial differences between the Malays and the Chinese emphasized by the actions of the three-star Chinese guerillas who came out of the jungle in September 1945, before we resumed control, and the fact that the revolt itself is almost entirely a Chinese affair, meant that in Malaya Communism has not been able to assume the guise of a national liberation movement inspiring a majority of the population against Western Colonialism. The Malays may have had their doubts about us, but they liked the Chinese Communists even less, and that outstanding fact meant that full popular support would not be given to this revolt. With a few notable exceptions in Central Pehang, the Malays were wholeheartedly behind the Government in a war which looked to them to be an attempt to set up an alien Communist régime in the Peninsula. This is a fundamental fact and has indeed made the difference between possible victory and almost certain defeat, such as the French have suffered in Indo-China.

We are not here today to study the history of this struggle, but we must realize that it provides the background to recent Malayan history: we cannot get away from it. It is sufficient to say that a year ago the picture was one of steady progress towards military success on the part of the Security Forces, and of considerable parts of the country freed from terrorism and proclaimed White Areas where many of the most irksome of the Emergency Regulations no longer apply, particularly those restricting the movement of foodstuffs. More White Areas have been proclaimed since, and today over one-third of the population lives in them. Parts of Johore have proved the exception to the general trend, where the situation in central Johore is just as grim as ever it has been. It seems that Communism in these areas has got a grip on the Chinese population which no force yet can shake off. But the military side is barely half the picture, and there were still too many fence-sitters in the country—persons too timid to take sides and viewing the struggle as one between British Colonialism and the new China, of which they are the more or less helpless spectators. The Government has been wooing this segment of the population in its struggle “for the hearts and minds of the people,” but the Communists, too, have their bait and cleverly disguise the hook within it.

During the desperate days of 1948-1951, when the issue was in doubt, the politicians' voices were stilled. But when it became apparent that Malaya was not to become a satellite of Mao's, they began to take heart of grace, and to press for some advance along the road towards the democratic liberal institutions promised in the Constitution. They also claimed that they, speaking with the backing of the people, could lead all the people in a crusade against Terrorism to an extent which the Colonial Government itself could never emulate.

If the Communist war provides the background to the Malayan Scene,

the multi-racial nature of its society provides the foundations on which the stage rests. The two predominant parts of that society are the Malays and the Chinese, almost equal in numbers and between them accounting for over 90 per cent. of the population. I do not think I need describe in detail the differences between these two halves of the population. They are wide and deep and, I am sure, familiar to you. Traditionally the Malays have looked upon themselves as privileged sons of the soil and to the British for protection against external enemies and economic domination. The Chinese were content to make money as privileged aliens in a well-governed country to which they have emigrated in such large numbers. This state of affairs was an unstable one, and could only last so long as British control was unquestioned. The Japanese army and the onward march of political thought in Asia destroyed the concept of permanent British rule. It was obvious, therefore, that a Malayan nation must be called into being to whom we could hand over the reins of government, and the task of turning this plural society into a nation, with a sufficiency of common loyalties to itself, became the supreme task laid upon Malayan statesmanship.

Between 1948 and the autumn of 1954 two important steps were taken, and, it is to be noted, taken at the instance of the Protecting Power.

The first step codified Citizenship, a matter of supreme importance in democracy where citizenship confers the right to vote, and the second step defined a positive Malayan programme of Education. Citizenship had been almost completely ignored in Malaya in the complacent halcyon days up to 1941. Persons born in Singapore, Penang and Malacca were (and are) British subjects; the Malays outside these Settlements looked upon themselves as the subjects of the Ruler of the State in which they were born, but did not consider this attribute extended to persons of other races born in the States. So long as all persons born in Malaya could obtain passports as "British-protected persons" the matter had not been one of great moment.

The Constitution of 1948 gave legislative clothing to the concept of local citizenship for the first time: some local inhabitants were citizens by operation of law, some could acquire citizenship on conditions. All Malays, of course, were citizens, but only a minority of the other races fulfilled the necessary conditions, and this is not surprising when we realize the Malay fears of being swamped by the alien tide—and after all the Constitution had been made by them and the British.

The Chinese never willingly accepted an inferior status, and with the growth of their political consciousness after the war they began to claim that citizenship should be decided by the principles of the *jus soli*—which means that persons born in a country are *ipso facto* citizens of it. Conservative Malay opinion of course opposed this. But the question was tackled; some concessions were made by the Malays, and after debate in State Councils, where Malays were in the great majority, and in Federal Legislative Council, a new code of citizenship was enacted in a series of complex and technical enactments. These laws do not as yet put non-Malays on the same footing as the Malays, but they do widen the field, and it is now true to say that over 40 per cent. of the Chinese in the country are

either citizens or are eligible for citizenship. So far by no means all those eligible for citizenship have taken the trouble to register, but numbers are increasing. To the Chinese this is not yet enough; they want the *jus soli*, and it is probable that in course of time this will come about.

In the matter of Education I think it is not unfair to say that before the war the British administration had not faced up to its responsibilities. It was considered sufficient to provide vernacular education for the Malays, and English schools for a minority of the intelligent children of all races. Monetary help to mission and denominational schools was granted when they conformed to the standards set by the Education Department. Similar encouragement was given to good Chinese schools, established and run by the Chinese community for their own children. So long as these schools conformed to the code, and taught nothing politically undesirable, they received support from a government which was only too pleased thus to "get by" on the cheap, without having to cater directly for the education of all its people. These Chinese schools were almost exact replicas of schools in China, and conformed largely to the National Government's code of education. They taught the young only their own mother tongues, and, in fact, how to remain Chinese in an alien land. In spite of the advice given by their experts, it does not seem to have occurred to the British administrators of a generation ago that their established system of education was omitting to train half the population to be "Malayan" citizens.

It was realized after the war that a positive educational policy was essential; the plan adopted was the creation gradually of truly National Schools throughout the Federation. I have no time to go into details; it must suffice to say that these schools were "to provide for children of all races a six-year course of free primary education with a Malayan orientation and appropriate for children between the ages of six and twelve." By the autumn of 1954 this policy had hardly been started; it required money at a time when revenue was falling, and in itself it was by no means unanimously welcomed by the Chinese, who saw in it an attempt to denigrate their own ancient culture. Now the new Government of the Federation is reconsidering its educational policy *de novo*.

We have considered two major bricks built into or planned for the building of the new nation, and the "bricks" were designed and emplaced or planned by the Protecting Power. It now behoves us to examine what the leaders of local opinion themselves had attempted and achieved by the autumn of 1954. In the main this was the statesmanlike realization of the most influential of the Malay and Chinese political leaders that unless communal differences could be overcome and a common denominator of loyalty to Malaya created there was no hope of building a self-governing Malayan nation. Encouraged by the work of the Communities Liaison Committee, presided over by the Commissioner-General, their leaders got together and have now created the Alliance of the United Malay National Organization with the Malayan Chinese Association, which has one common political platform and has fought elections at municipal and State level as one seemingly closely knit body. The Alliance has had very great success at the polls and can be said to be the only political "horse" in the

race at the moment. A tribute is due to the statesmanship which created this Alliance, to the Malay and Chinese leaders who realized so clearly the great danger for the country if political opinions were to be split along the lines of racial cleavage. This anti-communal approach to Malayan problems has now become a plank in the platform of all political parties. To some extent, of course, this process was only a papering-over of very wide cracks.

In the structure of the Malayan Constitutions themselves two big changes had been effected between 1948 and 1954. First of all, in Singapore the Rendel Commission had recommended sweeping changes, and these had been adopted. The Colonial Legislature created in 1946 had 25 seats, of which 12 were held by elected members. The new Legislature contains 32, of which no less than 25 would be elected. The Executive Council was to consist of a majority of Ministers in charge of departments with seats in the Assembly. The Governor still has general reserve powers over the whole field of government for emergency use, and is in sole charge of defence and foreign affairs.

In the Federation political pressure to start elections had been steadily mounting, and a Select Committee of the Federal Council had reported on the matter. In this event, and as a first step, it was agreed between Her Majesty's Government and the Rulers that the Federal Legislature should be increased to 100 members, of whom 52 were to be elected. *Pari passu* the States and Settlements also began introducing elected seats into their Councils, some with a minority and some with a majority of such seats.

There is little time to examine the economic picture. It remained, speaking generally, true to type, with ups and downs in the prices of the two chief products—rubber and tin—prices being high during the Korean War and declining rapidly in 1952 onwards. When rubber and tin are high, revenue is buoyant, and the converse is true. Truly here the "eggs are nearly all in one basket," and Malaya is ultra-sensitive to the values of these two commodities. Since the autumn of 1954 the pendulum has begun to swing again and prices have been much more buoyant.

Wise men have, of course, year in year out suggested a diversification of the Malayan economy in order to place it on a wider basis, but the fact remains that, taking the good and the bad years together over a considerable period, the cultivation of rubber will certainly have brought in more cash to the small farmer than any other crop. For the sake of the good years he will tolerate the bad. Another fundamental factor is that Malaya is not ideally suited to the cultivation of rice in large quantities. Scientific methods are increasing the areas under cultivation and, above all, the yield; but it looks as though increased production will at best only keep pace with the increasing population, of which the Malayan ricefields will at best continue to feed but one-half. All this points to the continuation of a brittle, sensitive economy sitting on a narrow base-plate; and it means that the development of industry—no easy task—will be needed to cope with increasing population; and this postulates stability and good government.

In our quick and rather superficial glance over the Malayan landscape

we have considered some of the outstanding facts and problems as they appeared a year ago. This was a convenient point of vantage for reasons which I hope are clear to you. The electoral urns were ready and it remained to see what would come out of them.

In Singapore the shady side has been ventilated in the English Press in larger quantities by far than is usual for Malayan news. The first General Election for the new Legislative Council there showed a sharp swing to the Left; the Conservative Progressive Party, led by Mr. C. C. Tan, which had been the largest elected element in the old Legislature, was heavily defeated, and Mr. Marshall has become the first Chief Minister, backed by a Labour Front majority. The opposition consists for the most part of the People's Action Party, well to the Left of Mr. Marshall. We have read how Mr. Marshall has had to cope with Communist-inspired rioting by hooligan schoolchildren and with intense labour unrest. He has had to forget conveniently his demagogic promises in dealing with incipient chaos. He has already challenged the prerogative of the Governor, but has succumbed to the charm of the visiting Secretary of State. Mr. Marshall has learnt the hard way; we can have confidence that he will ride clear of anarchy; we can and must hope that he will stay in the saddle lest worse befall.

In the Federation the Alliance won last July the most resounding victory probably ever achieved by a political party at the polls anywhere, winning 51 out of 52 contested seats. Tengku Abdul Rahman has been acknowledged as Chief Minister and holds the portfolio of Member for Home Affairs in the Executive Council, and other leading members of the Alliance have been appointed to portfolios with seats in the Executive Council. In both Singapore and the Federation the new Governments are planning further steps along the road to full democratic status, and no doubt 1956 will see the planning of new Constitutions in both areas.

What, then, are the problems and the possibilities which face these new young Governments in the onward march, first to self-government and then to independence, we hope within the Commonwealth?

The first big executive act of the new Federation Government has been the offer of an amnesty under terms to the Terrorists, which has as yet produced little results. Tengku Abdul Rahman and Mr. Marshall are hoping to meet the Communist leader Chin Peng and to persuade him to order his followers to lay down their arms. It, however, looks as though the terrorist leaders were hoping to negotiate a settlement rather than accept the offer of an amnesty. There lies danger for the two Ministers, as the temptation to negotiate and stop the war is strong, especially today when the woolly complacency of the Geneva spirit is appealing so greatly to the sentimental and the woolly-minded and the West seems to be lowering its guard. But if temptation is not resisted and Communism—as at present constituted in South-East Asia—is allowed to have its legal place in the political life of the country, then I think we can write off these young growing democracies, to say nothing of our own influence and our capital in South-East Asia. Fortunately, the influence of the Protecting Power is still strong, but it will tend to wane, and that quickly. Sir Donald MacGillivray and Sir Robert Black must now tread

gingerly, but let it never be forgotten that it is by British power alone that Malaya has been so far kept on this side of the Iron Curtain.

There is another great Malayan problem in the relationship of Singapore to the Federation. Shall they continue as separate entities or coalesce or federate into some form of union? Their separation was always something of an anomaly, bound together as they are by the facts of geography, the flow of trade and communications, and the realities of defence in South-East Asia.

Conservative Malay elements in the Federation fear the Chinese preponderance in Singapore and the chauvinist unrest of the Chinese proletariat there. With the lesson of Cyprus before them they may well feel, too, that Singapore, for high strategic reasons, may not be allowed the choice of complete independence by Great Britain. As for many of the local Chinese in Singapore, they do not want to be tied to a backward Federation advancing, in their eyes, so slowly along the road to complete democracy. Mr. Marshall stressed the need for some form of political unity in his election propaganda; in fact, he and the Federation Chief Minister have stalled on this point, and for the moment the only visible bonds are occasional *ad hoc* meetings between the heads of the two Governments.

No doubt in the end it will be inevitable that some closer union comes about—we see this process at work in Central Africa and the West Indies—but the road to it will not be easy.

In the Federation the Chinese demand for the *jus soli* as the test of citizenship may split the unity of the Alliance, and that unity may be still further strained in the search for a new and mutually acceptable educational policy. The Alliance itself as an omnipotent monolith runs the danger of heading towards Fascism, and signs of this have already appeared in the conduct of some of the more irresponsible elements in the party. A parliamentary opposition is essential to the proper workings of a democratic parliamentary machine, and as the other parties like Negara and the Labour Party are at present almost defunct, it may well be that that opposition may be created by rifts in the structure of the Alliance itself. The complete rout of other parties also, of course, results in a number of able men being excluded from public life, and one of these is Dato Onn himself. It would, however, be a major tragedy if the Alliance were to split vertically into two racially-inspired halves.

Malay poverty and lack of capital is another big problem for the future, again likely to strain Malay-Chinese relations. This may well prove to be the stimulus to the creation of a bigger and more influential Labour Party with Socialistic leanings. I think, in fact, that the Socialist "horse" may be a strong runner at the next General Election.

There is another problem in the matter of the Malay States. Will a democratically elected Central Government tolerate the amount of power still exercised in State matters by Governments which still tend to be ultra-conservative monarchies resting on a feudal basis? We know how Mr. Nehru has solved that problem in India, and his example is powerful.

Bound up with this, of course, is the question of the future of the Malay Sultanates. These Princes are still the objects of loyalty from their

subjects, and certainly no sagacious politician would seek to upset this state of affairs. In a sense the question is a technical one: how can sovereignty be exercised in an area containing nine Sovereign Princes, and two Settlements in which sovereignty rests with the British Crown? It looks as though sovereignty will have to be delegated if possible to one individual—one of the Princes maybe—who can exercise it as an individual.

What of the political leaders? What sort of men are they? Mr. Marshall is impetuous, inclined to be demagogic and has had everything to learn of the art of administration. But he is no Communist; he has learnt quickly and has appreciated what a drift to chaos would mean. We can hope that he will remain in the saddle lest worse befall.

In the Federation, Tenghu Abdul Rahman has acquired great popularity amongst the people by living simply amongst them and listening to them, even though he is a member of the Kedah Royal Family. He is, I think, sincere and friendly, but as a Prime Minister with full powers in the future one can be apprehensive about his mental capacity for so great a task. Fortunately, he has some able lieutenants in Colonel H. S. Lee, the Minister of Transport; Dr. Ismail, the Minister for Natural Resources; and Dato Razak, the Minister of Education. These three men provide the main driving force in the new Government.

Dare one hazard a prophecy? I feel that the Malays have made the mistake of clamouring too soon for the shadow of freedom—*merdeka*—and the departure of the British. For the moment they are politically in the ascendant, and the Alliance rests on a majority of Malay votes. But the Chinese have yet to “present their bill,” and when they do and we are on the way out, the Malays may well regret that there are no friends present to redress the balance in their favour.

I should like finally to say one special word to an English audience. As head of the Malayan Students' Unit in Great Britain, I realize what a target Malayan Students are for the Communist Party. The approach is subtly made through fellow-Malayans, most of whom would not admit to being Communists, but who as “fellow-travellers” propagate the Communist “line.” That teaching is, of course, that the Malayan Races Liberation Army is what it says it is, the “starry-eyed” vanguard of an army liberating the people from colonial tyranny. None of these gentlemen, living in security in the suburbs of this great city, have really much conception of the methods of the murdering thugs who have plagued Malaya for so long, nor of the aims of the leaders of those thugs. I have tried to suggest the true picture to you, and you may well have the opportunity to use it in discussion some time in the future.

Miss KELLY: There is an enormous amount of Communist literature in this country which is seen by Malay students. Can the Russians envisage using the Malaysians as a card eventually to use against China? Translations as well as ordinary Soviet literature are buttering up the Malaysians against the Chinese in a most incredible fashion.

Mr. CORRY: I have no doubt that the whole situation is being exploited by the Kremlin for its own purposes. It is rather difficult to know how far they leave things to the Chinese and how far they interfere directly

themselves. They are doing the same in the Middle East and buttering up the Arabs. One thing I would add is that it does not by any means follow that the Chinese are going to play the game for ever. They possibly have their doubts about the Russians.

A MEMBER: How do the birth-rates compare as between the Malays and the Chinese? What are the probable future rates of increase?

Mr. CORRY: I cannot give you actual figures, but I would say the ratio is about five to three. Certainly the Chinese increase is considerably greater than the Malays, but that has been due somewhat to child mortality, which is now being coped with, and the tendency is for the gap to narrow a little.

Mr. MILLER: May I ask for your prophecy as to the future of the Malay Rulers? I do not think we need contemplate any drastic action but a more constitutional course. The Federation of Malaya, among the federations of the world, is, I think, unique in that the component parts, except the two Settlements, are sovereigns and the Federation Agreement is legally between nine sovereigns on one side and one sovereign on the other. It is a matter of technique. I am very interested to know, when the new Government gets into the saddle and possibly the present large nominated proportion is replaced by elected members and the Central Government is therefore stronger than it is now, what rôle these nine Rulers will be able to play.

At the moment one sees on every occasion the High Commissioner, accompanied by the Chief Minister, meets the Rulers, and there seems to be a very happy relationship between them. The next step may be elections in the States and an elected Prime Minister taking the place of the present nominated one.

Do you foresee, for the stability of self-governing Malaya, Rulers functioning as a conference of senior statesmen collectively, as they do now, being accepted by an elected legislature of the Federation as a whole?

Mr. CORRY: It is a very difficult question to which one can think of all sorts of theoretical solutions. Loyalty to the Rulers is a very live thing among the Malays, and any interference that was regarded as interference would provoke drastic consequences. It might be possible to have the nine Rulers functioning as a sort of Council of the Throne. You talk about the technique of it. How does a nine-headed sovereign deal with a Prime Minister and a Central Government? I think it is very difficult. One possible solution suggested was that the Rulers should elect an "emperor." Personally I think that is quite possibly a solution. They might give something in the nature of power of attorney to one of their number to act as a sovereign in federal matters.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no other questions, I will on your behalf thank Mr. Corry very much indeed for all the trouble that he has taken in coming here and giving us this very clear picture of the Malayan Scene, which has been most interesting and which was put very clearly. We thank Mr. Corry very much indeed. (Applause.)

POLITICS AND ALPHABETS IN INNER ASIA

By PAUL B. HENZE

I. INTRODUCTION

CENTRAL Asia has a rich history. As far back as written record and archæological evidence go, the area has been swept by a bewildering succession of cultural, political and religious influences. Toynbee has compared the steppelands of Inner Asia with the sea and has found that historical forces have operated in these areas in much the same fashion as in maritime regions. Like the sea, the steppes have served as a highway between peoples. They have facilitated trade, conquest and the spread of cultural influences.¹

In conjunction with other forces of culture and civilization, many forms of writing have spread across Central Asia through the centuries. Very few alphabets seem to have been indigenous to Central Asia.² Most of them originated on the fringes of Asia and spread inward. Up until modern times the primary pattern of alphabetic diffusion through Central Asia has been from west and south toward the north-east. A good example is the Mongolian alphabet. Its ultimate origins have been traced to the Syriac script used by early Christians in the Eastern Roman Empire. The Syriac script was adapted for their own use by the Sogdians, an Iranian people, from Nestorian Christians. The Sogdian alphabet was in turn taken over by the Turkic Uigurs. The Uigurs made some adjustments to suit the peculiarities of their language and changed the style of writing from horizontal to vertical. The Naiman Turks, close neighbours of the Uigurs, adopted their method of writing and transmitted it to the Mongols at the beginning of the thirteenth century. This alphabet, with relatively little basic change, remained in use among the Mongols up to modern times.³ The Arabic alphabet spread across Central Asia in somewhat similar fashion, arriving with Islam in the ninth and tenth centuries, but it underwent no independent development.

The most dynamic period of Central Asian history was from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The Mongols and then the Turks experienced a great burst of military and political energy. Their conquests carried them into China, India and Persia, to Russia and into the heart of Europe. The political effect of their conquests was far greater than the cultural. The vast quantities of energy which these peoples had to spend to bring most of Eurasia under their power left them both politically and culturally weakened in their home territories. The sixteenth century marked a turning point in Central Asian history. After 1600 a period of relative cultural stability set in. Stability soon degenerated into stagnation. Cultural and religious stagnation was closely bound up with political stagnation. Inner Asia ceased to be an active force in world history and gradually became

instead a region where outside forces, converging from different directions, began to compete for the right to influence the future development of the area in accordance with their own special interests.⁴ The nineteenth century saw the beginning of a new era in Central Asian history. Power rivalries became more clear-cut and the heart of Central Asia came under the control of Russia. New cultural influences began to make themselves felt. The period of change which began in the nineteenth century has not yet come to an end, though the pace of change has accelerated tremendously during the last few decades.

Curiously enough, the question of alphabets is directly relevant to a study of the political, social and cultural changes that have taken place in the interior regions of Asia during the last half-century. An examination of the problem of alphabets and linguistic transformation also sheds some light on the possible course of future development of these regions.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Coincident with the onset of the period of stagnation in Central Asian history that began about 1600, the alphabetic picture crystallized and remained stable until the twentieth century. If we take the term "Inner Asia" to include all the territory east of the Caspian, north of the Hindu-Kush and the Himalayas, south of Siberia and west of the parts of China that are actually settled by Chinese, we find that three principal alphabets survived in this region into modern times: the Arabic, the Mongolian and the Tibetan. These alphabets correspond to the three predominant indigenous racial/cultural strains of Central Asia: the Turkic, the Mongolian and the Tibetan.⁵ The Arabic alphabet has been almost exclusively associated with Islam, the Mongolian and Tibetan with Buddhism.

The Uigur alphabet remained in use for official court purposes among the Turkic peoples until the time of Tamerlane, but in this field too Arabic script eventually gained the upper hand.⁶ All Turkic and Iranian peoples who professed Islam entered the twentieth century firmly attached to the Arabic alphabet. This was true of all the native inhabitants of Russian Central Asia as well as most of the inhabitants of Chinese Turkestan. Arabic script has also been used to a limited extent by the Chinese Moslems (Dungans) of Kansu and neighbouring regions for ritualistic and decorative purposes, though it is not used to transcribe Chinese sounds.⁷

The Arabic alphabet is not entirely suitable for accurate transcription of Turkic languages because of its limited possibilities for accurate representation of vowels. This deficiency was nevertheless in one sense a virtue, for it meant that dialectal differences were to a certain extent obscured in the written language. Use of the Arabic alphabet for the Central Asian Turkic languages facilitated the introduction of Persian and Arabic words and the diffusion of Persian and Arabic cultural influence throughout Central Asia. Until the Bolshevik Revolution, the Moslems of Central Asia were an integral part of the Islamic world. The Arabic alphabet had both symbolic and practical significance for the maintenance of religious and cultural ties—potentially political ties as well—with the countries of the Middle East and with other more advanced Moslem peoples in the Russian Empire, particularly the Kazan and Crimean Tatars.

The antecedents of the Mongolian alphabet have already been mentioned. The Tibetan alphabet has its origins in the Sanskrit. Though originally derived from outside sources, both the Mongolian and Tibetan alphabets went through a long period of independent development in Central Asia. These two alphabets are quite unrelated and involve rather different representational principles, but they have one interesting characteristic in common: both were originally fitted to a very archaic form of their languages. Both Mongolian and Tibetan writing, therefore, involves the use of more letters than are actually pronounced; there are silent consonants, and vowels are not necessarily spoken as they are written. This feature is present to a greater degree in Tibetan than in Mongolian, but in both languages it tends to minimize the influence of local dialects on the written language. In a different way the same effect was produced as when Arabic script was used for the Turkic languages.

The Mongolian alphabet continued in use into modern times in all areas where Mongols live: Inner Mongolia and parts of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia (now called the Mongolian People's Republic), Jungaria, the regions inhabited by Buryats around Late Baikal, and among the mixed Mongol and Turkic tribes of Uriankhai (Tannu Tuva) and the Altai region. It was also used by the Kalmyks, a Mongol tribe who migrated to the lower Volga in the seventeenth century; they were, however, liquidated as a national entity by the Soviets during World War II.

The Tibetan alphabet was and is used throughout Tibet and in the regions bordering Tibet inhabited by Buddhist peoples closely related to the Tibetans. Until recently, educated Mongols usually learned Tibetan as well as their own language, for it is regarded as the sacred language of Lamaist Buddhism.

To a very limited extent some of the Turkic tribes of the Altai region made use of the Mongolian alphabet for writing their Turkic dialects.⁸ There is also at least one instance of a Turkic group, the Sari Yogur of Kansu, adopting the Tibetan script for their language. This occurred at the beginning of the eighteenth century.⁹ When the Russians penetrated into the Altai in the nineteenth century, Russian missionaries devised Cyrillic alphabets for some of the Turkic groups in the area. These alphabets were very little used, but they are interesting as historical curiosities and indirect antecedents of the Cyrillic alphabets which the Russians imposed upon these and all the other Central Asian Turkic languages during the late 1930's.

The use of Russian as the language of officialdom, and to some extent of trade, spread rapidly in Russian Central Asia following the conquests of the nineteenth century. Russian was not widely learned by the native peoples, however, and its influence on the native languages was slight. No attempt at Cyrillicization of the native Turkic or Iranian languages was made or contemplated.¹⁰

Occasional use of the Chinese system of writing in Inner Asia has occurred from earliest times, for there appear to have been colonies of Chinese traders in these regions as far back as historical records go. There were also periodic Chinese military expeditions into the far interior. In areas which have been traditionally regarded as part of the Chinese Empire

in modern times—Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia—there have been Chinese officials and merchants employing the classical Chinese ideographic method of writing. Chinese ideographs, however, are not well suited for representing the sounds of the structurally very different Mongolian and Turkic languages. Therefore, while most of these languages—particularly those in direct contact with Chinese culture—have been represented in Chinese characters at one time or another,¹¹ no complete or lasting adaptation of the Chinese system to any of them has ever occurred. Chinese characters have continued in use in modern times in parts of Central Asia where there are Chinese; otherwise they have not been used.

The alphabetic picture of Central Asia which has been sketched out above prevailed until the Bolshevik Revolution in the territories conquered by Russia. Then a period of rapid change began. Some measure of the rapidity of all the change can be gained by considering, *e.g.*, the position of a forty-year-old Uzbek or Buryat now living in the U.S.S.R. If he had originally learned to read and write in the old alphabet in his childhood, he has since had to readjust himself to two completely different alphabets in order to read anything that is now published in his native tongue. In addition to having learned two new alphabets, he has twice had to go through lengthy periods of uncertainty about the way his language is supposed to be spelled, what words are regarded as suitable for literary use and what ones are not, even whether certain grammatical forms are approved. The process of adapting the Central Asian languages to new alphabets has involved much more than a shift in method of writing. There has been much vacillation and controversy over the particular local dialects chosen as the basis for the new written languages. The linguistic history of this period has been filled with discussion about such problems as where to borrow new words, whether to revive old forms, and how to eliminate earlier foreign borrowings.

III. "LATINIZATION"

A modified and improved Arabic alphabet was adopted for Uzbek in 1923. Similarly improved Arabic alphabets were introduced for Kazakh and Kirgiz about the same time. The Communists soon decided, however, that the Arabic alphabet in any form was not desirable. It represented too direct a link with Islam, with the Middle East and, above all, with Turkey.¹² It was declared Communist policy to raise the level of literacy as rapidly as possible, but the Arabic alphabet was not considered a desirable medium for this purpose. Abandonment of the Arabic alphabet would cut off the rising generation from earlier books and written materials as well as from current periodical literature from the Moslem countries south of the Russian borders. In spite of Lenin's pronouncements about the transformation of Russian Central Asia into a shining example of socialism in practice and a base from which the entire Colonial East could be liberated, actual Soviet policy from the very beginning aimed at cutting Central Asia off from all contact with the outside world. Russian Central Asia eventually became even less accessible under the Soviets than it had been under the tsars and the native emirs. The first and most important step in the process of isolating the area was the elimination of

the Arabic script. A decree of August 7, 1925, forbade importation into the U.S.S.R. of materials printed in the Arabic alphabet. Meanwhile, an officially encouraged movement for substitution of the Latin alphabet for the Arabic had made great progress across the Caspian, in Soviet Azerbaijan.

The language of Azerbaijan is very similar to the Turkish spoken in Turkey and is only slightly more distantly related to the principal Turkic languages of Central Asia. There had been talk of abandoning the Arabic script in Azerbaijan before the Revolution. Because there was some intellectual support for the idea of a new alphabet there, the shift to Latin letters came swiftly and without quite as much governmental pressure as was later required in some of the other Turkic-speaking areas. The Latin alphabet was introduced in 1924. On May 1, 1925, a decree of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet made it compulsory for newspapers and official use.

In 1926 a Turcological Congress was convened in Baku and the Latinization of all the Turkic languages of the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed official policy. The following year a Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was adopted and a permanent committee was established in Baku to propagate the new alphabet and aid in its adaptation to all Turkic dialects. The Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was simply the normal Latin alphabet supplemented by a few extra letters and signs designed to meet the special phonetic requirements of the Turkic languages. It was both phonetically sound and practical for everyday use. It was almost, but not quite, identical with the Latin alphabet which was adopted in Turkey in 1928.

The very concept of a *unified* Turkic alphabet meant that its proponents aimed at achieving the fullest possible degree of linguistic uniformity among speakers of Turkic languages in the U.S.S.R. with the intention of facilitating contact among them and creating a sense of unity and common purpose. Enver Pasha was still a live memory among Russian Communists in the mid-1920's, and manifestations of Pan-Turkism were already condemned and forbidden as anti-Soviet and reactionary. Among the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union there nevertheless remained a strong sense of common kinship, though such feelings could not be expressed except in linguistic and cultural terms. The Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was evidence of the strength of this feeling. For the time being, the Communists were willing to allow the Turkic peoples this much of a common bond. Later even this small concession would be withdrawn. Already the trend toward deliberate emphasis and magnification of the differences between the Turkic peoples was gaining strength. Central Asia, *e.g.*, was divided into elaborately separated "national" republics and autonomous regions during the 1920's and as little political recognition as possible was given to the age-old economic and cultural unity of the area.

Turkey adopted the Latin alphabet in November, 1928. Under the personal guidance of Atatürk, vigorous measures were taken to accomplish the shift from Arabic script as rapidly as possible. Less than a year later, use of the old alphabet for official purposes, for publishing and in the schools, was forbidden. As in the Soviet Union, alphabetic reform in Turkey involved far-reaching linguistic reform as well. Foreign words, idioms and grammatical forms were eliminated and replaced by new words

and forms taken from Anatolian dialects, ancient Turkish texts and other Turkic languages. In many instances new words and whole sets of terminology had to be invented to fit the needs of modern life. The process of linguistic reform in Turkey has taken many years and can hardly be said to be fully finished yet.¹³

Latinization in Turkey probably helped to accelerate the pace of Latinization in the U.S.S.R., for intellectuals among the Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R., though officially discouraged from doing so and reluctant to display overt interest in Turkey for fear of being branded pan-Turkic nationalists, were keenly interested in developments there.¹⁴

From 1927 to 1930 the Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was adapted to all the Turkic languages of Soviet Central Asia—Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Karakalpak and Kirgiz. Uigurs living in Soviet Central Asia, numbering about 100,000, also had their language readjusted to the new alphabet in 1930.¹⁵ Their cousins in Sinkiang, of course, continued to use Arabic script. The Persian dialect of the Central Asian Tajiks was also given a Latinized literary form during the late 1920's. Up until that time the written language of the Tajiks had been classical Persian in Arabic script. The new Latinized Tajik language naturally emphasized local dialectal peculiarities.¹⁶

Officially the change-over to the Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was completed throughout Soviet Central Asia by 1930. In some places local scholars had worked out Latin alphabets of their own, differing somewhat from the Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet. There were arguments in favour of the local versions, but everywhere, because of official pressure, the unified alphabet finally prevailed. From 1930 onward all publishing was done in the new alphabet and schools taught only Latin letters. Special classes were held for adults. It was at this same time that a cultural revolution on a large scale was initiated and a great campaign to wipe out illiteracy began. The rate of literacy among the masses of native Central Asians had never been very high, though Uzbeks and Tajiks were as a rule somewhat more likely to know how to read and write than Kirgiz and Turkmen. By the end of the 1920's, each of these peoples had developed small groups of intellectuals who took a lively interest in linguistic, cultural and historical questions. The Uzbeks, obvious cultural leaders of Central Asia, were particularly fortunate in this respect.

In spite of the limitations placed upon them by requirements of Communist dogma, these Central Asian intellectuals of the 1920's and early 1930's were still permitted considerable freedom of thought and expression. Soviet nationalities policy was still rather generous. One could be anti-Russian. One could condemn tsarist imperialism. Within the various national groups there were extended discussions and many-sided arguments on questions of interpretation of the national past, literary issues and language reform. Turkmenistan experienced heated literary and linguistic controversies during the early 1920's. One group apparently proposed that the new literary language be based on a revival of older Turkmen forms; another group wished to direct the development of the Turkmen language as much toward Anatolian Turkish as possible.¹⁷ There was much opportunism as well as much amateurishness among local intellect-

uals, much meddling by Russian Communists who did not understand the issues clearly.

The dialect originally chosen as the phonetic basis for the Latinized version of the Uzbek language was that of the town of Turkestan (actually located in Kazakhstan), while the grammar and vocabulary followed rather closely the usage of the Uzbek capital, Tashkent. This language, which was officially approved until 1937, showed real promise of developing into a Central Asian Turkic *lingua franca*, because it could be read and for the most part understood by Kazakhs, Karakalpaks and Turkmen.¹⁸ In 1937 an extensive reform of the Uzbek literary language was carried out. The Latin alphabet was retained, but the phonetic pattern of Tashkent was introduced while more of the words and forms of the dialects of the Fergana Valley were accepted as standard. Literary Uzbek was in this way made more different from its Turkic neighbours. The political significance of this change is, of course, not hard to see. *Divide et impera*—Moscow was eager to make the Central Asian nationalities feel as separate from one another as possible.

Strife and changes such as those which have been mentioned briefly in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan occurred in all the other Central Asian republics. Latin alphabets were also introduced among the smaller Turkic groups living in the Altai, the Shors and the Oirots.¹⁹ The then still nominally independent inhabitants of Tannu Tuva "adopted" the Latin alphabet in 1930. Until this time the Tuvinians had used the Mongolian script. Their written language was practically identical with classical Mongolian in spite of the fact that their local dialects were basically Turkic. Mongolian had been the official language of the government and the Tuvinian People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party. The Russians apparently feared that Tuva was developing in too pro-Mongol a direction. The new Latinized Tuvinian language was based on an amalgam of local dialects with a generous admixture of Russian words. The standards of the new Tuvinian written language were established by a commission of Russian scholars. For nine months after the introduction of the new language was decreed, the Tuvinian Mongolian-script newspaper *Ünen* (*Truth*, i.e. *Pravda*) was published in both languages. It was then changed completely to Latin-alphabet Tuvinian. The methods which the Russians used in forcefully changing not only the alphabet but also the language of Tuva at this time—when the area was still allegedly an independent republic—are most revealing, for they foreshadow the harsher methods of linguistic transformation which were to be used throughout the Soviet Union a few years later.²⁰

Buryat-Mongolia, which had become an autonomous Soviet republic [A.S.S.R.] in 1923, also experienced Latinization in the late 1920's. There had been an upsurge of pan-Mongol sentiment among the Buryats after the turn of the century. Buryat intellectuals were eager to forge closer ties with the Qalqa Mongols, the dominant group in Outer Mongolia. The Buryats emphasized similarities between their language and Qalqa when they Latinized it. This brought a crisis in 1932-33 and Russian intervention. As a result, the Buryats were forced to adopt Russian words in considerable number for political and scientific terms and to avoid the use of classical

Mongolian terms, or new words based on older Mongolian roots, still in use in Qalqa.²¹

With isolated nationalities, like the Tuvinians and the Buryats, the Russian Communists employed more direct methods of linguistic coercion than with the peoples of Soviet Central Asia. In the Mongolian People's Republic they were more careful. Here the Russians were eager to maintain a greater illusion of independence so as not to offend Chinese sensitivities or challenge Japanese ambitions too directly. Though a Latin alphabet was devised for the Qalqa Mongolian language in 1931, it was never officially decreed as compulsory and the old Mongolian script continued in use. Russian words were not forced upon the Qalqa Mongols and, unlike the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic enjoyed comparative linguistic peace during the 1930's.

As Stalin tightened his grip on the Communist Party and the Party consolidated its control over the outlying areas of the Soviet Union during the 1930's, the freedom of cultural development which the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union originally enjoyed became more and more circumscribed. The Soviet Union became more purely Russian in character and the larger minorities became increasingly suspect of being susceptible to foreign influences. This trend reached its culmination in the Great Purges of the late 1930's. Among the first victims of the purges were the political and cultural leaders of the non-Russian nationalities. Everyone familiar with the general outlines of Soviet Central Asian history has heard of the disgrace of Khojaev, the Uzbek Prime Minister, and Ikramov, the Uzbek Communist Party Secretary, who were condemned to death for treason in 1938. Large-scale arrests and executions occurred in all the Central Asian Republics. With the native leadership thus swept from the scene, the way was now clear for the Communists to proceed swiftly with the subjugation of these areas to more complete exploitation, more thorough Russification, more decisive measures to make the break with the past complete. The most striking outward symbol of change was the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet.

IV. "CYRILLICIZATION"

The Soviet Union's second "Alphabetic Revolution"²² came in 1939-40. The groundwork had been laid for it during 1937-38. The relatively free debate and the controversies over fine points of phonetics and vocabulary which had made the Latinization campaign lively and interesting were largely absent from the "Cyrillic Revolution." The Great Purges had barely ceased. The atmosphere was tense. The non-Russian nationalities, shorn of their native leadership, were confused and frightened. They were now clearly confronted with the prospect of inevitable submission to increased Russification. The Russians made no secret of the fact that the shift to Cyrillic was meant to make it easier for the non-Russian nationalities to learn Russian. It soon became evident that the shift was also intended to make it easier for the non-Russian languages to assimilate Russian words. One of the most eminent Soviet Turcologists, Professor N. A. Baskakov, has described the change and justified it as follows:

“The Arabic alphabet used by some peoples and the Latin alphabet introduced later could not keep pace with the development of the national languages of the previously backward peoples of the U.S.S.R. The adoption of the Russian script by most of the languages has not only contributed to their development, but has been of notable assistance to the various nationalities of the Soviet Union in their successful mastery of the Russian language and in the assimilation of Russian culture. It has in fact provided them with a uniform basis on which to acquire literacy in their native tongues and in Russian. Alphabets and scripts on the basis of the Russian have been worked out by most of the national republics and regions with due regard to the mutual exchange of experience and advice by the local and central scientific research organizations. As a result, the modern alphabets based on the Russian script fully represent the phonetics of the languages, contribute to the rapid acquisition of native languages in the schools, and to a remarkable extent assist the nationalities of the Union in learning Russian. The exceptional importance of the Russian alphabet calls for special care in its use. The task of the simultaneous inculcation of literacy in both the native and Russian languages can only be successfully performed by achieving the maximum equality in the value of the letters. In the alphabets based on Russian devised for each language, there should be as little conflict as possible between the value of those symbols and letters common both to the native language and Russian, which are only used for the phonemes of the national language, and other symbols and letters, also common to both, which are used only for loan words. This does not of course apply to special symbols not used in the Russian alphabet, which can only be used in root words of each language.”²³

There was no Unified Turkic Cyrillic Alphabet. This fact is very revealing as an indication of the change of temper in the decade that had passed since Latinization took place. After the purges, the Communists were no longer willing to allow the Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R. even the semblance of alphabetic unity. The Cyrillic alphabets devised for the Central Asian languages were deliberately made as different from each other as possible.²⁴ Likewise dialects were chosen as norms for the Cyrillic written languages that differed as much as possible from related neighbouring languages.

By 1941 the Central Asian Turkic languages, Tajik, the Turkic languages of the Altai and Buryat-Mongolian had all been changed over to the Cyrillic alphabet. “Independent” Tannu Tuva again made the change in step with the rest of the Soviet Union. The Mongolian People’s Republic lagged. It was a little more difficult to find an easy justification for the shift there, and the Russians were busy enough supervising the change in the U.S.S.R. itself. There was talk of changing to Cyrillic in Mongolia in 1941, but nothing happened, though a group of scholars was at work on a plan for Cyrillicization. Mongolia continued to use its own ancient alphabet until 1946, when Cyrillic was finally introduced.

The shift to Cyrillic involved many practical problems, as had the shift to Latin ten years before. Printing establishments had to be provided with new sets of type, public signs changed, books reissued in the new type. On the whole, however, this aspect of the change must have been easier than it had been the first time. Once again the Communists had armed themselves with a convenient weapon for combating a past with which they wished, at least in part, to break. Many of the native Central Asian poets, playwrights, novelists and journalists who had been carefully nurtured by the Soviet régime during the late 1920's and early 1930's were liquidated during the Great Purges. Their works were labelled treasonous and were proscribed.²⁵ In true Orwellian fashion, a whole rewriting of history had to take place. Millions of volumes had to be destroyed. The alphabetic change facilitated this process. As time went on, the Communists could console themselves, all materials printed in the Latin alphabet would become less and less accessible to a newer generation reared on Cyrillic.

The outbreak of war in 1941, the preoccupation of the Russians with the German invasion, the easing of Communist pressures in most of the areas inhabited by non-Russians in order to reduce disaffection and disloyalty—all these things meant that the peoples who had just acquired new Cyrillic alphabets were to some extent left to do with them as they pleased until after the war was over.

Once the war was won, the Communists began to devote themselves to domestic problems again. The German invasion had provided ample justification of the Communists' worst fears about the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. Central Asians had thrown down their arms and defected to the Germans in droves during the early phases of the invasion. Crimean Tatars and North Caucasian peoples into whose territories the German armies penetrated had seized what they considered an opportunity to rid themselves of both Communism and Russian domination and revolted. All this convinced Stalin and his henchmen that pre-war Soviet policy toward the minorities had been much too soft; tighter control and more rigid training were needed to make good Soviet citizens of them. The crack-down in Central Asia began early, but at first proceeded rather slowly. The assault on the native cultures increased rapidly in tempo in the late 1940's and the campaign reached its height during the last three years before Stalin's death.

Events on the "linguistic front" during the post-war period reflect the spirit of these years as a whole. Russification of the Central Asian languages was accelerated. The Turkic languages continued to be kept as far apart as possible in spelling, grammar and native vocabulary, but Russification affected them all in much the same way. Russian words were made mandatory for the majority of political, economic, scientific and technical terms. Geographic terms were likewise thoroughly Russified. Decreeing that words be used is one thing; getting people to use them in everyday speech is, of course, quite another. It is difficult to believe that much of the Russian vocabulary forced upon the Central Asiatic languages has yet taken firm root.²⁶

Another field where controversy developed was the question of spelling

borrowed Russian words. The rule was soon established that all words taken from the Russian must be spelled exactly as in Russian even though the phonetic requirements of the local languages might normally demand that changes in spelling to conform to native pronunciation should be made. Some attempts have been made to extend this rule to cover even the few Russian words which were assimilated into the Central Asian languages in pre-Revolutionary times, but they have not been very successful.²⁷

The post-war purging of Central Asian cultures involved much sharp criticism of literary and historical works, but few physical liquidations of their authors. Epic poems such as the Kirgiz *Manas* cycle and the Mongol *Geser* legends, which at an earlier stage had been publicized throughout the Soviet Union as great examples of native epic literature, were attacked as reactionary. The great Central Asian classic poets fared somewhat better. Nevai, Jami, Rumi and Firdausi have been declared Uzbek and Tajik national heroes, just as Nizami has been claimed for Soviet Azerbaijan. The works of all of these poets are now considered part of the "common cultural heritage of the Soviet people," though their writings are of course carefully edited before they are published.

Central Asian history has given the Soviets more difficulty than literature. Local histories produced during the 1930's could not meet the rigid requirements of the post-war period. There was much rewriting of history during the late 1940's and early 1950's. No local history which did not demonstrate that the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks, the Mongols and all the others were not destined by history to associate themselves with the Russians—and therefore justified to a considerable extent the conquest and exploitation of these peoples by Tsarist Russia as a progressive step—had much chance of meeting approval in Moscow. Even when Central Asian historians distorted the past of their peoples out of all proportion to the true facts, few of them succeeded in pleasing their Communist masters. Controversies which reached a high point before the death of Stalin have still not been settled. No satisfactory history of Kazakhstan, e.g., has yet been produced.²⁸

Since Stalin's death, the pace of Russification in Central Asia appears to have slowed slightly. The somewhat more relaxed atmosphere inside the Soviet Union which the post-Stalin collective leadership has fostered may have made it easier for the Central Asian peoples to resist Russification. There is not much to indicate that the present Kremlin leaders plan to change Soviet policy toward the non-Russian peoples, though they may be willing to slacken the pace and ease the pressure a bit.

Turkmenistan held its Second Linguistic Congress in October, 1954 (the first had been in 1936). One of the Turkmen linguists, Professor Azimov, stated on the eve of the congress that "under the influence of the language of the Great Russian people, the vocabulary of the Turkmen language is continually being supplemented and modified, and its grammatical structure is being perfected."²⁹ In the opening speech of the Congress, Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Durayeva deplored the fact that "bourgeois nationalists" had made it difficult for the Turkmen language to be enriched by the wholesome influence of Russian culture. Other speakers urged that Turkmen cease borrowing

from Arabic and Persian sources and take new words only from Russian, and condemned the continued use of native words for which a Russian equivalent had already been officially adopted. All this indicates that the Soviets are continuing to make intense efforts to Russify the Turkmen language, but it also shows that there must be a good deal of opposition to Russification among the people. The situation is presumably much the same among the other Central Asian peoples.

V. CHINA

The situation in China in respect to alphabets and linguistic change is very different from that in the Soviet Union. China is at only a very early stage of the reform process which has been under way in the U.S.S.R. for more than thirty years. Whether China will follow exactly the same course charted out by the Soviets is impossible to predict. What few signs we have indicate that the Chinese Communists are at least interested in experimenting along Soviet lines.

Until the Chinese Communist conquests of 1949-50, the Central Asian regions of China had been only loosely and sporadically controlled by Chinese central governments. Outer Mongolia was for all practical purposes lost before the outbreak of World War I. Tibet remained isolated and managed its own affairs. The Tibetan-Chinese borderlands were in a state of anarchy from the late 1920's onward. Sinkiang was largely under Russian control from 1930 until the early 1940's. The Chinese never relinquished their claim to any of these territories, but China itself was too much in a state of turmoil for any Chinese government to be able to exercise consistent influence on the economic, political or cultural development of these Central Asian regions.

The Soviets had been mostly interested in gaining short-term strategic and economic advantages during the period of their dominance in Sinkiang. They made no serious efforts to reform the social habits of the people or to interfere with the native languages or the Arabic alphabet which was in common use among Uigurs, Kazakhs and—to the extent that they were literate at all—the smaller groups of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kirgiz. Religion was not subjected to persecution. Both Turkic and Chinese Moslems practised their faith without serious hindrance.

Parts of Inner Mongolia were occupied by the Japanese during the 1930's and early 1940's. The Japanese experimented with an "Autonomous Mongol Government" and dabbled in pan-Mongolism. They made great efforts to ingratiate themselves with all Mongols. They did not attempt to reform the linguistic, religious or social habits of the Mongols. They did encourage literacy among the Mongols and subsidized the publication of a great deal of literature—mostly political—in Mongolian.

As early as April 1947 the Chinese Communists proclaimed an "autonomous" Inner Mongolia.³⁰ This marked the beginning of a concerted campaign to win the Mongols and other non-Chinese elements to the Communist side. As additional areas inhabited by Mongols were "liberated," they were added to the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. A great deal of political propaganda was printed in the traditional Mongolian alphabet. The Chinese Communists respected Mongol religious

and cultural feelings and carefully cultivated Mongol national pride. They appear to have had considerable success in winning Mongol confidence and support. The same approach was used as the Communists advanced farther into North-West China. Chinese policy toward the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang was very similar to that followed by the Russians toward their Moslem Turkic subjects during the early stages of the Bolshevik Revolution. The national sensitivities of all these peoples were ostentatiously catered to. As in Inner Mongolia, the Chinese printed and distributed a great deal of political literature among the peoples of Sinkiang, practically all of it in the Arabic script.

When the conquest of Tibet was completed in 1950, the Chinese Communists had succeeded in rounding out the traditional borders of the Chinese Empire with only one exception, Outer Mongolia, which remained firmly under Russian control.³¹ Firmly entrenched in power, the Chinese Communists next proceeded to elaborate their policy for the non-Chinese inhabitants of the country along classic Soviet Russian lines. Though non-Chinese peoples form a far smaller proportion of the entire population of China than is the case with non-Russian (or even non-Slav) peoples of the Soviet Union,³² the Chinese Communists have adopted a system of graded "autonomous" districts and regions almost identical to the Soviet pattern. There is one difference: the Chinese apparently do not intend to extend their system of autonomy so far as to establish separate "republics" for the major non-Chinese groups. In comparison with the Chinese even the larger minority groups are so small in numbers that such an extreme manifestation of ostensible "equality" would appear ludicrous. The new system has not yet been fully applied. Though the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was established in 1947 and enlarged in 1954 by the addition of the province of Sui-Yuan, the Uigurs of Sinkiang were not organized into an autonomous region until the summer of 1955, and preparations have only begun for a similar arrangement in Tibet. Many smaller autonomous units have been set up in various parts of western China—for Mongols and Kazakhs in Sinkiang for various Thai-related groups in Yunnan.

Among all their minorities the Chinese Communists have been busy laying the groundwork for large-scale propaganda and cultural activity. The spread of literacy has been vigorously encouraged and a great quantity of books and pamphlets has been published in local languages. Such activity is, of course, laudable in itself; but it is regrettable that so much of the new literature is dreary Communist propaganda. A recent official source describes these efforts as follows:

"The national minorities have also been given assistance in their educational development. . . . The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region now has more than three times the peak number of primary schools during Japanese occupation. Some nationalities, like the Olunchun, who had no schools at all in the past, now attend their own schools. . . . The winter-school movement has been developed on a mass scale in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and in Sinkiang. Great importance is now attached to the de-

velopment of the languages of the national minorities. The Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council has set up a special committee to study the spoken and written languages of the national minorities, to organize and guide research in that field. This committee will help create written languages for those nationalities having no written languages of their own and improve existing written languages of others. The creation of a written language for the Yi people of Sikang Province marks the beginning of such work. The People's Government is also using existing favourable conditions to full advantage for publications in the languages of the national minorities. The Commission of Nationalities Affairs has published over 700,000 volumes of books and magazines in the Mongolian, Tibetan and Uigur languages. Definite progress has also been made in developing local newspapers and publications in minority languages. Broad sections of the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uigur, Kazakh and Korean people can now read in their own language Marxist-Leninist classics and Mao Tse-Tung's works, documents of the Central People's Government, books on scientific and technological subjects, as well as literary works. In Sinkiang Province, the *Selected Works of Mao-Tse-Tung* have appeared in Uigar and Kazakh."³³

Another source describes publications activity in Inner Mongolia alone :

"From 1947 through 1951, 200 titles of different works in the Mongolian language totalling 1,300,000 copies were published. The total number of books and newspapers published in the Mongolian language in 1953 reached 2,700,000 copies. . . . Separate brochures of the works of Mao Tse-Tung which form part of the first volume of his *Selected Works* have been published in Mongolian."³⁴

It appears that most publications in minority languages which have so far been issued have been in traditional alphabets. To judge by recent official statements on the question of alphabetic reform, Chinese Communist intentions seem to be very far-reaching. In fact, the method of writing the Chinese language itself is apparently to be reformed to the point where the traditional ideographic characters will eventually be replaced by a purely alphabetic system based on Mandarin pronunciation. A "National Written Language Reform Conference" opened in Peking on October 15, 1955, attended by more than 200 delegates from various parts of the country. The official New China News Agency report of the work of the conference states :

"Wu Yu-chang, Chairman of the Committee for Reforming the Chinese Written Language, said in his opening address that the conference would deal with two urgent questions . . . simplification of the Chinese characters and popularization of . . . Mandarin Chinese. The latter measure was important, he said, to prepare for the alphabetic reform of the written language. . . . Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, gave a scientific analysis of the development of the Chinese written language and its

inevitable move in the direction of an alphabetic form. He called on all those engaged in the language reform to undertake the necessary work so as to bring about a step-by-step reform of the Chinese written language."³⁵

The concluding report on the same conference states :

"The All-China Conference on the Reform of the Written Language ended on October 23. . . . The conference adopted an amended draft of simplified written characters and outlined concrete measures for unifying the pronunciation of Chinese based on Peking pronunciation. . . . Opinions were exchanged at the conference concerning preparatory work for radical reform of Chinese written characters and the replacement by their equivalent sound in letters of the alphabet."³⁶

We do not yet know what kind of alphabet the Chinese propose to adopt for their language. It has, however, recently been announced that the language of the Mongols of China is to be reformed on the basis of the Cyrillic alphabet.³⁷ A September 19, 1955, despatch of the New China News Agency stated that the new alphabet would be introduced into Inner Mongolia in two stages covering a period of six years. The first stage will last until 1958; during this period teachers and printers will be trained in use of the new letters, printing establishments equipped and school books prepared. Newspapers and magazines will publicize and explain the use of the new alphabet. During the second stage, from 1958-1961, the new alphabet will gradually replace the old in schools, newspapers and for official use.

One is struck by the relative slowness with which the change is to be made, compared to Soviet experience. It should be remembered, however, that in Outer Mongolia the change from classical Mongolian script to the Cyrillic alphabet also took more time than in the U.S.S.R. The Mongolian dialects spoken in Inner Mongolia are similar, but by no means identical, to the Qalqa dialect of Outer Mongolia. Presumably one of the Inner Mongolian dialects, Ordos perhaps, will be chosen by the Chinese as the basis for the new written language. We as yet have no specific information.

Adoption of their new alphabet by the Mongols of China represents the first victory for Cyrillic outside the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic. There had been speculation as to whether the Chinese Communists would actually favour the advance of the Cyrillic alphabet into their territory or whether they might not already have developed sufficient Chinese national pride to wish to prevent such an obvious manifestation of the influence of Russian culture in China itself. We do not yet have any clear indication that the Chinese Communists are planning to Cyrillicize the Turkic languages of Sinkiang, but if the Mongols are to adopt a Cyrillic alphabet, why not the Uigurs and Kazakhs of Sinkiang, whose kinsmen across the border in Kazakhstan have been using Cyrillic since 1940?³⁸ Chinese Communist sources contain a few statements about alphabetic reforms among some of these and other

minority peoples, but it is not clear what sort of alphabet is being introduced. Radio Urumchi, *e.g.*, stated on October 29, 1954, that a 28-letter alphabet had been completed for the Kirgiz of Sinkiang. On July 29, 1954, the same station reported that a committee had been set up to study the revision and standardization of the language of the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. It may be that in both these instances the Cyrillic alphabet used by the Kirgiz and Kazakhs of Soviet Central Asia is being introduced, but we do not know. An N.C.N.A. despatch of September 11, 1954, stated that a written language was being created for China's biggest national minority, the 6,000,000 Chuang of Western Kwangsi. The Chuang are a Thai-related people. Unfortunately it is not known on what basis their new written language is being built. Within two or three years we should have a much clearer idea of the direction Chinese Communist alphabetic experiments are taking.

If the Chinese themselves should eventually adopt a Cyrillic alphabet to replace their ancient characters, the world would witness one of the most startling cultural changes in the history of China. Whether the Chinese Communists contemplate such a shift we do not know. For their part, the Russians have already been busy proving that Cyrillic is adaptable to the Chinese phonetic system. About 30,000 Chinese Moslems live in Soviet Central Asia, mostly in South-Eastern Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. Up until recently these people, who speak a Kansu dialect, have apparently continued using traditional Chinese characters, though a Latin alphabet was devised for them in the late 1920's and some Soviet sources indicate that it has been used in schools since then. In 1952-53 a Cyrillic alphabet was worked out for these people—Dungans, as they are called in Soviet terminology. The alphabet was approved at a conference held in Frunze, capital of Kirgizia, on May 27, 1953, and according to Soviet sources is now in use in Dungan schools in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The tiny Chinese minority of Soviet Central Asia, therefore, has already set an example for use of the Cyrillic alphabet which, if they wish, the Chinese Communists may follow.³⁹

Change of alphabets in China involves more complex questions than change in method of writing, teaching of the new letters, and equipping printing establishments with new type. As in the Soviet Union, some degree of linguistic reform is bound to accompany any alphabetic change. In the U.S.S.R. adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet opened the way for intensified Russification of the non-Russian languages. Will adoption of Cyrillic for the Mongolian dialects spoken in China involve Russification of these languages? More logically, reform of the minority languages of China should eventually entail some degree of Sinicization. But how can Sinicization take place if the Chinese language itself is at the same time undergoing an accelerated process of change which is to lead to adoption of a precedent-shattering alphabetic system? Fascinating questions—but there can as yet be no answers. The answers will come as the Chinese Communists proceed further with their programme for alphabetic and linguistic reform.

From Tibet nothing has been heard about alphabetic or linguistic reform. The Chinese Communists are still moving very slowly in Tibet.

They are anxious not to alarm the Tibetans. Rather than oppose the monasteries, *e.g.*, they are attempting to win the confidence of the lamas and to work through them to introduce gradual reforms into the country. They have started secular schools in Tibet, but on a very limited basis. They have put groups of scholars to work compiling standardized lists of Tibetan equivalents for Chinese Communist political terms.⁴⁰ They are steadily increasing the output of political literature in Tibetan. They realize, however, that Tibet is probably one of the knottiest problems Communists anywhere have ever tackled and that it will require much time before Tibet can be subjected to the full force of Communist pressures and transformed into a "people's democracy." Alphabet changes in Tibet will most likely not be undertaken until the Chinese are ready to break with the theocracy—the lamas, the monasteries and the Dalai Lama himself. They will not be able to take this decisive step until they have reared a new generation of secular intellectuals to serve as puppet leaders for the country.

VI. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

It would be unrealistic to maintain that nothing can be said in favour of the linguistic and alphabetic changes which have occurred in Russian Central Asia during the last thirty years. The pace of change has undoubtedly been too fast; there has been too much arbitrariness and consequently much confusion. Whether it had been forced by the Communists or not, however, some sort of change was bound to come to Central Asia. The change would undoubtedly have been delayed longer and would have been more gradual when it came. It would have been the result of natural evolution among the peoples themselves. In all probability the Central Asians, left to their own devices, would sooner or later have changed over to a Latin alphabet, following the example of Turkey. In spite of religious and cultural ties, intrinsic beauty and historic tradition, the fact remains that the Arabic alphabet is not well adapted to the Turkic languages. It is not as well suited to the needs of a modern society as the Latin alphabet, or, for that matter, the Cyrillic. There is no point denying that abolition of the Arabic alphabet has probably facilitated the spread of literacy in Soviet Central Asia.

A good case can be made for the adoption of the Latin alphabet in Central Asia. It facilitated contact among the Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R. It should have made it much easier for these peoples to profit by the cultural revolution which was taking place in Turkey at the same time; but this was prevented by Communist fears of pan-Turkism. The Latin alphabet, had they continued to use it, would have helped the peoples of Central Asia come into closer contact with the languages and culture of Western Europe. Communist apprehensions have prevented such contacts from developing.

From a purely phonetic point of view the Cyrillic alphabet is just as good as the Latin alphabet for writing Turkic languages, perhaps a bit better because it disposes of more individual letters and requires fewer special signs. From any other point of view it is difficult to make much of a case for Cyrillic, except that it facilitates Russification. Use of Cyrillic makes it more difficult for the Central Asian peoples to develop contacts

with the West. It cuts them off from Turkey. The Cyrillic alphabet has been applied to the Turkic languages in such a way as to emphasize the differences between them. Unlike the Latin alphabet applied to these languages, it can hardly be said to be fully phonetic, since all Russian borrowings and words derived from them must be spelled exactly as they are in Russian. Many of the sounds in these words do not exist in Turkic languages (or in Tajik or Mongolian). The Soviets claim that by insisting on Russian spelling and pronunciation for borrowed words they are "introducing new sounds" into the Turkic languages and thereby "enriching them." This is a very specious argument.

It is interesting to compare what has happened in Russian Central Asia under the Communists with developments in the freed colonial and former colonial areas in the Middle East and South-East Asia. India comes readily to mind. The Russians have written a great deal about English exploitation of India; they have frequently accused the British of disregard for Indian culture and Indian national feelings. But did the British force the English language on the Indians, or require that any Indian language be written solely in Latin letters? India, now completely free of any vestige of British rule, is the scene of active debate as to whether the English language should be retained in use in the country at all. English came to India by a process of natural absorption. Indians, speaking a multitude of different languages themselves, found in it a new bond of national unity. They now find it hard to give up, though some Indians insist that English should be abandoned because it is a badge of former bondage. The debate promises to continue for some time and arbitrarily imposed decisions from above are not expected, though the Indian government is encouraging the development of Hindi as a common national language. Meanwhile the other native languages of India—all of which developed freely during the period of British rule—are experiencing a further evolution along lines natural to them. English words were never imposed on Indians. Many were adopted and some are still in use. Others are being replaced by native forms. The Latin alphabet was not imposed upon the Indian languages to make it easier for the people to learn English. Indians are free to retain or alter their native alphabets and shape their languages as they see fit.

South-East Asia and the Middle East provide many examples similar to India. Indonesians and Vietnamese took the Latin alphabet from their former colonial rulers. It was not imposed upon them. In any case, both nations are now free to retain or abandon it. Both are retaining it. Dutch and French as auxiliary official languages are being eased out in both Indonesia and Vietnam. These peoples are picking and choosing as they please.

All the nations of the Middle East cling firmly to the Arabic alphabet. None of them has ever been under any foreign pressure to abandon it, no matter what forms of European domination many of them have experienced in the political or economic fields. The French are now much abused by Communists and Arab states alike for the injustices of their rule in North Africa. Still, the French have never tampered with the most precious national attributes of their Moslem subjects—their languages or

their religion. Thoughtful observers have remarked with justice that the Arabs, if they took a longer view of their own interests, might well try to work up at least as much concern over the fate of their co-religionists in the Soviet Union as they do for the welfare of the Moslems of Algeria.

There is not much more that needs to be said to demonstrate where colonial exploitation and imperialism in all its ugly aspects exist in the world today in their most acute form. Free Asia provides a fascinatingly diverse picture of natural processes of alphabetic and linguistic change and interchange at work. The fate of the alphabets and languages of the Central Asian peoples under Soviet Russian domination is both a symbol and a measure of the degree of subjugation which these peoples have suffered in every field.

And still the present situation is not without hope. Pressure generates resistance. Assaults on traditions generate national pride. Literacy is a two-edged sword. Central Asians are resisting Russification by many subtle means. There is nothing to indicate that in speaking among themselves they use very many Russian words. The Central Asian press is full of complaints about the fact that natives do not learn Russian well enough to have a practical command of it. Communist criticism of Central Asians' own interpretation of their history and literature never ceases. There are thus many signs that the native peoples of Central Asia have within themselves the resources to resist Russification and that beneath the surface there may run positive currents of thought which some day—if Russian Communist pressure lessens—may come to the surface and set the pattern for independent future development of the same sort that is now taking place in freer parts of Asia. The Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kirgiz would seem to be in somewhat less immediate danger of being overwhelmed by the tide of Russification than the Kazakhs who are already a minority in their own territory and who are each year being forced to play host to a new wave of predominantly Slavic settlers. Russification is also proceeding far among the Buryats. The unfortunate peoples of Tuva and the Altai appear to be in the worst position of all. They are too small in numbers to resist effectively for long.

Outer Mongolia is a different question. Though the Qalqa language has been Cyrillicized, it has not been Russianized to the same degree as the Turkic and Mongolian languages of the Soviet Union. It is hard to believe that the Chinese Communists are disinterested in what happens in the Mongolian People's Republic. The Russians completed a railway to Ulan Bator in 1954; the Chinese are busy building one at the present time. It may not be out of admiration for things Russian that the Chinese are introducing the Cyrillic alphabet in Inner Mongolia. Perhaps they feel that the Cyrillic alphabet has come to Outer Mongolia to stay and that the chances of the Inner Mongols to influence their brothers to the north will be enhanced if they have a common medium of communication. The possibility of becoming patrons of Pan-Mongolism must at least have crossed the minds of some of the more imperialistically minded Chinese Communists.

It would be folly to predict that the Chinese and the Russians are likely to begin quarrelling over Outer Mongolia in the near future. But if, as

many students of these questions believe, Chinese-Russian co-operation eventually turns into competition, then Outer Mongolia should be one of the regions where concrete signs of competition first become evident. The same is true of Sinkiang, whose inhabitants are closely related to the peoples of Soviet Central Asia. Whether the Chinese will impose Cyrillic alphabets on the peoples of Sinkiang we do not know, but if they do, it may well be with an eye toward using these minorities as a means of exercising influence on Central Asians under Russian rule. Such speculations seem fantastic in terms of the immediate future, but in terms of fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years—who knows?

The Chinese are now great proponents of Asia for Asiatics, but there is no reason to assume that the Russians must always remain honorary Asiatics in Chinese minds. For the present the Chinese Communists appear to be somewhat more Communist than they are Chinese or Asian, and they clearly feel that they profit more by co-operating with the Russian Communists than they could gain by breaking with them. But there are many political, geographical and historical reasons for believing that over a long period of time the Russians and the Chinese, whether Communist or not, are more likely to be competitors than partners. It is in the light of these possibilities that the processes of linguistic and cultural transformation among the peoples along the Inner Asian borders of China become an interesting study. New alphabets in these remote regions will in all likelihood be the harbingers of much more far-reaching changes.

REFERENCES

¹ Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D. C. Somervell), London, 1946, pp. 166-67; also the "Note: Sea and Steppe as Language Conductors" on pp. 185-86 of the same edition.

² A possible exception is the Turkic "runic" alphabet which was used as early as the Seventh century A.D. by Turkic tribes living in the region of the upper Yenesei and in what is now Mongolia. Much work has been devoted to inscriptions in this alphabet in recent years by both Western and Russian scholars, e.g.: von Gabain, *Alttürkische Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1950; Malov, *Pamyatniki Drevnetyurkskoi Pis'mennosti*, Moscow, 1951; Malov, *Yeneseiskaya Pis'mennost' Tyurkov*, Moscow, 1952.

³ Vladimirtsov, *Sravnitel'naya Grammatika Mongol'skovo Yazyka*, Leningrad, 1929, pp. 19-33.

⁴ An interesting interpretation of the rise and decline of Asian influences as a force in world history is given by Grenard, *Grandeur et Décadence de l'Asie*, Paris, 1947.

⁵ Iranian and related Indo-European peoples were in earlier periods much more important in Central Asia than they are today. Until the fifteenth century Iranian influence was greater than Turkic in the southern oases. The Tajiks and a few small Pamir tribes represent the only Iranians who have maintained their identity in Central Asia into modern times, though there is still a significant Iranian substratum among the Uzbeks. The Iranians of Central Asia, like the Turks, were early converts to Islam and adopted the Arabic alphabet.

⁶ The most recent study of this period of Central Asian linguistic and alphabetic history is Brockelmann, *Osttürkische Grammatik der Islamischen Literatursprachen Mittelasiens*, Leiden, 1954.

⁷ "Chinese Moslems practically all speak the Chinese language as their mother tongue. . . . A considerable number learn more or less Arabic; the mullahs use it in conducting services and others repeat transliterations of Arabic sounds represented

by Chinese characters. Believers who make the Pilgrimage often learn some Arabic, and the ordinary Moslem is proud to display his knowledge of even a few words of 'the tongue of the Angels.' In decorations and on utensils the Arabic script is found in abundance. Yet there is no linguistic difference between the Moslem and his neighbors of other faiths in the ordinary affairs of life."—Mason, *The Mohammedans of China*, The China Society, London, 1922, pp. 7-8.

⁸ Unlike most of the Turks of Central Asia, these Altai Turks, left behind in what appears to have been part of the original Turkic homeland, were never converted to Islam and consequently had no contact with the Arabic alphabet.

⁹ Wurm, *Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R.*, Central Asian Research Centre, London, 1954, p. 12.

¹⁰ A very interesting account of Russian-native cultural relations in Central Asia before the Revolution is given by Zenkovsky, "Kulturkampf in Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia," *American Slavic and East European Review*, February, 1955, pp. 15-41.

¹¹ The famous *Secret History of the Mongols*, e.g., though originally composed in Mongolian, has survived only in a Chinese "phonetic" transcription. The original Mongolian text has had to be laboriously reconstructed from the Chinese characters by scholars so that this valuable chronicle can be read and understood. Cf. Haenisch, *Die Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, Leipzig, 1948, pp. iii-xvi.

¹² The Volga Tatars, culturally the most advanced of all the Moslem Turkic peoples of Russia, also adopted a reformed Arabic alphabet in the early 1920's. The practicality and popularity of this reformed alphabet made the introduction of the Latin alphabet among the Tatars very difficult. Even Tatar Communists at first opposed it. Latinization was achieved among the Tatars by sheer force in 1929. See Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies*, London, 1952, p. 36.

¹³ See Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*, Jerusalem, 1954 (Studies of the Israel Oriental Society, No. 5). This very readable and highly informative study of the process of linguistic transformation in Turkey during the last 25 years gives a vivid impression of all the complications involved in such an undertaking. The alphabet shifts carried out in the Soviet Union have involved far more difficulties and confusion than in Turkey, for there has been more direct political interference and political requirements have varied greatly at different periods. Furthermore, there was not one, but *two* Soviet alphabet shifts, and no sooner had people become accustomed to the Latin alphabet than they had to change to Cyrillic. Last but not least, the Soviet Turkic languages have not only gone through a process of purification from foreign elements, like Turkish (Turks distinguish between their present language, *Turkish*, and the pre-reform language, *Ottoman*), but more recently they have also been subjected to the exact opposite—the necessity of assimilating a great number of Russian words and expressions. When one keeps all these things in mind, one sees how simple—with all its complications!—the Turkish linguistic reform has been compared to the ordeal which the Turkic (and most other non-Slavic) languages of the U.S.S.R. have had to undergo.

¹⁴ Sir Olaf Caroe has suggested that the success of Latinization in Turkey gave the Russians second thoughts about the long-range desirability of the Latin alphabet for the Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R. and that Cyrillicization as the final goal was probably accepted by the Communist leadership in the early 1930's; see his *Soviet Empire*, London, 1953, p. 156.

¹⁵ Several recent works provide interesting details about the Latinization process: W. K. Matthews, *Languages of the U.S.S.R.*, Cambridge, 1951, pp. 70-71; Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies*, pp. 34-37; Wurm, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁶ Matthews, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-5.

¹⁷ See Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies*, pp. 293-95.

¹⁸ The Uzbek dialect of the town of Turkestan preserved the principle of vowel harmony, lost because of Iranian influence in the dialects of Tashkent and the Fergana Valley, but still adhered to in the neighbouring Turkic languages; preservation of vowel harmony coupled with Tashkent vocabulary and idioms helped make the original Latinized literary Uzbek more readily intelligible to speakers of Kazakh, Karakalpak and Turkmen; see Wurm, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

¹⁹ The Shors have since completely disappeared as a separate national entity and their territory has been engulfed by Russian colonists. The Oirots, numerically

much stronger, still exist but under another name. Since 1948 they have been called *Altai* ("People of the Altai") and the term "Oiroi" is now never used in Soviet writings. Kolarz, in *Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, London, 1954, pp. 169-176, gives a summary of the history of these two small peoples under Russian rule.

²⁰ For an excellent summary of the history of Tannu Tuva since the mid-nineteenth century see Kolarz, *Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, pp. 161-69.

²¹ See Kolarz, *Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, pp. 124-26.

²² Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies*, pp. 37-38.

²³ N. A. Baskakov, "The Turkic Peoples of the U.S.S.R.—the Development of their Languages and Writing," originally published in *Voprosy Yazykoznaniiya*, Moscow, June, 1952; an English translation with a commentary by Dr. Stefan Wurm was published by the Central Asian Research Centre, London, in 1953; the above quotation is from pp. 30-31 of this edition.

²⁴ As had been the case when the Latin alphabet was adapted to the Turkic languages, extra letters and signs were necessary in the Cyrillic for sounds peculiar to Turkic such as the *ö* and *ü* sounds, the *ng*, the *gh* and the *j*, to mention only the most common. The Cyrillic letters for sounds peculiar to Russian but not present in the Turkic languages are not generally used to represent other Turkic sounds, for this would conflict with the principle stressed by Baskakov in the passage quoted above that alphabets must be so devised as to facilitate the learning of Russian by speakers of native languages.

²⁵ "The liquidation of the original nucleus of Uzbek cultural leaders was as complete as the elimination of the Uzbek political leaders who led the nation until 1937. Most of the prominent Uzbek poets and writers acclaimed in the first fifteen years of the Soviet régime must not be even mentioned today." Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies*, p. 279.

²⁶ It is interesting that many of the Russian words introduced into the Central Asiatic languages were originally borrowed by the Russians from Western European languages. Typical examples, whose meaning is readily recognized by any English speaker, include: *revolyutsia*, *proletariat*, *respublika*, *partia*, *kommunizm*, *sotsializm*, *demokratia*, *fabrika* ("factory"), *kombain* ("combine"), *traktor*, *filizofia*, *matematika*, *khimia*, ("chemistry"), *biologia*, *atom*, *kultura*, *gazeta*, ("newspaper"), *teatr*, *muzei* ("museum"), *sport*, *telefon*, *radio*, etc. (listed in Baskakov, *op. cit.*, p. 19). If one wishes to be technical, therefore, the Central Asian languages are being partly "westernized" while they are being "Russified." Modern Russian itself is by no means a pure language and its political, economical, scientific terminology includes a higher proportion of words borrowed from Western languages than is usually realized. (See Matthews, *The Structure and Development of Russian*, Cambridge, 1953, pp. 158-173.) It should be remembered, however, that the Central Asiatic languages are being required to accept these Western words in their Russian garb; they are to be spelled and pronounced in the Russian way, in spite of the fact that it would be natural for them to be assimilated into the Turkic languages in somewhat different form. Last but not least, these words are *forced* upon the Central Asiatic languages, not adopted by the free will of the peoples concerned or simply assimilated by natural linguistic processes. Rather than use these common Western words, some peoples have preferred to create new ones from native roots; the German language offers many familiar examples, as do modern Turkish and other Asiatic languages. The Central Asian peoples have not been permitted to exercise this kind of choice.

²⁷ See Baskakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35, 45-47.

²⁸ For a lengthy discussion of postwar purges and cultural controversies in Soviet Central Asia see Zenkovsky, "Ideological Deviation in Soviet Central Asia," in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, June, 1954, pp. 424-437.

²⁹ *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, September 25, 1954.

³⁰ Dylykov, *Demokraticheskoe Dvizhenie Mongol'skovo Naroda v Kitae*, Moscow, 1953, p. 75. This Russian work gives an accurate summary of the current Chinese "line" on Inner Mongolia and its place in the Chinese Communist state structure.

³¹ The Outer Mongols declared their independence of China in 1911, but the Chinese never recognized it. All Chinese governments and parties during the 1920's and 1930's stubbornly insisted that Outer Mongolia belonged to China. This was

also the position taken by most of the world powers. Even Mao Tse-Tung is quoted by one source (Edgar Snow, *Scorched Earth*, London, 1941, p. 289, as quoted by Friters) as saying that Outer Mongolia would naturally become part of the federated Chinese state the Communists would establish when they achieved power. At the end of World War II, as a result of a general readjustment of Chinese Soviet relations, the Kuomintang government agreed to recognize the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic. This occurred in early 1946. A thoroughly documented study of the legal and political status of Outer Mongolia during the last half-century was published a few years ago: Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*, Baltimore, 1949. It is interesting to note that Outer Mongolia was lost to the Chinese more recently than Formosa.

³² According to the 1953 census, the non-Chinese population of China totalled 35,320,360, or slightly more than six per cent. of the entire population; Russians account for approximately half, all Slavs for somewhat less than three-quarters of the total Soviet population.

³³ *Policy Towards Nationalities of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, 1953, pp. 67-68.

³⁴ Ovidenko, *Vnutrennyaya Mongoliya*, Moscow, 1954, pp. 83-84.

³⁵ N.C.N.A. dispatch quoted by Tass on October 17, 1955.

³⁶ N.C.N.A. dispatch repeated by Tass on October 24, 1955.

³⁷ N.C.N.A. dispatch of August 17, 1955.

³⁸ It is curious to note that a Russian-Uigur dictionary published by the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh S.S.R. in July, 1955, prints the Uigur in Arabic script. A Uigur-Russian dictionary, presumably also employing Arabic script, will be published in 1956. Since the language of the Uigurs living in Russian Central Asia was Cyrillicized in 1941 and all publishing in Uigur in the U.S.S.R. is now done in Cyrillic, the new dictionaries would appear to be for the use of Uigurs in Sinkiang. A recent Soviet textbook of the Uigur language (Najip, *Uigurski Yazyk*, Moscow, 1954) also employs the Arabic script and includes a short dictionary of new words and terms. The new words are mostly those required for translation of Communist political and economic writings.

³⁹ See "Novy al'favit dlya sovetskikh Dungan" in *Kratkie Soobshcheniya Instituta Vostokovedeniya*, XII, Moscow, 1955, pp. 134-36.

⁴⁰ N.C.N.A. dispatch of August 21, 1955.

AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

SECOND CENTURY B.C. TO 1222 A.D.

By LOUIS DUPREE

SIX series of invaders entered Afghanistan during the historical periods with which we are concerned. The first came out of Central Asia, second the Iranian Plateau, third from India, fourth from Central Asia, the fifth had its ultimate source in the Arabian Peninsula, the last came from Mongolia.

THE EARLY MOVEMENTS OUT OF CENTRAL ASIA

SECOND CENTURY B.C. TO B.C.-A.D. BOUNDARY

The Græco-Bactrian kingdoms in Afghanistan and north-west India (now Pakistan) first felt the impact of nomadic invaders from Central Asia about 135 B.C., when the Śakas pushed them out of Bactria (northern Afghanistan). The Śakas (variously called Sacas, Sacæ, Sacarauli, or Sacarauçæ in Indo-European classical sources; Se, Se-wang, and Se-jung in Chinese sources) had been slowly pushed west by a chain reaction which had its origin in the western frontiers of Ch'in Dynasty China in the third century B.C.

In the second century B.C. the two strongest political groups in the Far East were constantly at war; the sophisticated Han Dynasty Chinese and the nomadic kingdom of the Huing-Nu or Huns. Against these marauding herdsmen the great Ch'in emperor, Shih Huang-ti, began to build the Great Wall in 214 B.C.

By the beginning of the second century B.C. a pattern of raid-and-retaliation had been established. The Huing-Nu invaded the Chinese borderlands at will, and the Chinese sent armies to drive them out. As a result the Huns could not permanently occupy the looted lands, but neither could the Chinese system of *limes* keep the nomads from periodically raiding the frontier.

About 165 B.C. the Huing-Nu were attacked by one of their subject kingdoms, the Yüeh-Chih, setting in motion the chain reaction mentioned earlier.

Beaten by the Huing-Nu, but still strong, the Yüeh-Chih packed up horses, flocks, tents, and baggage and moved west, the only possible route to freedom. The Huing-Nu controlled the north; the Chinese the south and east. A small group of the Yüeh-Chih (called the Little Yüeh-Chih) moved south-west and settled among the war-like Kiang tribes of Tibet. The majority, the Great Yüeh-Chih, travelled north of the Gobi Desert into the lands of the Wusun.

The numerically inferior Wusun were defeated by the Yüeh-Chih, and subsequently moved north and attached themselves to the Huing-Nu for protection.

The Yüeh-Chih continued to move west, always searching for sufficient pasture lands. They found such lands across Lake Issik-Kul (now Lake Balkash, 43° 35' N., 76° 00' E.) in the Dzungarian Basin, but to gain possession of the land they were forced to drive out the occupants, the Śakas.

The Śakas fled in two directions, one group crossing the Oxus River into the Afghan-Greek kingdom of Bactria (Dahia or Tahia), another west to Parthian Iran. They did not remain long in Bactria, however, for once again the chain reaction had begun.

About 140 B.C. the Wusun, supported by the Huing-Nu, pushed the Yüeh-Chih from the Lake Issik-Kul region. In turn, the Yüeh-Chih drove the Śakas from Bactria.

The Śakas occupied Śakastan (modern Seistan) and founded a kingdom which for a brief moment extended from the Helmand River to the Persian Gulf and modern Iraq. Then the great Parthian soldier-king, Mithradates II (c. 124-88 B.C.), reconquered Śakastan and once again it became a Parthian satrapy.

The Śaka nobility became satraps and garrison troops in most of the eastern Parthian empire. Gradually the Śaka satraps of Gandhara (includes Peshawar and Jalalabad), Mathura (modern Muttra in India), Kaccha (Cutch), Surashthra (Kathiawar), and Arachosia (Kandahar) made themselves kings and, although still maintaining allegiance, the Parthian rulers were virtually independent.

By the B.C.-A.D. boundary most of the Greek states south of the Hindu Kush had fallen to the Śaka-Parthian kings, the last to fall being the kingdom of Kabul under Hermæus about A.D. 50. Whether Kabul fell to the Śaka or the Yüeh-Chih is still moot.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE KUSHANS

FIRST CENTURY A.D. TO FOURTH CENTURY A.D.

Parthia's hold on her eastern empire weakened, and finally collapsed, between A.D. 45 and 64. This collapse was precipitated by the rise of the Kushans, one of the five principal Yüeh-Chih tribes (the other four were Humi, Sewangi, Hitum, and Koruto) some time between A.D. 25 and 40. The Kushans united the Yüeh-Chih into a powerful military machine. Middle Eastern, Indian, and Western sources after the first century A.D. refer to the Yüeh-Chih as the Kushans, but the Chinese continued to use the older name. Henceforth, I shall call this empire and people Kushan, but remember that Kushan and Yüeh-Chih are interchangeable.

Kujula Kadphises (Kadphises I) and his son, Vima (Kadphises II) of the First Kushan Dynasty spread Kushan control from the lower Indus Valley (minus Surashthra) to the Iranian frontier, from the Sinkiang border to the Caspian and Aral Seas.

Kanishka I founded the Second Kushan Dynasty some time after the

death of Kadphises II. "Kanishka is certainly one of the two or three really great figures in Indian history. Not only was he a great soldier, but it was undoubtedly due in no small measure to his influence that Gandhara, the seat of his government, became a potent and vital centre of literary and artistic activity. He was also a magnificent patron of religious learning, and the northern Buddhists looked upon him in the same manner as the Eastern Christians looked upon Constantine. Numerous monuments and coins dating from his reign have been reported, but so lacking are the Indians in historical tradition that we are still in some doubt as to when his reign actually took place."*

Whenever he lived and died (probably around the close of the first century A.D.) Kanishka left an indelible mark on the Indian, Afghan, Iranian, and even the Chinese cultural landscape, for it was during his reign that Buddhism rose to its apogee in Central Asia and subsequently spread to the Far East and South-East Asia.

His armies marched down the Ganges at least as far as Benares and Ghazipur, conquered Surashthra and the mouths of the Indus. Kashmir, Sinkiang, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, all the Chinese provinces north of Tibet and east of the Pamirs fell to Kanishka. He moved his capital from Bactria to Purushapura (Peshawar), and Kapisa (Begram) became his summer capital. The North Indian capital was Mathura.

The death of Kanishka, like his origin and much of his life, is shrouded in mystery. Tradition holds that he was assassinated by his own officers, who had tired of being military exiles from their homes and families.

The Kushan empire held its own under the last two Second Dynasty kings, Huvishka and Vasudeva (who probably died about A.D. 220) and then began to break up into independent and semi-independent states.

The first two Kushan dynasties were periods of great artistic and intellectual achievements.†

Commercially this period was also of great importance. Both land and sea routes permitted an exchange of goods from China to Rome. Overland routes were more important during the first two centuries A.D., but some sea-borne trade existed between India and Rome, as conclusively proven by excavations at Arikamedu on the south-east coast of India.‡

The major east-west land route from China was: skirting the Gobi Desert and entering Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) at Tun Huang, turning north-west past Turfan and Urumchi (Tiwa) and passing through the Dzungarian Gates, then continuing across the Central Asiatic Steppes south of Lake Balkash through Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bokhara. From these last-named centres the route led south to Balkh, Bamiyan, Begram, Kabul, Peshawar, Taxila, and on to the Indian Ocean.

Another route led across Parthian Iran through Merv and Ectabana (Hamadan) to Seleucia, Petra, Palmyra, or Tadmor (Syria), which were among the more important central storehouses of goods for Rome and China.

Major items of export from the Roman empire (including Syria and

* McGovern, 1939, pp. 251-252.

† Rowland, 1953, pp. 75-122 is the latest work which discusses this.

‡ Wheeler, Ghosh and Deva, 1946.

Egypt) were: gold and silver plates, woollen and linen textiles, topaz, coral, amber, frankincense, glass vessels, and wine.

From India came cotton cloth, indigo, spices, semi-precious stones, pearls, ivory, Kashmir wool, steel swords, and furs.

Central Asia (including Afghanistan) contributed rubies, lapis lazuli silver, turquoise, various gums and drugs.

China sent raw silk to Rome, fancy embroidered silks to Central Asia and India, furs (from Siberia and Manchuria), and many spices to both India and Rome.

The "ultimate markets are indicated by the discoveries of Roman glass in China, of Indian pottery at Pompeii in Italy, of Chinese pottery in Roman tombs in the European Rhineland."*

THE KUSHANO-SASSANIAN PERIOD OF SMALL, SEMI-INDEPENDENT STATES

FOURTH-FIFTH CENTURIES A.D.

While the Kushan empire was slowly breaking up into independent fragments, a powerful new dynasty, the Sassanian, was rising in Iran. The Sassanians, under the founder Ardashir-i-Bahegan (A.D. 226-240) quickly overthrew the Parthians, and a violent reaction against Greek, Roman, and Central Asiatic influences began in Iran.

Ardashir overran the Kushan states from Sogdia to the Punjab, but by the time of his death, most Kushan states were again semi-independent, and only nominally recognized Sassanian overlordship.

From the beginning the Sassanians considered Byzantium, against whom they fought many wars, their main foe. This was one of the first periods of sustained East-West conflict and it lasted from A.D. 229, when Ardashir first marched against the Roman Empire, until the final defeat of the Sassanians by the Arabs in the seventh century A.D.

The effects of this struggle for the control of the Levantine coast, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia were far-reaching economically as well as politically. The overland east-west trade routes were more and more replaced by sea-borne trade across the Indian Ocean.

This upsurge in the sea trade did not mean that the overland trade was dead, or even dying, for as the Romans and Sassanians wore each other down militarily, the land routes were re-opened, and the Sassanians themselves became the land-trade middlemen, with Balkh, Samarkand, Bokhara, Merv, and Nishapur serving as their headquarters.

THE GUPTA WARS

FOURTH-SIXTH CENTURIES A.D.

Minor invasions from contemporary India must be mentioned briefly. A native Indian dynasty, the Gupta (c. A.D. 320-535) had established itself from the west to the east coast of India. The Guptas were as pro-Indian as the Sassanians were pro-Iranian. They tried to throw the Śakas and

* Wheeler, 1950, p. 52.

and Kushans out of western and north-western India, succeeding with the former, but only partially defeating the Kushans, who retained control of the upper Indus valley.

THE EPHTHALITE HUNS (WHITE HUNS)

FIFTH-SEVENTH CENTURIES A.D.

The small Kushan states were not united, and thus could not meet the sudden threat which emptied into Bactria in the fifth century A.D.

The Epthalite (or Hephthalite) Huns, as these new Central Asiatic invaders were called, are as much a mystery people as the earlier Śakas and Kushans, and the date of their invasion is difficult to determine.

History first records the Epthalites as clients of the Avar Mongolian Empire, about the end of the fourth century A.D. Probably wishing to be free of their overlords, the Epthalites moved through Chinese Turkestan and Sogdia, extorting tribute as they went.

Crossing the Oxus, the Epthalites drove out the Kushans, ruled by Kidara, a Fourth Kushan Dynasty king. The military aristocracy of the Bactrian Kushans fled south over the Hindu Kush, and being forced east by the Sassanians, passed through Kandahar and eventually conquered parts of Gandhara. The Kidarites (as the Fourth Dynasty kings are sometimes called) ruled north-west India, the Punjab, and south-west Afghanistan from c. A.D. 390 to 460, when they were again displaced by the Epthalites.

The Epthalite empire in Afghanistan and north-west India lasted about 150 years (c. A.D. 400 to 565) and extended from Chinese Sinkiang to Sassanian Iran, from Sogdia to the Punjab. More than thirty separate semi-independent or independent kingdoms had been conquered. The Epthalites did not have a peaceful reign, however, and the Sassanians were their chief antagonists. Several Sassanian monarchs, frustrated in wars with Byzantium, turned to the east. After being initially successful, they were ultimately defeated by the more militarily adroit Epthalites.

About A.D. 565 the Epthalites were attacked by the combined forces of the Sassanians and Western Turks, who had made their appearance in the political arena about A.D. 552 when they rebelled against and crushed the Central Asian Avar empire.

As a result of the victory the Turks become masters of all the White Hun territories north of the Oxus; the Sassanians ruled south of the Oxus.

Thus, at the beginning of the seventh century A.D. most of Afghanistan was under Sassanid control, divided into provinces governed by White Hun satraps in the north and Kushan (and/or Śaka) satraps in the south and south-west. While the Sassanian empire was slowly melting before the attacks of the Arabs in the second quarter of the seventh century, anarchy and minor invasions swept Afghanistan. Each new satrap had to fight for his position.

To further complicate the picture, the Hindus and Western Turks kept pushing the frontiers of the petty states, absorbing a few, accepting tribute from others.




FIG. I.—EAST ASIA IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C., SHOWING THE ROUTE BY WHICH THE SAKA AND YUEH-CHIH (KUSHANS) REACHED BACTRIA AND ARACHOSIA.

(Drawn by Prof. F. K. Morris).




FIG. II.—POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF EAST ASIA: FIRST CENTURY A.D.

(Drawn by Prof. F. K. Morris).

FROM THE ISLAMIC TO THE MONGOL INVASION

SEVENTH CENTURY—A.D. 1222

Sassanian power was broken by the Arabs at Qadisiya in A.D. 637. The *coup de grâce* was delivered at Nihawand (near Hamadan) in A.D. 641, and all eastern Iran fell into Arab hands.

The first big Arab raid through Kandahar and central Afghanistan took place in A.D. 699-700, when the Arab governor of Seistan was sent to chastise the Kushan (now called Shahiya) king of Kabul, who had refused to pay tribute. Even though defeated, the Kushans continued to rule Kabul as vassals of the Umayyad caliphs.

T'ang Dynasty China, which had defeated the Eastern Turks about A.D. 630, was also covetously eyeing Afghanistan at this time. Unable to fight actively for control of Afghanistan because of internal difficulties, the Chinese helplessly watched Arab raids for booty give way to permanent military garrisons during the period from A.D. 665-715. Native rulers were permitted to stay on their thrones, assisted by Arab military governors and tax collectors.

When the Abbasid caliphs came into power (A.D. 750-1258) revolts occurred all over the Islamic world, but al-Mansur, the second caliph of this dynasty, secured the empire. By 850, however, the Abbasids were beginning to crumble, and many petty independent Muslim states were formed in North Africa and Western Asia.

The first three semi-independent eastern dynasties were of Iranian origin: Tahirid (A.D. 820-872), which penetrated Afghanistan only in the extreme west, bordering Khurasan; Saffarid (A.D. 869 to c. 900), which broke the power of the Buddhist Kushans (Turki Shahs) of Kabul, Zamin-dar, Bust, Ghor, and Kandahar; Samanids (c. A.D. 900-999), ruling Seistan, Kandahar, all of modern Iran, and Transoxiana. All these semi-independent dynasties professed outward loyalty to the caliphs in Baghdad. Although the intellectual centre of Islam was still Baghdad, the Samanid capital, Bokhara, and its chief city, Samarkand, saw the rise of Persian scholarship. By the end of the Samanid Dynasty, both these cities ranked with Baghdad as centres of learning and art.

During the Samanid period, the Turks from the north, who had been gathering strength since the beginning of the Chinese Sung Dynasty (960) thrust themselves into the Islamic limelight for the first time. In 990, the Ilek (Ilaq) Khan (Kara Khanids or Toquz-Oghuz Turks) of Turkestan captured Bokhara, and nine years later finished off the Samanids, dividing the Samanid domains with the Ghaznavids, who under Subuktigin had seized Khurasan south of the Oxus in 994.

With the Ghaznavids or Yamini Dynasty (962-1186), the Turks made themselves a power in Iran, Afghanistan, and India. The founder of the dynasty, Alptigin, had been a Turkish slave in the bodyguard of the Samanid ruler. As had happened before and would happen again many times, the "slaves" of the Western Asian ruling families slowly and subtly (and at times not so subtly) changed roles with their masters. Gibb and Bowen (1951) give a brilliant study of this "ruling slave" phenomenon in the late Ottoman Empire (A.D. 1299-1923).

Alptigin had gained the confidence of his master and was made governor of Khurasan (capital, Nishapur), but he quickly found himself in disfavour for exceeding his authority and was forced to flee for his life. With a few loyal Turk followers, Alptigin established an independent dynasty at Ghazni. The real founder of the Ghaznavid Empire was Subuktigin (976-997), son-in-law and one-time slave of Alptigin. The succeeding sixteen Ghaznavid rulers, the most famous of whom was Mahmud (999-1030), were all lineal descendants of Subuktigin.

Mahmud was one of the greatest generals in history, conducting at least seventeen successful campaigns against India, adding north-west India and the Punjab to his empire, and adding riches to his treasury by looting rich Hindu temples. He overthrew the ruler of Ghur (Ghor), an independent mountain kingdom in central Afghanistan, in 1002. The Ghurid ruler was of "East Persian" descent, probably one of the last of the Kushans.*

At this time, the Sunni Caliph was virtually a prisoner of the Shi'ite Buwayhid ruler of western Iran. Sunni Mahmud invaded Iran and sliced Isfahan, Rayy, and the Makran coast from Buwayhid control. The Caliph, al-Qadir (991-1031), showed his appreciation by titling Mahmud *Yamin-al-Dawlah* (the right arm of the state).

Despite his military reputation, Mahmud filled his capital and other cities with men of learning and became a patron of the arts. Among these learned men were the scientist and historian al-Biruni, the poet Firdawsi, and the historian al-Utbi.

At the death of Mahmud, the familiar pattern of the breakdown of central authority occurred. Small independent states sprang up in the Indian provinces, while the Kara Khanids to the north and the Seljuks (who had replaced the Buwayhids in 1055) from Iran nibbled away at the frontiers. The death blow came from the Ghurids in 1186, when they defeated the last Ghaznavid prince at Lahore.

Thus in the last half of the twelfth century A.D. Turkish dynasties controlled all of the Eastern Caliphate: Afghanistan, eastern Iran, and West Pakistan were all under the Turkish Ghurids; central and western Iran were in the hands of the Seljuk Turks, until the Turkish Khwarizm Shahs came out of Transoxiana to overthrow them by 1194.

The Abbasid Caliph was Caliph in name only; the Arabs no longer controlled Western Asia as the year A.D. 1200 approached. The Turks were invincible, but there were rumours coming out of Central Asia that a saviour was on the way. The Christians believed Prester John was coming to save them from the Muslims; the Caliph hoped the new invader would re-establish the glory of a centrally powerful Caliphate.

The man who came out of Asia in 1220 was not a noble saviour on a white horse; he was a brutal, brilliant, military technician on a scraggly Mongol pony, leading an army of men who seemed to be part horse.

Temujin or Chingis Khan (1155-1227) made history by destroying the finest civilizations of the thirteenth century. He carved an empire from the China Sea to the Adriatic, but it was a transient empire, and the emperor slept in a tent instead of a palace.

* Sykes, 1940, p. 189.

The results were not transient: Western Asia still bears the scars, still suffers from the economic impact. The atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have destroyed much and killed many, but now the cities are rebuilt, even if the dead cannot be returned; the silent ruins, silted canals, and destroyed cities in Western Asia are still Chingis Khan's monument in world history.

But Islam did not die in the rubble. "In the darkest hour of political Islam, religious Islam has been able to achieve some of its brilliant successes."* For "less than half a century after Hugalú's (a grandson of Chingis Khan) merciless attempt at the destruction of Islamic culture, his great grandson Ghazan, as a devout Muslim, was concentrating much time and energy to the reunification of the same culture."†

SOURCES MENTIONED

- Gibb, H. A. R., and Harold Bowen. *Islamic Society and the West*. Vol. I. Oxford University Press, London, 1951.
- Hitti, Philip. *History of the Arabs*. 4th edition. Macmillan, London, 1949.
- McGovern, William. *The Early Empires of Central Asia*. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1939.
- Rowland, Benjamin. *The Art and Architecture of India*. Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1953.
- Sykes, Percy. *A History of Afghanistan*, 2 vols. Macmillan, London, 1940.
- Wheeler, R. E. M. *Five Thousand Years of Pakistan*. Christopher Johnson, London, 1950.
- Wheeler, R. E. M., A. Ghosh, and Krishna Deva. *Arikamedu: An Indo-Roman Trading Station on the East Coast of India*. *Ancient India*, July, No. 2, pp. 17-124. Calcutta, 1946.

* Hitti, 1949, p. 475.

† Hitti, *Ibid.*, p. 488.

Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published, and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual contributors.

REVIEWS

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Third Series; Volume VIII, 1938-39. H.M.S.O. 1955. Pp. 560. 50s. net.

The series of publications to which this publication belongs represents an attempt to mitigate on the one hand the rule forbidding any detailed account of confidential archives of our Government to be published for 50 years, and on the other to avoid the bias, conscious or unconscious, which publication by the Government itself may entail, and has in certain cases been held to have occurred. Hence publication on a selective basis has been entrusted to unprejudiced historians—in this case, Sir Llewellyn Woodward and Mr. Rohan Butler—with complete freedom in the choice of documents for publication.

Originally this series, authorized by H.M. Government in 1944, was divided into two series, the first opening with the Treaty of Versailles, and the second with the year 1930.

But the demand for *data* dealing with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 occasioned a Third Series, with Volumes I to VII covering the period from the German invasion of Austria in March, 1938, to September 3, 1939. Volumes VIII and IX of this third series are concerned with British policy in the Far East. This present volume begins in August, 1938, and ends in April, 1939, but the theme of the two volumes is continuous. Volume IX—for the period April 10 to September 3, 1939—completes the record in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939.

As regards the choice of August 4, 1938, as the starting point of this Volume VIII, it is pointed out in Sir Llewellyn Woodward's introduction that the choice

“... allowed the inclusion of material on the Far East immediately before and during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938. The situation in the Far East had an important bearing on British policy in Europe, while, in turn, the apparent completeness of the British and French surrender to the German diplomacy of menace influenced the policy of Japan.”

After pointing out that H.M. Government had no illusions about the intentions of Japan, the introduction goes on to point out that

“The three main factors determining the maximum of possible resistance were (i) The European situation; (ii) The attitude of the United States; (iii) The progress of British rearmament.”

The document content of this volume is divided into five chapters—of which the first is concerned with the British attitude towards the Sino-Japanese conflict, and attempts to reach an understanding with Japan on the treatment of British interests in China.

Chapter II includes an important despatch from Sir H. Clark-Kerr to Viscount Halifax of November 11, 1938, pointing out that in the Kuomintang there was a pro-Russia party—and that Chiang Kai-shek “spoke of necessity of teaching other friends than ourselves . . . he said that there were two or three roads open to him and that leading to Russia was one of them.”

Chapter III closes with a Japanese Foreign Minister's statement published in the *Japan Advertiser* on December 20, 1938, which speaks of “co-ordination between Japan, Manchuria and China in political, economic and cultural fields,” of “self-defence against the Communist menace” and of a “proposed new order for East Asia which will not only bring permanent stability to this part of the globe” but also “put the economic activities of Occidental powers in East Asia upon a far more solid foundation than at present.”

Chapters IV and V contain further correspondence with regard to Japanese attacks upon British interests in China, and the situations in Tientsin and Shanghai; Chinese appeals for increased British assistance, and reports of the conclusion of an alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan (January 1 to April 8, 1939).

There are appendices on the Naval situation in the Far East at the period, and on the arrest and internment of Ssu Ching-wu (October 4 to November 1, 1938).

The compilation shows, in certain respects, very clearly how and why our position and influence in the Far East has declined so much since 1938.

H. R. P.

Asia East by South: A Cultural Geography. By J. E. Spencer. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd. 1954. Pp. 453, with numerous maps and figs. in text. Small 4to. 68s.

This book forms one of a trio to which Professor Dudley Stamp contributed the volume on Africa and Professor Samuel van Valkenberg that on Europe. The reader can anticipate a high standard of scholarship and, on the whole, he will not be disappointed. The author is modestly described in the publisher's "blurb" as an "expert with more first-hand knowledge of the Orient than any other living geographer." This is high praise for the countryman of Owen Lattimore and Carleton Coon—to say nothing of some humble old-world amateurs of the same discipline. Indeed, Professor Spencer has had plenty of field experience. From 1932 he was attached to the Ministry of Finance in the Chinese Nationalist Government where for eight years he was an assistant district director in the Salt Administration. During the late war, he served under the American Office of Strategic Services. Part of his time he was chief of the research and analysis branch of the Far Eastern Division of OSS in India and China. After the war he travelled extensively in the Philippines. In 1953 he was appointed head of the Department of Geography in the University of California, Los Angeles.

The author observes that "one must grant, at the outset, that there is no completely satisfactory way to divide up portions of the world for detailed study." He finds that "the conventional continent of Asia is valid neither as a continent nor as a unit of geographic presentation." But "a simple climatic division of Eurasia has been made, three segments resulting. These are the dry lands of south-west and central Asia, the cold humid lands of north and north-west Eurasia, and the hot humid lands of south and eastern Asia." These last form the subject of his study under the title "Asia East by South." It is "Monsoon Asia" from north-west India to eastern New Guinea, from Java to Hokkaido. It is an intelligible field of study and the author has done a service in presenting a book which is within the grasp of the general reader and which revises current conceptions in the light of recent events and new knowledge and methods of presentation.

It is clearly impracticable in a brief review to do justice to the many aspects of the book. Part 1, Systematic Geography, includes chapters on Geomorphology, Climatology, Mineral Geography, Marine Life and Animals in Oriental Economy, The Geography of Health and Disease, Settlements and their Architecture, etc. These chapters are well done, although the publisher's "blurb" must have embarrassed the author in stating that "the discussion includes topics which have never appeared in any previous book on the Orient, such as the geography of animal distribution, the role of fish and fishing in regional economy" etc. Even poor old Marco Polo had something to say on these subjects; the Jesuits, Du Halde and a host of later writers. There is a whole literature on the aquatic life in eastern waters.

Part 2, occupying about two-thirds of the book, is a series of studies of individual countries in terms of "the regional growth of cultures." There is a "selected bibliography" of over 800 titles, including useful citations from specialist periodicals. With few exceptions, titles are of works published after 1940. There are numerous diagrams and small maps (often difficult to follow) and a few (rather badly reproduced) photographs. The physical maps (between pages 14 and 20) deserve criticism. There are no contours nor are any place-names given. In fact it is only possible to follow the often detailed text with an atlas handy. For the very interesting chapters on cultural history, which really merit close attention, the reader can best refer to the folding maps in René Grousset's *Histoire de l'Extrême Orient*—if he is lucky enough to have these volumes available. Only with such cartographical adjuncts are Professor Spencer's valuable essays on the regions comprehensible. The inadequacy of the maps is a serious defect in a geographical work. If the publishers were con-

cerned to save money (as all publishers are), they would have been better advised to economise on the fanciful illustrations of costumes which are repeated three times (stamped on the covers and at each end-paper).

The author, with all he knows and all he has to say, is, unfortunately, an addict of modern academic jargon. A circumlocutory elucidation of the obvious is a disease which is spreading among the Anglo-Saxons. Learned Americans are even more given to this "ahem" thinking than their English *confrères*; and it is a pity to see the virile modern prose of which Damon Runyon and Raymond Chandler were exemplars seeding off into such ramblers as the following:

"We cannot at this time specify how significant taming and domestication of certain animals was to some people as opposed to rejection of taming and domestication of the same animals by other people. It is likely that the variable interest of culture groups in certain animals significantly enters the question of distribution today." (p. 94.)

If this means anything at all, it would seem to mean that Chinamen did not train salukis to dive for fish nor did Afghans use cormorants for running down deer. Therefore you do not find salukis swimming in the Yangtse nor are cormorants encountered in the Khyber.

We also come across such expressions as "substantially small in proportionate volume" (p. 116) and "racial incubator location" (p. 117). And there are some very mixed metaphors which, perhaps, stir well in the pot of equivocal thinking. For instance:

"Out of the Mongoloid race *incubator* has come a succession of peoples as variable as those from the early Negroid and Caucasoid *hearths*. The earliest *waves* probably spread in all directions, but found the easiest zone of movement in eastern mainland Asia" (p. 116).

While on racial themes the Professor becomes a bit confused on the interesting subject of the Ainu, whom he describes first as "a mixture of proto-Mongoloid and proto-Caucasoid or Caucasoid-like people who had taken an unusual migration path to become lost in the enveloping Mongoloid realm and develop into a special physical type" (p. 117). On p. 377 we find a map illustrating "Approaches to Japan." Here one type of arrow illustrates "possible migration routes of the proto-Caucasoid Ainu and Neolithic Mongoloid groups" while another set of arrows indicates "possible northern routes of Paleolithic and proto-Neolithic elements." We may ask what is the difference between proto-Caucasoid and Caucasoid-like peoples? If it is not possible to propose a specific difference, why confuse the reader with alternative versions? What was an "unusual" or for that matter a "usual" migration path during the remote Paleolithic, proto-Neolithic and Neolithic epochs? The reader is further confused by the unscientific mix-up of racial and cultural terms: proto-Caucasoid, Neolithic Mongoloid, proto-Neolithic, etc. Presumably the author has based his statements on the learned articles cited in the bibliography to Chapter 24. But a leading American anthropologist, Professor Carleton Coon, prefers to regard the Ainu, with other aboriginals, as "relatively undifferentiated varieties of mankind, left over from man's wide wanderings through late Pleistocene time." Although the Ainu seem to derive from an early Palæolithic white stock (as do Kerry-men and Riffis), and Coon has observed individual Ainu "who closely resemble Tolstoy and Darwin," it would seem better to leave them at present without attaching to them contradictory racial and cultural labels which relate to much later epochs, and without attributing to them "unusual migratory paths" by-passing Sakhalin and descending from Kamchatka.

In view of the author's participation in Asian events from the Olympian level of the Office of Strategic Services, it is interesting to note his conclusions. They are quoted without comment:

On India: "If Britain did bring a kind of peace and stability to Indian life in the various regions she took over, one may almost question their worth. . . . Certainly the British have been responsible for many evils in 400 years' contact of east and west. . . . But Indian culture is not free from blame. . . . the modern Indian people are the inheritors of the most restrictive and complex bodies of culture in the world today. . . . This fact is partly responsible for the plight of the Indian peasant population." (Pp. 185-6.)

On Indo-China: "The cause of the Free World has been damaged by the action of the French in handing over a large region and perhaps 12,000,000 people to Communism. . . . The settlement turns the tide again in favour of Communism." (p. 253.)

On China: "There is ground for belief that Communism will fail again in China, as it has failed in the past, and that eventually Chinese society will return to a system of operation more nearly in harmony with many of the chief values of the Chinese as a people." (p. 342.)

The author's observations on "Population" are more weighty and merit careful study in the short section on the subject and in the different "regional" sections of the book. A sombre tone colours his conclusions (pp. 122-3):

"The disturbing feature is that the West has helped remove many of the traditional checks and balances from population growth in the Orient without supplying the productive means to feed the increases. Preventive and curative medicine, and public health facilities, if incomplete, have been effective in lowering infant mortality rates, preventing killing epidemics, and keeping child-producing age groups alive. Flood and famine relief, the discouragement of infanticide, the relative peace, and the prevention of tribal and inter-regional wars all have been factors making for modern increase in population. The standard of living has been declining for well over a century. Unless new keys for agricultural production can be put into the hands of all oriental peoples rather quickly, distress and unrest may unleash a series of militant, bloody, and disease-filled checks and balances throughout the Orient. On the other hand, if such provisions are devised and successfully inserted into the oriental economy, the resultant net increases may well overwhelm the world in a migratory exodus out of one great incubator realm, such as the world has never known."

All this may be related rather significantly to Sir Llewellyn Woodward's recent address on "The Price of Peace" (printed in the *Listener*, September 29, 1955).

W. E. D. ALLEN.

Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan. By Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath W. Burks. New York: D. van Nostrand Co. Inc. 1954. Pp. 630. Index; cover map.

This substantial volume is described as a comparative study of the Far Eastern tradition of governing men from early days to the present time. Its first two authors, an American and a Chinese, are respectively Professor of Asiatic Politics and sometime Special Lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, whilst the third is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers. The authors see in the present governments of National China and Communist China, as well as in the government of Japan, the natural successors to past governments, so that to interpret the past is to explain much of the present. Some would hold that modern Communist China has completely thrown over old beliefs: the authors stress that present-day Chinese belief in China's antiquity must still be reckoned a force in the international scene.

Passing in review Old China, the Confucian State and the Manchu, stress is then laid on the "Government of the Christian Rebels, 1850-1865" (T'ai-ping rebellion) with its many reforms stemming from entirely Chinese sources and presenting "the parent phenomenon of the Chinese People's Republic." The failure of the movement is discussed and the scene then shifted abruptly to the Old First Republic of 1912-1928. There follows the rise of the Kuomintang, 1928-1949. Between the two Chinas of today the authors find an ideological gap even broader than the Formosan Straits.

Almost exactly half the book is devoted to Japan, and the headings of the 13 chapters suggest the line of thought followed. The cultural and physical background of Japanese government warns Americans to build up an objective understanding of the country. The Japanese Model of a Chinese Empire traces the development in the seventh century of the attempt to create an Empire along lines (and with Confucian doctrines) learned from China. The next chapter describes the dual government—one to reign, the other to deal with the mundane business of ruling—

which lasted a thousand years. The "well-policed Paradise of Isolated Japan" was destroyed by the "Coming of the Sea-Borne States," so that Japan learnt from Europe to construct "the Japanese Model of Europe." At this stage Japan accepted the role of a great power—remaining traditionally Japanese behind a façade of a modern-looking and apparently westernized government—the Meiji constitution. In fact, parliamentary Japan and militarist Japan existed side by side—with the ascendancy of the latter which led to the disastrous entry into the Second World War. Nearly a hundred pages are devoted to subsequent events, leading to the final chapter on the Japanization of American democracy—the Japanese absorbing into their rich political experience the advantages of one more political system. On this note the book ends—with the future an obvious question mark.

L. DUDLEY STAMP.

The Struggle for Asia. By Sir Francis Low. Bristol: Frederick Muller. 1955. Pp. viii + 239. 5½" × 8". 15s. net.

As may be expected from an editor of the *Times of India*, this volume is a masterpiece of reporting; a balanced survey of the forces operating in India today and their trends. The area covered includes the Middle East and Korea, with the factors operating in each area.

Once Asia very nearly dominated Europe. For 200 years Europe has, in effect, very nearly dominated Asia. "Colonialism," say the Yanks, in one of their brash over-simplifications, forgetting that the alternative could only have been, in many areas, savage existence and jungle. The West has altered all that. The liberated countries are seldom grateful, but they now have standards to go by. Sadly enough, too many regard Communism as a fitting alternative to Colonialism. "Freedom," in the Western sense, conveys little to illiterate tribes more accustomed to slavery in various forms, and totalitarianism.

Sir Francis in his survey describes conditions in each country, and then summarizes the overall problems involved. The more the reader knows of any particular area, the more he is impressed by the balanced and objective description of what is, was, and will be going on. No writer on Asian problems can afford to ignore any of the facts and arguments, which are more authoritative than one can ordinarily hope to look for in such a work. This is no perfunctory reporting of a world tour like "Inside Asia." It is the considered findings of expert study by an editor who for many years had to weigh up the effects of these rumblings of awakening Asia.

A note on the ground covered might be useful. First—historical background. Last, the "crucial issues." The spasms and torments of an awakening continent. The Middle East. Japanese nationalism. China—present and future. The Colombo powers—India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon—in their new independence, and the tragedy of Indonesia. Korean agony. The chaos of Indo-China. Philippine progress. India and China. S.E.A.T.O.

It is valuable to compare this volume by a practical English journalist with the study of *Representative Government in South-East Asia* (reviewed on p. 288 of this Journal) which covers a smaller area—Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Indo-China, prepared by an American University under the ægis of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One would imagine that, after nearly exterminating Red Indians, the U.S. would go slow on treating subject races. Not so. Mrs. Roosevelt is far more critical of British rule in India than the Indians themselves. The West interprets foreign rule in various ways. The Americans pour in money, but don't help the nationals to govern themselves with the same understanding or human touch as *we* achieve ourselves. The Dutch still less so. The home stockmarket took precedence of preparation for self rule. Likewise bureaucracy and privilege in French colonies. Spain based its methods on religion, which survived when Spain ceased to be a great power. We may hear more yet of Belgian and Portuguese methods, where education mainly provides the required standards.

Sir Francis Low's work covers the whole field of which this American professor only analyses a portion, but the difference of angle is interesting.

G. M. ROUTH.

Turkey. By Geoffrey Lewis. Benn. 1955. Pp. 212; map; index. 21s.

Mr. Lewis has produced what those interested in Turkey have long desired to have—a short, unbiased, scholarly statement of fact, free alike from pedantry and sensationalism. Within the compass of some 200 pages, he gives his reader all the information he is likely to require on Modern Turkey and its institutions.

The book is divided into two parts: the Story of the Turkish Republic and Aspects of Modern Turkey. If anyone should fear that the first part is “just some more potted history,” he is mistaken. By the rigorous exclusion of all incidents and persons foreign to his theme, the author has avoided what would have become, in the hands of one less judicious, a dreary mass of names and dates. Instead he has produced a fascinating sketch that embraces the whole range of Turkish history from early days in the central Asiatic homeland to the present.

Even the hardened reader of Turkish history will find much that is new to him. He will learn, for example, on page 31 that Mustafa the Third “attributed the Prussian victory in the Seven Years’ War to efficient staffwork on the part of Frederic (*sic*) the Great’s astrologers.” Again (to pass to later times) there is a fine picture (page 90) of Atatürk standing up before the inhabitants of İnebolu at the beginning of the “hat campaign” and solemnly informing them that “the name of this head-dress is ‘hat’.” In fact there is hardly a page that does not contain some curious (though apposite) detail.

A valuable feature in the first part of the book is the short sections dealing with certain “key words” of Turkish history (words which we all know but would not like to define!): Caliphate, Ulema, Sublime Porte, Millet, Devşirme and Capitulations. Only in the case of the last word has the author omitted to give the derivation. To complain of minor omissions in a book that covers such a vast field in so few pages is scarcely justifiable. Still, while treating the reforms of Mahmud the Second, Mr. Lewis might perhaps have mentioned the issue of coins bearing the Sultan’s portrait, a flagrant but not unparalleled flouting of Islamic practice which led to the slaughter of 4,000 persons before the offending coinage was withdrawn. The rather complex history of Turkey since the First World War receives full and lucid treatment in the later chapters of the book. Some who believe that Turkey has become, for good and all, a secular state, will be interested to learn that, since the Democrats have assumed power, there has been a perceptible swing towards Islam (with sporadic wearing of the fez in the eastern provinces).

Part Two consists of a kind of gazeteer, providing up-to-date facts on such matters as geography, agriculture, minerals and education. Chapter 24 on the ethnic composition of Turkey is especially welcome. Finally, in his “summing up,” the author attempts to answer the question that has been gathering momentum in the reader’s mind as he progressed through the book: What are the Turks really like? “Dour,” replies Mr. Lewis, “and over-sensitive,” and he mentions that in the Turkish translation of *Macbeth* the witches’ cauldron loses two of its most characteristic ingredients—nose of Turk and Tartar’s lips. He does not say if Western bustle has put an end to the *keyif*. . . . Mr. Lewis appends an annotated translation of the Turkish Constitution and a good map, at the side of which he has thoughtfully added a list of modern Turkish place-names with their old equivalents. (Antakya: Antioch; Hatai: Alexandretta—to quote two examples.)

This book is presumably meant for the General Reader (if such an omniscient being has ever existed) and the author gives curt but sufficient directions on how Turkish words are to be pronounced. He omits, however, to guide his reader on the subject of stress. Enough has been said to show that the work under review is both informative and readable. It is a commentary on the words of E. J. W. Gibb (written more than 50 years ago): “We are constrained to admit that the mental energy of this people is unimpaired, and that those who have glibly doomed it as plunged in a lethargy from which there is no awakening . . . have but shown once more how worthless is the judgment that is based upon ignorance and prejudice.”

J. DAVIDSON.

Abode of Snow: A History of Himalayan Exploration and Mountaineering. By Kenneth Mason. Rupert Hart-Davis. Pp. 372; 21 photographs, 16 maps. 25s.

Hitherto in all the vast literature of exploration and mountaineering in the Himalaya there has been no complete history, perhaps because the time was not ripe or because there was no one competent to write it.

Now both these obligations have been fulfilled in happy combination.

Men will still go to the Himalaya, as they have always done, and there is much still to be discovered there and many high peaks are not yet climbed, but the ascent of Everest, and the conquests of K2 and Kangchenjunga that have so quickly followed, are the end of a story, a dramatic climax that cannot come again; and because the climax has been so swift and so widely proclaimed, it has overshadowed and almost obliterated the foundations on which it was built.

Seen in isolation, these great enterprises may do much to prejudice the future of mountaineering by obscuring its true nature except from those who have known it at first hand.

At this opportune moment Colonel Mason's book has come to tell the whole story, and there is no doubt that it will remain the classic work on the Himalaya.

Nothing that counts has been left out; the techniques and mechanics are there as well as the zest, the magic and the mystery, all told with the innate authority of much practical experience and profound scholarship, and with an economy of language, sense of history and a depth of understanding that give his book a first place in literature.

It is the philosophy as well as the romance of mountaineering on the grand scale, and it is written objectively, although the author is not without his heroes and his enthusiasms, as well as his rogues.

The opening chapters describe the geography of the Himalaya and the Karakoram and the prevailing weather conditions. This first introduction to the great peaks and the vast region that they dominate may require some application by the ordinary reader—there are so many names, and few people over a certain age are used to geography on this scale—but his perseverance will be rewarded. The physical details are touched with colour and the Himalayan giants emerge in perspective for the the story that follows. To those for whom the book is primarily intended these chapters are invaluable.

Then come the first known travellers, the Jesuit missionaries of Akbar's time, the early British explorers and their rough route maps, the beginnings of Indian geography with Rennell and his "Great Map of Hindoostan," and the start of the great story of Himalayan survey under the creative genius of Sir George Everest.

Many readers will learn for the first time of his momentous work in measuring the Great Arc of the Meridian in India; they will also meet in these pages for the first time the brilliant and varied band of explorers and surveyors of the nineteenth century; Webb, whose first calculations to make one of the Himalayan peaks higher than the Andes was greeted with derision outside India; Moorcroft, the Liverpool veterinary surgeon, who disguised himself as a fakir; Johnson, whose excess of zeal was his undoing; Montgomerie, the first to see the distant giants of the Karakoram; Godwin-Austen, the artist, and greatest mountaineer of his day; the pundit explorers immortalised by Kipling, and many others.

These were exciting times and they are given added interest by the charming photographs of some of the great men.

Colonel Mason ends this early period of discovery with the arrival of Graham and his Swiss guides, the first man to come to the Himalaya mainly to climb.

The next period, 1885-1918, begins with Younghusband's historic journey from China over the unknown Mustagh Pass to Kashmir, and the opening of the Gilgit road, that encouraged an organised expedition from England—Conway's exploration of the Karakoram glaciers, in 1892. One of its members was Lieut. Bruce, of the 5th Gurkhas, who, thirty years' later, was to lead the first attempt on Everest.

It was perhaps the golden age of Himalayan adventure, as it was in other fields of European activity; it was ended, as they were, by the tragedy of the first World War.

Although, in its last decade, the Italians, D'Abruzzi and De Filippi, organized expeditions to K2 on an elaborate scale (and there was another, tri-national, to Kangchenjunga in 1905 "less happily planned and composed"), it was still the period of

the individual rather than the team, of the peerless Mummery, of Freshfield, Longstaff and Bruce. They were the first to win the confidence of the local people, to use Sherpas and Hunzas on the mountains and to study the problems of living at high altitudes.

The author completes this part of his story with a brief account—four and a half pages—of his own work in the re-survey of Kashmir and on the joint survey, which he led on the Indian side, to link up with the Russians on the Pamirs. Many have reason to be grateful for the resulting map, which “has so far been sufficiently accurate to escape criticism.”

The final thirty-five years Colonel Mason divides into three periods; 1918-28, marked by the first three great attempts on Everest from the North; 1929-39, notable for the entry of the Germans on the scene, the tragic disasters on Nanga Parbat, and for the renewed North Col assaults on Everest under Ruttledge, Shipton and Tilman; finally the post-war years, which saw the conquest of Nanga Parbat, Everest and other great peaks.

The story of these great episodes is splendidly re-told with a mastery of detail and a magic of analysis that leads inexorably to the destined end of failure or success.

We learn of “Longstaff’s almost instinctive knowledge of climbing and of snow and ice conditions at high altitudes,” how, on Nanga Parbat in 1934, “there were too many eager men too high,” of Wiessner’s fatal decision on K2 in 1939, “when each day added to the errors of judgment and the weather was never to blame,” and of Houston on the same mountain in 1952 that “his was a strong party and deserved success” and how in the tragic outcome “perhaps the mountain had been merciful.”

The author’s own philosophy is clear throughout the book; it is best summed up by this extract, part of a quotation from Mallory:

“A mountaineering enterprise may keep sanity and sound judgment and remain an adventure. And of all the principles by which we hold the first is mutual help.”

The index and appendices are exceptionally good and useful.

The simple conventions used for the individual mountain maps are admirably suited for their purpose. The small scale maps are also good; perhaps one of the Punjab Himalaya separate from the Karakoram and a fold-out for the whole region would be asking too much.

There are, too, magnificent photographs of the main peaks, but Rakaposhi, alas, is veiled in mist.

W. R. B.

The Marching Wind. By Colonel Leonard Clark. Hutchinson. London. 1955. Pp. 346; thirty photographs and five sketch maps. 9½" × 6½". 21s.

The author has made a great contribution to our knowledge of an unexplored and almost unvisited region of Central Asia. His chief incentive and primary objective was the great Amne Machin mountain range in the extreme north-east of Tibet, the existence of which had been reported by American pilots flying over the “Hump” during World War II. The mountains had been observed from some distance by Dr. Joseph Rock about 25 years earlier, and before that, in 1908, by the German, von Filchner. Colonel Clark had already made four visits to China, the last having been on special service behind the Japanese lines during World War II. The Amne Machin runs roughly from south-east to north-west, about 80 miles south of the great Koko Nor Lake, and within a great bend eastward of the Yellow River. Dr. Rock describes it as “One of the grandest mountain ranges of all Asia,” and “the central peak towers to more than 28,000 feet.” But this shadowy part of High Asia is inhabited by one of the fiercest and most predatory of Central Asian tribes, whose opposition to penetration of their sacred high places would surely be intense. However, Leonard Clark had not only “a way with him,” but was blest with good fortune. First he linked up with a Torgut Mongol “prince,” Tsedam Dorje, master of many tongues, with Western education and thoroughly well versed with the political set-up in Western China. Exiled from Peking, he was working at translation and interpretation at the Catholic mission in Lanchow. The two made a pact to enter forbidden Tibet. Luck held, for they obtained an introduction to Ma Pu Fang, the Tungan Governor of Chinghai and Generalissimo of the only Nationalist armies still intact in 1949. These were composed mainly of Chinese Moslems. At Sining, China’s westernmost city, Colonel Clark seems to have planned with that colourful.

keen anti-Communist leader, a scheme whereby his armies should become the eastern wing of a continent-wide Moslem attack on totalitarian Communism. The idea so appealed to Ma Pu Fang that he gave unstinted help to further Clark's plans. These were to include, not only exploration of the Amne Machin group, but the examination of the true source of the Yellow River and inspection of the Chinese advanced post on the edge of the Tsaidam. From Sining an equally vital and fruitful contact was made, in the course of a personal visit to the Panchen Lama, then residing in the cloister city of Kumbum, a short distance to the south. His Holiness agreed to dictate and to issue a command to all Tibetans, requiring them to assist, and to refrain from hindering, Clark's work in Tibet. It seems more than likely that the Panchen (or Tashi) Lama envisaged himself seated, in the not far distant future, on the Dalai Lama's throne in Lhasa. The chief danger to Clark would be from the Ngoloks, who did not confine their activities to guarding their sacred mountains, but who raided and slew far afield. However, a nominal "peace treaty" was arranged, and as a further safeguard the Governor insisted that they should join up with a strongly escorted caravan then leaving for Lhasa. The escort commander, Colonel Ma Sheng Lung, proved to be another colourful and resourceful individual. Indeed the trio, with their boldness, their zest for adventures and their high spirits, were like a Central Asian reincarnation of the Three Musketeers. Alarms and skirmishes, not without loss to the Ngoloks, punctuated the marches south-eastwards from Sining. Nevertheless, from their camp 14, on the north-eastern spurs of the central Amne Machin, they succeeded in taking observations, albeit with a somewhat scratch collection of implements. These consisted of a theodolite loaned by the "Chinghai Highway Bureau," von Filchner's old German army instruments, Dorje's aneroid, and a boiling-point thermometer. In his note Colonel Clark gives the height of the main peak as 29,681 feet, as compared with his figure for Everest of 29,144; thus making Amne Machin higher by 517 feet. But in his preface he qualifies this, saying that owing to the inadequacy of the borrowed instruments there may well be an error of 2,500 feet upwards or downwards. While the surveying was in progress the clans had begun to gather and active hostilities were impending. The reduced party were not in a position to bluff, so they pulled out by stealth, to rejoin Colonel Ma Shen Lung. Traversing most difficult country in appalling weather conditions, they moved first north and then west through the sources of the Yellow River and their dividing spurs, eventually reaching Fort Shau Je Te on the edge of the great Tsaidam swamps. This was China's most westerly outpost, and here they found lavish hospitality and even luxury. But they could not dally, for word came through from General Ma Pu Fang that the Communists had overrun Nationalist China, and that he was endeavouring to extricate his Moslem forces. Clark had done his work, and with his diminished band made his way back to Sining, passing close to Koko Nor, and reported to General Ma, and also to the very complacent Panchen Lama. The whole Odyssey had lasted just six months—it has been vividly narrated, portraying the spirit of rare adventure in happy—some might say exuberant—style. But this is typical, not only of the leader, but of the trio of good companions. It would be improved by a glossary, and in this connection a note or two may be allowed. The name *Ngolok* actually means "Face-Back," hence rebel. And a chorten is not, as stated, a burial place; though it may contain a relic of a saint. *Shrine*, or *stupa*, is a better translation. Lastly, it should be explained that Chinese Moslems usually bear both Chinese and Mohammedan names. The book is well illustrated and has adequate maps drawn by Miss Grace James.

H. W. T.

Science, Democracy and Islam, and other essays. By Himayun Kabir. Geo. Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. 126. 12s. 6d.

Philosophical musings and arguments make up the greater part of this collection of eight essays; they are the thoughts of an erudite man in the language of a professional philosopher. In the title essay the author seeks to prove that the only gate through which Science could and did come into the world was the Muslim doctrine of the unity of God and the universality of natural law. But scientific method and knowledge existed before Islam was preached, science later flourished also in places

where Muslim doctrines had had little influence. One may accept that the philosophy of Islam provides a good environment for scientific and democratic progress, but the author goes too far and over-reaches himself in failing to prove the causal connection. The Islam to which Himayun Kabir attributes the coming of Science and Democracy is the pure essence distilled by Muslim thinkers and not the practical religion followed by the generality of Muslims. In this he is not alone, for writers on Christianity also tend to write of what they themselves read into the New Testament and not of what is practised by the common man.

The next five essays are mainly on Freedom, Democracy and Philosophy, and are provocative of thought. Some of the arguments lead one to wish for a meeting with the author in order to put the other side, but readers unversed in the language of Kant and Berkeley might be at a disadvantage in vocabulary.

The seventh essay, "East and the Problems of Education," is worth the book's price to any Westerner whose mind or activities are to stir out of Europe. From it we can appreciate what the East can give us in exchange for and to set against the material progress of the West. The last essay presses home this point in a tribute to Mohandas Ghandi. There is a clear description of the nature of Satyagraha and of some of Ghandi's thought and ideals. If the reader is tempted to think that some of the theories propounded lack practicability, perhaps he needs to read again the seventh essay.

J. M. C.

Forgotten Kingdom. By Peter Goullart. John Murray. 1955. Pp. 218. Ill.; map. 18s.

The "Forgotten Kingdom" is the Nakhi country round about Likiang. Although the Nakhi have been subject to China for some 300 years it can be seen from this book that they have managed to preserve their attractive national individuality and character.

While they have suffered some harm from Chinese customs, witness Peter Goullart's explanation of the habit of suicide among the Nakhi—from Chinese arts they have got only good; and it seems they have even kept alive ancient Chinese music in a purer form than can be found elsewhere.

Until the Communist revolution Chinese administration seems to have troubled them very little, and, even remembering that the Governor of Yunnan was for so long a non-Chinese, I was surprised to read in this book of the apparent absence of Chinese officials or settlers, as well as of Chinese ways, in Likiang.

Peter Goullart, originally a refugee to China from the Russian Revolution, went to Likiang in 1939 as an official of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives. In Likiang he found his paradise; and he describes with deep feeling its peaceful charm and beauty—the profusion of roses, crystal-clear streams, fragrant pinewoods and stately snow mountains. His unassuming adaptability soon found him a place as friend and adviser in the happy, gossipy, convivial society of that easy-going little city beyond the reach of wheeled traffic. He has clearly acquired a sympathetic understanding of Eastern minds without becoming either a dreamy mystic or a sentimental romantic—two pitfalls which seem to await many Western votaries of the East. His book displays a shrewd, humorous ability to see what is going on around him, while from his Taoist studies he has learnt tolerance and the art of "going with the stream." His harmonious association with the people of Likiang had its reward in the success of his co-operatives in which, he tells us, Chungking officialdom was convinced he would fail.

The Yunnan-Burma-Tibet border country is the home of many other interesting peoples beside the Nakhi. There are the Minchia, Lisu, Lutzu, Liukhi, Lolo, Miao and others of whom I had never heard and would gladly hear more—the Boa, Chungchia and Attolay. Without claiming to be an anthropologist or anything of the sort the author tried to find out all he could about the various tribes he met, and in this book he tells a good deal about their different ways. His comments on Tibetan matters—of which I have some experience—in spite of a few venial inaccuracies in detail, grasp the essentials with discerning commonsense, and I suppose, therefore, that what he has to say about other peoples of the area is equally reliable, especially as he lived with many of them either in his own house or in theirs.

In the course of his ten years in Likiang, Peter Goullart saw "the unique and spectacular phenomenon" of the wartime boom in trade between Tibet and the China border, in which all the animal transport resources of Tibet were mobilized and Tibetans in every walk of life launched into the risky, profitable business.

Peter Goullart's stay was ended by the arrival of the Communist serpent in his Eden. It is saddening to read of the swift transformation of the gay, friendly young Nakhi into drab, earnest, insolent Communist neophytes. Peter Goullart does not speculate about the future, and one is left wondering whether there is any hope that the novelty may wear off soon, and remoteness allied to the non-Chinese character of these peoples may save them from the worst effects of change and uniformity.

Of the photographs which illustrate this book some are good, some not so good; and I was disappointed not to find pictures of more of the interesting tribes whom the author met. There is a rather indifferent map and no index; but Mr. Goullart has made a most entertaining and informative book out of his experiences—I might add that for good measure he throws in a possible rival to Mount Everest in "Niето Cavalori."

It is sad to think that he has had to leave a life in which he was not only happy but was clearly useful also and in which he could acquire valuable information about many little-known non-Chinese peoples.

H. R.

Crescent and Green. Cassell and Co. 1955. Pp. 170. 10s.

A collection of sixteen essays on various aspects of the culture and heritage of Pakistan. Each is contributed by an acknowledged authority on his or her subject.

The Indus basin gave birth to one of the oldest civilizations in the world; and at least as ancient were "peasant cultures" in the mountainous wastes of Baluchistan, where the Pakistan Archæological Survey have recently unearthed "rich artistic treasures" and the earliest known example of a non-pictorial script. This is revealed in the first group of six essays dealing with history and archæology. We learn—and it will be fresh news to many of us—that the ruins of Harappa on the Ravi River and of Mohenjo Daro on the Indus, discovered as recently as 1944, were the twin capitals of an empire which existed over 4,000 years ago. It is described as an empire in its true sense, with well-built, carefully planned, prosperous cities and with its own indigenous and distinctive architecture, costume, art, pottery, cult and script. And throughout its millennium of existence it remained completely isolated from its neighbours save for a thin trickle of trade. Sir Mortimer Wheeler takes us for a vivid tour through the city of Mohenjo Daro, as it then was, and treats us to an imaginative pen picture of its fall to hordes of barbarian invaders about 1500 B.C.

Moving onward from prehistoric times, Professor Norman Brown surveys the passing scenes in Pakistan and reaches the conclusion that the periods during the past 2,500 years when the Punjab has been culturally or even politically assimilated to the rest of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent are relatively few and short. Hence modern Pakistan, as a Muslim nation, is looking not eastwards, but westwards whence Islam was born.

These half-dozen essays, which follow an opening article by Professor Arthur Toynbee, are easy to read, full of interest and very instructive. Then, in a lighter vein, come a one-day visit from Karachi to the ruins of Thatta and, secondly, a review by Winifred Holmes of the memoirs of a Turki princess who was a descendant of Ghengis Khan and a sister of the Emperor Humayun. It gives one a brief and attractive glimpse of intimate court life during the Moghul sixteenth century.

The next group of three essays describes the characteristics and traces the development of Muslim art from the advent of Islam to the present day. We learn that, within the last five years, there has been an unprecedented revival, stimulated by generous patronage, of the fine arts in Pakistan; and we are given a descriptive *Who's Who* of contemporary artists, with Chughtai as a "towering figure" amongst them. These essays will certainly be of great value to Pakistani artists and of much interest to their patrons and well-wishers.

The final group of essays are written on various aspects of the philosophy of Iqbal, who joined his ancestors a little more than a decade ago. They are very difficult

reading for one who is unfamiliar with philosophical parlance, for example: "The cosmological argument tries to reach the infinite by negating the finite"; "Man as a whole is an individual, but as a whole he is also a person"; "As a whole of persons, society is a whole of wholes."

The student of philosophy will, without doubt, find these essays fraught with wisdom and will derive much benefit from their study; but the untutored reader is likely to wallow through a slough of bewilderment and emerge no whit the wiser.

Lastly, though sandwiched between the essays on art and those on philosophy, is a critical review by Professor Benjamin Brooks of the works of three English novelists who wrote about British India many years ago. Boasting that he "belongs to a generation of readers who found Kipling and all he stood for repugnant, if not repulsive," the professor, as a newcomer to Pakistan, fills more than three pages with a damnation of this world-famous author and all he wrote about the Indo-Pakistan scene. He is "surprised" to find himself favourably impressed with A. E. W. Mason's *The Broken Road* (written in 1907) and is "disappointed" in E. M. Forster's *A Passage to India* (written in 1924). Professor Brooks' controversial and unsavoury contribution to *Crescent and Green* seems pointless and quite out of step with other articles in this interesting and instructive volume.

M. M.

Outlines of Muhammadan Law. By Asaf A. A. Fyzee, M.A.(Cantab.) Second Edition. Geoffrey Cumberlege. Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. 409. 28s.

The notice on the inside of the jacket states rather optimistically that this is a "book for layman, student and specialist alike." Like the swimming-bath, it has a shallow end, but the novice is warned that after the initial step the depth increases very suddenly. In the first ten pages he finds himself in safe, not to say elementary waters, descriptive of early Arab race and philological characteristics. He is even warned not to mistake the Sabians for the Sabæans. But a few pages on he will be up to his neck in the sources and definition of "fiqh" as opposed to "ilm," and by the time he reaches the eight forms of divorce the waters may well have closed above his head. If, however, he is an amateur or professional student of Islamic law, or even, as the author suggests, a practising lawyer in need of a refresher course, he will be well rewarded by reading this book.

It consists of a general introduction to Muhammadan Law followed by a chapter on its application and interpretation. The thirteen following chapters deal with main divisions of this Law, such as Dower, Wakf, Marriage, Gifts, Pre-emption, etc., as applied in India and Pakistan.

Each chapter is divided into numbered sections listed under the chapter title. Maintenance, for instance, is divided into: Maintenance Defined, Obligations arising on Marriage, and Obligations arising out of a Blood Relationship. So it is simple to turn up any particular aspect of a subject for further study or reference. There are three Indexes—of Cases, of Names and Terms, and of Subjects—a select Biography, and several short Appendixes, a Table of Koranic Heirs in Sunnite (Hanafi) Law, a Diagram illustrating Agnatic Heirs in Sunnite Law, and Diagrams illustrating the Shiite Law of Inheritance.

This second edition, carefully revised though it is, contains a few slips, such as the omission of Kenya and Tanganyika from the list of areas in which Ismailis are to be found.

The chapter on Wakf is especially interesting in these days of radical change in the administration of awkâf in many Moslem lands. Dr. Fyzee alludes in a note to the abolishing of certain kinds of awkâf in Egypt, but he throws no legal light on it, probably from the lack of enough clear information. He touches on past reform in Algiers, Morocco and Turkey, however.

The earliest wakf mentioned by legal authorities is that of 'Umar, the Second Caliph, who accepted the arrangement as suggested to him directly by the Prophet himself. A non-Moslem is entitled to benefit by a wakf as long as he is not an enemy-alien. Such facts are doubtless well known to the professional, but are of real interest to the amateur who already has a certain though limited knowledge of the subject.

The chapter on Marriage Agreements is enlightening, especially recent reforms whereby the rights of the wife can be greatly enlarged by legal contracts with her husband at the time of marrying.

The complicated system of Sunnite and Shiite inheritance is dealt with in outline but with considerable detail attached. The uninitiated will need courage to penetrate this portion. Some of the classification looks, at first glance, more like algebra than law. Yet it is relevant to many wider matters in the Moslem world of today. For instance, the thousands of new landowners in Egypt who are buying six to ten faddans each from the state. How are they going to bequeath their property, whether they die before the full sum is paid or not? And how will this affect the agricultural produce of the land? This question is not referred to in the book. It may be outside its scope, but it is of interest.

To enjoy parts of this work does not necessarily mean an attempt to digest all. The reader can follow various lines of his own such as the effect of English law on the application of the Shāri'a during the two centuries of British Rule. Dr. Fyzee does this as he proceeds, through direct and indirect allusion. Or an interesting sideline for the amateur student of Islamic law who knows some Arabic is to note all the root meanings of the Arabic names of various laws and dispensers of laws mentioned by the author. In this connection, is the well-known Levantine term "Hawaja" linked with the word "Khoja," through the latter's strict meaning of "Khawāja," given on p. 55 by Dr. Fyzee? This, however, trespasses into the enticing fields of philology, away from the purely legal.

It seems a pity that the author has twice stated in almost the same terms (p. v and p. 329) that "Muhammadan law is often conceived as a conglomeration of chaotic rules based in the main on the arbitrary dictates of a revengeful Semitic deity," for surely no one who considers the question at all would form, let alone express, so distorted a view. Especially today, when thinking people realize how essential it is that Islam should join forces with all God-fearing people in the battle against the materialism which bids for world domination.

But in spite of this remark and another negative one about the period from the third century of the Hijra to the present day being one of "general decadence," Dr. Fyzee succeeds in imparting much of his enthusiasm as he goes.

Finally he throws out a challenge: "The real cause of the difference between the principles of the Sunnite law of inheritance and its Shiite counterpart is one of the most important problems remaining unexplored by modern research, and it is the hope of the author that someone with ability and experience will take an early opportunity to proceed on a voyage of discovery."

MARY ROWLATT.

State and Economics in the Middle East. A Society in Transition. By Alfred Bonn . Second edition (revised). Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1955. Pp. 439. 40s.

This volume by Dr. Bonn  (Professor of Economics and Director of the Economic Research Institute at The Hebrew University, Jerusalem), published under the auspices of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, contains 400 pages of encyclopedic information, with statistical tables, notes and observations.

The first edition was completed in 1946. The author points out in the preface to this second edition that he "decided not to insert major changes, primarily because I think it is too early for a re-appraisal of recent history." Instead, he has added a final chapter called "The Middle East after the Second World War." This last chapter is but twenty pages of the whole, so readers who look for up-to-the-minute information and views may be disappointed; but those who wish to study or refer to Middle East conditions in the last 150 years will be well rewarded. With that as a background, the allusions to the immediately contemporary scene, brief as they are, become more interesting than many an up-to-date commentary taken out of its historical context.

The book is in four parts entitled: "The Middle Eastern State in Transition," "The Agrarian Society of the Middle East," "The Industrial Revolution in the Middle East" and "Problems and Aspects of a Changing Society." The findings

of each chapter are summarized or put in numbered sub-headings, so Dr. Bonné's framework is clear. But the matter within the framework seems, at times, rather unnecessarily complicated. The length of sentences and obscurity of wording calls for real concentration. If you are a female reader, forbid the children to come into the room, turn off all wirelesses, have nothing in the oven to be remembered, and you will progress—otherwise it will be stiff going.

There is no need to fear a markedly biased outlook, though many of the points dealt with are potentially most controversial. Dr. Bonné is too erudite and too deep a thinker for that. His presentation of the Egyptian Revolution of today is realistic, understanding and fair. But some may feel that his picture of Islam could have been more constructive. The great spiritual qualities in past Orthodox and Sufi Moslems have been soft-pedalled. The power which enabled Rābi'a of Basra, for instance—a penniless, orphaned girl of the second century A.H., whose material prospects were exactly nil—to become a spiritual influence to leaders of her day and for centuries afterwards, is a power to be reckoned with.

Dr. Bonné uses the word "ideology." We are in an ideological age, and it is interesting to read the words of one who is aware of it. At one time he goes to the pith of the matter: "So long, however, as Oriental Governments and their Western sponsors are unable to counter the Russian ideas by presenting more effective ideas, Russian propaganda will fall on fertile ground in considerable sections of Oriental populations." Perhaps a third edition will tell us something of the answering ideology, for there are signs of it being thought out and lived out in the world today. A remarkable mission consisting of men and women from varied backgrounds and nations has recently visited Middle Eastern and Asian centres. It has effectively rooted the idea of a moral and spiritual ideology adequate to unite the world. *The Times* reported it as being "a tour that almost amounted to a triumphant progress."

The author of this book has covered a great horizon of works in the course of acquiring his facts and arriving at his deductions. They range from the books of Karl Marx and Max Weber to the Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement of 1891 and a past number of the noble journal in which this review appears. There is one quote with no indication of its source—doubtless a slip; a small printer's error on p. 322; and in mentioning the forms of vessels on inland waterways Dr. Bonné speaks of the Nile *dahabia* as a cargo boat, where presumably a *ghiassa* is meant—for the *dahabia* is primarily for passengers. But these instances are only insignificant drops in an ocean of accuracy.

To conclude: if the reader disagrees with some of the author's deductions, at least he is given ample data from which to draw his own. Therefore, this is a valuable book to read and to possess for all those interested in Middle Eastern affairs.

MARY ROWLATT.

Israel and her Neighbours. By Norman Bentwich. London: Rider and Co. 1955. Pp. 174; index and map. Ill. 12s. 6d.

Mr. Bentwich's aim in writing this book is an interesting one. While the Jews in general, and Israel in particular, are placed in the centre of his survey, he takes note of the Arabs in Israel, includes a chapter on *The Arabs in History*, and relates Palestine-Israel and its history to the surrounding peoples and nations. Beside the knowledge and experience gained of Modern Palestine during his service with the Mandatory Government, he has a special interest in archæology, and the visitor to Israel with this book in hand will find much in it to render his visit the more enjoyable.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty faced by a writer who aims at covering a vast subject in a comparatively small compass is the danger of making general statements which have to be made but which need very skilful wording if they are not to be misleading. The paragraph on Muhammed (p. 38) is a case in point. The influence of Jews and Christians in regard to the beginnings of Islam is a much-debated question. None the less, as a modern scholar has written: "Monotheism was permeating the environment in which Muhammed grew up and attracting some of the most enlightened among the Arabs." In other words, Muhammed's message must have

fallen on soil to some extent prepared. Mr. Bentwich says nothing of Hebrew monotheism, but it also must have had a slow development before it could take a wide and public hold over men's minds.

The second paragraph on p. 158 is a little misleading. The Hebrews (not the Jews) together with other Semitic peoples, first used the term "Aram" apparently to denote the country to the north-east of Palestine, including Damascus and Mesopotamia. Syriac is not the same as Aramaic, of which it is an eastern dialect. Aramaic has a long history and has suffered many changes. The name "Lebanon" is already used in the Ras Shamra tablets. Although the Ugaritic epics throw a flood of light on the religious and cultural environment of the early Hebrews and on Hebrew and Arabic linguistic origins, it is hardly true to say that they contain "moral precepts similar to those of the Law of Moses. . . ."

Another statement which might be questioned is that the Lebanese Christians belonged to sects which had "broken away from the single Church in the Dark and Middle Ages" (pp. 161-62). Were the Byzantine days dark ages? And from which single church were the new churches formed during successive centuries? The term "relics" for the Eastern Churches is not a happy choice. While we are on the subject of the Christians, Paul was travelling from Jerusalem to Damascus (p. 165). The incident of the basket is disputed, but it certainly was some time after "he began." His escape was not from Straight Street but from a house built on the city wall. Coming to the Druses, on p. 162 the impression is given that no Druses remained in Lebanon after the French intervention. According to the 1944 census, there were 74,000 Druses in Lebanon.

A minor matter is the spelling of "Muhammed" in two ways on p. 14. "Omayad" is more correctly spelt Omayyad or Umayyad. Mr. Bentwich refers to Egypt in his chapter on Arab History, and explains in his Foreword that he is concerned with Israel's Arab neighbours, otherwise perhaps more about Egypt might have been expected from the title.

K. H. H.

Himalayan Barbary. By Christoph von Haimendorf. London: John Murray. 1955. Pp. 241; 35 illustrations and 1 map. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". 21s.

The scene of this narrative is a portion of the vast hill region which stretches along south of Assam's northern frontier with China and Tibet. It had been for numberless years a "terra incognita," closed to explorer and anthropologist alike. Though actually, some thirty years prior to the mission here described, a semi-military expedition had attempted to penetrate the upper reaches of the Subansiri, but turned back, well short of the snow ranges, when armed opposition was met with. In 1944 the Japanese invasion of Burma had brought home to the Government of India the fact that her eastern borders were vulnerable and that the existing vacuum between Assam and Tibet ought to be filled. Government launched a programme of exploration, and the distinguished ethnologist Christoph von Furer Haimendorf was assigned to the Balipara Frontier Tract. He had to disrupt his work with Gonds in the Deccan and to undertake the task of establishing relations with the unadministered hill tribes, and of exploring the upper Subansiri. A beginning was to be made with the Apa Tanis, who were believed to be less backward than their close neighbours, the Daflas, who were distinctly intransigent. To the east the Miris, though not troublesome, were also less developed. The Politicals intended to provide an armed escort, but von Haimendorf considered that any display of force would be prejudicial to his first contacts with the tribesmen and would jeopardize any chance of establishing mutual trust. After much argument he gained his point and set out not only unescorted but accompanied by his gallant wife, Betty. She had lived for four years among aboriginals, and both she and her husband were convinced that her presence would help to create confidence.

Owing mainly to the war, equipment of all sorts was almost unobtainable, and it came to the point when "what we did not have we must do without." However, they were provided with an Assamese "admirable Crichton," who was knowledgeable and influential, and also with a highly efficient interpreter. Range after range of wooded mountains separate the Apa Tani valleys from the plain, and the more direct route lay through the country of the Hill Daflas, whose character was painted

in the blackest colours. A crowning piece of good fortune was the arrival of three Apa Tanis who had come to make contact with the Politicals (for tribal ends). Like all their fellow tribesmen, they wore close-fitting bamboo tails, painted a vivid red. Six marches brought the mission to the chief village of Haja, where, exercising tact and diplomacy, they made friends—embarrassingly close—with the inhabitants. A house was even put up for them within a matter of hours, for which all payment was refused. It became their main headquarters for their two seasons in the region. But this seemed to intensify the bad feeling between Apa Tanis and Daflas. Kidnapping of men, women and cattle had occurred regularly, and also instances of hand-hunting. There were, of course, reprisals and also ransoms. Despite all this, trade relations between the agricultural Apa Tanis and the cattle-breeding Daflas continued. The von Haimendorfs stayed on for some weeks with the tribe, observing their lives, their economy and their habits. They were especially struck by the industry of the people, who “had created and maintained an oasis of stability within a world of semi-nomadic improvident tribesmen . . . every gift of nature was bent to the service of man.”

They were anxious to explore farther north, and before the Monsoon compelled a return to the plain they began tentative inquiries with a view to a later visit. It was clear that the co-operation of the Daflas and with it the establishment of more peaceful inter-tribal relations would be a *sine qua non*.

Luckily, Dafla envoys came in not long before the mission left, and mutual peace overtures began favourably. A touching farewell marked the end of this first stage. Government then decided to establish a provisional base in the Apa Tani country, with military airports as necessary. This was with a view to extending political control, not only of the foothills but up to the border. The long-term objective was law and order, with the suppression of inter-tribal feuds. In the autumn, with only slight show of force, relations between Daflas and Apa Tanis were more or less stabilized and reconnaissance higher up the Subansiri could begin. Visits were made to the villages of the Miris and of the clans who maintained trade relations with Tibet. Opportunity was taken of observing the way of life, the religion and the rites of the tribes. There were, of course, occasional periods of tenseness, and both von Haimendorfs had some anxious moments. Trade methods between antipathetic clans were interesting. An inhabitant of the village might go to live in some hostile neighbourhood, but would remain there unembarrassed, and he would frequently become the trade agent between the two. The mission did not actually reach the frontier, but the contacts made and the friendships established augured well for a further mission during the winter of 1945-46. However, this was not to be, for the Government of India decided to postpone indefinitely further exploration in the area. It seems a pity, because there would have been little difficulty in reaching Agla Maira (near Tibet); and even Eru Nime (far Tibet), where Ludlow and Kingdon Ward had been six years earlier. The author's concluding remark of regret will evoke sympathy: “. . . even a fraction of the resources spent, year after year, on Himalayan mountaineering ventures would suffice to put these unknown border lands on the ethnographic map and to acquaint us with populations living in complete seclusion from the modern world.”

H. W. T.

Golden Interlude. By Janet Dunbar. John Murray. 1955. Ill.; index. 18s.

Janet Dunbar's *Golden Interlude* tells the story of Lord Auckland's Governor-Generalship of India, 1836-42, as seen through the eyes of his sisters, the Hon. Emily and Fanny Eden. It is based on material drawn from that minor classic, Emily Eden's *Up the Country*, her nephew William Osborne's *Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh*, and her sister Fanny's Journals, parts of which are here published for the first time. It will delight the many who in their day have toured the same plains, rivers, and mountains as the Edens. But it can also be confidently recommended to those who have not.

Janet Dunbar says that she would have preferred to present the sisters through the medium of their own letters, but that this proved impracticable. One cannot but deplore the fact. Not that I wish to suggest that Janet Dunbar does not write

well. She does. But there is an attraction in having things at first hand, especially from two such lively pens as those of the Eden sisters. It is sad to think that much of this newly found material will never be published.

To set off against the loss of not always being certain that we hear the authentic voices of the Edens, we have the advantage of Janet Dunbar's sketch of the background against which the historic tour "Up the Country" took place. Emily Eden gave the reader no assistance of this kind; mentioned the officials and soldiers she met only by letters and not by name; and, moreover, closed her book before the disasters of the First Afghan War occurred. The reader was left wondering how the somewhat superior author had stood up to the reverse of fortune which was soon to befall Lord Auckland, her brother. Janet Dunbar tells the whole story of his term of office, and we learn not only about foreign policy but about his laudable efforts to improve facilities for Indian education, and to insist on his compatriots maintaining a proper standard of behaviour to Indians. She also enables us, for the first time, to see both Miss Edens distinctly. The two sisters reacted differently to the Indian scene. Emily, ceaselessly homesick, hating the heat, liking India only when it resembled her native Kent—which was seldom enough—and finding no pleasure in the society of the British. Fanny, despite recurring malaria, taking India to her heart and rejoicing in its colour and variety. Typically, to Emily her tent was "Misery Hall." Fanny wrote of hers as a "Fairly Palace."

But however much Emily may have disliked life in India, she never let it interfere with her duty. Wherever the Edens went they entertained tirelessly. For young civilians realizing for the first time the heat, loneliness and monotony of Indian Station life they had a special welcome. But they are particularly noteworthy for their manners to Indians. Lord Auckland seems to have been the first Governor-General to dine with an Indian at his house; and Emily set an admirable precedent in interesting herself in the establishment and maintenance of a dispensary for Indians at Simla.

This book has many merits, but its title is not one of them. To Emily it would have seemed inanely inappropriate. *Golden Interlude* indeed! She had hated every moment of it! And the last three months of it had aged brother George ten years. To Fanny, perhaps, it was. But it cost her her health.

G. C. S. CURTIS.

India: New Patterns. By Lady Hartog. Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. 153; map and index. 12s. 6d.

As time goes by, the type of small analytical book on India which in the past English men and women regarded as their prerogative will disappear. Rightly the Indian now tells his own story in his own way; and in doing so the past yields to the urgency and complexities of the present.

In the nine years during which Lady Hartog was at her husband's side in Dacca and Delhi she was able to penetrate the surface of formal social relationships and come to know the mind of the Indian intelligentsia. Before she died she was able to leave us perhaps the last of the "little" books deriving from an English analysis, which in the past we could expect in profusion. Not unnaturally the most impressive passages relate to education and matters concerning social problems and reform. Here the author reveals her sympathy and understanding. The problem of language and the fierce controversies which continue to rage around the various alternative choices are set out in simple, effective clarity. Simplicity indeed is behind this little book's attraction and persuasion. But it is not the simplicity of ignorance. Rather does it indicate the character of a lady who, in her rare moments of criticism, must have disarmed those whom she criticized.

The comment on Kashmir and the one chapter devoted to India's external and Commonwealth relations hardly carry the authority which is necessary in these days of expert scrutiny where international affairs are concerned. The value for us lies mainly in the circumstances which permitted Lady Hartog to return to India in 1953 and thus provide us with a true and sympathetic picture of internal transition. I would commend this book to students who wish a difficult story told in a simple way with sincerity and accuracy.

BIRDWOOD.

One Man's Journey. By Leonard Cottrell. Robert Hale. Pp. 256. Illustrated. Index and Cover Maps. 16s.

The object of Mr. Cottrell's visit to the Middle East in the autumn of 1955 was to report on the activities of various U.N. agencies. He was seconded to U.N.E.S.C.O. by the B.B.C., and accompanied by a French journalist, a Swiss photographer and a French recording engineer. This book is an account of their travels and what they saw in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Libya. The author was obviously greatly impressed by the selflessness and international outlook of the workers, who are doing so much to overcome the plagues of bilharzia and malaria and to alleviate the hardships of the wretched Arab refugees. What he tells us about W.H.O., U.N.I.C.E.F., and U.N.R.W.A. is most illuminating and inspiring, but his reactions to the history all around him are more interesting and perhaps make more lively reading.

In Mr. Cottrell's story one is unavoidably brought face to face with the problem of bureaucracy in international organizations, and there is more than a suggestion that paper almost counts for more than people. This is illustrated in the part played by the high-powered P.R.O. who organized their tour and who was very much put out if anything upset the minute-by-minute programme prepared. Mr. Cottrell writes: "There were offices, typewriters and the inevitable bewildering, tiring interviews with officials behind desks. The usual long list of appointments remorselessly arranged, taking up one's precious time, and fifty per cent. of them useless from any practical point of view. Smiles, handshakes, pamphlets handed out: facts, figures, statistics." Is the United Nations Organization in danger of smothering the workers for its agencies in the field under a blanket of files and hand-outs? Paper and typewriter may well be the curse of the modern age, preventing men and women from giving their full attention to the real work before them and absorbing their energy in the futile submission of reports and returns.

When Mr. Cottrell writes of the past his heart is clearly in his subject. He has a good general knowledge of Middle Eastern history, and, even if it is superficial, he is able to draw a pleasant picture of ancient glories. He is the ideal tourist, who can not only appreciate beauty, but also knows sufficient about the men who created it to make the ruins live.

Altogether this book gives an interesting account of present conditions against the background of the past. Mr. Cottrell's interviews with the Presidents of Liberia and Syria, as well as with General Neguib, make effective reading and have the mark of the trained observer. The book may be recommended as a pleasant account of a journey many of us would like to make. It is a pity, therefore, that it is marred by a number of inaccuracies, which a careful check would have prevented. However, the illustrations are good and make up in part for other shortcomings.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Michael Symes' Journal of his Second Embassy to the Court of Ava in 1802.

Edited by Professor D. G. E. Hall. Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. lxxxix + 181. Index. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 25s. net.

The volume is a spotlight on the Burmese scene during the troublous period before the British annexation. The horrors and discomforts suffered by the natives during these several hundred years show that there is much to be said for the change to civilized "colonialism." It may be true that nations prefer self-government to good government, but there is a limit. In a rich countryside like Burma all these killings and torturings were quite unnecessary. Portuguese influence and their Inquisition experience did not help matters.

The King to whom the missions from the Governor-General at Fort William were accredited during the period 1795 to 1812 was Bodaupaya (1782-1819). (The first Burmese war was in 1824-6.) Symes describes him as "a child in his ideas, a tyrant in his principles, and a madman in his actions."

The 89-page introduction gives the setting, an eloquent tribute to Professor Hall's scholarship and a very readable story of John Company's diplomacy of those far-off days. The gracious wording of official reports recalls the dignities and cultures of another age. Symes had been deputed as an envoy to the Court of Ava in 1795, and

following his return to Calcutta after seven months, he published an excellent study of the Burmese scene—a balanced survey described as “the fullest account of that little-known country that had ever appeared in any European language.” Capt. Hiram Cox was now sent as Resident in 1796, but, being less long-suffering than Symes, returned with a flea in his ear two years later. The Marquis of Wellesley found, in January 1802, that circumstances—especially French rivalry from Mauritius and trouble with Arakan—called for a further mission, which reached Rangoon in May and proceeded up river to Ava in September—when the 100-page *Journal* of the visit starts, recording up to February 1803. It shows our envoy’s amazing patience during a period of studied insults and acute discomfort. In the end, character and forbearance triumphed and possibly saved an unwanted war.

This book is a useful contribution to history and must be read as such. The editor knows his period and his Burma—fascinating, if tragic.

There should be a bibliography, and letters such as No. 14 (Appendix 1) should be tied up to the relevant page in the *Journal*. A sketch map would be useful.

G. M. ROUTH.

The End of Extraterritoriality in China. By Wesley R. Fishel. University of California Press. 1952. Pp. 318. Bibliography, Index.

Extraterritoriality, says the author, is not to be confused with extrajurisdiction, which refers to the immunities accorded a diplomatic envoy and his suite in accordance with international law. It refers to the extension of jurisdiction by one state beyond its own borders to those of its citizens living within the boundaries of another. Such citizens, subjects or protégés are exempted from local territorial jurisdiction, and are placed under the laws and judicial administration of their own state. Though dating in China from the T’ang Dynasty, in its modern form it began in 1842-44 after the First Anglo-Chinese War, and is first mentioned in a document of 1843. Though regarded by the foreign powers concerned as designed to protect their nationals from the vagaries of Chinese justice, there is little doubt that at first the Imperial Government of China regarded it as a concession to inferiors. In due course, however, it became the basis for a wide range of special privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China, including special leased areas, concessions and rights. Under it grew up the great international settlement and port of Shanghai, Shameen Island at Canton, and the foreign control of Chinese customs. By the end of the nineteenth century virtually the entire foreign commercial structure of the country was based on rights and privileges guaranteed under treaties which had granted extensions of extraterritoriality. Protection even extended to missionaries in the remotest parts of the country. Anti-foreign reaction set in, culminating in the outburst of terror known as the Boxer Rising, in 1900, but the murder of scores of missionaries and other foreigners only strengthened the demand for further controls by the Powers holding extraterritorial rights. The beginning of the end came with the First World War, when China declared war on Germany and Austro-Hungary, and automatically terminated the special rights of those nations. The events which followed are traced in detail, and 68 pages of notes give full reference to sources.

The whole constitutes a full and scholarly assessment of the rise and fall of a system which could only be temporary, though it lasted exactly a hundred years, until the treaties of January, 1943. Under these, Britain and the United States relinquished their rights and were followed almost at once by Italy and Vichy France.

L. DUDLEY STAMP.

Biography of Huang Ch’ao. Translated and annotated by Howard S. Levy. University of California Press. 1955. Pp. 144. \$2.

Mr. Levy (the translator) and the editors of the Chinese Dynastic Histories Translations series—S. H. Chen, Woodbridge Bingham, Wolfram Eberhard, H. H. Frankel, Elizabeth Huff and O. J. Maenchen—have given us in this biography an interesting and well-presented version of this celebrated and dramatic story of the unrest accompanying the end of the T’ang Dynasty. The rebellion described in the original of the “Hsin T’ang Shu” (New History of the T’ang Dynasty) by Ou-Yang

Hsiu, Sung Ch'i and others, took place in the period 875-884. The leaders were at first Wang Hsien and Huang Ch'ao (who survived the former, who was killed in the first stages of the affair). The revolt following the earlier one of An Lu Shan began the sequence of events which culminated in the end of the dynasty (907).

During an earlier reign, that of Hsuan Tsung, in order to deal with menacing incursions of Uigurs, Tibetans and other invaders, the defences of the far-flung empire had been entrusted to ten legates, or "Chieh-tu Shih," whose independence became almost as great a danger to the throne as that arising from the barbarians themselves. Eventually, after the suppression of anarchy which they were causing, the power of the dynasty came to be concentrated in the hands of the palace eunuchs, who were actually able to select the heir to the throne and even to command troops.

Inevitably, anarchy and rebellion ensued, breaking out when the youthful emperor Hsi-tsung was eleven years old. A sense of despair among the people of the prefectures of the Yellow River, aggravated by drought and crop failures, led to desperate looting and anarchy. There was a strong accession of force to Huang Ch'ao—who led the movement and gave it direction—amounting to a number of about 600,000 when he took the Imperial capital, Ch'ang-an, in 881.

It is a story in many ways typical of the many revolts experienced in China's turbulent history, with a fair share of treachery and incompetence among the Imperial commanders and troops opposing the rebels; yet, on the other hand, with much loyalty, particularly from the official and scholar class. The emperor did not find it possible to muster sufficient force from his own domains to suppress the rival régime—by now Huang Ch'ao, having usurped the throne, was obliged to summon alien assistance in the shape of Li K'o-yung a Sha t'o Turk, together with an army of 10,000 Tartars. This very effective military leader recaptured Ch'ang-an in 883, but, as might have been expected, it did not prove of ultimate profit, since he later became one of the contenders for its power when it fell.

The Chinese text is a bold and extremely terse piece of writing and the laconic style seems to add effect to the impressive record of bloodshed. "Ch'ao again entered the capital. Enraged because the people welcomed the royal divisions he allowed (his troops) to attack and kill 80,000 of the inhabitants. Their blood flowed into the streets (forming streams) of fordable depth."

"There was a great battle fought against the royal divisions of Liang-t'ien p'o in which the bandits were defeated and several tens of thousands of them were taken prisoner. The corpses covered a distance of thirty li. These were gathered to form a monument of victory." Such were the manifestations when the mandate of heaven became exhausted and such was the usual result of attempts to attain it.

The ensanguined tale is well annotated with good indexing and referencing, and the main version from "Hsin T'ang Shu" has been much augmented by information from a very wide range of other authorities. In all there are about eighty of such listed sources in the bibliography in a wide variety of languages. As a result, many interesting points emerge in the footnotes, and as an example we have—by way of contrast to the obvious sadism of the great rebel—some of his juvenile compositions, created for his father and grandfather:

When autumn arrives on the eighth day of the ninth moon
 After my flower blossoms, all the flowers will be destroyed.
 Colliding with Heaven, the fragrant hosts will penetrate Ch'ang-an;
 The entire city will be girdled round with its golden armour.

Another admirable feature of the book is the inclusion of two versions of the rebellion by Arab historians, Abu Zaid and Mas'udi, whose observations and standpoint are of value even today to students who may be interested in interaction of different civilizations in Asia and their current unfoldment. Muslim authors could not fail to react when a major role was played by a Turkish military notability, and, of course, in the fall of the T'ang dynasty.

There is a good deal of topographical and governmental detail which is likely to please serious students; and the typography, with its Chinese characters and—to a lesser extent—Arabic script, is excellent.

The translator is to be commended on having produced a work both interesting and provocative out of difficult materials.

A. H. S. C.

The Nine Songs. A Study of Shamanism in Ancient China. By Arthur Waley. George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 63. 10s.

Mr. Waley has, in his translation of the "Nine Songs," given us another of his inimitable studies in Chinese literature. Reading this collection of poems from the writings of Ch'u, one is brought suddenly face to face with the unknown depths of the mysticism of Ancient China.

These poems present extreme difficulty in translation, because their meaning is very obscure, and it is doubtful whether they are even much understood in China today, although there is a degree of scholarly interest in them.

The author himself discusses, at the beginning of his interesting introduction, the point as to whether he has been right in selecting the word "shaman" to express an adept in the Chinese cult of spirits called "wu." A "wu" was an individual approximating to a medium or sybil, who, by dancing, incantation and rites, became apparently possessed. In a traumatic or hypnotic state a "Bright Spirit" would then descend upon him or her. This extremely widespread propensity in China was quite similar to the better-known dark cult, which has been subscribed to in Mongolia, Siberia, Tibet and other parts of Central Asia. "Shamanism" has also been observed among Eskimos and the Red Indians of North America.

This primitive religion was, at the time of Chingiz Khan, the official faith of the Mongols, and his difficulties with Tebtengri will be remembered. It was a source of much difference between the Mongols and the Chinese, who were quite absorbed in Confucian beliefs and customs. The Sage had given the excellent advice, "Revere spirits but keep them at a distance," and Chinese officialdom was therefore hostile to the practice of the "wu."

As an example of the quaintness and clarity of the imagery, the following is an extract from the invocation addressed to Ho-Po, the River god:

In his fish-scale house, dragon-scale hall,
Portico of purple-shell, in his red palace,
What is the Spirit doing, down in the water?
Riding a white turtle, followed by stripy fish.
With you I wandered in the islands of the River.

There is about all these poems, however sceptical one may be of their message, a quality of haunting beauty and a pristine translucence which brings to mind the works of Hesiod or Homer, belonging, with them, to the morning of the world.

The well-informed commentaries after each poem assist much in our approach to understanding the imagery of invocations to such supposed entities as the Big Lord of Lives (Ta Su Ming), or the Lord of the East (Tung Chun), and the others; but there is so much unsaid.

Now to the measure of the drum we have finished our rites,
From dancer to dancer the flower spray has been handed,
In Spring the orchid, in Autumn the chrysanthemum,
So shall it be for ever, without break.

A. H. S. C.

In Two Chinas. By K. M. Panikkar. George Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. 179. Index. 12s. 6d.

It must have fallen to the lot of few to represent their own country in another under two such different régimes as General Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Government in Nanking and that of Communist China in Peking.

In one chapter (IV) Mr. Panikkar describes the curious interlude when diplomatic privileges were removed by a non-existent Foreign Office, where Chinese was the only language, and where the use of cyphers was not permitted and couriers were not allowed.

Ex-Embassies were confined to a small number of cars—the American Embassy establishment of motors was reduced from 110 to 5. Chinese servants had the upper hand of their masters, could not be dismissed, and put forward fantastic demands, which had to be met.

The author took advantage of this "non-diplomatic" period to prepare a memorandum on the situation in South-East Asia. In this he obtained the cooperation of British, Australian and American ambassadors. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, and it can be justly stated that this document became the basis of the discussions which led to the Colombo Plan, a plan which has made giant strides since those days.

The *Corps Diplomatique* finally evacuated Nanking, and the author spent a short interlude in India, stopping in Burma to visit U Nu's government. He then became aware that he was to go back to China as India's first ambassador to Mao Tse-Tung's Communist government in Peking, with the agreement of Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai.

He was received with proper pomp and protocol but remarks on the "tendency of the new régime to have their interviews late at night." This, of course, was nothing new; in olden days most important meetings would be held at two and three in the morning.

The author makes interesting comparisons between Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Tse-Tung, and remarks on the physical strength of the latter, coming as he does from iron-hard peasant stock.

In the chapter on "A Tour in the Interior" the author describes his visit to Sian—where Chiang Kai-Shek was detained by Chang Hsueh-Liang (the young Marshal). On the walls of the pavilion in which he was detained, a poem in Chinese was written—a rough translation reading:

A great thieving animal was caught here
but it was let off, when we discovered
that it was no Wolf
but a Jackal.

The author's final conclusions are that the New China is the culminating event of Asian Resurgence; that the new government in China was the fulfilment of a hundred years of evolution;* that China desired to maintain the continuity of her life and culture. May her culture not be destroyed by the dead level of mediocrity which seems to be Communism's ideal.

H. St. C. S.

My Boy Chang. By Hope Danby. Victor Gollancz. 1955. Pp. 222. 13s. 6d.

Emily Hahn says that this book will be enjoyed by those fortunate people who called Peking "Home." Note the use of the past tense, as presumably there are very few foreigners who call that heavenly capital "Home" today.

Miss Danby reveals in the early pages of this charming book how she is inevitably run by her Number One boy, who considers that propriety demands that she has a female servant, as well as the males which help to fill the compound of any house owned or rented by a foreigner. One may presume that the amah was a relation of the Number One boy, or at least that he was under some obligation to her. Common (Chinese) sense persuades the Number One boy that there is nothing incongruous in washing his feet in a capacious saucepan with the aid of his mistress's French perfumed soap, or in filling his mouth with water and squirting the contents over the linen to be ironed. I feel that the same boy would have excused himself for straining soup through a sock by assuring his mistress that it was not a *clean* sock.

Mandarin English can be very strange; the authoress's "Rost Turk," "Befe stank" (Beefsteak) "Snakes on Tost" (Snipe on Toast) call to mind many similar efforts, such as fine gauge stockings, which may be described as "all-same-no-have-got" stockings.

The description of "Magic" Gardening will remind all former residents of Peking how, in an hour or two, empty beds will be full of flowering plants. The Number One boy orders 300 pansies and 150 snapdragons from the Travelling Flower-Seller, who carries these plants, on the point of blooming, or actually in bloom, in his flat baskets swinging from a pole over his shoulder.

The Temple in the Western Hills—"Temple of the Fragrant World"—in which

* Why only a hundred years?—H. St. C. S.

Mrs. Danby spends some hot-weather months, recalls those refuges from workaday life, so aptly named and so utterly peaceful. Their views over the Peking Plain, reminiscent of the Campagna at Rome; the swaying willows, and the droning priests, all unite to paint an unforgettable picture.

Alas! all these charms evaporated during the Japanese occupation of Peking, and though an integral part of the book, the happy atmosphere fades away, making the first part of the book all the more enjoyable. A book to read—and even to return to in free moments.

H. St. C. S.

The Chinese Gentry. Studies on their Role in Nineteenth-Century Society. By Chung-Li Chang. University of Washington Publications on Asia. University of Washington Press. 1955. Pp. xxi + 250.

This publication, a product of the Modern Chinese History Project, carried out by the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington, is a book of a quite unusual nature. It purports to be a contribution to nineteenth-century Chinese history, but is, in fact, a sociological study based largely on methods which can only be described as statistical, and to a lesser degree biographical, analysis of numerous case histories of typical members of China's former "upper crust."

While containing much information of varying degrees of value, it is an extremely difficult book to read, and it may possibly be of interest to remark that it appears to conform closely to the canons of sterile scholarship which it condemns, because, within about 200 pages of text, it is difficult to come across any original thought. Indeed, there is not much in the way even of analysis which would appear to be of great value, or indeed any just appreciation of the mentality or capabilities of the class which it professes to examine.

Everyone admits that, in the nineteenth century, the Chinese gentry had become largely bankrupt of ideas or administrative resource and were out of touch with the inexorable tide of progress brought to the country by the West (and America); but surely there are grounds for regret, from some standpoints, at their collapse, which removed from the world a begetting and appreciating order of society which has produced manifestations of art and æstheticism unrivalled anywhere. The author has, in fact, so far recoiled from his own national style as to depict, in Figure One, what can only be described (to borrow an engineering term) as a "flow sheet" of the processes whereby the Commoners—such as the "tung-sheng" and the "chen-shiu"—are transformed by the examination process into "lower-gentry" such as "chien-sheng," "sheng-yuan" or "li-kung"; and finally into the ultimate apotheosis of the scholar, the "upper-gentry"—placing the fortunate candidate among the "chen-shi," the "chu-jeng" or the "kung-sheng." Arrived at these heights, the fortunate ones were able to secure the highest dignities of civil or military office or title.

It is considered that by the methods employed in the book no just or impartial assessment of the real significance or worth of the class under criticism may be obtained. Nevertheless, it can be said that the work contains an extremely competent analysis of the nature of the Imperial Examinations and very pertinent observations about the many unproductive years spent by the luckless professional scholars, whose lives were condemned largely to futile cramming. This discussion has been constructed from very authoritative sources and developed in an entertaining chapter called "The Examination Life of the Gentry," but unfortunately nothing is told of the sort of thinking and little about the kind of character which emerged from the process.

There are, however, many admirable lessons to be drawn from this study which reflect on those, wherever they may be, who are responsible for the working of bureaucratic machinery, and which lead to the comment that, while government is in essence a fairly simple and direct process, administration is not. The latter, being the product of narrow and self-perpetuating functions, is complex and ultimately self-destructive. When a system deprives an individual of his inborn status—which is an "inalienable right"—either by an oppressive system of selection or by "thought control," the simpler and more natural impulses latent in society will always inevitably redress the balance in due course.

A. H. S. C.

The Sixth Column. By Mahmood Khan Durrani, G.C. Cassell and Co. 21s.

This heroic personal story of Col. Durrani's is no literary *tour de force*, but it does describe in a vivid manner the extraordinary tribulations and trials through which this gallant Muslim ultimately emerged triumphant.

For seemingly unending months and years the author underwent persecution, torture and great physical and mental anguish, at the hands of the Japanese and the members of the I.N.A. Brutal though the methods of the former, the I.N.A. were not left far behind, and it is very easy to understand the deep hatred existing between such men as Durrani and the Hindus, when the latter are on top. When the trend changed, and an ultimate Allied victory seemed likely, their attitude improved, but the seeds had already been sown, and one feels that in the mind of the author there will never be a friendly thought for Hinduism or Hindustan.

Durrani's activities had to be skilfully camouflaged, as he was supposed to be training a team of Muslims to be landed on the Indian coast from a Japanese long-distance submarine. Their supposed task was to be to sabotage the Indian (including Muslim) war effort. Under cover he was inculcating in his pupils' minds the fact that they must give themselves up to the British authorities after landing. They were to report the intentions of the Japanese and so provide the British with valuable data for defence and counter-attack.

Gradually the Japanese formed the conclusion that he was secretly working against them, and he was fortunate not to be shot out of hand. His sufferings were such that, had it not been for a sustaining faith, he would have welcomed death as a release. The book ends with the author's being called to see the F.M., Sir Claude Auchinleck, and the presentation of the George Cross to him by Lord Wavell. He records a conversation with Lord Pethick Lawrence, in which he put forward the Muslim point of view. An additional chapter by Mr. Mast tells the story of the Japanese submarine's voyage to the coast of Suid, the landing at Pasni, and their submission to the Revenue Officer of the State of Kalat; a fitting outcome to the sustained and heroic efforts of the gallant author.

H. St. C. S.

Land of the Sherpas. By Ella Maillart. Hodder and Stoughton. 1955. 18s.

This is a truly delightful little book wherein the famous traveller-writer tells of her happy visits to the villages and shrines in the foothills of the Great Himalayan Chain, to the north of Khatmandu. In some 40 pages she has brilliantly portrayed the lives and the customs of the Sherpa and Tamang inhabitants. And she has given us an excellent collection of 77 pictures to depict: in Part One, "The High Valleys" and in Part Two, "Places of Pilgrimage." The scenes of these are conveniently explained in the list preceding them. That the title of the book may possibly be considered by some as an overstatement in no way detracts from its merits.

H. W. T.

The World of Dew. By D. J. Enright. Secker and Warburg. 1955. Pp. 216. Ill. 18s.

The author writes his book after eighteen months as a professor of English Literature at Konan University. It is eminently readable but leaves, in the reader's mind, the fact that Japanese evaluation of English literature is a very curious one.

The approach seems to be one of sadness and gloom, the impression is one of seriousness and grimness which would appear to prevent any real pleasure in the study of the subject. This may be the result of a post-war depression which appears to pervade the Japanese nation. It is natural that this should be so.

We are given glimpses of the poetic mind of many Japanese in the chapter "The Ancient Pond." Examples of Haiku poetry are given, headed by the translations of three by Basho, the classical poet, who lived from 1644-94. The translation given of one of the best known:

The ancient pond
A frog leaps in
The sound of the water

does not appear to compare with another translation (not quoted) which reads:

A silent pool:
The "plop" as the
Frog slips in.

This expressive poetry is at its best, to my mind, in the poem:

The scissors hesitate
Before the white chrysanthemums
a moment.

The translations given are those made by R. H. Blyth in *Haiiku*—except "The Silent Pool."

The author complains of the "thinness" of Japanese poetry, but in the Haiku form, surely, there is a concentrated essence which can hardly be described as "thin."

The chapters on "Madame Butterfly" and "Miss Moth" are vividly descriptive of the part Japanese emancipated (?) womanhood plays in Japan today. Japanese difficulty in differentiating between the English letters "L" and "R" is amusingly illustrated by the notice over a Tokyo station reading:

SUNLIGHT SOAP. LEVER BROTHELS LIMITED.

Without pretending to depth of knowledge, this is an informing and entertaining book.

H. ST. C. S.

The Honorary Secretaries will be grateful for unwanted copies of the Society's JOURNAL as follows:

- Vol. 1 (1914), Part 4.
- Vol. 5 (1918), Parts 1, 2.
- Vol. 7 (1920), Parts 1, 2, 3.
- Vol. 8 (1921), Parts, 1, 2.
- Vol. 10 (1923), Parts 2, 4.
- Vol. 11 (1924), Parts 1, 3.
- Vol. 12 (1925), Part 2.
- Vol. 33 (1946), Parts 3/4.
- Vol. 35 (1948), Part 1.
- Vol. 39 (1952), Part 2.

ELLA MAILLART



THE LAND OF THE SHERPAS

When, in 1949, the remote kingdom of Nepal at last opened its frontiers, Ella Maillart determined to see this very individual civilisation before it disintegrated before the forces of modern materialism. The result of her journey was **THE LAND OF THE SHERPAS**, a collection of magnificent photographs of Sherpa life introduced by a learned and perceptive essay. This book maintains the standard of Ella Maillart's famous "Forbidden Journey" which the *Sunday Times* considered "enough to place her among the great travellers of the world".

78 photographs in gravure
18/- net

H O D D E R A N D S T O U G H T O N

NOTICES

THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

*being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend ^{him}
her for membership.*

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His
Her connection with Asia is :

(Entrance fee, £1. Yearly subscription, £1 10s. for country and overseas members.
£2 for residents in the London area.)

NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the past few years the Journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. The Council again appeals to all members to sign this deed of covenant, and would particularly ask that those proposing candidates for election point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed.

DEED OF COVENANT

I
of
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date of this Deed or during my life (whichever shall be the shorter period) I will pay to the said Society from my general fund of taxed income such an amount annually as after deduction of income tax at the Standard Rate yields the net sum of
The first payment is to be made on the
Dated this day of 19.....
Signed, sealed and delivered by the said
In the presence of:
Address of Witness to your signature
.....

(NOTE.—The Deed must be signed by the subscriber on a date prior to the date of the first yearly payment, as shown in the body of the Deed.)



JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XLIII

APRIL, 1956

PART II

CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL - - - - -	90
NOTICES - - - - -	91
TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P. - - - - -	92
A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By LORD BIRDWOOD, M.V.O. - - - - -	101
THE DRAGONS LASH THEIR TAILS IN INDO-CHINA. By COLONEL MELVIN HALL, D.S.O. - - - - -	113
THE CAMBRIDGE EXPEDITION TO AFGHANISTAN, 1955. By O. R. DE BAER - - - - -	121
THE CYPRIOT TURKS. By C. F. BECKINGHAM - - - - -	126
THE RUSSIAN TOUR OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By GEORGE EVANS - - - - -	131
CORRESPONDENCE - - - - -	137

REVIEWS:

Defeat into Victory, 138	The Life of Muhammad, 151
Last and First in Burma, 140	Jews and Arabs, 152
A History of the Crusades, 142	An Introduction to Modern Arabic, 153
The Koran Interpreted, 143	Village Life in Modern Thai- land, 154
Two Nations and Kashmir, 144	Law in Communist China, 155
A Handbook to India, Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon, 145	The Uneven Road, 155
The Arab Manuscripts of Mount Sinai, 146	The Crescent in Crisis, 155
The Art and Architecture of Japan, 146	Just Half a World Away, 156
Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, 148	From the Back Streets of Ben- gal, 156
Central Asiatic Journal, 149	Russian Holiday, 157
Syria, 150	Road to Rakaposhi, 157
Syrian Harvest, 150	A Mountain Called Nun Kun, 158

Published by
THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY
2, HINDE STREET, LONDON, W.1
TEL: WELBECK 4823

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL 1955-56

President :

THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D.

Hon. Vice-Presidents :

THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
LT.-GENERAL SIR ADRIAN CARTON DE WIART, V.C., K.B.E.,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

LORD HAILEY, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.
GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Chairman of Council :

ADMIRAL SIR CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B.

Vice-Chairman :

C. A. P. SOUTHWELL, C.B.E., M.C.

Vice-Presidents :

BRIGADIER S. H. LONGRIGG, O.B.E.,
D.LITT.

LT.-GENERAL H. G. MARTIN, C.B.,
D.S.O., O.B.E.

DR. E. J. LINDGREN, M.A.

V. PURCELL, ESQ., C.M.G., LITT.D.

DR. L. LOCKHART, PH.D.

SIR HUGH DOW, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

SIR CLARMONT SKRINE, O.B.E.

G. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

Hon. Treasurer :

MAJOR EDWARD AINGER.

Hon. Secretaries :

W. H. INGRAMS, ESQ., C.M.G., O.B.E., Near and Middle East.

COLONEL H. W. TOBIN, D.S.O., O.B.E., Central Asia.

GROUP-CAPT. H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD, O.B.E., Far East.

Hon. Librarian :

COLONEL F. M. BAILEY, C.I.E.

Secretary Emerita: MISS M. N. KENNEDY.

Members of Council :

LT.-COLONEL THE LORD BIRDWOOD,
M.V.O.

V. L. WALTER, ESQ., C.B.E.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR LESLIE
HOLLINGHURST, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C.

LT.-COLONEL E. H. GASTRELL, O.B.E.

F. B. SADLER, ESQ.

SIR JOHN TROUTBECK, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.

LT.-COLONEL A. C. GALLOWAY, C.I.E.,
O.B.E.

SIR NEVILLE BUTLER, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

Local Honorary Secretaries :

Bahrein: SIR CHARLES DALRYMPLE
BELGRAVE, K.B.E.

E. Canada: R. S. HOOTON, ESQ.

India: W. H. T. HARRIS, ESQ.

Kuweit: D. C. FITZPATRICK, ESQ.

Khartoum: SIR EDWIN S. CHAPMAN
ANDREWS, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

Lebanon: MRS. K. JOLY.

W. Pakistan: W. A. BROWN, ESQ.,
M.B.E.

Qatar: P. J. BAWCUTT, ESQ.

Secretary :

MRS. K. G. PUTNAM, M.B.E.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

The Annual General Meeting of the Society will take place on Wednesday, June 13, at the Rooms of the Royal Society, Burlington House at 4.15 p.m.

ANNUAL DINNER

This will take place at Claridge's, London, W.1, at 7.30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 11. Formal notice has been sent to all members. Applications for tickets should be sent to the Secretary at 2, Hinde Street as soon as possible.

NOTICES

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following :

The Advance of the Egyptian Expedition Force, under the Command of General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.—July 1917 to October 1918, with 49 maps.

Central Asian Review, Vol. III, No. 4, 1955.

New States and International Organizations, pub. by International Political Science Assn. U.N.E.S.C.O. Paris 1955. On sale at H.M. Stationery Office, London, price 13s.

The United States and the Arab World, Mohammed shafi Agwani, pub. by the Muslim University, Aligarh.

H.A. Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1955.

The Pleistocene Artifacts of Hotu Cave, Iran, by Louis B. Dupree, reprinted from the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 96, No. 3, June 1952.

The Bulletin of the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology of the National Taiwan University, No. 5, with English translation.

Iban Agriculture. A report on the Shifting Cultivation of Hill Rice, by the Aban of Sarawak, by J. D. Freeman. H.M. Stationery Office, London, price 12s. 6d.

Emergent Turkish Administrators. A publication of the Administrative Sciences, University of Ankara. Publication No 1, 1955.

Orientalia, Katalog Nr. 22, 1955.

Notes on the Dispersal of the Dromedary, by Marvin K. Mikesell, reprint from the *South-western Journal of Anthropology*, pub. by University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.

The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1955.

Correction to List of Members.

P. 13: The correct address of Mr. John Biggs-Davison, M.P., is 14, Lennox Gardens Mews, S.W.1.

TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.

A lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 8, 1956, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Philips Price has kindly come to talk to us this afternoon on "Tensions in the Middle East," a most apt subject at this time. He needs no introduction to most of those present; he has spoken to us often before. But for the benefit of those who have not had the pleasure of meeting him previously, suffice it to say that he is a Member of Parliament, a journalist, a writer of distinction and a lecturer; also he is a great traveller of wide experience, and he is shortly going to publish a book mainly about his journeys. We are fortunate to have him here today. Mr. Philips Price.

ON previous occasions when I have had the honour of addressing this society I have generally described a journey that I have made in some part of Asia in which the society is interested.

On this occasion I am not describing a journey but making a general survey of the M.E. and trying to unravel some of the thorny problems that are now presenting themselves. I am conscious of the difficulty of this task and of the fact that in process of doing this I may tread on someone's toes.

The title of this lecture is: "Tensions in the Middle East." These have increased greatly in recent months. A new phase in the history of this part of Asia is opening up, and very heavy responsibility rests on this country with its decade-long responsibilities and interests here. I need only remind you that oil in the Persian Gulf is 60 per cent. world oil resources and that oil now heavily supplements our coal for industrial purposes.

The old Middle East, as many of us once knew it in the days of our youth, is gone.

Those of us who served in India in the Army and the I.C.S. in Egypt and the Sudan, or fought in the war against the Turks in 1914-18, or once travelled like me in the old Ottoman Empire and in the Persia of the Qajars, have seen a completely new M.E. rise before our eyes over the last twenty-five years.

It was bound to come about that national consciousness of the people between the Caspian and the Mediterranean should wake at last from medieval slumber.

What the Reformation brought us in Western and Central Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—when the national states of this continent as we know them today began to take shape—came to *Eastern Europe* in the latter part of last century and the beginning of this.

The delayed influence of the French Revolution spread to the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Serbia became independent; Rumania, Greece and later Bulgaria followed suit.

But through all this time there was little stirring in the Middle East. The Wafd, however, formed in Egypt, an Arab national movement spon-

sored by Arab dynasties, grew underground in Asiatic Turkey and blossomed forth under the leadership of Lawrence after Turkey joined the first world war.

Then the ancient Kingdom of Persia in 1909 was convulsed by revolution. One Shah abdicated and another granted a constitution.

At the end of the first world war we saw a number of Arab kingdoms and republics created under French and British protection. Persia and Turkey threw off various attempts of European powers and of Russia to establish protectorates over them.

Then Turkey under that really great man, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was at this stage the only country which completely succeeded in abolishing its old regime and in founding a republic with every prospect of adopting the European social and industrial system and passing from dictatorship to a system of civic liberty and of parliamentary government for its citizens.

Yet even Turkey has not fully reached that stage as the stresses and strains within that country in recent months have revealed. But it is fast moving along this road.

Turkey's age-long hostility to Russia, at whose hands she has suffered encroachments ever since the time of the Empress Catharine, has brought her right into the Western camp.

When the Russian revolution created a Communist social and political system over one-sixth of the earth's surface, the cold war in its various stages began in Europe and Asia. The struggle against Russian imperialism is not new. It has gone on since Peter the Great's days. But it is made more dangerous now by the ideological inspiration of Communism behind it. So there has begun a struggle between the Western free way of life and the Communist totalitarian way of life. And the national consciousness of the Middle East is now mature enough to choose between these two ideologies.

In S.E. Europe when the national movements became mature early this century there was no challenge of Communism confronting these countries. It was parliamentary democracy and civic freedom which the young states of S.E. Europe (Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Poland) could choose as against feudalism and foreign imperialism of the past. But today the countries of the Middle East can choose either a Western way of life or the Russian system. There is a new choice—not there before.

There are three great racial linguistic groups in the Middle East, and they roughly correspond with three political systems: the Turkish Republic, the Arab States, Persia.

Turkey has chosen her course. Persia, with some hesitation, seems to be choosing at least alliance with the West—but there are complications to which I shall refer later. The Arab countries are divided and hesitant.

Many are seeking to join Mr. Nehru in creating a neutral world between the Western and the Russian camps. Nationalism has among the Arabs a strong anti-Western trend. It is the fear of people that have for so many centuries been under foreign Western domination that conditions their thinking, and also the fear of a people who are not sure of themselves. Turkey has been for centuries free and independent and the centre of an Empire. Therefore she could pass easily through the revolution which

created the modern European type of state and come out into the Western camp and way of life.

The transition was easy because Turkey's nationalism had not been really suppressed at any time.

Even the much weaker Persia held together in a national unity in spite of most critical times after the first world war and during the second world war. The revolution of 1919 and the creation of the Pavlevi dynasty headed by Riza Shah laid the foundation of a much stronger Persian nation with a central government, though, unlike Turkey, Persia still retains many social and economic weaknesses.

The battle to keep Persia in the Western camp and lay the foundations of a healthy society and a strong economy is in full swing. Recent developments seem to show some success for the Western Powers in helping Persia to come along with them and keeping her outside the Russian camp. I think in this respect a lot is due to the young Shah, who realizes, as many do not, the importance of social reform in Persia.

But the outstanding feature about Persia, to my mind, is that, in spite of social and economic weaknesses and great inequalities of wealth, national consciousness, patriotism and solidarity remain strong. It is the result of centuries of independence and a great historic past.

But it is the Arab countries about which the greatest uncertainty exists.

The Arabs have always been great fundamentalists. According to the Arabs of the old school, man is made to conform to laws and customs which do not alter. It was Arab fundamentalism which created the Sheriat law.

Under this law the lives of men, both spiritual *and temporal*, are regulated. Man renders to God not only the things that are God's but also the things that are Cæsar's.

This philosophy, of course, is slowly breaking down now and a reformation is coming to Islam. But Arab fundamentalism takes other forms today, and is seen in a refusal to compromise or to find the practical way out of a political problem.

It has also been difficult to get Arabs even to combine among themselves. Feuds between the rival Sheikls, the Hashemite and Ibn Saud dynasties continue and now have the smell of oil. The Arabs have not got a strong political sense because they have throughout the centuries had few periods of self-government or real independence.

The Arab tribesmen who followed Mahomed and created the armies of Islam soon came under foreign political influence. Under the Ommeyyid Caliphate the Greek influence was strong. Under the Abbasid Caliphate it was the Persian influence. Then came the disaster of the Mongol invasion and the sack of Baghdad, and the Arabs finally came under the rule of the Turks.

Socially and economically the Arabs are very diverse; cultivators of the soil in the "green belt" of the Mediterranean coast, the irrigated lands of the Nile and in the Tigris and the Euphrates watershed. But large numbers are still primitive nomads.

Thus the social and educational gap is wide between the Bedouin of the Hedjaz and the educated Arab of Damascus and Cairo. Except in the

larger towns of Arab countries, society is patriarchal, *i.e.* the rule of male head of family. Sheriat law, with its provisions about division of property among children, has made a system of property inheritance difficult to apply in the modern world. But changes are taking place. The Arab world is slowly passing over to a modern European social system of families in which each member has his rights, not subjected to will of patriarchal head. But now at this moment when Arab society is in a state of critical transition there has burst with full force into this country between Mesopotamia and the Libyan desert the disruptive force of Zionism. And thus the injection of an alien fully-fledged European system into M.E. was bound to create violent reactions. The creation of the political state of Israel has introduced a foreign element into the complex political system of the M.E.

It has resulted in intense embitterment of the Arab nationalist movement, which might have been kept within bounds and have become ready to co-operate with the West. But now there has been let loose a wave of xenophobia and a readiness to see European powers trying by underhand means to re-establish their imperial power over the Arab countries once more. A wild emotionalism has been let loose, driving out all reason. Arab fundamentalism has been redoubled. *The creation, in other words, of the state of Israel has been an unmitigated disaster for the M.E.*

The interpretation which the Western Powers and America allowed to be put on the Balfour Declaration—a vague document—by the Zionists, has resulted in the estrangement of the whole Arab world.

We have sown dragons' teeth in the M.E. and the swords are now coming up.

During the 1914-18 war we made contradictory promises to defeat Turkey. We told the Jews they would have a national home and we did not define it. We told the Arabs by the Sykes-Picot agreement that the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire would go to Arab states under French and British protection.

By the MacMahon agreement with Emir Hussein of Hedjaz we gave the land from the Arabian desert to the east Mediterranean to Arab rulers—no mention of "national home for Jews."

Arabs remember this—and Arabs, like Irish, do not forget or compromise. Arabs are not, like British, always ready to forgive and compromise. And, unlike the tolerant Turks, wrongs rankle.

So today we have tensions in M.E., and Russia is always ready to exploit these tensions on her borders or anywhere in Asia. This is a source of danger to M.E. countries and to Western powers with their oil interests, for Arab nationalism is now embittered and the intrusion of Zionist state in M.E. has caused Arabs to regard danger of Russian Communist imperialism to be a matter of little importance to them compared to danger of Western imperialism, which they think has forced a Jewish state on them.

Some of them therefore are adopting a neutral attitude in cold war and even, as the recent arms purchase from Egypt shows, are ready to blackmail the West in order to destroy the state of Israel.

But, just as Arabs have never been united in the past, so today there has been a certain divergence in the matter of tactics over the attitude to

Israel and Russia. They are all united in hatred of Israel. But the Arab state nearest to borders of Russia, Iraq, has always tended to see the need for defence against Russian southward expansion and to seek Western aid for this purpose.

Also, Iraq, while supporting Egypt in her demand that the British withdraw from Canal Zone, has always been ready to see in Britain a potential ally against Russia, and even to overcome the ingrained Arab distrust of Turkey in interest of defence of M.E. against Russia.

Thus there has come about a divergence of policy among some Arab states. This came to a head when in 1955 Iraq joined the Turco-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. This has blossomed out into the Baghdad Pact which Great Britain has now joined. This pact roused resentment in Egypt. First of all, it showed that some Arab states were prepared to act independently of Egypt and undermine Egypt's leadership of the Arab world. Secondly, it showed that Iraq in fact regarded Russia as a danger as much as Israel, or perhaps greater. This was heresy because the Arab states that follow Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria regard Israel as the sole enemy and Russia as a potential instrument that can be used to blackmail the Western powers.

The key to the situation seems to me to be in Egypt.

Can Egypt be got to at least hold to her neutrality and make it benevolent neutrality towards the West without exacting blackmail?

I think it unwise to regard Egypt as an enemy of the West, although her behaviour would justify that assumption.

We must keep our heads in spite of provocation. What are the facts about Egypt?

As I see it she is being subjected to many internal stresses and strains.

She is ruled by a military dictatorship, but one which is the most efficient, progressive and, by Middle East standards, the least corrupt than any regime in that country since Cromer's day.

Consequently the regime has its enemies among the corrupt politicians and plutocrats of the Wafd and among the adherents of the late King of disastrous memories.

Moreover, Egypt has suffered a reverse in the Sudan where she overplayed her hand, and the Sudan consequently rejected her overtures for a "link" with Egypt and adopted a policy of Sudanese independence.

The military regime in Egypt is under pressure therefore to show its people that it has a forward foreign policy and is out to make Egypt the dominant power in the Middle East.

But Egypt has an Achilles heel. Her population is rising fast. Irrigation works of great cost are needed, and only foreign finance and technical aid can give this to her. The Asswan High Dam will solve the problem for some years of averting starvation in the Nile valley.

Here is where the Americans and to a lesser extent we can come in. But there is no use attaching political strings to our aid or Colonel Nasser will run off to Russia for the money. We, on the other hand, cannot abandon the Sudan, which claims that the Asswan Dam would rob her of certain Nile water reserves which are her due.

A most delicate situation is thus created and we must exercise the utmost

tact to try and keep Egypt benevolently neutral in the cold war, give her economic aid without sacrificing our security or the rights of the Sudan or our oil interests in the Persian Gulf and without letting Russia into a key position in the Middle East.

We shall not succeed in this if we try to hector Egypt, or any other Arab state for that matter, into leaving her neutrality and joining the Baghdad Pact.

All this means that we run a risk. But nothing in foreign affairs is gained without running risks. In the long run our most powerful aid is our reputation for justice and fair play to see us through.

“To our own self be true,
And it must follow as the night the day
We cannot then be false to any man.”

We can rely, too, on the fact that culturally the Arab world is nearer to us than it is to Russia. Islam and Christianity have much in common, and neither has anything in common with Communism. Moreover, we have taught the Arab world something of the value of justice and civil liberty.

Yet the hard fact remains that the situation on the Palestine front is dangerous and explosive. We must seek a long-term solution of the Arab-Israel conflict by getting both sides to sit down and talk. Years may pass before a solution is obtained. In the end both sides must give way something.

Meanwhile a short-term policy must be to prevent an Arab-Jewish war from breaking out again. Along with the United States and France we must work out a system whereby the Tripartite Pact is strengthened and Western air and ground forces are ready to intervene to stop a fresh outbreak.

What about the other Arab states? Syria I have always regarded as even more hostile and bitter towards the West than Egypt. No doubt this is partly due to the poor show the Syrian army put up in the Arab-Jewish war.

I do not think we can count on Syria in (1) trying to settle the Arab-Israel conflict, (2) trying to build up a defence system against Russia under the Baghdad Pact. Indeed, one can look forward to nothing but obstruction from Syria in getting oil from the Persian Gulf across Syrian territory to the Mediterranean coast by demands for unreasonable transit dues.

This raises the question whether we would not be well advised to try and arrange with Iraq and Turkey for the construction of a new pipe line from Kirkuk and Mosul through the vilayets of Diabekr and Gaziantep to the Mediterranean coast at Iskanderun, an all-Turkish route.

Also road and rail communication between Iraq and Turkey needs developing so as to avoid having to cross over or go too near to the Syrian frontier. For vital supplies of oil for the Western world and Turkey and for military communications between Turkey and Iraq it would be foolish to rely on co-operation from any neighbouring Arab state except Iraq.

The other Arab state much in the news of late is Jordan. We all know the delicate set-up there and the artificial economic state of the country

dependant on outside subsidies. Also its geographical proximity to Egypt and Saudi Arabia and liability to pressure from these quarters.

It is therefore unwise to press Jordan to join any group which would subject it to pressure from its neighbours. It would not be wise for her now to join the Baghdad Pact. Jordan is not like Iraq, near to Russia. She is near to Israel and she has the largest number of Palestine Arab refugees of any Arab state. Therefore wisdom would suggest that Jordan be left alone. I would even go so far as to agree that the Arab Legion be put direct under the Jordan War Office instead of being semi-autonomous as it is today.

I now come to Iraq. Iraq is the only Arab state on which a considerable degree of reliance can be placed. Her proximity to Russia and her long distance from Israel makes her see things more in line with the Western powers. The P.M., Nuri Said Pasha, is a known Anglophile and Turcophil.

Yet there are weaknesses in Iraq which we would be foolish to ignore. Nuri Said is not interested in social questions. They bore him. He can manage his sheikhs, he can cajole the powerful merchant families of the chief bazaar towns. But can he manage the intellectuals and professional classes that are springing up in these towns and which have liberal ideas on social questions and want to see agrarian reforms and an improvement in the status of the workers and peasants?

Two years ago the government of Jamali consisting of young Arabs and two Khurds showed signs of being able to work out a policy of this kind, but it fell because it got no support from the elder statesmen and Nuri Said's regime treats these social questions with indifference.

Iraq has not shortage of money. A large part of the oil revenues are going to a Reconstruction Commission for capital development schemes. But one fears that some of the money will not go for the objects for which it was originally intended. The intellectuals and professional classes of the towns seeing this may gravitate towards Communism as the only way out. This is the danger, but one must not exaggerate it. As long as Nuri Said lasts his prestige should suffice to keep things on an even keel. When he goes there are possibilities that a government of the progressive type of Arab and Khurdish youth like the last government of Jamali will be formed. It should be the duty of our diplomacy to help to bring this about.

As regards the defence of Iraq it can be stated that the Baghdad Pact is not just the creation of Nuri. Something like this had been in the air for some time. When I was in Iraq in 1953 I spoke with the then P.M. Jamali and I remember he emphasized the need for defence against the North and rather criticized us for not giving Iraq more military aid. Public opinion in Iraq is in fact attuned to the idea of Western aid against infiltration from the North.

Yet the question remains what value has the Baghdad Pact. Is it worth the upset caused by creating the hostility of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria and throwing half the Arab world into the neutral camp? Is it worth adding to hostility of Mr. Nehru by seeking military allies among the smaller M.E. states.

For my part I think it is worth while incurring the displeasure of Mr.

Nehru if something valuable can be attained by the Bagdad Pact. Mr. Nehru after all can afford his neutrality and his flirtation with Russian Communism because he has the wall of the Himalayas and the buffer of Pakistan between him and Moscow. Egypt, as I have shown, too, is far away from Russia and can afford her form of neutrality.

But Iraq has the vulnerable frontier of Khurdistan with only Persia and a weakly-held Azerbaijan between her and Caucasus. Here, too, are Khurdish tribes with whom the Russians are constantly intriguing. Here we ought to think out the kind of military aid that Iraq should receive under the Baghdad Pact.

I should say decisively that aid should not be based on the assumption that a full-scale atomic war or even a war with conventional weapons will be waged by Russia against Iraq. To induce the Iraqis to build themselves up into an armed camp of this nature would be wasteful, unnecessary and provocative. It would arouse the suspicions of Nehru and his neutral satellites, who would feel that it might bring war nearer to them.

Moreover, it is not the kind of war that is likely. A Russian offensive in these parts would be an offensive of infiltration through disaffected tribes, like Khurds and Kashgais. An air force and mobile units with appropriate weapons for rough country is the kind of defence needed for that situation.

And that is the kind of tactics that Communism adopts in these countries. The Baghdad Pact would justify its existence if it affords Iraq means of defence of this kind.

It will justify its existence still more if it hastens the economic advancement of Iraq. Financially the country is strong with its oil revenues, but its primitive social structure and low educational standards prevents rapid economic development. Iraq lacks even elementary education and is very short of skilled workers and technicians. The supply of European teachers and instructors with salaries guaranteed from funds set up under the Bagdad Pact is probably the best contribution to this problem that can be made. It will be slow but sure and will lay the foundation of a strong Arab country in a vital area of the Middle East with the oil resources so much needed in the West.

To sum up then I should say that the following things are vitally necessary :

1. To stop the danger of war between Israel and the Arab states.
2. To take preliminary steps to get the Arabs and Israel to discuss a long-term settlement.
3. Not to attempt to induce any Arab state to join the Baghdad Pact, except Iraq, which is now a most important link in it.
4. Rely on Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and as far as she can, Persia to organize resistance with Western aid to Communist infiltration into tribal areas in the territories north and north-west of the Persian Gulf.
5. Organize economic aid wherever possible, and in Iraq particularly the provision of educational facilities for training skilled workers and technicians.
6. Tell the public of the Middle East what we are doing and how we want to help the Arabs to help themselves. Tell them that the old imperial-

ism is gone, but let our case not go by default because we are too proud to reply to the miserable vapourings of corrupt Arab politicians, the bribings of the King of Saudi Arabia and the moral sermons of Mr. Nehru.

Our task is hard, but we can rely on our reputation of justice and fair play.

If we persevere I believe that we can make a vital contribution towards the task of relieving the "Tensions in the Middle East."

A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By LORD BIRDWOOD, M.V.O.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 7, 1956, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Lord Birdwood, who has kindly come to talk to us this afternoon, is too well known to need any introduction from me, especially as fairly recently he gave the Society an extremely thoughtful and interesting lecture on another very knotty problem—that of Kashmir. Today we are fortunate to have him to speak to us on what he calls “A Different View of the Middle East.” I feel sure you all look forward to hearing him as much as I do and so without more ado I ask Lord Birdwood to address us.

MR. CHAIRMAN, Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel that the somewhat pretentious title, “A Different View of the Middle East,” needs an explanation. A short while ago I was sitting next to a friend at a dinner and listening to a speaker who is generally regarded as an expert on the Middle East. My friend also had forgotten more about the Middle East than I shall ever know, and I turned to him as I was listening and whispered: “Have you heard anything new?” He replied “No” and added: “Have *you* heard anything new?” I said “No,” and the conclusion was that in terms of the eternal problem of Arab and Jew there is really nothing new for anyone to say.

And yet for those of us who—like myself—claim no intimate acquaintance with the Middle East but feel, nevertheless, frustrated and fascinated as students of international affairs, the position today is surely a challenge? And when I say “a challenge” I do not necessarily mean that we should say anything new, still less *do* anything new; but what I hope to do is to put before you some new thought. You may recall that David Cecil, in his book *Lord M.*, tells of Melbourne criticizing a friend who had a habit of thumping the table and saying that “something *must* be done.” “Whenever he says ‘something *must* be done’ I know well enough that *he’s* going to do something damn silly!” was Melbourne’s comment. That, in a sense, applies to the situation today. Recently in the House of Commons expressions were used such as “action is to be taken to restore British prestige”; “What we want is an emphatic re-assertion of British interest in this area”; and probably the same kind of thing is being said there this afternoon. It is easy to blame Sir Anthony Eden, Mr. Morrison and this and that Party; whereas the person we should blame is Arthur Balfour.

As I see the position, if we can afford it we all want a kind of mental convalescence; we could all profit from a period of rest. The West, and the Arabs and the Jews have all gone through a long process of negotiation, ending in a form of nervous breakdown; we all need a period of mental convalescence. Unfortunately, it does not seem that we are going

to have it. But if what I have suggested be anywhere near the truth, then neither words nor deeds are required. There is need for a good deal of thought, of quiet diplomacy behind the scenes, of consideration of ways and means; in short, of everything which the soldier understands by the term "appreciating the situation."

I said that "neither words nor deeds are required." That, of course, was an over-simplification. Obviously, we must continue with personal negotiation. What I meant to imply is that we—and more particularly the Americans—could profit by approaching our Middle East problems in a less hysterical, a less tragic, mood. To give but one example: I saw about a month ago a statement in the Press to the effect that "Western policy will be directed towards achieving Arab unity. It is regarded as imperative that, before the spring, we shall have effected a common Arab approach to Middle East problems." That was the sense, if not the actual wording. It needs only the most casual acquaintance with present conditions to realize that at this moment the mutual dislike of Iraq and Egypt for one another is nearly as intense as the dislike of any Arab State for Israel; and that any overt effort to bring Colonel Nasser and Nuri es Said together round a Conference table would create problems and not solve them.

Apart from that, I ask myself, exactly what would Arab unity at this stage achieve? And here is the first of what I would claim as an innovation in thought and approach. Of course we would like everyone to be friends in the interest of international peace and economic progress. Thus many constant doubts—political and economic—would be removed. But if this Arab unity were to be achieved and were only, as I believe it would be at this moment, a kind of artificial façade, it would be achieved for one purpose only, and that would be to push Israel into the sea. I am not moralizing about Israel, except to this extent. In my view the Balfour Declaration was a disaster, but at this stage one cannot unscramble the egg. Mr. Dulles, whose somewhat acrobatic handling of Middle East affairs sometimes leaves us a little bewildered, was right when, on February 24th, he drew our attention to the fact that Israel was a creation of the United Nations and as such, even in its most inept of moods, one cannot see the United Nations permitting Israel's destruction. If, therefore, an Arab world, united only for the purpose of destroying Israel, were to make its attempt and fail, not at first but eventually, after the United Nations or the Tripartite Guarantee Powers had intervened, I think it is an understatement to say that we would face international confusion on a scale beyond imagination.

I believe that in all sincerity in 1942 we dangled the conception of the Arab League before the Arab world as a carrot in front of a willing horse; and had not the League been born in 1945 in the shadow of the developing Palestine situation, those very worthy objectives, cultural, economic, social, the removal of travel restrictions and Customs and so on, which the League in its Charter hoped to achieve, might have been realized. That was not to be. Palestine obsessed the League from its inception and, in the event, its priority task, the elimination of the age-old feud between Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite dynasty was never attempted. Read the early

history of Arab negotiation in 1942 and 1943 towards the creation of a League, and you realize that from the first day of Nuri es Said's plan Egyptian prevarication was preventing unity. (So much for the charge that a Western-inspired Baghdad Pact in 1955 destroyed Arab unity!)

As to the issue between the Hashemites and King Saud, it still dominates internal Arab polemics today. The rational conclusion, surely, is that if Arab unity is to be true and lasting it can only grow from within. My mind turns to the unity between the Scandinavian countries, a unity which has grown over generations out of common needs and interests, and the natural ties of all that we understand by "a common way of life." The Arab world has yet to find that common way, and no amount of Western prodding and interference is going to assist it. The day that unity does come from within it will be welcome. Until it comes of its own exertions, let us be content to let friendships and alignments find their own level, and in the process let us, too, seek and find goodwill and friendship where and when others are ready to accept our offers. Let us leave it at that.

Let us apply that more specifically to the two countries, Iraq and Egypt. What should be our attitude to Iraq on the one hand, and to Egypt on the other? We cannot separate Iraq from the whole concept of the Baghdad Pact. After spending a fortnight there recently I find the answer in the case of Iraq quite simple. Amid the doubts surrounding shifting loyalties should we not be thankful for one firm friend? I take this opportunity to put in a word of defence for the Baghdad Pact, which seems to me to be attacked in a most irresponsible manner all over the place. Supposing we had adopted an utterly defeatist attitude in 1948, would N.A.T.O. ever have seen the light of day? The Baghdad Pact says nothing more than N.A.T.O. does. N.A.T.O. merely says: "Here we put down a thus far and no farther line"; and the Baghdad Pact simply says: "In the Middle East we put down a thus far and no farther line." If we are to adopt a defeatist attitude one year after the initiation of the Pact, there is never going to be a line at all.

I would say that friendship with Iraq derives from a common interest: we both wish to place the security of Iraq's oil beyond question. But apart from a common interest there is a lot left over which derives from a brief association of the past—not always happy at the time, but today leaving few symptoms of that narrow anti-colonialist and vindictive outlook which warps the Egyptian approach. Samir el Rafai, the new Prime Minister of Jordan, recently went on a flying visit round the Arab capitals and, subsequently, in an interview to *The Times*, he drew a contrast between the approach of Nasser and that of Nuri es Said. He referred to the latter as seeking the security of his country by fitting it into the grand strategic plan which begins in the West, with the framework of N.A.T.O. and the extension of that conception to the Middle East. Nasser he regarded as still the victim of anti-colonial obsessions, regarding the Baghdad Pact as an extension of colonialism dressed up in new clothes under the cloak of a Treaty.

But how to deal with Colonel Nasser? I have not been through the brain-wash process of a talk with the new Prophet of the East. I am told that he conveys sincerity. That he is building a different Egypt appears

to be beyond doubt. I am told that, given time and left alone without Western interference, he may one day be prepared to come to some compromise agreement with Israel. Be that as it may, there are indications pointing in the other direction: that he is preparing himself for the rôle of a second Saladin. We should realize that in a few weeks a £200 million Base will be in his hands. We are told that the hand-over and take-over have gone ahead of schedule in harmony, with both sides paying scrupulous attention to detail and determined to give no cause for criticism or complaint. There has been no pilfering. How wise of the Egyptians. In another few weeks this prize will be in their hands. I know that under the agreement of July, 1954, Her Majesty's Government may inspect installations by means of a limited number of personnel attached to the British Embassy. But the doubt comes not, as I see it, during a period of comparative vacuum such as the present. The doubt would come if and when the Base ever had to be occupied and used for the purpose for which it was intended. The Base was surely intended as a centre for the maintenance and reinforcement of mobile forces operating probably at great distances from Egypt. In other words, there is envisaged the employment of just such a force, for just such a purpose, as I see it, as the Baghdad Pact is designed to meet. The stores and supplies, the guns and tanks in cold storage on the Canal are for use if and when the whole security of the Middle East is in danger. And that is just what the Baghdad Pact, as I conceive it, is for, with particular emphasis on the oil of Iraq. It is curious that whereas Colonel Nasser in 1954 was prepared to recognize, after some hard bargaining, that an attack on Turkey represented a threat to the Middle East and, therefore, created the conditions under which the Base could be reactivated, he yet refuses to accept the Baghdad Pact, which is an agency designed for Turkish security, if ever there was one. At this moment it is quite impossible to visualize Colonel Nasser permitting the Base to be reactivated for the Benefit of the Baghdad Pact. And so what? as they say.

I am wondering if there is any sense in developing the idea that possibly we might sell the immovable property to Egypt, probably at great loss, and move the movable property somewhere more secure. Why not to Aden? There may be strategic reasons against that, but at least there is a great deal of food for thought in relating the Canal Base to the demands of the Baghdad Pact.

One finds some interesting ramifications when one does a little research into the present position of Jordan in relation to Arab unity. I offer my impressions, as they were gathered recently in only a few hours spent in Amman, when I had talks with most of those concerned. It would probably be of interest if I read to you exactly what I had intended to say only a few hours before we heard of Glubb Pasha's dismissal. This is what I wrote: "Had King Abdullah lived, probably his dominating personality and his political skill and his own ambition might have managed to bring some sense of unity to Transjordan east of the river and to his new annexation on the West Bank when, without asking permission of his Arab neighbours, he annexed the western bank which his Arab Legion had won for him. Abdullah met his end in 1951 and, in the event, Jordan today is

a split personality. Both Government and King can periodically manage to divert attention away from internal schism by working up a common fanatical hate of Israel, but that and one other asset are the only two cards in a weak hand. The other is the Arab Legion. The Legion today is enlisted about 60 per cent. East Bank and 40 per cent. West Bank. That being so, the opportunities for mischief-making amongst the Palestinian Arabs in the Legion is a temptation, overwhelming to those who seek their opportunity to make mischief, and plot and plan from outside. When I was in Jordan recently, Glubb Pasha was spending three and four days of the week visiting his units and, in his own personal way, keeping them free from political contamination. As you know, they came through the recent test—and it was an exacting test—with their loyalty to the Jordan of Abdullah's traditions unimpaired. But there is a move to get rid of Glubb and his 60 or so officers and warrant officers. It is a move that lends itself very easily to the imaginative purposes and aims of those who control 'The Voice of the Arabs' from Cairo and who find their ready audience in the bazaars and coffee houses of Jerusalem and Amman. What would be the effect supposing that one day the Jordan Government were to fall for this? Remove Glubb and his loyal commanders and I would not give the Arab Legion more than a few weeks of unity. Let the Legion crumble and we would, in turn, witness the disintegration of Jordan itself. What would then happen to the West Bank? As I see it, it would either be seized by Israel or we might witness an attempt by Egypt to set up a puppet State for the benefit of the Mufti of Jerusalem (which is what some believe is the goal of Egyptian policy), or we might witness a combination of both. In any case, there would be sufficient ingredients for a brew of utter confusion."

There is nothing new in that, really. Just over two months ago, in a conversation with the Editor of an influential Beirut newspaper, I was given quite clearly to understand that "Glubb must go." Well, Glubb has gone. Without inside knowledge of all the circumstances it would not be right to be too dogmatic, but, as I see it, there are now about four or five possible lines of action, and it is easy to find arguments for or against any one of them. I can only tell you the way in which my mind works, as a result of the information available.

The Arab Legion was created in 1921 under Captain Peake for certain purposes—for repulsing the Wahhabis, for fighting Bedouin raiders and, generally, for lending stability to a new, weak and inexperienced kingdom. The Legion grew, and in 1941 it was used outside Jordan territory in helping to crush the Rashid Ali rebellion in Iraq, so that there was a precedent for its use outside Jordan in connection with the desire to harness it to the Baghdad Pact. The Legion took part in the Syrian campaign and it was later the only effective Arab force in 1948 in the Israel war. I have always understood that Abdullah was a realist, and it seems only fair to say that sooner or later he would have been prepared to come to a permanent agreement with the Israelis. Not so his grandson. He has fallen to the temptation of winning popularity. We know that the day he dismissed Glubb Pasha, after seventeen years in command of his Legion, was referred to as a "Holy Day." On that occasion he said:

“We have succeeded in our movement by God’s will.” He continued: “I hope God will help us *to regain our stolen rights.*” There is only one interpretation: that whereas Glubb had regarded the Arab Legion as a sure defence against Israeli aggression and that conception lingered on, today King Hussein regards his Legion as the means by which Israel will be driven into the sea. So Glubb had to go.

Now, does anyone seriously believe that the movement to throw off British Control of the Legion is going to end with Glubb’s dismissal? We have withdrawn 15 officers. We have said that the fate of the remaining officers is subject to negotiation. But they are not going to stay. The Legion is going to slip out of British control. Even if King Hussein has second thoughts, at this stage I doubt if Egypt will allow him to reverse the clock. Nor can we insist on Jordan, a sovereign independent State, retaining British officers. We shall have to watch them go. Our Prime Minister recently drew attention to the fact that under the Treaty there is no obligation for British officers to serve in the Legion. We shall have to watch politics creeping into the Legion. We shall have to watch events taking their course and, as I suggested in the passage I read out, we shall be powerless to prevent that. There was a time when, as I see it, by spending money on psychological warfare within Jordan itself we might have swayed Jordan. That time has gone.

That being so, the question arises as to whether we are to continue to pay a subsidy of £8,750,000 a year, plus a certain amount of economic aid—which, I believe, in 1955 amounted to a total of £11,000,000 or £12,000,000—whether a subsidy should continue to be available for a Legion which now exists for a completely different purpose than that for which we conceived the subsidy should be given. We have failed in an effort to place the Legion at the disposal of the Baghdad Pact Powers. For what purpose, then, are we to continue to support the Legion and the country which it represents? Are we to continue to pay a subsidy with one hand and, at the same time, with the other hand defeat the purposes of the Legion, as we understand them, according to our obligations under the Tripartite Declaration?

I suggest that one vital test can always be applied, and that is the security of the oil and, with it, the interests of the Baghdad Pact Powers. Would they be jeopardized if we pulled out of Jordan altogether? Well, Khrushchev, with whom one does not often find opportunities to agree, though at least we agree with him in this, said clearly recently that oil was the main interest of the Western Powers in the Middle East. We have air bases at Mafrak and Amman—150 miles to the east and we are in Iraq territory on unpolluted soil with friends. I am wondering if under the claims of Middle Eastern defence, and more specifically the Baghdad Pact, if we do need aerodromes and air bases about this area, whether we cannot move them across the border, only half an hour’s flying time away from existing bases, and put them on to Iraq territory? Would the Iraqis possibly not welcome that kind of development? If so, and if we put the whole of this area at the centre “into coventry,” so to speak, would our oil supplies be in jeopardy? Could we in fact isolate a Middle East war from the flow of oil? I believe it could be done.

What would happen, supposing we wrote off Jordan and took the Egyptians and Saudi Arabians at their word when they say they can take on the subsidy? Well, £11,000,000 is quite a lot of money, even for a rich country like Saudi Arabia. It is one-tenth of the Saudi Arabian oil royalties, and I understand that even with all their oil royalties the Saudi Arabians have not paid their Army for several months! I personally would like to see it work that way. I would like to see Jordan having to go through the experience of eating her words and coming to her senses, perhaps, in the process. But, in all fairness, I have to point out the arguments against that. The arguments against it are that you throw Jordan to the wolves and the wolves probably include the risk of the Communists. I have reason to believe that General Glubb's view is that we should still linger on in Jordan trying to rescue such friendship as is left and not get overheated about what has happened. Well, there are the two views. I personally would prefer the former and more definite action to precipitate the situation.

May I for a moment divert into theories and philosophies? There comes a time in human experience—and we assume that nations these days operate under much the same laws as human beings—when men learn only through their own follies. In a new international dispensation which clamps down a retrogressive equality on all nations, we are quite powerless to take the measures which we could have taken fifty years ago to prevent war. We can prevent *incidents*; the United Nations Armistice Commission can do that. The only way in which we could prevent war breaking out in the Middle East would be to place soldiers on to Israeli soil and on to Arab soil. As I see it, we are not prepared to do that. Only a few days ago our Foreign Secretary used these words: "The British Government had never proposed sending armed contingents of any nation to police the line."

John Dewey's philosophy of experience says that men may have to learn through patience, chaos and war, but the fact is that sooner or later they do learn. I am coming reluctantly to believe—in regard to prevention—that the day when these contesting parties taste the first meaning of modern war may be their first day of reason, and wisdom, after folly.

Recently I was talking to an enlightened man, the Vice-Chancellor of Beirut University, and after he had remarked that in the event of war the Arabs would win the first round and it would be the only round, I had to draw his attention to the fact that whether the Arab won or lost his war, Beirut is only a few minutes' flying time from Israel, and the Vice-Chancellor would see his University lying around him in ruins.

If the United Nations were really prepared to take strong measures—and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has played with the idea of United Nations forces on the Armistice Line, only to discard it—if the United Nations were ready to take control, then our conclusion would be different. But without that, the best that the Tripartite Guarantee of 1950 can do is to attempt to restore the situation after the event; in other words, *after* war has broken out. And what a situation one can visualize the United Nations would have to restore, with both sides claiming to be the victim of aggression!—a complete confusion; perhaps a situation provoked by one side in order to

be able to challenge the other side and present it as the aggressor. Within that context, let us make it plain—in all honesty—that we can only leave Israel and the surrounding Arab countries to their own devices. And can one, in fact, really ever visualize the Tripartite Guarantee being used by United States forces against Israel? I cannot.

One would like to think that it may be possible for the Jordan twins to separate out, so that the original Transjordan could close in on its former boundaries and find its own soul in much the same way as Turkey, who did not really find her soul until able to close in on her own Anatolian soil. In those circumstances we might be able to continue in some confidence our relationship with the original and reduced Jordan. At the moment I can only see the House of Jordan being brought down as a pack of cards.

Having placed the area into comparative isolation in regard to active drastic measures of policy, there are, I suggest, certain lines of enquiry which could be pursued quietly, unostentatiously, behind the scenes.

First, as to Israel, I wonder if anyone has ever tried seriously to consider the advantage of the internationalization of the port of Elath? With international control of Elath the Jews would be assured of their trade up and down the Gulf of Akaba and out to the world. It would also give the Egyptians a passage of right across two or three miles of Israeli territory which they are at present denied.

Secondly, the strengthening of General Burns' Armistice Commission is an obvious step, if only to be able to prevent incidents and also to prevent war. This is a step which has been repeatedly advocated by Sir Anthony Eden.

Thirdly, cannot the issue of the refugees be put to them in the form of a choice, a choice which, naturally and rightly, the Arab countries always demand? Hitherto, the refugee has only been asked whether he wishes to remain inside his camp or go to Israel. If the Israelis could put the question in the form: "We Israelis will take back all those who wish to return, provided you Arabs take in those who do not," my information is that, in fact, two-thirds of the refugees would not wish to return to Israel. And then, again, I consider the United Nations have not put a high enough price on refugee settlement. They have not offered any large, imaginative sum towards assisting the settlement of the refugees. It cannot be too strongly stressed that this is an international responsibility—let the world pay for it—and it is up to the United Nations to think in terms of a sum of two or three hundred million pounds. You can buy a settlement if you put the price high enough.

Finally, I wonder if the human factor has yet been fully exploited? Could not one good man be put on to this problem, with profit? Dr. Graham made an attempt to solve the Kashmir problem and succeeded in knocking down eleven of the twelve issues. It is true that the one issue that remained was far more important than all the others put together, but it did have the effect of focussing criticism on the one man instead of on to this or that nation outside. If we could find another Count Bernadotte it would have the effect of defeating Arab criticism that the Western world is meddling and muddling in their affairs, to a certain extent. Perhaps

we could find a Martin Luther, or a Mahatma Gandhi or another Abraham Lincoln to help us with the problem. We are told that international forums are at work and that at this moment the Tripartite Guarantee Powers are working thousands of miles away in New York. But is that really going to make for progress? Could not one man on the spot, devoting his life to the matter, if he is the right man, do a little bit better? I really cannot find any reason why the human factor should not be successful.

Fundamentally, there is no reason why these two peoples should not live together for mutual prosperity and progress. I recall that chapter in Genesis which, in effect, says: "Abraham was a naughty old man who took a look at Hagar. Hagar was a young lady up to no good, and the result was Ishmael, whereupon Sarah sent Hagar packing." I have always understood that Arab stock grew from the twelve sons which were subsequently accepted as the sons of Ishmael, while twelve years later Isaac saw the light of day and was responsible for the seed of Israel. One is forced to reflect on that kind of historic background. When one goes to the country and notes the background of the Palestinian Arab one sees him spilling over, seeking and finding his fortune throughout the Middle East; he is entering into administrative and technical jobs, into office, taking charge of the schools. In character, in appearance, in method of thought and action there is little difference between him and his Semitic brother over the border.

So I conclude that this particular problem is concerned with the interplay of human personalities rather than with concessions on the ground here and boundary adjustments there. If one man could be found—and obviously a Solomon is not very appropriate—to reduce this matter to human contact perhaps he could summon up that spark of divine wisdom which all men hide somewhere beneath that rather futile, impenetrable make-up of pride reserved for the world around them. How truly Ruskin spoke when he said that pride is at the bottom of all human dissension.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have time for questions and comments.

General WATERHOUSE: During the 1941 rebellion in Iraq the uniformed part of the Arab League refused to fight against the Iraqis. The only men who came forward were the tribal levies who wore tribal clothing and had long hair and were commonly known as "Glubb's girls."

Lord BIRDWOOD: I used the illustration only as precedent for the use of the Arab Legion outside Jordan territory. I think the Legion played a considerable part in the Syrian campaign subsequently?

General WATERHOUSE: I am not sure.

Asked what was the present position of the Iraqis in Jordan,

Lord BIRDWOOD replied: The two kings are first cousins, both members of the Hashemite dynasty, who have hitherto been in close relationship. However, the present development does not tie up with the traditional friendship as between two first cousins of the Hashemite family. That, at the moment, makes for Iraq-Jordanian estrangement. The latest development is that King Hussein has been invited to take part in the

discussions at present taking place in Cairo between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Mr. T. PHILIPS PRICE : I was interested in the suggestion by Lord Birdwood that we might withdraw our air bases from Jordan and ask permission of the Iraqis to establish them across the frontier. I feel Lord Birdwood is absolutely right as to that. Would he not go further and say that, seeing that our only really true friends in the Arab world are the Iraqis, and seeing that there is a great commercial interest in oil, should we not try to eliminate the dependence on the transit of oil through Arab territories which are potentially hostile? And had not we better try to save money by withdrawing the subsidy from Jordan and spending the money on developing oil connections between the Kirkuk fields and the Gulf, or across Turkey to the Mediterranean?

Lord BIRDWOOD : I have always been meaning to find out whether the proposition of piping oil from the northern Iraq and other oilfields through Turkey is likely to be a reality or not. I do not know. In any case, there is this to remember : that even if oil is piped down to the Gulf it has still to come through the Suez Canal. As I see it, if Egypt were ever to interfere in a big way with oil supplies to the West she would invoke a whole packet of trouble right outside Middle Eastern questions. She would cut into the International Convention of 1888, which was reaffirmed in our new agreement with Egypt in 1954; and the whole question of the handling of the Suez Canal, which reverts to Egypt in 1968, would arise. That would be a matter for international interference, so perhaps it is reasonable to suppose that oil from Iraq piped down to the Gulf and removed by sea is on a safer basis than oil piped across Syria.

Mr. ROLAND BRAMLEY : I would like a definition of "friends" in the Middle East. Does it mean the rulers? Many people realize that during the last twenty-five years there has been a widening gulf between the ruled and rulers.

Lord BIRDWOOD : We have to take friends at their face value when and where we see visible expressions of friendship. We cannot delve deeply into the relationship between rulers and ruled in the Middle East these days. We simply have to accept the evidence of our eyes. At this moment the evidence is that a mob can be whipped up in Amman simply through being able to listen to the "Voice of Arabia" in the coffee shops. What that mob does and says we accept as an expression of either friendship or enmity. That is all we here in London can do.

Mr. G. E. L. FELLOWES : In 1955 we got 162,000,000 tons of oil out of the Middle East. In ten years' time that might be 400,000,000 tons, which has another bearing on the pipeline. I do not think there is anything physically impossible about building pipelines in Turkey. It might cost about £60,000,000 and would not be a substitute for the present pipeline, but an addition, in order to cope with the enormously increased volume of crude oil which is coming out over these years.

Miss HOLT : How far is the attitude of King Hussein dependent on the fact that he might be afraid of Saudi Arabia linking up with Egypt?

Lord BIRDWOOD : I would say that the present King of Jordan is the victim of four or five influences of which that is possibly one. I did

indicate that Egypt perhaps only proffered assistance to Jordan in order to facilitate its disruption. It would not be unnatural if the West Bank were to develop as an Egyptian satellite. Perhaps, as you suggest, the King is motivated by that kind of thought—let's be friends with the Egyptians and the Saudi Arabians from the beginning. That is only one of several motives.

A QUESTIONER: It seems that a certain amount of confusion is created by the word "friendship," which I would like to go into a little. As regards Iraq and the reference to the great friendship of that country towards Britain, it is essentially Nuri and his chiefs who are friendly towards Britain; so that one needs to be careful in speaking about Iraqi friendship, though potential friendship does exist with the Iraqis. That ought to be nursed. It has not been nursed properly in the past. It should be nursed in the future.

LORD BIRDWOOD: I entirely agree, though I would not go so far as to say that friendship towards Britain is confined to Nuri and his chiefs. You will remember that Samir el Rafai, after his visit to Baghdad, expressed the view that, whether or not there was a Nuri clique, the country as a whole is firmly behind the Baghdad Pact. That was his conclusion and also it was the conclusion of another Arab.

MISS WARBURTON: No mention has been made of what is likely to happen to Jerusalem if war should break out. I wonder whether the United Nations should be responsible for seeing that something should be done to neutralize the city or to put it under some sort of international control, perhaps through the Armistice Commission?

LORD BIRDWOOD: If the United Nations could be brought to the point of honouring their own decision as to the internationalization of Jerusalem you might then get a degree of stability. Unfortunately, one cannot see it happening; they will not keep to their own decisions. In the event it is always left to us. I personally would like to see some of these smaller nations roped into this, if only as a focus away from us to bring home to the Middle East that somebody else bears some responsibility.

COLONEL WHITTERON: Does Persia come into the picture at all?

LORD BIRDWOOD: Only so far as Persia last October joined the Baghdad Pact, and we know the extremely effective manner in which they have dealt with their Communists using psychological warfare to great effect. The Persians have, apparently, a most effective broadcasting system which gives back again what it takes from behind the Iron Curtain. Persia is not an Arab country and therefore has no particular interest in what is happening in Jordan or Israel. Our only concern is that Persia shows every sign of being a loyal member of the Baghdad Pact. From the military point of view, that does not amount to much at the moment. But we are able to use Persian soil. To declare your general policy within that Pact shows on which side of the fence you are, and the psychological effect on your colleagues is out of all proportion to any military assistance.

WING-COMMANDER HARRISON: I was interested in Lord Birdwood's idea of moving our air forces, especially to Iraq. I think I am right in saying we are only in Jordan under Treaty, and we could, of course, be forced to leave. Although Iraq is not very far away from the area of

Jordan or Israel—and naturally I am a great believer in the effect of air power—I think air power in conjunction with troops on the spot can do far more. If an Israel-Arab dispute came about and we ever had to withdraw our forces from Jordan we would be in a very poor position. If it happened to be a question of Jordanian aggression, the mere fact that British troops were in Jordan would have a stabilising influence and perhaps prevent the aggression, whereas if it is Israeli aggression we could immediately go to the aid of the Arab Legion which, without doubt, would be overrun on the West Bank if we had no force on the spot.

Lord BIRDWOOD: As you probably know, the force in Jordan at the moment amounts to very little. There is only one squadron of the Royal Air Force there, as far as I know, and one battalion of the Royal Fusiliers down at Akaba. What I dislike about that is that the force is too small to be effective, and yet large enough to create political trouble. It falls between two stools. If we are going to stay in Jordan, as we are entitled to under the terms of the 1948 Treaty, we should perhaps increase our strength. On the other hand, if we are going to come out of Jordan, as I indicated is my view at the moment, nothing from a military point of view is lost by just withdrawing a squadron of the Royal Air Force and putting it 150 miles away to the east. As regards the position under the Treaty, I think I am right in saying that the Treaty runs for twenty years and is due for revision after fifteen years, which would mean 1963. On the other hand, when we were negotiating for Jordan to come into the Baghdad Pact, one of the bargaining cards was a revision of the Treaty, and the Jordanians have always indicated that they wish for revision of it.

The Meeting closed with a vote of thanks.

THE DRAGONS LASH THEIR TAILS IN INDO-CHINA

BY COLONEL MELVIN HALL, D.S.O.

THE Military and Aviation Editor of one of the more widely known and widely read of the American daily newspapers contributed a column some weeks ago on the situation in Viet Nam under the heading "Comforting Spot in Asia." I regret that I am unable to share his view. The situation in Indo-China, more particularly in Viet Nam, continues tenebrous and confused. If it is not indeed deteriorating—and in some respects it may not be—it appears to the writer of the present article singularly devoid of comfort for the anti-communist Western Powers.

The satisfaction manifested in some Western circles, especially in the United States, at the setting up of a so-called democratic Republic of South Viet Nam under the presidency of Ngo Dinh Diem, formerly Prime Minister appointed by Bao Dai while the latter was still Chief of State, would seem to have been based on certain misconceptions of the precise form this "democratic" Republic was to take. It is, in effect, an authoritarian dictatorship of Mr. Diem, the latter personally backed by the unswerving support of the United States Secretary of State, as well as to a considerable extent by the American taxpayers' money.

Opposition to President Diem's arbitrary handling of the internal and external problems of his tottering young State appears to be growing among numerous elements of Vietnamese opinion, and there is some evidence that these latter are drawing closer together in their common dislike of Diem's methods, though they have been divided in the past by conflicting interests and mutual distrust.

The so-called "referendum" of October 23, 1955, by which Bao Dai was deposed as Chief of State in favour of a Republic presided by Ngo Dinh Diem, was completely—and quite effectively—"rigged" by Diem. That some 98 per cent. of the vote was for Diem is understandable in view of the manner of presentation of the referendum. That in certain districts there were more votes for Diem than there were voters is not quite as easy to explain, but still comprehensible under the circumstances of the "vote." One may reflect on the fact that some 15,000 Vietnamese of a certain degree of influence who opposed Diem were in jail, including roughly 500 officers of the National Army. As an impartial French correspondent wrote, the vote "was as least as free as in most countries behind the Iron Curtain." Diem is in no way inept at exiling, imprisoning or frightening into inaction those who oppose him.

Ngo Dinh Diem, who was appointed Prime Minister of South Viet Nam shortly after the Geneva "conference" had cut the young Vietnamese State in half, received his mandate from Bao Dai, with at least no

opposition from the American Department of State. He had, and still has, the reputation of being an honest and an austere patriot. This I do not challenge; yet these qualities, estimable as they may be in themselves, leave much to be desired in the Prime Minister—now Chief of State—of a country in formation under excessively difficult circumstances.

Diem, whatever his virtues and despite the energetic though sometimes unimaginative support of his premiership by the Americans, proved a disappointment as Prime Minister, and similarly as Chief of State. He has shown himself arbitrary and undiplomatic, intractable, rather stupid in certain ways and without any real gift for governing. His conception of a “democratic” administration is curiously patterned. Little has been accomplished to reconcile the divided political interests of the south. He has tried to crush his opponents rather than to bring them to conciliation. His vaunted advocacy of “total national revolution” (with himself as dictator in effect) may well be headed for total national disaster.

He established a censorship of news both in and out of Viet Nam that would not shame an iron-curtain satellite. (This, as was recently announced, has now been lifted, but one needs further evidence than the mere announcement that freedom of the press has been restored.) He threw his country into a civil war that many Vietnamese patriots regarded with regret approaching consternation. These included a considerable part of the Vietnamese National Army—other than adherents of what is sometimes called “Diem’s Catholic Sect” by Vietnamese of different persuasions, plus certain elements of less precise backgrounds whose interests stem from personal rivalries in the highly confused case of the National Security Administration. In launching this civil war Diem disregarded the strongly expressed advice of General Ely, then French Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China, who subsequently requested and obtained transfer from that area and has now been appointed Chief of Staff of the French Army; and, I believe, that of American General Lawton Collins, both of whom urged that Diem try to solve his difficulties with the Sects by negotiation. (Some form of negotiation with, or integration of, the Sects appeared feasible at one time—though not 100 per cent. on Diem’s terms—prior to May 29, 1955, when Diem attacked them.)

Diem is an ardent—even a fanatical—Catholic, yet he recently has been in acrid conflict with the Vatican, the latter having refused to appoint Diem’s brother as Archbishop of Viet Nam despite Diem’s vigorous urgings. I know little of this prelate’s potential qualifications for the appointment which Diem urged; but while Diem himself may be honest and sincere, which I have not heard challenged, the same description cannot be applied to certain other members of his family and of his clan who have formed a notable part of his relation-packed cabinet and close counsellors.

In Diem’s handling of the Sects, some of which have religious or semi-religious backgrounds of other beliefs, he managed to deter them from any real desire to join a nationalist front. With a truly nationalist government representative of all elements in the complex structure of South Viet Nam the Sects would have been prepared to play their part—though doubtless with certain privileges and guarantees for themselves. But to submit

gracefully to annihilation, or to be put under the rule of what they hold to be another and an unfriendly Sect—the “Catholic Sect of Ngo Dinh Diem”—is something they are not ready to stomach, and despite a modest number of successes of a military rather than a diplomatic nature—unless bribery, in a few cases, may be considered diplomatic—it seems questionable if Diem will be able to enforce their complete and lasting submission by the methods he has chosen to adopt. This, I am assured, might well take thirty years, and I have been asked whether the American taxpayer is prepared to continue that long to provide the funds to enable certain elements of South Vietnamese to slaughter other elements of South Vietnamese. Diem refers to those who oppose him as being rebels, though in the case of the Sects, as well as of others, they are rebels against his personal dictatorship rather than against the nation, and they have vigorously and successfully resisted communist penetration of the territories they controlled.

I hold no particular brief for the Sects, other than that they have constituted in a politically divided country the strongest element of resistance against communism. They are a curious and often a troublesome carry-over of feudalism and of local insecurity during the Japanese occupation of Indo-China. But they exist, and feudalism was not ruled out in Europe overnight by an edict. Also they have the oriental conception of “face” and they have been branded as bandits by Diem, which they strongly resent.

True, the origins of some of them, more particularly the Bien Xuyen, have not been untainted with piracy. The bases of others, notably of the Cao Dai Sect, stem from a religious upsurge seeking to express faith in God in a fashion of their own choosing. There are nearly two million adherents to the Cao Dai faith, which has a Pope, bishops and bishopesses, and a hierarchy of saints including Victor Hugo, Jeanne d’Arc, Châteaubriand and Sun Yat Sen.

The Sects are an anachronism, with their private armies, their jealousies and rivalries, their disputes over money, arms and privileges—frequently in combat with one another as in European feudal times, and in some cases divided within themselves—and in their fiefs, where they collect taxes for their own benefit, not for the State. Yet these are matters to be corrected by integration or assimilation and not, it would seem to this writer, to be dynamited in a shaky national structure that shows too many signs of collapsing by itself. Bao Dai—of whom more hereafter—managed with considerable adroitness to keep the Sects in hand and at the same time to restrain their predatory ambitions, which Diem has conspicuously failed to do apart from slaughtering a fair number of their adherents, at the cost of substantial losses to the National Army. That Bao Dai granted them certain special privileges is not to be contested; that they returned some part of these in kind is similarly on the record. Yet by and large the Sects were more effective in thwarting communist infiltration in their areas than was the hard-put French Expeditionary Corps plus the Vietnamese Army in others. The French High Command had confidence in the anti-communism of the Sects and made full use of this by means of substantial subsidies—withdrawn after the turning over by the French of effective control to

the Vietnamese. In a military sense this is a soundly established tradition, to subsidize your friends (or allies) for doing what you are too hard pressed to do yourself on all fronts at the same time.

Numerically the organized cadres of the Sects amounted to roughly 35,000 Hoa Hao, 15,000 Cao Dai (this figure obviously does not include the close to two million non-militarized adherents to the Cao Dai faith), and 5,000 Binh Xuyen. They have recently had losses in battle with Diem's troops and have for the moment been dispersed, taking refuge in the jungle and from there conducting guerilla warfare which will be exceedingly difficult to suppress permanently, as was learned by the French Forces of the Far East, unless the large majority of the population of Cochinchina can be won over to the support of the "Diemists," which seems questionable. Their numbers remain substantial. There were also some 40,000 Viet Minh of a pretended "army of liberation" still scattered throughout the south, though I do not know—nor do I think that anyone else does with certainty—how many of these have been dispersed, recalled to the north, or "converted" to anti-communist nationalism.

The answer to it all isn't simple, nor has there been as yet a very clear approach to a workable solution. The divergent elements in the south are pretty truculent and certainly have not been brought together. There are pro-Diemists and anti-Diemists, and "revolutionaries" whose past associations and present aspect in certain cases offer scant prospect of resistance to communism. There are nearly a million refugees, mostly Catholic, from the north whose resettlement is a heavy responsibility. Not even half of these have as yet been resettled, outside of dismal refugee camps, on a permanent basis with cultivable lands allocated for their maintenance. And there are the Sects, whose eventual suppression—if they can be suppressed—will tax the resources of the National Army to an extent it may not be able to support.

The French Expeditionary Corps, already reduced to 20,000, was to be entirely withdrawn from Viet Nam by April 1 of this year, as Diem had demanded. They will serve to strengthen the French position in North Africa, leaving the eventual defence of South Viet Nam to the Vietnamese National Army of 100,000 effectives, latterly trained by Americans, with perhaps another 50,000 reserves to be called up in case of need. How long this force might prove capable of retarding a direct thrust by the Viet Minh from the north, whose army is considerably stronger and more heavily equipped, is problematical, but much of the best informed opinion holds that it would not be for more than a very few weeks at most. The Vietnamese Army has already suffered quite severe casualties in combatting the Sects, without having reduced the latter to impotence. Apart from the still extant forces of the Sects, now largely dispersed in the jungles, it seems unlikely that the bulk of the South Vietnamese populace would take any very active part in the conflict until they had decided for themselves which side would ultimately be the winner.

A somewhat curious aspect of the withdrawal of the French forces comes now from the Americans, who have not been conspicuous in their wholehearted co-operation with the French in Viet Nam but are suddenly showing concern as to the eventual security of the vast quantity of military

equipment, arms and munitions, totalling in the hundreds of millions of dollars, furnished to South Viet Nam through American aid.

In North Viet Nam, that part of the country handed over to the communists by the so-called Geneva "conference," there are serious economic problems, though the military strength of the Viet Minh is continually increasing with Chinese and Russian aid, and with Chinese military technicians who clearly have not been sent there to gratify the Western Powers. The annual deficit in rice for local consumption, of roughly 100,000 tons in a normal year, has been much increased since the war. Ho Chih Minh has been relegated to the status of an elder statesman, though his photographs still preside over all meetings. Yet he did no small job during his recent visits to Moscow and Peking: Chinese economic aid to the Viet Minh (in addition to direct military aid) estimated at £115 million; Russian aid at £35,800,000 plus 50,000 tons of rice purchased in Burma.

The agricultural crisis, however, is a continuing situation which though temporarily relieved by Russian and Chinese aid may eventually lead to the invasion of South Viet Nam from the North to get control of the rice areas there. The Viet Minh Army—much of it already battle-hardened—is clearly being trained, under its Chinese advisers and technicians, for offensive war.

The Viet Minh leaders have been insistent on the holding of the general elections, as provided in the Geneva armistice agreement of 1954, throughout Viet Nam prior to July 20, 1956. Diem, who has refused to recognize the Geneva agreement—possibly with reason—is quite adamant against the elections being held, in any event at that date. In this he is opposed by the British and the French, who hold themselves to be guarantors of the terms of the armistice agreement. The U.S., as observers merely though with a not unsubstantial delegation, were not a signatory to the agreement. How this will eventually turn out remains to be seen, but Mr. Diem is a peculiarly stubborn man. Yet his refusal to hold the elections would hardly seem to indicate an overwhelming confidence in the results of his anti-communist efforts in the south up to the present time.

On March 4 of the present year elections were held in South Viet Nam for a short-term Constituent Assembly to pass on the proposed new Constitution and prepare elections for a regular National Assembly. It need hardly be assumed that these March elections were wholly "free" in effect. They were furthermore a bit troubled by exchanges of bombs, which one might hesitate to commend as normal healthy democratic practices. Of course the Diem list succeeded handsomely.

The Emperor Bao Dai, or ex-Emperor if one prefer, is neither an enigma nor a colourless personality, nor is he the dilettante he has sometimes been made out to be by people who do not know him. He has received very bad publicity, particularly in the United States; largely ill-informed and biased, or based on catch phrases such as the "playboy Emperor" and the "absentee Chief of State." This has been unfortunate and to a large degree unmerited. He is in fact a patriot who has devoted long hours to the complex problems of his country, and who perhaps understands them better than many others who seek a viable solution. And his "absenteeism" was by means wholly of his own choice.

Bao Dai's traditions rest in those of the hereditary Emperors of Annam, an Empire that no longer exists, which formed Central Viet Nam in the short-lived Vietnamese State so soon sundered in twain by the Geneva agreement. These traditions, this prestige, still persist in the minds of many Vietnamese. This is also true of Bao Dai's own prestige, though the latter may have been tarnished in some respects by events not fully within his control. Yet it still exists to a considerable measure in his own country, notwithstanding an abortive attempt to denounce him by certain members of a self-styled Imperial Family Council, a body without legal status evidently activated by bribery or by threat, or both. It also seems clear that substantial elements of Vietnamese were in no wise fooled by the "deposition" of Bao Dai as Chief of State nor unaware of the manner in which this was staged. The paucity of Diem's accomplishments since then has doubtless substantiated their views. An increasing number of Diem's own compatriots regard his regime as corrupt and inefficient—without accusing him personally of being corrupt; while he continues with a mystical belief in his own destiny, regarding himself as the inspired saviour of his country.

While one does not maintain that Bao Dai might not perhaps have been more dominant in the struggle for self-expression of a State in formation, he accomplished considerably more than has generally been credited to him, and there is no doubt that he was blocked from numerous angles. He was named Chief of State of Viet Nam, with French support, after the collapse of the Japanese occupation in 1946. He had previously accepted for a time an attachment as Counsellor to Ho Chih Minh, when that revolutionary was wearing the colours of a nationalist patriot. Ho Chih Minh harried the Japanese, wherefore he was heartily supported by the American OSS. But when his communist affiliations came into the open, Bao Dai left him.

As Chief of State of Viet Nam Bao Dai achieved, diplomatically, far more for the prompt and total independence of his country than communist Ho Chih Minh had ever demanded. This he did with considerable dexterity, though risking—and at times incurring—the stigma of being a French puppet, while the French were still in administrative control of most parts of the country and for some time provided the only effective military forces, except for the Sects, against the Viet Minh.

Then came the great let-down of Geneva in 1954. Bao Dai was temporarily in France for a physical check-up and medical treatment, and was asked to remain for the conference. When this resulted in the severance of his country in twain he refused to sign the convention that turned over twenty-six provinces and 9,600,000 souls to the communists. In July 1954 he appointed Diem to be Prime Minister, possibly to some extent to satisfy American demands, and agreed to give Diem a free hand as Chief of Government, while continuing to exercise his own legally vested powers as Chief of State by remote control from France—which he was asked to do. Had Bao Dai returned to Viet Nam then he would have been placed in an impossible position. If he supported the Sects in any manner he would have incurred the enmity and opposition of the Americans and again have been called a French "stooge." If he backed Diem fully, and not only

against the Sects, he would have been branded an American stooge, and this by many Vietnamese. If he attempted to mediate between them on the spot, he would have been damned by both sides and certainly not have received any useful support from the Americans who were so determinedly pro-Diem. The time was inappropriate for his return; on the other hand he achieved, until Diem went full out in civil war, some fairly useful results, operating from France, in mediation. But the accomplishments of Diem's "free hand," with all its hearty support from the U.S., have proven considerably less gratifying than was hoped, nor do they seem destined to offer great promise for the happy future of free Viet Nam.

Bao Dai proposed in May of last year a concrete plan for the re-establishment of order in the rapidly disintegrating situation in Viet Nam. There is not space here to summarize what the plan comprised; but to this writer it made very good sense and offered considerable—perhaps the only—promise of restoring the situation, in a well thought-out and liberal way. The proposed plan was well received by the French but had no support from the Americans. Its definite torpedoing came from the American Secretary of State who marked this by conspicuously snubbing Bao Dai—then still Chief of State—in Paris.

In many ways it all sums up to a confused and sorrowful story, and one in which it is gravely to be feared that many millions of well-meant American dollars are being poured down the drain. Bao Dai is strongly anti-communist. The French in Indo-China have certainly not, with exceedingly few possible exceptions, been pro-communist. Diem is rabidly anti-communist. So also are the Sects. The whole basis of American policy in Indo-China is the turning back or at least the containment of the laval flow of communist encroachment in South-east Asia. And yet these various elements have not found it possible to unite in the common cause, to "play ball" with each other, and in some cases are vigorously combating one another, either with arms or propaganda or both.

Bao Dai has accepted his "deposition" in a philosophic and dignified manner. He lives in France, going in for the physical sports he enjoys and which keep him fit. He refrains from taking part in the activities of certain prominent anti-Diem Vietnamese exiles in France, these including two former Prime Ministers and a former Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army. He continues to keep in close touch with the multiple problems facing his country, which he is perhaps better equipped fundamentally to comprehend than anyone else.

If Diem should fail to steer his country into calm seas, and there are, regrettably, many indications that he is failing so to do, there is a possibility that Bao Dai may eventually be recalled to Viet Nam by popular opinion to take charge of the affairs of State. I make no prediction as to such an event: it is merely a possibility. No one else has appeared so far who could command the respect of the Vietnamese should Diem be released from his functions by popular resentment against his manner of handling them.

In Cambodia and Laos, too, the situation is complicated and confused, with somewhat different local problems but basically the same background—the communist threat and the not always understanding and often un-

imaginative support of their Western allies who want so much to aid them and who are expending millions of dollars in trying to do so. Space limitations preclude my taking up in this article the immediate concerns and worries of these two lesser countries. But both are watered by the Mekong river, which flows through South Viet Nam and debouches into the South China Sea, and as we look on the turbid upper and lower reaches of this great river we may perhaps remember that its sources rise in China.

The following back numbers of the R.C.A.S. Journal are urgently required :

- 1917 Part 4.
- 1918 Parts 1 and 2.
- 1920 Parts 1, 2, and 3.
- 1919 Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

THE CAMBRIDGE EXPEDITION TO AFGHANISTAN, 1955

BY O. R. DE BAER

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, January 18, 1956, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. de Baer and some friends of his at the University of Cambridge at the beginning of 1955 wrote to the Society and asked if we could give moral support for an expedition they were planning into Afghanistan. The moral support we as a Society were able to give amounted to a few introductions which we hoped would help Mr. de Baer and his party on their way. He has now returned to tell us of the expedition and to show some of the slides taken by members of the expedition. He was himself educated at Harrow where he was head of the School. After his National Service Mr. de Baer obtained an open scholarship at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he still is. I now ask him to give his lecture.

ONE of the first questions that I am invariably asked is: "Why did you go to Afghanistan?" In other words, firstly, "Why did we go at all?"; secondly, "What were our objects?"; and thirdly, "Why Afghanistan?" Our expedition, like almost every other expedition like it, started because the Long Vacation gives us a gap of four months which we had to fill, and we wanted to fill it by travel. We chose Afghanistan because it was within easy reach of Cambridge in the time available, because one of us spoke Persian, because the country is remote and little-visited, and because, to the best of our knowledge, no one from an English university had "done" Afghanistan for some time. Having settled on the fact of our going and on the country to which we were going, it now remained to find some reasons for going there, reasons which must—and eventually did—satisfy both this Society and also the Royal Geographical Society as to their adequacy as grounds for their giving us their support. I should like here to express our very sincere gratitude to both Societies, without whose help and encouragement we should never have left England at all.

Our aims, then, could be summarized as follows: firstly, to compile a regional survey of a given area, including such aspects as agriculture, religion, industries, customs, geology and so forth, including some map-making and as much photography as possible; secondly, a survey of the nomads of the area; thirdly, the collection of botanical and entomological specimens for the British Museum. There were in addition a number of other aims—mostly small jobs which we were asked to do—which I will not mention.

We approached the Afghan Government about this time last year, with an application to enter and study the Wakhan valley, and little knowing that merely to apply for such permission could be enough to prejudice our chances of going anywhere else when, as was bound to happen, permission was refused. When we left, we still had had no definite reply, and on the day of our departure we did not know where we were going.

We set out on June 15, in a state of uncertainty which was in no way lessened by the fact that the railway strike had deprived us of passports, and headed by the usual route to Ankara. I am sure that this route has already been described to you by far more competent speakers than myself, and I will say nothing about it. From Ankara, instead of going via Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad, as is more usual, we decided to head East across Eastern Anatolia and directly into Persia, reaching Teheran via Tabriz. It was a decision that we did not regret. The June heat on this plateau—at an average height of some 5,000 feet—was not unpleasant, and it was some cause for complacency to learn of the horrors which another party had endured in a Baghdad heat-wave. Thinking back, and comparing the lush green of the countryside and the coolness of the nights in Eastern Turkey with the Syrian desert which we crossed on our return journey, it seems one of the most pleasant parts of the trip, and this route is one that I can strongly recommend to any one contemplating a motor car trip to the East.

We arrived in Teheran after about twelve days, and we were lucky enough to enjoy the very kind hospitality of Mr. and Mrs. Denis Wright (members of the Society) at the Embassy whilst our papers were finally being put in order; this done, we left for Meshed.

We crossed the frontier at Islam Qal'a, and made for Kabul along the northern route which skirts the Russian frontier, through Maimana, Andkhui and Mazar-e-Sharif, and which then goes over the Hindu Kush by that miracle of engineering, the road over the Shiba Pass and its approaches; after a small detour to see Bamian we arrived in Kabul. Here we spent some ten days getting our affairs sorted out; during this time we were put greatly in the debt of another member of this Society, Mr. Dulling, who with Mrs. Dulling looked after the four of us at the Embassy during the whole period, and who made what would otherwise have been a trying time into an enjoyable episode.

It was in Kabul that we learned that permits to enter the Wakhan would definitely not be given. We then applied for permits for Nuristan, where we had hopes of establishing or disproving the existence of a peak, believed to be some 24,000 feet high. This also was refused, although not so firmly, and I may say in passing that I have already applied for permission to go there this summer. Finally we were offered Badakhshan, an offer that we accepted, and so we set off once more to Faisabad, where we were put in the charge of the Governor himself. He quickly made us understand that although the permits purported to be valid for the whole of his province, they were in fact only valid for "non-prohibited areas," or in other words the Kokcha valley as far east as Jurm. We therefore ended up some thirty miles from Faisabad, in the plain which is known on maps indiscriminately as Khairabad, Barak and Pa-i-Shahr, and which is locally known as Boharak. It is a plain formed by the confluence of three rivers, and, fortunately, a good field for research.

I should like to mention at this point that although we experienced no small frustration over the getting of our permits, and particularly over the rather oblique ways in which we were told that such and such an area was forbidden, once we were in Boharak we were given complete freedom to do what and speak to whom we liked, as well as every facility, including even

servants, and that the official attitude to us was, within its strictly defined limits, most co-operative. The people, as you will be seeing, were invariably extremely kind and helpful.

After some weeks there, we felt that we had done what we could. The main gap in our survey resulted from the fact that we were not allowed to go to Shiva, the 12,000-foot high lake which is where the local herds and also the nomads spend the summer months. Fortunately, the nomads came down from these pastures in time for us to photograph them, and we heard enough about Shiva for the omission not to loom too large from a technical point of view, but it was a great disappointment to us personally.

On leaving Boharak, we travelled a few miles downstream to Kishm, and then into the Khwaja Mohammed Range on horseback; here we found a mountain, some 13,000 feet high, which we climbed. It was an easy climb, counting as little more than day's exercise. This done, we returned to England via Qandahar, Herat, Baghdad and Beirut, somewhat disappointed with what we had been able to achieve, but having acquired a great respect and liking for a country where we had been treated extremely well.

The CHAIRMAN: There is still a little time remaining and Mr. de Baer has said he will be pleased to answer questions.

Sir GILES SQUIRE: Can the lecturer say how long the nomads have actually followed the route he mentioned, because a good deal of nomadic migration has changed its course during the last few years. They used to go down from the Himalayas into India. Now it is impossible to go to India many have commenced to trek through the Himalayas northwards. Have the nomads been doing this trek for generations or is it a new route?

Mr. de BAER: These particular nomads are Pathans and they have been doing this trek for a very long time; indeed, it seems that their predecessors did it in Marco Polo's day. There is no reason why they should go anywhere else because to the north there is the boundary of the Oxus. For a long time the nomads have been going up to Lake Shiva where the pastures are very rich. The Afghan Government has a plan for settling the nomads, but I do not think these particular ones will be affected for some time; as far as I know, these people have been making this trek for centuries past and their course—a fairly obvious one—has not changed, although now a large number of police go up to keep order and see that the nomads do not go too near the Russian frontier.

Colonel GASTRELL: The lecturer mentioned the Helmand river scheme. Had he an opportunity of seeing the work done by the Americans in that connection?

Mr. de BAER: We did not see the Helmand river project itself, but we arrived at works further up which were certainly most impressive; an extremely good piece of workmanship. However, we heard one or two rumours in Kabul to the effect that there had been insufficient study of the soil before starting on the project and that there was not very much likely to grow there when the land was irrigated. This is, of course, if it is true, a reflection on the overall plan, and not on the work of the Americans, which by any standards is superb.

Miss R. KELLY: Was there any tendency for Soviet visitors to come from north of the border and for the Afghans to make return visits?

Mr. de BAER: There is little crossing of the frontier backwards and forwards, and the Oxus river is a formidable barrier. Probably there are some 300 miles of the frontier which are more or less open, but the area is patrolled. Although we did not see them, the Russians are said to have machine-gun posts at half-mile intervals. The Afghans do not apparently make much effort to prevent anybody going or coming, but the Soviet authorities are extremely particular. One gathered that it would be unwise, to say the least, to try to cross the frontier if you were a Russian, particularly as it would be necessary to cross some 200 miles of the Qara Kum sands in order to get to the frontier if you do not wish to cross the Amu Darya (Oxus).

Mr. J. HAMILTON: Are the Russians operating at all extensively in the construction of roads? Who are the technical people engaged on road works?

Mr. de BAER: The roads across the Hindu Kush were built in the 1930's by the Afghans. The Russians, as far as we could tell, were not doing anything on the main roads; the only evidence of Russian work that we came across consisted of three large petrol storage tanks at Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Kabul. All the petrol comes from Russia. The Russians also have a scheme for metalling the roads in Kabul, and it is high time that that was done. As far as we know, there were no attempts on the part of the Russians to extend their plans beyond Kabul, but what goes on in the mind of the Government there is more than one can say.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: Who is running the cotton mills at Puli-Khumri?

Mr. de BAER: I believe they are run by German technicians. There are many Germans in the area, a large number of them ex-Nazis who are unable to return to their own country, so that they are completely in the hands of the Afghan Government. If they do not keep busy or if they fail to do as directed, they can easily be put into gaol with no consul to look after them. As a result those Germans are extremely valuable. There is a United Nations Mission in the country who have a supply of specialists able to help with the mills and so on.

Mr. E. M. MALAN: Had you a knowledge of the language so that you were usually able to make yourselves understood?

Mr. de BAER: We had a certain knowledge of Persian and, fortunately for us, the Tajiks with whom we mostly came into contact spoke Persian of a sort. In fact, Persian rather than Pushtu is the *lingua franca* of the country. Pushtu is of course the official language. We really had not much difficulty; we were supplied with an interpreter—I suppose one can call him that—who spoke about three words of French! Never when speaking to the nomads did we have any difficulty, as they all had a smattering of Persian, as did the Uzbeks.

Mr. LANGE: The last place I visited in Persia was Kahriz; the next place, in Afghanistan, is Islam Qala. Between the two there are about fifteen or sixteen miles, and when I crossed from Persia into Afghanistan there was no road whatsoever; there were only ruts through which I

moved. When I asked the people why they made no roads I was told that there was hardly any communication; that the area was regarded as no-man's-land. Is there now, some fifteen years since I was there, some semblance of a road being made from Kahriz to Islam Qala?

Mr. de BAER: Yes, there is; the frontier station in Persia is now called Yusufabad, and by the time you reach Islam Qala you are in Afghanistan. There is the semblance of a road from Persia, but you know quite soon that you are in Afghanistan because the road rapidly deteriorates. There was very little traffic on the road when we were there in 1955. An Afghan bus runs from Herat to Yusufabad once a week; there are very few other vehicles apart from an occasional foreigner's car returning from India. As far as we know that is the only road between Persia and Afghanistan. We tried to make our return journey across the Dasht-i-Margo, but we were told there was no road and no Customs facilities between Girishk and Zabul.

Miss HOLDSWORTH: Do Afghan men all have four wives, or do the educated men limit themselves to one?

Mr. de BAER: I believe that in most Muslim countries it is considered a sign of prestige to have a number of wives because that means having also money; statistics given by any local man as to the number of wives he had should therefore be taken with a pinch of salt! The educated men, as in Persia, tend to have only one wife. I imagine that many men would be unmarried, as the female population is said to be very much smaller than the male.

The CHAIRMAN: As there are no other questions I now, on behalf of all present, thank Mr. de Baer very much indeed for coming and giving us a most interesting description of the Cambridge Expedition to Afghanistan and for showing us some lovely photographs, many of which were extremely human. We join also in congratulating the Cambridge team on their expedition.

THE CYPRIOT TURKS

By C. F. BECKINGHAM (of Manchester University)

RECENT events have bestowed upon the Turks of Cyprus a notoriety with which this peaceful community is not familiar. They have not given much trouble to the administration, they are not often mentioned in the British Press, and tourists and archaeologists who visit Cyprus usually take little interest in them. A minority constituting about a fifth of the total population, mostly engaged in agriculture and far from wealthy, they are less prominent than the Greeks in those occupations that attract the traveller's attention. There are, for example, hardly any Turkish hotels in Cyprus. None of the many travel books that have been written about the island has much information about them. Only one official publication gives a detailed account of their communal affairs, the *Interim Report of the Committee on Turkish Affairs*, 1949. To supplement this the student must resort to files of local newspapers, sometimes very tendentious, and accessible only in the Secretariat at Nicosia. It is not surprising that the Cypriot Turks are often dismissed as a moribund remnant of the defunct Ottoman Empire.

The Turks who live, or used to live, in the islands of the Mediterranean may be divided into two categories, of which the communities of Crete, now dispersed, and of Cyprus are good examples. The Cretan "Turks" were not ethnically Turkish, or even Anatolian at all. They were Cretans whose ancestors had accepted Islam at some time after the Turkish conquest of the island in the middle of the seventeenth century.* Conversion altered their legal status, but they did not thereby abandon their language, their dress, their customs or even intermarriage with families that had remained Christian. In Cyprus, on the contrary, the overwhelming majority of the Turks are the descendants of immigrants who came from Asia Minor, chiefly from the southern provinces, in the half century or so that followed the Ottoman conquest (1570-71). Many at least of the newcomers were settled upon land that had belonged to the Latin nobility, the Venetian state, the Roman Church, or the military or monastic orders. The names of some Turkish villages indicate this. The hamlet of Temroz (Greek *Temblos*) near Kyrenia, once belonged to the Templars, and after their suppression to the Knights of Rhodes, whose name is also preserved at Arodez (G. *Arodhes*). Ankolem (G. *Angolemi*) is thought to commemorate a feudal lord from Angoulême. Mora was once a hospice of the Knights of Rhodes. Alaminyo (G. *Alaminos*) and Piskobu (G. *Episkopi*) both belonged to the great Ibelin family, the Crusader Counts of Jaffa. In many, though not all, these Turkish villages the people still know from

* The fact that something like half the population of Crete was converted to Islam at this time proves the superficiality of some common generalizations about the decline of Ottoman institutions and of Turkish Islam after the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.

which part of Anatolia their ancestors came. Several families living in and around Köfünye (G. *Kophinou*) in the Larnaca district originally came from Antalya. The inhabitants of the large village of Galatya in the Carpass peninsula say that their forebears emigrated from Konya. Many similar instances could be cited.

In certain ways, therefore, ties are even closer between the Cypriot Turks and Turkey than between the Cypriot Greeks and Greece. No large migration from Greece to Cyprus is known to have occurred since ancient times. The Cypriot dialect of Greek is distinctive. In manners and temperament most visitors find the Cypriot less vivacious and more devout than the Greek from the mainland.* His Church is, of course, in communion with the Church of Greece, as with all other Orthodox Churches, but it is autocephalous and its Archbishop takes formal precedence of any Archbishop from the Kingdom. Though many Cypriot peasants no doubt envy the Church its broad acres there is little anti-clericalism except among the Communists, in marked contrast to the situation in Greece. When, on the other hand, a Cypriot Turk crosses less than fifty miles of sea that separate him from Turkey he finds few changes, apart from those connected with a different administration, that are of any significance. Nor is his dialect provincial in the same way as Cypriot Greek. It is purer than many dialects spoken in the Republic.

By the Cyprus Convention of 1878 Britain conditionally assumed responsibility for the administration of Cyprus, which nevertheless continued to be a part of the Ottoman Empire, *de jure*. The Greeks welcomed the change, which they regarded as the first step towards incorporation in the Kingdom. Nor were the Turks resentful. Their own religious institutions were safeguarded by special clauses, and they perhaps felt that they were safer under the ægis of the most powerful empire in the world than they would have been under their own Sultan, who was compelled every few years to cede fresh territory to his enemies. Commerce was already, and largely continued to be, a Greek monopoly, infringed somewhat later by the arrival of a small number of energetic Armenians. The Turks were mostly officials or farmers. In the first years of British rule they continued to hold a high proportion of government posts, but their situation deteriorated after Turkey joined the Central Powers in 1914. The island was then formally annexed to the British Crown. There was hardly any evidence of anti-British activity among the Cypriot Turks during the war, which was not popular in Turkey itself, but the position of the community was now far less secure. It was well known that many English statesmen, notably Gladstone, had been favourably disposed to Enosis. Their difficulty had always been that Cyprus had not been theirs to give away. Britain could not, without the most flagrant breach of faith, relinquish to Greece the territory of her ally the Sultan, which had been entrusted to her to ensure the integrity of Ottoman territory elsewhere in the face of Russian aggression. After 1914 the ally became an enemy and Cyprus became Britain's own to give.

* One friend of mine, well acquainted with both Greece and Cyprus, once said that the only Cypriots who reminded him of the Greeks of Greece were the Turks of certain villages in the Paphos district.

With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Sèvres the position of the more conservative among Cypriot Turks became desperate. They had not only ceased to be, even theoretically, the subjects of the Sultan and Caliph. There was soon no Sultan or Caliph to whom they could be subject, for the Turkish Nationalists abolished them. Alarmed by the increasing number of Greek officials in the local administration, and by the possibility that the island would be ceded to Greece, some of them identified themselves with the British as much as they could. Naturally, the authorities tended to rely upon such anglicized Turks in communal affairs. Among younger men, however, there was increasing sympathy with the Turkish Revolution, and a certain number of them migrated to the Republic. For his part Atatürk welcomed them, for they were accustomed to European methods and standards of administration, had no traditional loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty, and were, as most Cypriot Turks are, entirely without religious bigotry. The Turkish Government offered them educational opportunities and the prospect of responsible posts in the public service. It is not likely that more than about 8,000 left Cyprus, but those who did included men of education, enterprise and social standing, coming from families which were accustomed to undertake important duties in the community.

This migration affected the Cypriot Turks in two ways. Some of those who left sold their estates before leaving, and valuable property passed into Greek ownership at this time. Moreover, the community has suffered from losing the services of able men who would by now have attained to influential positions. On the other hand, their presence in Turkey has helped to intensify the interest taken by the Turkish Government and people in the future of Cyprus, to which, for obvious geographical and strategic reasons, they could not be indifferent even though there were not a single Turk in the island.

Atatürk's reforms were gradually introduced among the Cyprus Turks without encountering serious opposition. Though, it is hardly necessary to say, there was no official compulsion, or even encouragement, the veil for women and the fez have almost disappeared. Experience of European, secular administration and the liberalism characteristic of Cypriot Islam were responsible for the fact that the innovations caused less trouble than they did in some parts of the Republic. There was at the same time a growing feeling that the small group of anglicized Ottomans did not represent the community, and that the British relied too much upon their advice and gave them too much power. After the riots of 1931, when Government House in Nicosia was burnt, the Legislative Council was dissolved and the Constitution suspended. The rioters were, of course, Greeks, and the Turks have never been able to understand why they, who were loyal to the Government and whom nobody accused of complicity in the disorders, should have been treated in the same way as the Greeks. Following on Britain's encouragement of Greek military action in Ionia, which Turks have resented more than the war of 1914-18, this failure to discriminate between the guilty and the innocent community has led many Turks to feel that all British governments are irrationally philhellene. To this cause is often ascribed any reluctance on the part of the authorities to use force

against the lawlessness of the Enosis party. The attitude of the British was, of course, that language, race and religion were without legal significance and that both Turks and Greeks must be treated merely as Cypriots.

The dichotomy in the social structure of Cyprus which the events of 1931 so clearly revealed is a survival of the old Ottoman *millet* system. Under that system the Orthodox Christian, the Armenian Christian and the Jew had each been subject in matters of personal law, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, to the jurisdiction of his own ecclesiastical courts, which could call upon the Ottoman authorities to enforce their decisions. In this way each religious community became something of an *imperium in imperio*. It is easy to understand how the Archbishop of Cyprus became very powerful, more powerful at times than the Turkish Governor whose relations with the Orthodox population were largely conducted through the hierarchy. On occasion an Archbishop might be deposed, or even executed, as was Kyprianos in 1821, and the system was gradually modified in the nineteenth century, as the Empire came to be increasingly centralized. Nevertheless, the advent of the British meant a certain loss of power for the Church. No Archbishop could hope to challenge a British High Commissioner as successfully as he had sometimes defied a Turkish Pasha. Nor was the new policy towards the *millets* always popular. Resentment was caused when the British refused to use the police to enforce the collection of ecclesiastical taxes from the Orthodox population as the Turks had been doing.*

The solidarity of the Muslim *millet* has survived three-quarters of a century of foreign rule. All Cypriot Muslims feel themselves to be Turks, whether they are descended from immigrants from Anatolia, as most of them are, or from Cypriots converted to Islam, as some of them must be, or from Muslim Arabs who came from other Ottoman provinces, as a very few of them are. There are Muslim villages where the people speak Greek rather than Turkish, but these villagers are as enthusiastically Turkish in their sentiments as those who know no Greek at all. The Orthodox community is somewhat less homogeneous. For one thing there is a greater disparity of wealth among the Greeks than among the Turks. There is also a large Greek Communist party, or, it would be more accurate to say, a large party which accepts the leadership of a small Communist group. Though both the Church and the Communists want Enosis, and though some Greek Communists are practising Christians,† it has become obvious that close co-operation with the Communists would cost the Archbishop the support of the Government of Greece.

The communal question in Cyprus thus resembles that which existed in

* Details of this curious dispute will be found in Sir George Hill's *History of Cyprus*, vol. IV, pp. 573-5. Similarly, in 1949 a Turkish Committee recommended that the colonial government should levy a tax on the Muslim population to meet the cost of repairing mosques and paying salaries to their imams. The suggestion was ignored. In both instances the British authorities have doubtless considered that religious obligations are a matter for private conscience.

† Mr. Osbert Lancaster tells a story of a Greek Communist, "guilty without question of at least half a dozen singularly brutal murders", who excused himself from a party meeting in order to make his Easter communion. *Classical Landscape with Figures*, p. 32.

the undivided Indian Empire. It is not surprising that partition has been discussed as a possible solution, notably by the Turkish journalist, Ahmet Emin Yalman. The Communists call for a united front of Greek and Turkish workers, but Communism has virtually no influence among the Turks; in Cyprus as in the Republic, most of them regard it as a thin disguise for the old enemy, Russian imperialism. The Greeks have tried to placate Turkish opposition to Enosis by offering to guarantee the position of the Muslim minority. For the same reason that the Muslims of India were unwilling to put themselves at the mercy of a permanent Hindu majority in a self-governing India, the Cypriot Turks are very suspicious of British plans for constitutional development. When a minority feels itself threatened by a majority, as the Turks certainly do in Cyprus, it is of little use to offer them proportional representation in an elected assembly. They would always be outvoted in such a body, and it would not console them that they could always vote in exact proportion to their percentage of the total population. For, unlike a political party that finds itself in a minority, they could have no hope of persuading some of their opponents' supporters to vote for them at the next election. Under a parliamentary system nothing short of equal representation with the Greeks would give the Turks a feeling of real security. The Greeks, in a majority of four to one, are obviously not likely to make such a concession. Nor would reserve powers vested in a British Governor satisfy the Turks completely, for they distrust the philhellenism of British officials. It has even been claimed that Enosis might be preferable to autonomy without this safeguard. In the former contingency Turkey could make representations in Athens regarding the treatment of the Muslim minority in Cyprus. She could hardly compel the Colonial Office in London to put pressure on the officials of a self-governing colony, with which she would herself have no direct relations.

Plural societies such as that of Cyprus have existed in the Middle East since ancient times. Islam inherited from the Hellenistic world the rudiments of the *millet* system, herself accorded a subordinate but definite status to the adherents of other scriptural religions, and was able to govern these societies with remarkable success. They had little difficulty in adapting themselves to the earlier, paternal phase of British colonial rule. It remains to be seen whether they can survive under the unitary parliamentary democracies which Britain is now trying to establish throughout her empire.

November, 1955.

THE RUSSIAN TOUR OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

By GEORGE EVANS

Mr. George Evans, Special Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in South-East Asia, last year covered the recent tour of the Soviet leaders. As it was not possible for Mr. Evans, during his short stay in London, to talk to the Members of the Society as had been hoped, we are indebted to him for permission to publish the following article.

THE ten thousand mile tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan undertaken by Marshal Bulganin, Soviet Prime Minister, and Mr. Krushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party, at the end of last year made history in more ways than one. Not only was it the first Soviet State visit of its kind to Asia but the first to any non-Communist country with the exception of Jugoslavia.

That the travels of the Soviet leaders and their reception, particularly in India, should have aroused the interest they did in the rest of the world is not surprising. The tour was the first real opportunity anyone had had of watching the new order of Soviet diplomacy in action, at any rate at close quarters.

From the moment of their arrival in Asia, Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev were represented as doing no more than returning similar visits paid to Russia earlier in the year by Mr. Nehru and U Nu, the Indian and Burmese Prime Ministers. On the face of it this was, of course, the case—though few indeed were the diplomatic observers who were not convinced that the Soviet leaders intended doing a great deal more. In spite of some of Mr. Khrushchev's more painful indiscretions it is now generally agreed that they succeeded—far beyond the expectations of even the most sanguine optimist in the Kremlin.

Viewed in retrospect the Russian arrival in New Delhi on a clear, sunlit afternoon last November, was an event of more than passing historical significance. It marked a new epoch in Soviet-Asiatic relations and, for that matter, in the whole fabric of East-West relations as well. From the outset it was evident that the West viewed the Soviet incursion with considerable misgivings to say the least.

India's reaction was different. Probably no one who had not witnessed the ardour of the masses thronging the beflagged and garlanded streets of Delhi the day the visitors arrived could measure the warmth of their welcome merely by reading about it. It was spontaneous and sincere. In the opinion of many Indians it was also, in some respects at least, over-effusive. Certainly neither effort nor expense was spared to mark the occasion.

State visits, whenever they occur, generally follow a set pattern from which they seldom depart. There can be few recorded instances of such

a violent and rapid departure from the normal by the guests as occurred in this case.

Although Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev had been a full three days in India before they launched their first attack on the West—using the Indian Parliament as their forum to the chagrin of many Indians—there were already abundant indications of Mr. Khrushchev's intentions. Indeed, viewing Old Delhi the morning after his arrival he felt moved to shake his head over some of the more splendid architectural creations of the Moghul Emperors and point the moral that they just showed how the people had been exploited then. His appreciation of the marble splendour of the Taj Mahal was clouded by similar reflections.

Thus was the stage set for the extended and strenuous tour of practically the whole of India that followed. In the course of it the Soviet leaders visited numerous industrial and community projects, attended scores of receptions and banquets arranged in their honour and made countless after-dinner speeches. Mr. Khrushchev exchanged pleasantries and banter with politicians and civic leaders at all levels. He imparted technical know-how to engineers, farmers, builders, students, scientists and even astrologists—and scowled at the “paid slave writers of the Capitalist Press” as he later described the Western correspondents who had attached themselves to the tour.

Marshal Bulganin, who was described throughout as “Mr.” apparently at his own request, made fewer speeches—and ignored the Press. His greater reserve, urbanity and composure presented him in a more dignified light throughout.

From the beginning it was made clear that neither of the Soviet leaders enjoyed precedence over the other. In fact their efforts to ensure that neither should even appear to be “more equal” in the hierarchy sometimes introduced an element bordering on farce into the proceedings.

The spectacle of two elderly, rather benign-looking gentlemen marching along in step as they reviewed a guard of honour, their hands rising and falling in perfect unison in salute, had possibilities that would have delighted any cartoonist. The same unity of purpose was evident in most of their public appearances and gestures, even down to waving identical straw hats at the crowds from the back of their open car.

The Grand Tour took the Soviet leaders to the Punjab, Bombay, Poona, Bangalore, Ootacamund, Madras, Calcutta, Patna, Jaipur and, at the end, to Kashmir. It was accomplished at breakneck speed in a matter of about a fortnight.

From Bombay onwards Mr. Khrushchev pursued his campaign against “Colonialism” with mounting vigour. Marshal Bulganin, on the other hand, confined himself in the main to the stereotyped sentiments that might have been uttered in the same circumstances by almost any visiting statesman. Compared with Mr. Khrushchev's, his speeches, even those denouncing colonialism, were models of restraint. The most significant of them was an attack on the presence of the Portuguese in Goa.

Before the tour had been very long under way it became evident through the medium of the local Press that Mr. Khrushchev's oratory was creating strong resentment, particularly in London. There is not the slightest

reason for supposing that the two Soviet leaders were unaware of this fact. It did not, however, deflect them from their course.

In considering the tirades directed against Britain by Mr. Khrushchev it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which some of them were made. I think the possibility certainly exists that had he not compromised himself at the start and felt the necessity of recovering lost ground, his subsequent behaviour might have been more restrained.

How, exactly, did Mr. Khrushchev compromise himself, it may be asked? I think the answer is that both the Soviet leaders alienated a considerable section of moderate opinion at the outset of their visit by their misuse of the Indian Parliament as a platform from which to launch an attack on countries friendly to India. The Indian people have a natural courtesy and there is no doubt that many of them felt this to be in bad taste. At the best it was an abuse of hospitality.

It was clearly the cause that led to the appearance of the first breath of criticism of the tour as a whole. It was expressed by a leading political commentator in the *Times of India*, who pointed out the discourtesy to India's friends implicit in the visitors' action.

Mr. Khrushchev's reaction to this was both prompt and characteristic. The day it appeared he made speech at Bombay in which he accused the Western Powers of having started the last war. From then onwards scarcely a day passed without one or other—and sometimes both—the Russian leaders making a fresh contribution to the general disharmony which their speeches had already provoked.

The technical perfection of Russia's latest hydrogen bomb which was dragged in about this time was widely interpreted as another bid to regain lost ground. It was a gesture that could have been construed either as a threat or a promise and in the event it turned out to be a singularly bad psychological blunder to make, in India of all places. Certainly the immediate effect was to release a greater and far more outspoken volume of criticism than any which had gone before. Much of it came from quarters which could be described as anything but pro-Western.

Even Mr. Khrushchev recognised it as deplorably bad strategy. For the remainder of the tour nothing more was said about the bomb. Instead, the theme of colonialism, particularly "British colonialism," was resumed with greater vigour.

It was at this critical juncture of the tour that Mr. Nehru flew to Calcutta to make a significant contribution towards restoring some kind of harmony. The stir which the speeches were creating in London was by then well known to everyone—including Mr. Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin.

In an extempore addition to his carefully prepared speech Mr. Nehru pointedly spoke of India's lack of hostile feelings towards Britain despite the history of their past relationships. The Soviet leaders heard it with massive and inscrutable solidity of countenance. The next morning, in accordance with their programme, they interrupted their Indian tour to visit Burma.

On their return a week later they paid a two-day visit to Kashmir, apparently at their own request. In the course of this they expressed sup-

port for India's stand on the Kashmir question. The pronouncement not only completed the swing back of public opinion in favour of the Soviet (in shining contrast to the West) but it came as a fitting climax to a hard campaign. The not altogether unjustified suspicion of the outer world was that the sole purpose of the trip by Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev to Srinagar had been for no other purpose than to create such an impression.

A sufficient interval has now elapsed since the tour ended to assess its effects with greater accuracy than might have been possible earlier. The first fact that emerges is that it created an enormously good impression throughout India. It also inspired a vast fund of goodwill towards, and interest in, the Soviet Union in places where neither existed before.

Here, after all, were two of the world's most powerful leaders, who not only expressed sympathy with India's aims and aspirations but promised to help her achieve them—from purely disinterested motives, too, and not, like the wicked capitalists and colonial oppressors, because it was desired to gain something in return. The cries "Indians and Russians are brothers" which greeted the Soviet leaders on all sides acquired a new significance. To millions of politically-minded Indians they symbolised a new hope—the hope of ending economic dependence on the West by pointing to an alternative. So I think the answer to the question of whether the tour achieved its main object must be that it did, handsomely, from a Soviet point of view. Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev certainly committed some grave errors of political judgment in the course of it but not the least remarkable aspect of their performance was the speed and efficiency with which they retrieved their mistakes.

The pattern of the Russian tour of Burma differed only in detail from its Indian counterpart but its impact was less. I think it would be fair comment to say that, on the whole, the Burmese people accepted their distinguished guests with more detachment than their neighbours. This is not to imply that their welcome was lukewarm which manifestly it was not. It was just not quite so overpowering, which may have been due to the fact that Burma is less well able to afford the prodigality which India displays towards her guests.

In any event, Rangoon's decorations contrasted poorly with those displayed in Delhi, Bombay or Calcutta—which may have cost anything from £20,000 upwards in each place. Burmese crowds, even making allowances for the disparity in populations, were smaller than Indian crowds and they were either less enthusiastic or more restrained.

In Burma, Mr. Khrushchev's attacks on the West changed from being a periodic occurrence to being an everyday one. Several other interesting contrasts were also noticeable. In India, for example, the Soviet police and security bodyguard accompanying the party were seldom evident, so little did they obtrude. They were very much in evidence in Burma from the start. Considering the audacity of the rebel gangs and, more ironically, Communist rebel gangs, in Central Burma which the Soviet leaders visited, this was not perhaps surprising.

A day or so before they arrived in Maymyo, for example, an armed band seized two officials of the World Health Organization in their offices in

broad daylight and carried them off into the jungle. When I arrived in Maymyo, travelling with the heavily armed Russian convoy, the town was being guarded and patrolled by more than a brigade of troops. There were even bren-gunners posted on the roof of the telegraph office.

Burma still bears many of the scars of war. What they saw there in this respect, particularly in Rangoon and Mandalay, provided the Soviet leaders with at least a new setting for an old and somewhat hackneyed plot. Needless to say the causes of the war and its effects on Burma were soon being ascribed to the unprincipled activities of the Capitalists. This, and the old theme of colonial exploitation by the British quickly became staple fare for Burmese audiences.

Because of the uncertain political situation and the very real risk involved, the Soviet travels in Burma were somewhat restricted. Apart from Rangoon, the only other places visited were Mandalay, Taunggyi and Maymyo. So keyed up had Mr. Khrushchev become by this time that he even took the opportunity presented by a pleasure cruise on the Irrawaddy at Mandalay to deliver yet another political oration.

The Burmese end of the tour is, however, noteworthy for one important reason. It marked the first open breach in relations between the Soviet party and the group of British and American correspondents following the tour. This occurred shortly after Mr. Khrushchev's uncomplimentary references to Britain which he made at the Shwe Dagon pagoda in Rangoon. The Soviet correspondents (chiefly from *Pravda* and *Tass*) insisted that Mr. Khrushchev's remarks had been distorted and that he never made them. Mr. Khrushchev himself made no complaints. Indeed, far from retracting a single word, he remarked with complacency the very next night: "Some people didn't like what I said yesterday and they will not like what I am going to say now." Needless to add, what he was going to say then, and did say, was that the English had sat on the necks of the Burmese—and a good deal more in a similar vein.

The people who have since rushed to the defence of Mr. Khrushchev, in Britain and elsewhere, have either not been made aware of incidents of this kind or else they have deliberately chosen to overlook them. My own considered view is that the Soviet leaders were neither misrepresented nor misreported. Their speeches were rendered into plain English, sentence by sentence, as they were made, by two perfectly competent interpreters. The conclusion that they meant every word they uttered is inescapable. It is possible, of course, that they never foresaw the circulation which their sentiments would receive, but that is quite a different matter.

The tour of South-East Asia ended a few days before Christmas in Afghanistan. During their five-day stay there neither Marshal Bulganin nor Mr. Khrushchev left Kabul. As in Burma, their appearance seemed to arouse less popular enthusiasm among the masses than it did in India. Of course neither Burma nor Afghanistan possesses such a large proportion of informed public opinion as India. It is doubtful if more than 50 per cent. of the population in either country even knew that the visit was taking place.

Kabul airport as yet possesses few modern navigational aids. The arrival of the Soviet aerial armada in indifferent weather was an operation

—one imagined, looking at the snow-capped peaks that encircle Kabul—that was not entirely free from an element of risk. However, it was accomplished despite the difficulties, albeit at the second attempt. Afghanistan's large colony of Russian technicians wearing proletarian cloth caps were well to the forefront in the welcoming crowds lining the streets for the ceremonial drive from the airport to the King's Palace.

From the start Mr. Khrushchev's fiery brand of oratory was lacking. Evidently by the time he reached Kabul he had either exhausted his repertoire or else he felt that it was no longer necessary.

Perhaps the highlight of the Soviet leaders' visit to Afghanistan was a Buz Kashi, or goat game, which was specially laid on for their benefit in the national stadium. Buz Kashi, in which two teams of horsemen compete for goals, using the body of a dead goat or calf, can be a spectacle of singular ferocity. Serious injuries to the competitors and their horses frequently occur and fatalities are not unknown. Looking at the two distinguished guests in the Royal box watching this strange game, I could not help wondering what thoughts their expressions of polite interest concealed. The game originated in the Soviet Asian republics but it is not now permitted in Russia at all.

Viewing the tour as a whole I consider that one of its most illuminating aspects was the security precautions apparently deemed necessary to ensure the safety of the Soviet leaders. This side of the operation was entrusted to no less a personality than Army General I. A. Serov, Mr. Beria's successor. Out of the total Soviet party of about 100 who arrived in New Delhi, it was estimated that no fewer than 30 were bodyguards or security men of one category or another.

Neither General Serov nor his aides came into the public eye until they reached Burma. It was there that General Serov, in a heated scene, accused a number of Western correspondents of "stage-managing a lie." The incident occurred on a small, up-country airstrip, where a Soviet policeman intervened to prevent photographers taking pictures of a mine-detector. It is difficult to understand why the Russians should have objected as strongly as they did. Personally I should not have objected in the least—considering that it is not unknown in Burma for planes to get blown up by landing on mines planted on the runways by the Communist rebels.

The fact was, however, that the Soviet party in general, and General Serov in particular, took the strongest exception to it. In a scene of astonishing peurility in which he dropped the illuminating remark: "This couldn't happen in my country," the General engaged in heated argument with a group of correspondents and finally turned his back on them in a very angry frame of mind indeed. Later, Soviet security men walked round the airfield taking pictures of every single Western correspondent there. The correspondents, hastily focussing their cameras, began returning the compliment, and the resulting duel of shutters was watched in utter amazement by the large crowd of Burmese present. Thereafter General Serov had no further contact with the Western Press until he stepped out of his plane at Kabul at the end of the tour. Confronting his astonished gaze there was a group of the same ubiquitous correspondents

—industriously examining the armour of a massive, Soviet-built, bullet-proof limousine, which had been specially imported into Afghanistan for the convenience of the visitors.

Orders were spoken, and a burly Afghan soldier, waving a loaded Sten gun, moved rapidly across and shooed the inquisitive visitors away. Throughout the tour it was isolated incidents of this kind that threw most light on the rigidity of the Soviet official mind. Obviously, as in this case, unfavourable use could be made of any undue tendency on the part of the guests to feel concern for their safety in the host's house. Apart from anything else, General Serov's brief included keeping such unscrupulous performers as the "capitalist slave writers" at arm's length. In this he was not always successful. With the Soviet correspondents, some of whom were Party members of standing, no like difficulty arose, naturally. Their dispatches conformed to pattern. I recall hearing one senior Soviet correspondent admonishing a Western correspondent for what he called misinterpretation and distortion of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches. He wound up by saying: "You should always wait for the official translation of the speech, which is always ready the next day."

Like so many other aspects of the tour, this struck me as being yet another symbol of the vast gulf that has still to be bridged before any sort of understanding between the Soviet Union and the West is possible. In whatever light it is viewed, the Grand Tour can scarcely be said to have brought the prospect of one being achieved much closer.

January, 1956.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor.

DEAR SIR,

I deeply regret that in my note on Sir Ronald Storrs in the last number of the quarterly I gave wrongly the four best books on which he lectured. They were the Bible, Shakespeare, Dante, and Homer. And in that order. He was, too, a great lover of Horace, but he did not consider him one of the supreme four.

Yours truly,

NORMAN BENTWICH.

Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published, and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual contributors.

REVIEWS

Defeat into Victory. By Field-Marshal Sir William Slim. Cassell. 1956. Pp. xi + 576. 21 maps; index. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6". 25s.

This is the complete record of two modern campaigns under the most adverse conditions in some of the most difficult country in the world. It may be one of the last of its kind before science changes the pattern, but this struggle and its telling will probably become regarded as one of the most remarkable chronicles of war.

The author in his preface suggests that the General is "by no means best fitted to write its history. That, if it is to be complete and unbiased, should be the work of someone less personally involved." In the main this may be true. Depends on the General. If one who has been Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, and then selected from retirement to head the Army as C.I.G.S., such judgment might not be so certain.

Field-Marshal Slim must be counted as one of the great leaders in history. It is not easy to indicate the precise reasons for this. Probably the human touch. Much can be done by brilliant planning and execution, but when everything goes wrong morale depends a lot on personalities. The first hundred-odd pages on defeat and evacuation record the stark grimness of a beaten army's survival. With Generals other than Alexander (of Dunkirk) and the author, and without the monsoon, the story might have been different. Indeed it is at least doubtful whether the later stages, Imphal and Kohima, the Burma advance, and the rush to Rangoon, would have been successful under any other leader. On each occasion it was a very near thing. Had Lt.-Gen. Slim been commanding the Japs, again the story might have been different.

Returning to command—modern communications in a main campaigning area 220 by 350 miles enabled the author to exercise a personal influence on events almost comparable to Wellington's. He could and did visit tight places, inspire resistance and maintain liaison. He complains (p. 56) of Gen. Alexander exposing himself, yet in watching an attack (p. 449) by his old regiment (6th Gurkhas) on an entrenched position, he broke his own strictest rules.

The whole programme is in effect a proof of how a really determined modern commander can, if need be, break away from tradition and produce results not obtainable by following the text books. In almost every chapter we see striking examples of this. "Our own Royal Navy" (p. 130), eventually 1,000 vessels for the Hoogli and Arakan coasts. Development of air supply in the jungle, drop signals, etc. No doubt worked out by staff and technicians, but the reader senses that most of the real initiative came from the commander.

In the case of Wingate, not many generals would have had the patience and will to interpret other people's ideas so successfully. Even lukewarm support of such a revolutionary experiment might have contributed to its failure. General Slim's confident co-operation on the other hand equally ensured its success. Then there was the Kalewa Shipyard, building teak warships on the Chindwin (p. 399), for attacking enemy positions and carrying tanks. This was a departure from the traditions of the "thin red line" and frontal attack, when Anglo-Saxon morale had once asserted its superiority. These traditions lingered, alas, on the Arakan Front (p. 152), until a new local commander introduced more modern and imaginative methods.

The reader might assume that General Slim relied much on the inventive initiative of his subordinates. The facts are otherwise. No doubt they interpreted his ideas, but the original thoughts must have been largely his own. In trying to assess the relative value of the author's interpretation of generalship, these important and often revolutionary conceptions were of great importance. Coupled with his human sympathy with the fighting soldier, his optimism under the most adverse conditions, and his amazing success in using modern communications to reconnoitre and meet

his men, it is possible that these difficult Burma Campaigns produced a Commander better suited to its conditions than any soldier of his time. Consider (p. 108): "I had tried growing a beard at one time myself in the retreat, when it was becoming rather fashionable, but mine appeared completely *white*, and the probable effect of having a Corps Commander who looked like Father Christmas was such that I resumed shaving with the relic of a blade." One wonders if Monty, or MacArthur, or even Wavell, would have expressed such sentiments.

A word on the literary style. A model of readable compression. No extra words. In the past such detailed strategical and tactical records would have expanded into two or even three volumes, and perhaps omitted many of those homely and intimate asides which make much of the book read like a novel. At times, of course, the number of units, characters in the story, make it necessary to employ the Staff College jargon—this specially applies to the advance on Rangoon. Yet even here one feels the writer has his tongue in his cheek. His work will no doubt become a text book for future commanders; a most comprehensive study of fighting a difficult campaign yet published, so it would be wrong to envisage the interest only of the casual reader in preference to the educational background. Yet, even so, the combination in this instance of both aspects is probably unique. There is more to it than the necessary flair for impressive reporting which one is entitled to expect from the author's military experience in very high places.

A word about the enemy—and our Chinese allies. In many passages Field-Marshal Slim speaks in high appreciation of Japanese military art. No other soldiers ever evolved such selfless traditions. Suicide was normal in preference to capture. In one case the survivors of a beaten remnant formed column and marched into the Irrawadi. Life, Japanese life, may mean less to Nipponese than to Europeans, but such opponents raise new factors in civilized warfare. With regard to the command, overall strategy offers little to criticize. When their methods fail is in lack of flexibility. The British detachment is capable at times of contravening regulations and written orders, and using common sense. Not so the Jap. Here the Anglo-Saxon has an advantage on the German, but this advantage is much more marked in fighting Japs, a factor which the author frequently took into successful account.

The Chinese presented yet another interpretation of military ideology. The author defines this on p. 64. Both command and troops *can* be superlative. General Sun, he says, would have been a good commander in any army. But Chinese ideas of time, maintenance and logistics in 1942-5 were so primitive that their "assistance" was too often a liability. Yet without such assistance the retreat in 1942 might possibly have been a massacre, and the invasion of 1944 could hardly have succeeded. In any case it was a near thing.

There were other "imponderables" which worked in our favour, though little noticed in these pages. The pro-British feelings in Burma, especially among the Karens (pp. 499 and 516) were nursed by British officers and others like Seagrim, Nimmo and McCrindle. By threatening enemy communications through the years they did much to reduce the long odds against British arms.

After the six harrowing chapters of Book I, Book II (73 pages) describes the author's task on the muddy end (in both senses) of India's Eastern Army to counter the rising tide of Japanese aggression. Again the monsoon helped and gave time to build up resources. Book III (p. 199) relates the testing of the weapon evolved, followed by "The Tide Turns" (p. 285). Our Army Commander had his wish of an all-out offensive by the Japanese on Kohima and Imphal, followed by his own thrust upon their exhausted forces. Major-General Sato's "bullet head" favoured successive assaults on Kohima instead of destroying our relatively undefended railhead at Dimapur. When the R.A.F. wanted to bomb Sato at this time, "they were astonished when I suggested they should abandon the project as I regarded their intended victim as one of my most helpful Generals" (p. 311).

Book V, "The Decisive Battle," tells of the destruction of the Japanese main army near Mandalay, assisted by a well-executed feint. It is doubtful whether ordinary text-book methods could have ever displaced this efficient and more numerous enemy in his long-prepared positions. The last Book (VI) deals with the race to Rangoon against the enemy and the monsoon—once again a very close thing.

One of the reasons why this volume must remain a military bible for the future is the way the writer goes out of his way in almost every chapter, and especially in his "Aftermath" (p. 111) and "Afterthoughts" (p. 355), to analyze his problems and reasoning, especially his "mistakes." Though some of the latter are perhaps recognizable in retrospect, many a successful soldier might be forgiven for acting beforehand as described.

A criticism is the need for an overall strategic map, in addition to the three of North, Central and Southern Burma. The "Two Million" sheet (32 miles to the inch), from Fort Hertz to Prome and Chittagong to Lashio, would only measure 18" x 12", no larger than some of the existing inserts.

In conclusion, it is the opinion of this reviewer that though this campaign may not have been quite so vital as certain others in the last war, its military lessons are unique, a final answer to the myth of Japanese superiority in any branch of war.

G. M. ROUTH.

Last and First in Burma. By Maurice Collis. Faber. 1956. Pp. 297; index and map. Illustrated. 30s.

This book deals with the civil and political side of a period on which much has been written in military despatches and memoirs. The author has relied largely on papers placed at his disposal by Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, including his correspondence with the Secretary of State, and the book therefore takes a biographical form. Although for this reason the personal view naturally tends to predominate, new light is thrown on many events which have been the subject of controversy and criticism, often imperfectly informed.

Mr. Collis sketches with admirable lucidity the course of the military campaign which was to drive the British out of Burma. But since this is not a military history the campaign merely provides the tragic background to the ever-rising surge of insoluble problems besetting the civil administration of a country folding back on itself as the Army retired. On his arrival in Burma Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith had found a Ministry pledged to making co-operation in the war effort conditional on a promise of early Dominion status. He was able to win them over to unconditional co-operation and they stood by him to the end. "As the Japanese advanced into the country it would have been easy for the Ministers to have sent them Emissaries and come to an understanding. . . . Had they done so the population would have followed their lead. . . . As it was, nothing of the kind was to happen. The Ministers remained faithful to the last dreadful minute, and the people bent their heads to the storm in the hope that it would pass over them without destroying them." (In view of much that was said afterwards about a hostile population, it is interesting that Sir William Slim puts down the actively hostile element at "certainly not more than five per cent.—a figure which compares favourably with the number of collaborators in many European countries.") It is well that these things should be recorded. It was Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith's sense of Britain's debt to a country she could not defend and his loyalty to Ministers who had stood by him which governed his approach to the political scene in 1945.

The dominant theme in the second part of the book is the emergence of the resistance movement and the part it came to play after the return of the Government in 1945. Mr. Collis traces its course from its origin in the extremist Thakin party, the leaders of which went out to meet the Japanese and under Aung San joined with them in the invasion of Burma. Aung San built up the Burma Defence Army, but, by 1943, disillusioned in their hopes of the Japanese as liberators, he and his associates were plotting to use this Army against them. They formed the "Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League" and claimed to be the provisional Government of Burma. They made contact with the secret organization of Force 136 and in due course Aung San brought the Army over to the British side. The use to be made of the Army and the political implications involved were to cause a deep rift between Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith and Lord Mountbatten.

Mr. Collis perhaps overestimates the importance of the Thakins in 1942. He says: "One is bound to ask the question why it was the Thakins and not some other party

that raised the Resistance." His answer is that they were the only party capable of doing so and that even in 1942 they must have been more formidable than they appeared. Is not the answer, more simply, that it was their initial co-operation with the Japanese which enabled Aung San and his friends to build up their organization under the shelter of the Japanese, at a time when the leaders of the other parties, who at first had as much to fear from the Thakins as from the Japanese themselves, had been driven into hiding?

The obvious military course was to make full use of a resistance movement, regardless of its past. Lord Mountbatten is quoted, from his Despatch, with reference to the possible danger, from the Civil Affairs point of view, that offence might be given to the more respectable elements in the population: "I had reminded them that the respectable elements had remained inactive; while it was the active, politically conscious and politically organized elements in the country which were about to undertake the rising." Lord Mountbatten's responsibility did not extend to the political future of Burma. He could not, nevertheless, dissociate himself from the political effect of action taken in the military field. He had less reason than Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith to doubt the assurance of Force 136 that the Resistance represented all parties, or to question the assumption that elements which were politically inactive and unorganized must be politically unconscious. He was anxious to be able to hold out some promise for its political future.

He could not persuade the Governor that this should be done. The Governor was under orders from the Cabinet to keep the League in check. The Cabinet's policy was laid down in a White Paper providing, after a maximum of three years of direct rule, for an election to restore the 1935 Constitution. This would give the League a chance to make good its claim to represent all parties. In the meantime every consideration of loyalty and decency required that the leaders of other parties should have an opportunity to emerge and re-establish themselves.

This was the uneasy situation when the Governor returned to Rangoon in October, 1945. Meanwhile the legend of Aung San as the liberator had grown. His acceptance as an ally had built up his prestige. He was seen to be conferring on equal terms with the highest military officers. (A simple but material fact which Mr. Collis might have added is that in the complete absence of ordinary communications in Burma he was able to range the country in military transport when his rivals were tied to Rangoon.) Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith was quicker than the Cabinet to realize that, whatever the case when Aung San brought over his Army, he was now the dominant personality in Burma. Protracted negotiations to bring him into the Government on any terms which did not involve the scrapping of the White Paper and the virtual abrogation of authority were fruitless. In the background was the standing menace of an armed force only waiting for Aung San's bidding. A critical situation was further bedevilled by a public denunciation of Aung San as a murderer, an accusation as difficult to ignore as it might be fatal to act upon. In the face of a complete impasse Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith suggested to the Cabinet a solution which involved modifying the White Paper and aiming at an early election for a Constituent Assembly, cutting out the 1935 Constitution. As Mr. Collis says: "This proposal was essentially the same as that which the Cabinet made 8 months later . . . and which was accepted by the League and solved the Burma problem." He coupled with it an offer of his own resignation if it should be thought that this might relieve the tension. "In the sequel the Cabinet accepted both his solution and his personal self-sacrifice, though without thanking him for either. Indeed, by the time they applied the solution they had forgotten that he had pointed it out and, thinking they had discovered it, took all the credit."

Mr. Collis sums up: "Thus, by April, 1946, Dorman-Smith had arrived at a position similar to Mountbatten's. From the start both had been critical of the White Paper, but Dorman-Smith had had some hope that with the backing of the Moderates it might be acceptable to the Burmese. And, indeed, no one could have been certain before the event that this hope was groundless. After feeling his way for 6 months Dorman-Smith, by a process of trial and error, was convinced that what he had been asked to do by the Cabinet was an impossibility. Mountbatten could say with truth, 'I told you so', but he was in the happier position of an outside critic."

It is tempting to speculate what might have happened if this or that turn had been taken in the past. Would Aung San have emerged at the top if he had been halted before his legend had grown? Would the League have elected to remain in the Commonwealth if the Cabinet had been more forthcoming at an earlier stage; if they had ignored at once, as they were obliged to in the end, the murder accusation; or if the League had known, when they made their decision, that India was, surprisingly, to make a different choice? Mr. Collis does not altogether resist the temptation, but is cautious in his conclusions. In his own words: "The historian, oppressed enough by the task of establishing what did happen, is discouraged from pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of what might have happened, for once he interferes with the actual march of events countless imponderables arise to confuse him."

J. H. W.

A History of the Crusades. Vol. I. (The first hundred years.) Edited by M. W. Baldwin. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1955. Pp. xxvi+694. 14 maps, 4 illustrations. 96s.

Fourteen scholars have combined to produce this volume. Pity the poor reviewer! It is the first of five which will tell the whole story. In addition to the history, it describes the inception of the plan with a note on the orthography of proper names, contains a gazetteer, a list of important towns with the dates of capture and recapture, a chronology of the chief events, 14 small but clear maps, an index and a bibliography to each section. As civilization and institutions are reserved for a later volume, practically the whole of this is political—in other words, fighting, with a few marriages and alliances thrown in. The story to be unfolded is complicated, as there were so many parties; Crusaders from the West, some in the cause of religion and some seeking kingdoms; Greeks afraid of the Westerners but hoping to extract some profit from them; Syrian Christians who hated the Greeks; Armenians with mixed feelings towards Byzantium and always the discord between the Greek and Latin churches. The Muslims were equally divided with Arabs, Turks and Turkomans. The Seljuq empire was in decay, Mosul claimed suzerainty over North Syria, Egypt had not forgotten that it once ruled South Syria, Aleppo and Damascus were frightened rivals, Hama and Homs aspired to independence in a smaller way, and in Northern Mesopotamia several Turkish rulers added to the kaleidoscope. Nur al-din of Aleppo began the task of uniting these irreconcilables and Saladin stepped into his shoes and completed the task, though his preference for his own people, the Kurds, made extra difficulties for him. Sometimes Muslim joined with Christian against Muslim, and Christians behaved similarly. There is not one thread of narrative, but a network, and confusion is increased by the paucity of names, so many Baldwins and Bohemunds and more than one Nur al-din.

The history begins with a sketch of the social and political state of Europe in the 11th century and outlines the Christian resistance to Islam in Spain, Italy, Sicily and Byzantium. The section on Byzantium tells a little about the administration of the empire but otherwise this chapter is a record of battles and sieges and is dull reading. The early pilgrims get their share of attention. The tale of the Crusades to the Holy Land is told in great detail, as befits a book of reference. There are no surprises; Pope Urban was the prime mover in the first crusade, and Peter the Hermit takes a back seat. What is new is the union of the Western and Eastern sides of the story in one book. A chapter is given up to the Assassins, who were ready to murder anyone who threatened their interests and, apparently, to sell their daggers to any buyer. The weapon was always the dagger, perhaps some idea of ritual murder. In this connection it may be noticed that opposing views have not always been ironed out; on p. 594 the importance of the enmity between Sunna and Shi'a is upheld and on p. 96 it is denied. It was never decided whether a crusade was a war or a pilgrimage; the first was hampered by crowds of pilgrims, unarmed and unruly, and in later ones many potential recruits thought they had done their duty when they had visited Jerusalem, and returned home at once, so doing nothing to strengthen the Christian states, which were always short of man-power.

This history does much to vindicate the character of Alexius. He was in a difficult position; he needed help from the West but feared the ambition of the

leaders of the crusade, was ready to help them but anxious to protect his subjects from the lawlessness of a mob which did not always distinguish between Eastern Christians and infidels, and wished to get some profit for the empire out of conquests in Asia Minor and Syria, so he adapted his policy to every change of circumstance and made the Latins suspicious of him and his "treacherous" Greeks. Here as everywhere else the discord between the churches was pernicious.

The verdict on Saladin is that he was greater as a man than as a general; skilled though he was in war, his greatest success was due to the mistakes of his adversaries. He could unite the opposing interests of the Muslims because they saw that he was not working for himself but for their religion, instead of hoarding treasure for himself he spent it lavishly to attain his end, and his magnanimity to his enemies compelled admiration.

The Crusaders worked out a new system of fighting to meet the tactics of their foes, the heavily armed knights acting in conjunction with the infantry, who neutralized the Muslim archers. When the cavalry acted alone, their horses were killed by the archers and the dismounted knights were killed or captured.

It is disturbing to meet "the full story of this event is told in another chapter," but such hindrances to the flow of the narrative are few considering the many tangled threads which have to be unravelled. The writing is adequate if not distinguished, though a few phrases jar on an Englishman. The handsome volume is beautifully printed and the only complaint is that there is no guide to the whereabouts of the pictures.

A. S. T.

The Koran Interpreted. Translated by A. J. Arberry. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1955. Vol. I, pp. 350. Vol. II, pp. 367. 45s.

Some two years ago Professor Arberry published translations of extracts from the Koran which have been revised for this version of the whole book, and the favourable opinion expressed about the selections applies to much of this work. Details may be criticized; to mention some. An Arabic verb means "to think someone or something a liar or untrue"; it becomes "to cry lies to"; I doubt if that is English though "some they cry 'Lies' to and some they slay" makes sense. "Wide schism" and "far error" both turn the same adjective; the idea is that the longer a man pursues a path which branches off from the straight road, the further he removes himself from the truth. I do not believe that that idea can be expressed in one word or in anything but a paraphrase. "Marry" occurs twice in one sentence but in one case it means to take a wife and in the other to give a wife to a third party; this is not made clear. The interpretation is founded on Muslim commentators and there are no surprises. Therefore it is wrong to use Shechina. The word was borrowed into Arabic and assimilated to a standard form but it is not known what Muhammad meant by it. Exegetes offered a choice of meanings: that which gives rest and content; the Law; a figure of emerald or some other precious stone with the head and tail of a cat and two wings; images of the prophets from Adam to Muhammad.

The practice of printing the text in short lines suits rhetorical passages but not pedestrian prose. Long, straggling sentences are cut up into three-inch lengths regardless of syntax and sense; to take an example at random:

God pardon thee! Why gavest thou them leave, till it
was clear to thee which of them spoke the truth, and
thou knewest the liars?

Those who believe in God and the Last Day
ask not leave of thee, that they may struggle
with their possessions and their selves; and God
knows the godfearing.

Sir John Squire comes to the rescue: "It is extraordinary what a lot you can do with a platitude when you dress it up in Blank Prose."

Surely the explanation of some of the strange syntax is that passages were patched up after the first composition. Professor Arberry lays emphasis on the rhythm and

cadence of the book and grows lyrical about its beauty as he heard it recited at night, but one suspects that parts of the book were not chosen for these religious exercises. If the recitation was loud enough to be heard in an adjoining house, it may be taken for granted that it was intoned and not read, so the rhythm was not due to the text. One is reminded of the Italian with no English who declared "This is true poetry" as he listened to the declamation of Dr. Edith Sitwell's verse. Speaking for myself, I have not been struck by the rhythmic cadences, and Abu l-'Ala is reported to have said that his verse would be as beautiful as the Koran when it had been polished by the tongues of men for 300 years. Presumably we all know poems which we love for the sound though we recognize that the sense is not all that it might be; the Professor's argument almost leads to the view that the sense does not matter so long as the sound is pleasing.

Each volume has a preface. The first gives a review of the English translations of the Koran with the story of the birth of Jesus as a sample, ending with his own version. Something of the wisdom of the serpent is displayed here, as this is one of the more intelligible passages; for one thing is certain: that Muhammad—like George Washington, though in a different sense—could not tell a story. There are no helps to aid the layman to understand what he reads; he is told there are notes in other editions. A reader who pays 45s. for a translation has a right to be annoyed when he is told to buy a second version to understand his purchase. The Professor pities those who, in their preoccupation with details, cannot see the Koran as a whole. One can only reply: "Is the Koran a whole?" Some Muslims reject a part of it; others assert that something has been cut out; and the traditional arrangement of it is purely mechanical. It is amorphous, not an artistic unity.

A. S. T.

Two Nations and Kashmir. By Lord Birdwood. Hale. 1956. Pp. 237. Maps, illustrations, index. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 21s.

No other could probably approach this thorny problem with quite such appropriate background. Only son of India's well-beloved "Birdie," 26 years in the Indian cavalry, with unusual contacts in Indian civil life, and, since retirement, world-wide travel, including Red Cross activities and a lecture tour in America. In India every door is open, and his own studied, unofficial impartiality gives him a status at least comparable with Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Graham. It may be that his detached judgment may yet play a part in stilling the slumbering volcano.

It is a tangled story of vacillations and indecisions. So often the right decision at the right moment could have produced a workable result. Instead, what was for many months a *casus belli* is still a dangerous international sore.

In some ways the author's 83 pages on the subject in *A Continent Decides* (1953) was easier to follow than this fuller documentation of 1956. Certain headlights stand out. In 1947 (p. 42) Lord Mountbatten, on behalf of the Government of India, informed the Maharajah that accession to Pakistan would not be regarded as an unfriendly act, but deprecated attempts at complete independence. This record rules out suggestions that Nehru's claims on Kashmir were definitely premeditated. Thereafter events took charge. The Tribal Invasion called for action by regular troops to prevent massacre and chaos, and India, at Hari Singh's request, staged a very able airlift. Logically this called for supporting statesmanship and funds. A standing army of occupation and adequate administration to deal with a vacuum. Had the Ruler been a Moslem and acceded to Pakistan, the story would have been different. In the event it is possible that Nehru, with the background of a Kashmiri Brahmin and India behind him, may well have smiled as he saw the peach ripening above his hand. A Kashmir Assembly (p. 186) constituted an effective secular local Government, obviously too valuable to replace at this stage. Theoretically, no doubt, this could equally function under Pakistan, but could the smaller State provide the troops and organization necessary to ensure success for building up a State of 82,000 sq. miles and four million very diverse inhabitants? Continuity is also a factor.

Lord Birdwood ventures a tentative solution (p. 198). A conference of 30 members, covering all relevant shades of interest, to examine the best type of local government for a federal Kashmir, and then perhaps for such government to arrange

a plebiscite. Such a solution may or may not prove more workable than its predecessors.

The author describes his work as more a diary (p. 201) than a history, because the last word has not yet been said. Albeit this conscientious and efficient summary of all the factors up to 1956 must prove a very necessary document for historians of the future. No doubt several problems seem at the moment insoluble. At first sight Pakistan's claims appear unanswerable. Can a State in the Western circle allow a neutral India access to a doubtful Afghanistan and behind it? Should a majority of Moslems in the Jhelum Valley be added to the Moslem minority under Indian rule? An appendix (p. 224) shows that the Jhelum and Chenab irrigation waters are not really a problem. There remains the "Face and Prestige" question. No Government of either State could hope to survive an adverse decision. Both might prefer war, which might lead anywhere.

The Indian Prime Minister's view is that he is there. *J'y suis, J'y reste*. It may well be that time and the present administration can eventually build itself up into some workable answer which might satisfy all concerned.

Lord Birdwood has at least done his bit and provided a readable summary of the facts needed to guide those concerned.

G. M. ROUTH.

A Handbook to India, Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon. 17th Edition. Edited by Sir A. C. Lothian, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. John Murray. 1955. Pp. cii + 625. 5" x 7½".

The 15th Edition was reviewed on p. 325 of the *Journal* for April, 1938.

The 16th, also edited by Colonel Sir Gordon Hearn, issued in 1949, was an interim publication. The present issue has been completely recast to cover post-war changes and to satisfy the demands of a far larger travelling public who require such guides more than in the days when resident soldiers and civilians predominated.

It is a model of what such a guide should be, and can be relied on by all travellers whether for business or pleasure. No doubt some of these will do their bit, by relevant contributions, to keep details up to date, and also describe other itineraries, especially in South India, worth a visit by those who would be interested in ancient cultures.

Maps are generously provided, including many town plans and their historical details. It might help serious travellers to know where they can obtain copies of the various excellent series of Survey of India Ordnance maps on 1", 2", 4" and other scales, of the areas they intend to visit. Travel agents cannot always supply such information.

The pre-war English Bradshaw used to mark the page of the relevant Table against each rail connection. It would be a real help to readers if the figures of the railway routes (p. xcvi) were so marked in the general sketch-map of the area in the flap. This would be a cheap and useful measure. The scale (in miles per inch) and the "R. F." should appear on this map, for purposes of comparison.

Regarding literature, p. xxii refers to "a list of books by the National Book Council," which is a bit vague when preparing for a sudden journey. It would help to quote a few selected volumes which might be read on the voyage. In the case of Burma, Ceylon, and Kashmir, this has been done.

Nepal is now coming into the news. It might be worth a few sentences *re* approaches, Gurkhas, and present position, more or less on the lines of Afghanistan on p. 512.

Chandigarh (p. 254) calls for early attention, which it will no doubt soon achieve in its own right.

On academic subjects, three points suggest themselves.

Many travellers are interested in studying history through the old cemeteries. One such is referred to near Ludhiana on the Grand Trunk Road. There are others. Most of the great administrators left their bones on the job. They will not now continue to be preserved with the same care.

The tea position in India and Ceylon has assumed recently a new importance, both to the Indian budget and our own dollar balance. It is fair to say that the British

tea-planter is irreplaceable. A few words here might have a real Commonwealth value, not in any way propaganda, but a statement of the facts.

It is well understood that these Handbooks are non-political, yet a very short statement, even a hundred words, by a real authority on the place of these states in the British Commonwealth, might remind travellers what sort of countries they are visiting. Somewhere perhaps on p. lxxvii.

Any traveller who visits these regions without this indispensable guide has only himself to blame.

G. M. ROUTH.

The Arabic Manuscripts of Mount Sinai. By Aziz Suryal Atiya. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. Pp. 97, 16 plates. 11¼". U.S. \$7.50.

The fame of the Monastery of St. Catherine on Mount Sinai first burst upon the world with the discovery of the *Codex Sinaiticus*, which the Soviet Government sold to the British Museum in 1933 for £100,000. During the past century a number of expeditions have been made to the somewhat inaccessible site; perhaps the best-known was that made by Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Gibson, which brought to light the *Codex Syriacus* and revealed the presence in the Monastery of valuable Arabic manuscripts. Finally in 1948 the University of California African Expedition, at the instance of Dr. Henry Field and Professor W. F. Albright, set forth from its field headquarters in the Egyptian Faiyum "to investigate the possibility of microfilming the priceless library." The volume under review is the first-fruits of that initiative; it is the first volume of the Publications of the American Foundation for the Study of Man. Its standard of production is not unworthy of so impressive a title.

The sub-title more closely defines the scope of the book as "A hand-list of the Arabic manuscripts and scrolls microfilmed at the library of the Monastery of St. Catherine, Mount Sinai." The author of the hand-list is the eminent Egyptian historian Aziz Suryal Atiya. A foreword has been contributed by Dr. Wendell Phillips, President of the American Foundation for the Study of Man. The total number of documents listed is as follows: 696 codices; 1,067 scrolls. With very few exceptions the codices are of Christian books, not a few of a great antiquity—for example, four books of the Old Testament (in Arabic) from the 9th century, three Pentateuchs of the 10th century, a copy of the Gospels dated 897 A.D., three other copies of the Gospels equally ancient, a copy of Epistles and Acts dated 867 A.D., and a remarkable quintuple palimpsest (Syriac, Greek and Arabic) of which the bottom layer, the Syriac, is "certainly not later than the 5th century." Almost all the codices are as old or older than the 13th century, and the collection thus clearly constitutes a most valuable source for the study of Christian Arabic literature. Scarcely less important, at all events to the historian, is the immense range of scrolls—decrees, firmans, treaties, deeds, and other legal documents and miscellanea. The hand-list is enriched with plates of the highest quality illustrating some of the most interesting items.

To organize, carry through and print the results of this expedition must have been extremely expensive, and it is a cheerful commentary on the possibilities still existing in this materialistic age that American funds were made available for the execution of this strictly scholarly project. All concerned are to be heartily congratulated on what they have achieved. If the hand-list is not perfect—why no references to Graf, for instance?—it is for all that a fine piece of work. The book itself is a splendid addition to any library.

A. J. ARBERRY.

The Art and Architecture of Japan. By Robert Treat Paine and Alexander Soper. Penguin Books. 1955. Pp. 294; Plates, 173 pp. 45s.

In this extremely able and admirably produced addition to the Pelican History of Art Series, the authors are to be commended on a very attractive and positive study of Japanese art and architecture.

They treat the subject from the sociological and historical as well as the æsthetic

aspect, and bring out, with an emphasis which is often lacking in studies of the subject, the essential flavour of originality which characterizes Japanese art forms. This feature is often missed, or tends somehow to be overlaid, by the myth of Japanese imitativeness which often classes them as receivers and adapters of culture. The truth is, of course, that while the Japanese taste is an educated one which is extremely aware of merit in the artistic conceptions of other countries and tending to be influenced by them, they have also a supreme mastery of their own.

Indeed, there has always been an inexhaustible well of original and creative design channelled by canons of great sensibility from which springs some of the highest forms of Asiatic genius.

It is the task of Messrs. Paine and Soper—and one which they have obviously discharged with much pleasure as well as erudite appreciation—to describe the products of this genius through the ages. They have, as the title suggests, divided the book into two parts, the first concerning itself with painting and sculpture which has been written by Paine, and the second with architecture which has been the work of Soper.

The first author, after a discussion of primitive Japan, its mythology and Shinto beliefs, as is inevitable, plunges into an account of Buddhism and its deep and pervasive influence on Japanese life and art. In three chapters starting with an account of the Asuka period (552-710), then the Nara period (710-784), and of the Shingon and Tendai sects of the early Heian period, he gives an extremely readable account of this difficult subject which could hardly be bettered as an introduction. There is also further development of the subject in a later chapter about the great Kamakura period, when Buddhism emerged from its isolation and became a more public form of worship. He has also much to say on the Renaissance of Chinese tradition in the Muromachi period (1392-1568), and, after surveying the decoration of castles in the Momoyama period (1568-1615) and various schools of painting, ends with a discussion of the work of the print designers of the Ukiyo-E school in the Edo period (1615-1867). An excellent feature of the authors' treatment is a wealth of quite detailed information, not easily obtainable elsewhere in such a compact form, about the interesting personalities who created all this loveliness—the artists and craftsmen of Dai Nippon.

The series of plates relating to this section of the book has been chosen with great circumspection and is well reproduced, although it is greatly to be regretted that they are not in colour. Just tribute is paid to bronze, wood, and lacquer as media for religious imagery, and to painting from many different schools. It is a pity that more could not have been said about theatre masks, which might well have been included as sculpture. Throughout the reader is made aware of the splendidly trenchant quality of imagery, conception and design which is one of the most characteristic features of the art of Japan.

The second author has produced an authoritative and well-illustrated account of the main features of Japanese architecture, both sacred and secular. He has, more than his collaborator, an interestingly archæological and anthropological approach to the whole question, and makes many extremely pertinent observations about the origins of the Japanese race, the interplay between the Ainu, the Yamato and the Yayoi races in the dawn of history, and studies the primitive life of the country alternating between "pits" in the winter and "nests" in the summer. There is a quite detailed analysis and some descriptive matter connected with Shinto observance.

Particularly important chapters are those dealing with architecture of the Asuka, Nara and Heian periods, tracing the origins of the interesting blend of cultural influences, including the Tartar state of Wei, its Chinese rival Liang, and even Afghanistan which last provided designs for Stupas.

We are also provided with much descriptive matter, both textual and in the form of clear architects' sketches and diagrams of most of the types of buildings, both religious and secular, of all periods. There is particular emphasis on the Heian period and also the Kamakura period after the fierce wars of the twelfth century.

The accompanying plates at the end of the book are of great charm and include pictures of pagodas, palaces and shrines, together with paintings of interiors and

landscaped drawings of these beautiful expanses of buildings, in which may be seen their picturesque inhabitants about their occasions.

It is to be hoped that the effort made by these authors may be rewarded by much interest in this account of the splendour achieved by Japan through the ages, enriching the Asiatic heritage.

A. H. S. C.

Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia: with a translation from the Mongol of Sh. Nachukdorji's *Life of Sukebatur*. By Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon. Issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1955. Pp. x+186.

Mr. Lattimore's new book falls into two nearly equal parts. In the first half the author discusses, under the title "Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia," the process of growth of the "satellite relationship" as exemplified in Outer Mongolia, the first and model Soviet satellite. The second half consists of a translation of the official life of Sukebatur, the founder of the Mongol revolution, written by Sh. Nachukdorji, and first published in Mongol in 1951.

This translation is not, as Mr. Lattimore suggests, the only one to be made of a contemporary Mongol book into a Western language. There are, for instance, official Czech and German versions of Choibalsang's *Concise History of the Mongol Revolution*, as well as a German translation of Tsendenbal's *Life of Choibalsang*. The book's unique value lies in the fact that it is prefaced by Mr. Lattimore's expert consideration of the factors underlying the development of the Mongol revolution, enabling the reader to evaluate more reasonably the officially-inspired panegyric which follows. Mr. Lattimore speaks of the relatively slow process of Sovietization of Outer Mongolia, and in this respect his exposition of what he terms the "doctrine of the irreversible minimum" in Soviet policy may prove an important formulation. He suggests that when, in the early twenties, Outer Mongolia had been cleared of anti-revolutionary elements, the main immediate object of Soviet policy had been achieved, namely the security of Siberia in this area. That this explains the fact that Mongolia has not been annexed to the Soviet Union appears plausible, for in all practical matters Mongolia follows the Russian lead, and formal annexation could do no more.

Both nationalism and revolution have run different courses in Outer and Inner Mongolia respectively. Outer Mongolia was always less under the direct authority of the Manchu authorities, and, which is more important, the penetration of Outer Mongolia by Chinese immigration and economic exploitation, though serious, never had such a disastrous effect as in those Mongol territories nearer China. It may be as Mr. Lattimore states, that the reason why there was never any positive desire among Outer Mongolian leaders to annex Inner Mongolia (except on the part of the Jebtsundamba Qutugtu at one time), was a disinclination to involve themselves with a territory so subject to Chinese influence. But there is in addition official disapproval of pan-Mongol nationalism as distinct from mere national feelings. In the *Concise History of the Mongol Revolution* it is the anti-revolutionaries—first the Jebtsundamba Qutugtu of Urga in his capacity as Emperor of the new Mongol state established in 1911, and later the Japanese as the sinister employers of Semenov and his White Russian Government—who are criticized for their pan-Mongol policies. Indeed, the slogan of a Greater Mongolia was on Japanese lips right up to the last war, though evidently a deceptive slogan to cover up for imperialist expansion. A well-informed observer, W. Heissig, describes how at the time of the invasion of Inner Mongolia by Outer Mongolian and Soviet troops in 1945, the Japanese-organized Inner Mongolian soldiers not only made little or no resistance to their Communist brothers, but arrested Japanese officers and welcomed the liberators, while the population liquidated landlords and high lamas. It was at that time, if ever, that a unified Mongolia could have been formed, but the Outer Mongolian troops were almost immediately withdrawn to be replaced by Chinese Communist units. Heissig interprets these transactions rightly, in my opinion, as showing an unwillingness on the part of the Russian leaders and the Chinese Communists to complicate their relationship by a thorough revision of the question of Mongol unity. Mr. Lattimore's

theory of the irreversible minimum might be adduced here, especially as we know that the Communization of Inner Mongolia, under the leadership of elements trained in Outer Mongolia, then proceeded apace, and resulted in the establishment in 1947 of the Mongol Autonomous Region within the Chinese People's Republic. It is undeniable that the Japanese pursued a pan-Mongol policy for their own ends, though certain material advantages did accrue to the Mongols by the way, and equally Soviet disapproval of a united Mongolia, reflected in the disregard in which the traditional Mongol heroes Genghis Khan and Choktu Taiji are held, shows where Soviet interests lie.

Mr. Lattimore notes (p. 89) the changes brought about by the victory of the Communists in China. "Instead of holding an important flank position, the Mongols are now situated in a geographical zone through which it is of very great importance for the Russians and the Chinese to develop their strategic and economic communications with each other." This new situation was recognized by the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship between China and Mongolia in 1952, and recently more tangible evidence of the new situation is to be seen in the completion of a new section of railway between Ulan Batur and Chamu Ut and the opening at the beginning of this year of a new and shorter through traffic line between Moscow and Peking via Ulan Batur, Chamu Ut, Erh Lien and Tsining.

The personal name of Tsedenbal (see p. 62, note 1) is given by an official Chinese source as Umjagin.

C. R. BAWDEN.

Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. I (1955), Parts 1 and 2. Joint publication of Mouton and Co., 'S-Gravenhage, and Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. Annual subscription D.Gld. 32 per annum, four issues.

The first two issues of this new quarterly have recently appeared. It is the product of the initiative of a number of leading scholars in several parts of the world, including the United States, Germany, Turkey and Japan. The editor-in-chief is Dr. Jahn, of the University of Leiden, and the editorial board includes such noteworthy names as Professors Eberhard and Maenchen-Helfen, of the University of California; Dr. Poppe, the eminent Russian Mongolist, who is now at the University of Washington in Seattle; Professor Menges, the Columbia University Turkologist; and Dr. Zeki Velidi Togan, Turkestani authority at the University of Istanbul. The *Journal* is published jointly by Mouton and Co., The Hague, and Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.

The aim of the *Central Asiatic Journal*, as Dr. Jahn succinctly states in a foreword to Part 1, is to fill "the urgent need for an organ to serve as a forum for all those concerned with research on Central Asia." Particular attention is to be paid to research in the Turkic and Mongolian fields, though Iranian and Tibetan subjects are also to be included. The editors of the *Journal* hope to keep it sufficiently broad in scope to cover not only linguistic and historical research, but the archæological, ethnological and sociological aspects of Central Asian studies as well. Each issue is to consist of approximately 80 pages and there are to be four issues each year.

Volume I is dedicated to the distinguished Belgian missionary and Mongolian scholar, the Reverend Antoine Mostaert. The initial article in the *Journal* is devoted to an evaluation of Father Mostaert's recent researches in the field of Mongolian folklore and epic poetry, and a bibliography of works by other Mongolists on related topics.

Of the remaining ten articles which these first two issues contain, five deal with linguistic topics and five with historical and literary subjects. All but three are devoted to the Mongolian and Turkic fields. Outstanding among the linguistic contributions is a long article by Prof. Menges, "The South Siberian Turkic Languages, I" (Part 2, pp 107-136), which is apparently only the first of a series of three or four which will appear in subsequent issues of the *Journal*, since it deals only with the geographical distribution, history and phonology of these languages. The article is marred by the use of a rather awkward transcription system for Turkic and Mongolian words. Tuva is also not a federal soviet republic (SSR), as Prof. Menges states on p. 109. But these are small shortcomings indeed in a highly original article on a little-explored subject.

From a historical point of view, one of the most interesting contributions is a study of the origins of the Huns by the Japanese scholar, Dr. K. Enoki, "Sogdiana and the Hsiung-nu" (Part I, pp. 43-62). A second part of this study is to follow in a later issue.

Most of the articles in the first two issues of the *Central Asiatic Journal* are in English, though three are presented in German. The *Journal* is handsomely printed; the Arabic alphabet is used for citations in Arabic and Persian, and the Cyrillic alphabet is occasionally used for Russian and modern Soviet languages. For the most part, however, Asiatic languages as well as Russian are cited in Latin transcription. There are, unfortunately, a few typographical errors (e.g., "peninsular" for "peninsula" in II, 19-20, p. 56; "my" for "me," I, 7, p. 62) but these are not serious. One can hope that the amount of space devoted to book reviews can eventually be expanded; the first two issues have only ten pages of reviews *in toto*.

With more and more attention being given to Central Asiatic historical and linguistic research in many parts of the world, the *Central Asiatic Journal* is bound to fill a sorely felt need. The *Central Asian Review*, which was started at Oxford in 1953 (see J.R.C.A.S., April, 1954, p. 175), is just completing its third successful year. It concentrates almost exclusively upon Russian materials relating to the contemporary scene in Soviet Central Asia. The *Royal Central Asian Journal*, senior publication of the Central Asian field by several decades, includes within its purview a much broader Asian area—Turkey, the Arab countries, India and South-east Asia—as well as the Central Asian heartland. It concentrates on interpretation of current political and economic developments within the region. All three of these Central Asian journals, therefore, complement each other in admirable fashion. There is remarkably little overlapping. All three are in one way or another indispensable for the serious student of Central Asia.

PAUL B. HENZE.

Syria. By Robin Fedden. London: Robert Hale. 1955 (Revised Edition). Pp. 235. Cover maps, index. 21s.

This book was first published in 1946 and reviewed in this *Journal* of January, 1947. There is little in the revision of the book that requires a revision of the review. Mr. Fedden has written a description of the buildings and the history of the past that is interesting and enjoyable. He speaks of the countryside with a loving knowledge that will lead others to it, and their visit will be the fuller for his insight. The author states that he does not set out to cover the contemporary economic, social, and political conditions: the jacket, however, claims this book as a comprehensive survey. It is comprehensive of the physical aspect and the sights of interest but it cannot, in one volume, encompass the economic and political growth of Syria since the Second War. Nor does Mr. Fedden in this book go so far in making one acquainted with the personalities of Syrians. He is more fully absorbed in describing what there is to be seen, and brings the river and the temples, the mountains and the towns vividly to the eye of the reader. The photographs are excellent and the text goes behind to show the past of what the camera sees.

J. M. C.

Syrian Harvest. By Edwyn Hole. Robert Hale. 1956. Pp. 218. Glossary and index. Ill. 18s.

This book is largely what the reviewer had himself hoped to write, and so there arise cross-currents: disappointment at being forestalled and enjoyment of a very good book.

Mr. Hole writes of a Greater Syria, covering in parts Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, but his main focus is Damascus. It is the visitors to Syria rather than the Syrians themselves that mostly fill this book and, although there are many glimpses of Arab life such as a description of the coffee ritual, there is no attempt to cover in full the customs and habits of the country. St. Willibald and William Lithgow are among the travellers who feature, and Mr. Hole gives a good picture of a pilgrim's difficulties.

Without being a history, this book gives a clear account of the many overlords of Syria. Perhaps it is his admiration of the great Abd el Qader that leads the author to remember the French bombardments of Damascus rather than any good they did there. The foundations of modern Syria are more fully covered than the present edifice except that the fine photographs and descriptions of places to see are well worth the attention of a visitor.

Besides all this, there are some charming Arab "Just So Stories" and a useful chapter on Arabic music. Containing so many facets, there is no great coherence of subject matter in *Syrian Harvest*, which is an entertainment rather than a text book. The author shows his scholarship in exhuming interesting matter from recondite sources, and the few minor inaccuracies of present-day fact are quite unimportant.

Mr. Hole rightly shows how far in advance of the West were once the Syrian men of learning; unlike some writers, he is not blinded by the charms of the country and of the people into ignoring their human faults. This is by no means a full picture of Syria, but it is enlightening; the style makes the text readable and the personal feelings of the author jut through in a way that keeps the book fully alive.

J. M. COOK.

The Life of Muhammad. A translation of Ishāq's *Sirat Rasūl Allāh*. With introduction and notes by A. Guillaume. Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xlvii + 813. 63s.

This is, somewhat surprisingly, the first English translation of the earliest extant life of Muhammad. The Arabic text was edited by Wellhausen nearly a hundred years ago, and has since been printed in Egypt. A German translation by Weil was published in 1864, but it is difficult to procure now and scholars have long known that it required revision. Professor Guillaume's complete and authoritative version is one of the most important works of Arabic scholarship to appear in recent years. Research in several branches of Islamic studies will benefit from the mass of material that his patience and learning have made readily accessible.

The biography is often quoted as the work of Abdul Malik ibn Hisham, who died about 830 A.D., that is, some two centuries after Muhammad himself. It is really a recension by Ibn Hisham of a work by Muhammad ibn Ishaq, who died in 768 A.D. It is one of this book's many merits that the translator has removed Ibn Hisham's interpolations from the text and has collected them at the end as notes; Weil and the editors of the Arabic text followed the MSS. in including them in the narrative. We can now see at a glance that Ibn Hisham's additions amount to only about an eighth of the whole. Usually we cannot tell how much he may have omitted, but sometimes other writers quoted or can be assumed to have used the earlier text of Ibn Ishaq. Professor Guillaume has translated and included extracts from such writers whenever their statements supplement or modify what we read in Ibn Hisham's edition. This is not the place nor is there room here to refer to all the problems of scholarship which can profitably be reconsidered in the light of this translation. Time and again in reading it one is reminded of the scanty use that has been made of Ibn Ishaq's work. One example must suffice. The history of Abyssinia in the seventh century is obscure. There are no Ethiopic sources except confused and dubious lists of kings. Ibn Ishaq recounts how, as is well known, certain Muslims fled to Abyssinia to escape from persecution and were protected by the King. He also says that this King's father had been murdered by the nobility and replaced by his brother, that after the brother's death none of his sons had been found fit to rule, that his nephew had then been enthroned, that during the time that the Muslims were in the country there was a rebellion which was crushed in a battle by the Nile, and that the celebrated Zubair swam the river on an inflated skin to obtain news for his fellow refugees. There is reason to be suspicious about some, but not all, of these details, but they are not so much as mentioned by Budge, or Coulbeaux or even Conti Rossini, all of whom wrote long histories of Abyssinia.

It would be a pity if this book were read only by scholars. It contains much that will fascinate any one with an interest in Arabia or in Islam. The general reader may find the genealogies and the long passages of poetry tedious. He may regret

that Professor Guillaume has not explained the Arabic words, such as *isnād* and *riwāya*, which he uses freely, and will certainly be puzzled by the abbreviations, which are nowhere expanded. He will, however, be rewarded by many passages which bring to life the background and atmosphere and the personalities of early Islam. There is space to quote one example only. The speaker is Umar, the future Caliph. "When I became a Muslim that night I thought of the man who was the most violent in enmity against the apostle so that I might come and tell him that I had become a Muslim, and Abū Jahl came to my mind. . . . So in the morning I knocked on his door, and he came out and said, 'The best of welcomes, nephew, what has brought you?' I answered that I had come to tell him that I believed in God and His Apostle Muhammad and regarded as true what he had brought. He slammed the door in my face and said, 'God damn you, and damn what you have brought'."

Apart from an unfortunate omission on the title-page, whereby the work is ascribed to Ishaq, the author's father, the standards of production and proof-reading are high.

C. F. BECKINGHAM.

Jews and Arabs. Their Contacts through the Ages. By S. D. Goitein. New York: Schocken. 1955. Pp. xiii + 257. Index. 8½" × 5½". \$4.00.

The author of this book on "the social and cultural contacts between the Jews and Arabs" throughout history is a professor at the School of Oriental Studies of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. His qualifications to write this book are, in his own words, as follows: "I had worked in this field for almost thirty years: first, in connection with large-scale researches into Muslim religious literature and historiography; secondly, during my study of Oriental Jewish communities, in particular the Yemenites, the most genuine Jews living among the most genuine Arabs; finally, during my work on the *Geneza* medieval documents written in Hebrew characters but mostly in the Arabic language."

The range of the book is clearly very wide. It covers the common origins of the Arabs and Jews and points out that, despite almost identical backgrounds, the fortunes of the two peoples in history followed different courses; it traces the relations of the Arabs and Jews and their mutual influences throughout the ages; finally it touches very briefly upon their contemporary revival and the clash of their national interests in Palestine, and hints at the prospects of their future relations.

To write a book on such a subject requires a great deal of erudition, and this Dr. Goitein has in abundance. But it also requires, among other rare qualities, independence. It is possible to write a parallel book on "Arabs and Jews" and arrive at results that the change of emphasis in the changed title implies. The salient facts are already well known, but the author's selection and interpretation of a great many of them is new. As a point of view, this book is invaluable; as an independent treatise on the relations between the Arabs and Jews throughout history, it should be read with great caution. A selective method of treatment of the facts; a subtle way of stressing certain aspects and neglecting others; and a passion for substituting new and questionable terms for well-known and familiar ones—are some of the impediments to a full appreciation of a timely book on a difficult subject.

The author questions the familiar use of the word "Islamic" in connection with that "great medieval civilization of the Middle East" as misleading (p. 210). Presumably he would still more vehemently question the word "Arab" or "Arab-Muslim" in the same context. If these familiar terms, approved by generations of Orientalists, are not to be used, what else does the author suggest? "The medieval civilization of the Middle East" is so colourless that it must be rejected by all serious students of Islam and Arab history.

Again, the first five lines of the first chapter of this book contain the statement that the state of Israel is surrounded by "states whose official language is Arabic." What is the purpose of the insertion of the word "official" here? Do the people of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon speak or write languages different from that used in the offices and business of their governments?

The use of the word "nation" and its connotation in the modern sense, with which the author seems to be over-fascinated, is misleading when speaking of the eruption of the Arabs into the Fertile Crescent after Islam (p. 213). Similarly the word "Israel" is used indiscriminately throughout the book, so much so that its historical sense is mixed up with its present national sense, confusing it even with the usual terms "Jews" or "Israelites."

Professor Goitein is rightly described by his publisher as "one of the most distinguished living Arabists." Therefore one would expect more care in avoiding mistakes in translating simple Arabic words. Thus, for example, *Tammuz* is July, not June (p. 179); *dhura* is maize, not wheat (p. 191). Incidentally the correct Arabic for sweet is *hulu*, not *helu* (p. 35), the lands of Islam are known in the Arabic sources as *dar*, not *mamlaka* (p. 111), and the present prime minister of Egypt is Colonel, not General, Nasser (p. 13).

Leaving details and regarding the book as a whole, perhaps its most significant portions—unfortunately the shortest and the most equivocal—are to be found in the introductory sections (pp. ix-xiii, 3-18) and the concluding pages, particularly 213-34. These touch upon the present attitude of the Arabs to the State of Israel. The author says that the political element has been excluded from the book. But how can it be, when the whole problem of Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine was created, nourished to maturity and is now being perpetuated, largely by political forces? Actually, however, one is under the impression that the main inspiration of the book is political. This impression is strengthened by the political judgments summarily pronounced by the author in the opening and concluding sections of the book.

It is a pity that he does not say much about the Arab minority in Israel. Their existence is no more than an "interesting phenomenon" (p. 9). But from what he writes immediately afterwards it is clear that the Arabs in Israel are intended for national and cultural assimilation. This subject is obviously of such importance that it deserves more than a passing mention by an author or a reviewer.

Any difficulty that the reader, like the reviewer, may find in disentangling the facts and arguments from a confabulatory narrative overcharged with numerous neologisms and suggestive parentheses will be amply rewarded. This is a highly provocative book which should be read by Arabs, Jews and all those interested in their past and present.

A. L. TIBAWI.

An Introduction to Modern Arabic. By R. Bayly Windler and Farahat J. Ziadeh. Princeton University Duplicating Bureau. 1955. Pp. x+331. Index.

The names of the authors appear on the title page in the form of the letter X, crossing each other, in order, as it is stated in the Introduction, to "symbolize the complete collaboration between them in preparing the book." The names are given above in alphabetical order.

This book is a beginner's manual in modern Arabic journalese, designed with a minimum of grammar and a controlled vocabulary of just over one thousand words. It is neatly and clearly arranged and typed, except for some pages in the final sections where signs of haste are apparent. For example an Arabic glossary is not typed like the other texts but written in a hand which is likely to puzzle the beginner.

On the whole the contents of the book are adequate for their purpose and nothing of importance is omitted. It is, however, optimistic to assume that a foreign student can teach himself Arabic through this book alone; the teacher will still be indispensable. Perhaps more examples and texts for translation, and less grammatical terms, would have been more helpful for a general grasp of the structure of the Arabic language at this stage. Although the authors are deliberately concentrating "on the style employed in newspapers," most of the texts used seem to be composed, or drastically adapted, by the authors. Texts taken from the Arabic Press with little editing, as on page 110, should serve the purpose better, especially as one of the aims of the authors is to increase the student's knowledge of the Middle East.

Chapter VII (pp. 28-37) on "the Arabic language in general" could be omitted altogether, or at least placed later in the book. The authors themselves say that they do not expect it to be understood by the student immediately; they recommend it as a guide reference for the student as he advances in learning the material of the book.

There are a few instances of pedantic adhesion to grammar, such as "Azzaman" or "Azzam" (p. 73) contrary to current practice. Sometimes illogical usage is sanctioned, such as the word "ahdath" on its own, instead of "ahdath min . . ." or the plain "haditha" (p. 91). A number of questionable terms are accepted, such as "bait" for "usrah" (p. 104). Examples of unpolished sentences or weak sentence-construction are quite numerous. Those on pages 130-131 are typical. It is true that the authors' aim is "pedagogic rather than literary," but surely simple, correct and orthodox Arabic is what the beginner needs and what the teacher should impart.

A. L. TIBAWI.

Village Life in Modern Thailand. By John de Young. Institute of E. Asiatic Studies, Berkeley. University of California Press. 1955. Pp. 221. Bibliography and Index.

This book, a product of the Institute of East Asiatic Studies, University of California, sets out to give a picture of how a Thai peasant and his family live and work, to show how the life of the peasant has changed in the last half-century, and to point out some of the possibilities for his immediate future. It deals largely with the Northern part of Siam, in particular the rice plain round Bangkok. The book is descriptive, not statistical, based on three years' study on the spot.

Such a study is opportune; things are changing rapidly in S.-E. Asia. Change is the theme of the book. As a small example, one of the excellent photos illustrates the new Western style of hair-do now being adopted by the village girls. Changes in land tenure, travel, religious and social habits, public health and education are some of the subjects dealt with.

The book should be welcome to the student of the wider field of South-East Asia. Thailand is the one country in the area that has not had a period of "Colonialism." It is interesting to see if and how developments there differ from other parts. Take, for example, the village system, the smallest unit. The set-up of the administration in Siam a century ago was not very different from that of Burma. An absolute king, a series of officials below him; at the foot the village headman, who was not an official, chosen, perhaps informally, by the villagers. The choice was recognized by the King and his officials who, in dealing with the village day-to-day affairs, acted with and through the headman. This worked; the villager was not then much interested in matters outside his neighbourhood.

The coming of new ideas inevitably affected the villager; he began to take an interest in larger affairs. In Burma this interest was met finally by parliaments, members of Council, votes, etc., and now by Independence and a Republic. The status of the headman altered and declined.

In Thailand the headman still retains his position in the village. For the many and increasing affairs which affect a wider area he is still kept in the picture by an extension of the system. Six or eight neighbouring villages are grouped in a "Tambon" (translated as Commune); one of the headmen, styled the "Kannan," is the head of the "Tambon"; dealings with the Government are largely through the Kannan. The group of headmen meet often to deal with matters of common interest; they have a large voice in the selection of the local representative on the central Assembly. A similar system was tried out in Burma two generations ago; it did not flourish. It seems to be working in Thailand, which appears to have squared the circle.

Another interesting innovation is the village "Doctor." Modern health measures are on the way, thus a tremendous onslaught has been made on malaria; on this the account is most interesting. But modern medicine is expensive and the villagers are conservative. Each village has a "Doctor" who acts under the District Health Officer and receives a small stipend. The standard at present is low, but there is

the embryo of a health system, and when it comes it will not be centralized and imposed.

These are brief examples of matters interesting to students of S.-E. Asia and others. The book would be improved by a better map and a glossary of Siamese terms.

B. W.-P.

Law in Communist China. By Father André Bonnichon, formerly Dean of the Faculty of Law, University Aurore, Shanghai, China. Published by International Commission of Jurists, The Hague, Netherlands.

This pamphlet—it is no more—should be read by everyone who has any doubts about the “Law” as administered in China today. One frequently hears the mistaken remark that Communism in China is not the Russian variety, but a watered-down kind, to suit the Chinese people.

In the days when extra-territorial rights were so much condemned it was argued that foreigners would get a square deal in Chinese Courts. How utterly wrong is that theory is illustrated by the sentence: “Defence amounts to revolt.” If an accusation is made, any attempt to deny it is anti-government agitation. Confession of deeds not committed may save the life of the accused, but any defence is practically asking for a death sentence.

Apart from the complete absence of justice—in our acceptance of the term—in the Courts, there were the great popular judgments in Shanghai in 1951, when thousands of people gathered in the stands of a sports arena condemned to death hundreds of so-called reactionaries (Chinese) squatting on the football field. Father Bonnichon’s “judge” stated at the beginning of his trial: “If you have been arrested, it is not without reason, for the Government acts always in the right—it is therefore certain that you are guilty.” Two paths lie open to the accused: either he confesses his crimes (which he has not committed) when the Government will act with clemency, or he refuses to confess, thus resisting the Government, in which case the severest of punishments await him.

The pamphlet concludes with the hope that an International Voice may rise in favour of those unfortunates who are still in Chinese prisons, and who remain behind the Great Wall of Communist Illegality until death releases them.

H. St. C. S.

The Uneven Road. By Lord Belhaven. London: John Murray. 1955. Pp. 334. 15 illustrations, 2 maps, index. 25s.

Lord Belhaven is one of the few who have served the Aden government who have committed their experiences to print. We are particularly indebted to him, therefore, for his latest book, which describes his service in South-West Arabia between the wars. It is well written and, of course, authoritative, and is an extremely valuable original source for research on the military history of the Aden protectorate.

The names of the well-known Aden soldiers and administrators occur again and again in the book and one is left with a sense of regret that they have not found it possible to give us a detailed account of their work in South-Western Arabia.

The Uneven Road will become a classic of Arabian travel and of Aden history.

ERIC MACRO.

The Crescent in Crisis. By N. A. Faris and M. T. Husayn. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas. 1955. Pp. 191, endpaper maps, index. \$4.

This work by two well-known Arab scholars deals with the stresses and strains within the Arab World today and with the unifying factors that are basic on the one hand and new-found on the other. It is a useful little book for those wishing to be brought up to date on the nebulous affairs of Pan-Arabism.

ERIC MACRO.

Just Half a World Away. By Jean Lyon. Hutchinson. 1955. Pp. 318. Illustrations, index and glossary. 21s.

In giving this book its sub-title "My Search for the New India" the authoress also gives us the clue to her success. Unlike so many travellers in India she had no prejudices and she really was a searcher after truth. There was no anti-imperialist bias background, nor was there the influence of American republican or anti-colonial ideas. This was due, no doubt, to Miss Lynn's birth and upbringing in China and her many years of residence there. She is scrupulously fair and does not hesitate to allocate blame wherever it may be due or to point out errors where she thinks they exist. In only one important point is she badly wrong, namely that she is searching for something that doesn't exist. There is no such thing as a new India. This she appreciated to a certain extent insofar as it explained the problems of caste and religion, but she seemed to forget that democracy in India did not spring into life fully developed in August, 1947, and industrial India equally is considerably older than the present republic. Much has happened during the past eight years, but it is all the result of generations of work by men of many races, and the credit is due to them all.

Apart from this tendency to assume a fresh start in 1947, Miss Lyon has written one of the best books of recent years about India. She was no fair-weather tourist, nor was she content to study the country and its people from the comfort of a modern hotel and a high-powered car. Her search started in a mud-hut with two cows and continued along dusty roads, across deserts and over mountains. She visited Maharajahs and was disturbed by the wealth of one and the feudal power of another. She attended elections, was present at religious ceremonies and travelled for days in the retinue of a Hindu ascetic. Wherever she went and whatever she saw she gives a vital and clear description, not only of the scene itself, but also of the effect it had upon herself and others present. Her critical faculties were never dulled, whether the object of her remarks were her fellow-country folk in Delhi or the political theories of Vinoba Bhave.

The main conclusion which she reached seems to be that spiritually India still has a long way to go. The caste system is still one of the chief factors in life, although much is being done to alleviate the lot of the untouchables by education and rural development. The experiment of democracy seems to be working well, and Miss Lyon's experiences illustrate the great interest which people of all classes take in political development and the selection of their representatives. Miss Lyon is not only extremely observant, but is also gifted with a sense of humour and an ability to understand foreign peoples. She is sympathetic without being sentimental, and it is safe to say that this book, which covers so many aspects of India, from Cape Comorin to the mountains beyond Simla, is well worth reading by all who want to be up to date. In addition it is splendidly illustrated and written in a style which makes it a pleasure to read.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

From the Back Streets of Bengal. By Bernard Llewellyn. Geo. Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. 280. Illustrated, cover maps, index. 18s.

This book is written from an unusual angle. The author, though not a Quaker, was in charge of the Friends Centre in Dacca, a town of East Pakistan which has attracted the attention of few observers and fewer authors.

His efforts to establish a village work camp for Bengali students are praiseworthy but pathetic, and his persistence is much to be admired. The discouragements that he met with would have daunted all but those with stout hearts.

The Dacca students found the conception of work for others less well off than themselves very difficult to grasp; so difficult in fact that they could see the feasibility of others doing such work, but not themselves. They would agree with Thomas Carlyle that there is "a perennial nobleness and even sacredness in work" without wishing to take any action on those lines. Despite the lack of encouragement, the author and his co-workers battled along, and a work camp was organized to the

point where "all that is needed is the students to do the work."

A few volunteers appeared at Novogram, but they rapidly vanished and now the author reluctantly acknowledges that "Life in Novogram has long since reverted to normal."

There is a chapter describing a visit to Sevagram, Gandhi's latter-day home, and here one finds a Basic Education Centre organized by a devoted Englishwoman. Here reading, writing, spinning, weaving, the milking of cows, the growing of crops are taught, and the "Failed B.A." is definitely not one of the products of this quite admirable Basic Education. There are 300-400 adults and children at Sevagram—how long will it take this heaven to work?

The chapters on Kashmir are well done, but it is evident that the prosperity which was brought by the European traveller is a thing of the past—one can only conjecture if this will ever return.

The photographic illustrations are good. Those interested in the rather sad picture of parts of India and Pakistan today will find a great deal to ponder over in this thoughtful book.

H. ST. C. S.

Russian Holiday. By Allan Chappelow. Harrap. 1955. Pp. 190. Illustrated. 18s.

The background of the author is that he was born in Copenhagen and educated at Oundle, London University and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was a prizeman. The tour was organized by the Travel Department of the National Union of Students and cost £95 per head. An equal number of Russian students came to England at the same time as the author's party was visiting Russia, and one would much like to see a book written by one of these Russian travellers, should such a volume exist. The writer describes himself as a Liberal. Stress is laid on the fact that the author's party of 26 students was essentially non-political and fact-finding; amongst them was one American. Very considerable freedom of movement seems to have been granted them, and though naturally everything of Russia today was put in the most favourable light, there seems to have been little forcible propaganda. A love and respect for old Russia seems to have been shown, even by the people who have been most active in destroying it. The author gives a fair and unbiassed description of what he saw, and one feels that he was an objective observer.

He concludes that Russia is unlike any other country—a country of paradox, anachronism and enigma, and his only object is to integrate and clarify a picture of this country. He achieves a large measure of success in this effort.

H. ST. C. S.

Road to Rakaposhi. By George Band. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 192. 50 illustrations; maps and diagrams. 4½" × 6½". 16s.

This account of the doings of six members of the Cambridge University Mountaineering Club makes excellent reading. The road to their objective in the Western Karakoram took them right across Europe and half across Asia. Plans were perforce based on the period of the Long Vacation, so the first half of the party drove out in May-June, in their Bedford "Dormobile," leaving the others to follow by air after sitting for their June examinations. Food and equipment went conveniently by sea. Ted Wrangham has contributed a pleasant description of the road journey and tells of many happy encounters and of the almost unfailing help rendered by British and other officials.

Rakaposhi (the "Dragon's Tail"), some 25,560 feet in height, had been tackled without success by two previous, smaller parties. The Cambridge team was stronger and better equipped, though far from the lavish scale of the big Italian expedition to K.2 a few weeks earlier.

George Band takes up the story from the arrival in Rawalpindi a few days before schedule. Just before leaving England they had been staggered by the news that an Austro-German party had been given permission to attempt, not only Rakaposhi,

but also Dastoghil, 25,780 feet, in the Hispar Mustagh. Fortunately these potential rivals decided, after reconnoitring, to try further north where, in the Batura region, there were other virgin "eight thousanders." Another stroke of tremendous luck came to them in the person of General Hayaud Din ("Gunga" to his host of friends). He was then Chief of the Pakistan General Staff and decided to accompany the Cambridge expedition as liaison officer.

Their attempts followed much the same lines as had been taken by their predecessors—first the North-West Ridge and then the South-West Spur. Their setbacks were likewise very similar, and though they did in fact open a way to the summit by their "first ascent" of the "Monk's Head," they were in no fit state to exploit this success. Contenting themselves with this achievement they made their way down to Base Camp, the first stage of their long journey home. George Band ingenuously admits that even seven thousand miles were not enough to teach him to drive, and that after two failures to do so he has not yet passed his test. "The hazards of a busy shopping street are greater than those of the Himalaya." This is one example of the happy style which runs through the book. The maps and diagrams are excellent, but the photographs, though interesting, are hardly up to standard.

H. W. T.

A Mountain Called Nun Kun. By Bernard Pierre. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 189. 20 illustrations, 5 maps and sketches. 8½" × 5½". 16s.

It was a happy coincidence that both John Hunt and his friend Bernard Pierre should be leading successful expeditions simultaneously, at opposite ends of the Himalaya. But it seems strange that Nun, the second highest peak* in Kashmir, only 60 miles from Srinagar, should have remained inviolate for so many years. Actually, Hunt and James Waller had looked at it eagerly 20 years before. And it is interesting to note that one of the summit pair, Madame Claude Kogan, became thereby the woman's altitude record holder. With her was the Swiss Protestant Pastor from Leh, who had left a message for his flock: "The Pastor has gone to the presence of the Most High." The author's vivid narrative of the course of events, his intimate portrayal of those taking part and his picturing of the wonderful setting are all brilliant. The avalanche which brought two of the party to the very brink of death, the wiping out of Camp III, his esteem of their gallant Sherpas and his own unhappy renunciation from the final assault, are all told of with typically Gallic freedom from inhibition. To quote Sir John Hunt: "An intensely human story."

H. W. T.

* Nanga Parbat is higher by 2,200 feet—23,410 as against 26,620.

NOTICES

THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend $\frac{\text{him}}{\text{her}}$ for membership.

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His
Her connection with Asia is :

(Entrance fee, £1. Yearly subscription, £1 10s. for country and overseas members.
£2 for residents in the London area.)

NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the past few years the Journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. The Council again appeals to all members to sign this deed of covenant, and would particularly ask that those proposing candidates for election point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed.

DEED OF COVENANT

I

of

hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date of this Deed or during my life (whichever shall be the shorter period) I will pay to the said Society from my general fund of taxed income such an amount annually as after deduction of income tax at the Standard Rate yields the net sum of

The first payment is to be made on the

Dated this day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of:

Address of Witness to your signature

.....

(NOTE.—The Deed must be signed by the subscriber on a date prior to the date of the first yearly payment, as shown in the body of the Deed.)



JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

VOL. XLIII

JULY-OCTOBER, 1956

PARTS III & IV

CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	162
IN MEMORIAM :	
SIR EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.	163
COLONEL STEWART FRANCIS NEWCOMBE, D.S.O.	164
NOTICES	165
GREAT FIGURES OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY HIMALAYAN EXPLORATION. By LIEUT.-COLONEL KENNETH MASON, M.C.	167
THE OUTLOOK IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA. By HAROLD INGRAMS, C.M.G., O.B.E.	176
THE WEST AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By MR. BICKHAM SWEET-ESCOTT	187
THE EDUCATION OF ENGINEERS IN RUSSIA. By B. L. GOODLET, O.B.E., M.A., M.I.C.E.	200
ANNUAL MEETING	213
THE MIDDLE EAST, THEN AND NOW. By SIR HARRY LUKE, K.C.M.G., D.LITT.	219
ANNUAL DINNER	226
LEVANT DUSK : THE REFUGEE SITUATION. By STEWART PEROWNE, O.B.E.	235
THE END OF PASHADOM. By GERALD DE GAURY	243
THE SPITI VALLEY TO-DAY. By ALASTAIR LAMB	248
CORRESPONDENCE	255
REVIEWS :	
Kuwait and her Neighbours, 257	The Trail of Marco Polo, 267
The Development of Iraq, 258	Kazak Exodus, 268
Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, 259	Caucasian Review, 269
A Manual of Lebanese Administration, 260	Oracles and Demons of Tibet, 270
Muhammad at Medina, 260	Martyr au Thibet, 271
Cities and Men, 261	Tibetan Skylines, 273
A History of Turkey, 262	Himalayan Circuit, 273
The Lycian Shore, 263	The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobči, 274
A Selected Bibliography of Articles dealing with the Middle East, 264	Japanese Literature in the Meiji Period, 274
Law in the Middle East, 265	The Art and Architecture of China, 275
War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 265	The Empress Wu, 276
Byzantium and Istanbul, 265	Imperial Woman, 277
The Mountains of Pharaoh, 266	East and West. Some Reflections, 278
	The Scrolls from the Dead Sea, 279

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL 1955-56

President :

THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D.

Hon. Vice-Presidents :

THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

LT.-GENERAL SIR ADRIAN CARTON DE WIART, V.C., K.B.E.,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

LORD HAILEY, O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.

GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Chairman of Council :

ADMIRAL SIR CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B.

Vice-Chairman :

C. A. P. SOUTHWELL, C.B.E., M.C.

Vice-Presidents :

DR. E. J. LINDGREN, M.A.

V. PURCELL, ESQ., C.M.G., LITT.D.

DR. L. LOCKHART, PH.D.

SIR HUGH DOW, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

SIR CLARMONT SKRINE, O.B.E.

G. STEPHENSON, ESQ.

LT.-COLONEL THE LORD BIRDWOOD,
M.V.O.

V. L. WALTER, ESQ., C.B.E.

Hon. Treasurer :

MAJOR EDWARD AINGER.

Hon. Secretaries :

COLONEL H. W. TOBIN, D.S.O., O.B.E., Central Asia.

GROUP-CAPT. H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD, O.B.E., Far East.

J. M. COOK, ESQ., Middle East.

Hon. Librarian :

COLONEL F. M. BAILEY, C.I.E.

Secretary Emerita : MISS M. N. KENNEDY.

Members of Council :

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR LESLIE
HOLLINGHURST, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C.

LT.-COLONEL E. H. GASTRELL, O.B.E.

F. B. SADLER, ESQ.

SIR JOHN TROUTBECK, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.

LT.-COLONEL A. C. GALLOWAY, C.I.E.,
O.B.E.

SIR NEVILE BUTLER, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

LT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN BAGOT GLUBB,
K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.

L. W. AMPS, ESQ., O.B.E.

Local Honorary Secretaries :

Bahrein: SIR CHARLES DALRYMPLE
BELGRAVE, K.B.E.

E. Canada: R. S. HOOTON, ESQ.

India: W. H. T. HARRIS, ESQ.

Kuweit: D. C. FITZPATRICK, ESQ.

Khartoum: SIR EDWIN CHAPMAN
ANDREWS, K.C.M.G., O.B.E.

Le banon: MRS. K. JOLY.

W. Pakistan: W. A. BROWN, ESQ.,
M.B.E.

Qatar: P. J. BAWCUTT, ESQ.

Secretary :

MRS. K. G. PUTNAM, M.B.E.

IN MEMORIAM

SIR EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

SIR EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., who died on April 24, 1956, at the age of 86, had been a member of the Royal Central Asian Society for 35 years. He joined the Society in 1921 on the completion of his 5 years' term of office as Judicial Adviser in the semi-military, semi-national administration set up in Mesopotamia on its liberation from Turkish rule. The task of re-establishing the judicial system in an administration of which the juridical status was that of an army occupying enemy territory, was something of a paradox. To it he brought not only the legal skill and wise judgment with which he had organized the system of law and justice in the Sudan, but, above all, a manifest integrity which won the immediate respect and later the affection of the Arab leaders. In 1921 the whole position was revolutionized by the arrival of King Faisal I and the promulgation of the Mandate for Iraq. The present writer, who had by then succeeded Sir Edgar, had the best possible opportunity of appreciating the value of his services to the liberating Power and the liberated nation. His success in the Sudan, where he had a clean slate to write on, did not blind Sir Edgar to the contrary conditions prevailing in the liberated Vilayets. He made no attempt to lay down new foundations, but confined himself to building up and modernizing the system already in being. Thus it was that in the political ferment, engendered by an ardent nationalism, which accompanied the constitutional changes from mandate to treaty, and finally to complete independence, the judicial system and the administration of civil law went peacefully on its way without opposition, interference or drastic change. The bridge which Sir Edgar had built stood the strain, and one of its main props was the trust which he himself inspired.

In this Journal it is natural that Bonham-Carter's services in the Middle East take pride of place, but they fill only one chapter in a long life of public service. Some would say that this began when, after playing for Oxford at Rugby Football, he took his place in the English side as an international player! For the 16 years before he came to Iraq he served as the first Legal Secretary in the Sudan; and this entailed devising and initiating an entirely new system of law, both civil and criminal, and a judicial machine in a country where there were no civil courts and no lawyers. In the eyes of the natives (to quote *The Times*) Bonham-Carter's work was recognized as the ideal embodiment of justice in contradistinction to the days of Dervish oppression and Egyptian rule. No tribute can be too great for the man who inaugurated it. But it must not be supposed that his influence and abilities were exercised only in the legal and judicial field. The law impinges on economics and administration, particularly when the foundations of both are being laid, and the successful development of the Sudan owes much to the first Legal Secretary and his two friends—James Currie and Slatin Pasha.

After his return from the Middle East in 1921 and his happy marriage with Miss Charlotte Ogilvy in 1926, his ripe experience and trusted wisdom found scope in public work of remarkable variety. He became a member of the L.C.C.; an expert in housing; Chairman of the National Housing and Town Planning Council; Chairman of the First Garden City Ltd. at Letchworth; Vice-Chairman of the Commons and Footpaths Society; "himself not least but honoured of them all."

In this Journal such a summary would not be complete without special mention of the part he took in the foundation of the British School of Archæology in Iraq (Gertrude Bell Memorial). Aided by a legacy of £5,000 from Gertrude Bell, and at the request of the Bell family, he became the honorary secretary, and, with Lady Bonham-Carter, launched from their own home a wide appeal, culminating in a public meeting which filled the Central Hall, Westminster. Adequate funds were thus raised to establish the School on a sound basis. The success achieved in active co-operation with the Iraq Government's Department of Antiquities is well known. Sir Edgar was Chairman of the Executive Committee till 1949 and remained an active member of the Council.

NIGEL DAVIDSON.

COLONEL STEWART FRANCIS NEWCOMBE, D.S.O.

THE outstanding facts in Newcombe's long and distinguished career are known to all those whose pleasure or duty has brought them into the Middle-Eastern scene; his service with the Royal Engineers in South Africa, followed by ten years with the Egyptian Army; the valuable survey work he did in Southern Palestine before the outbreak of the 1914-18 War; the expert knowledge which he brought to the army of the Amir Faisal from the early days of the Arab revolt; and his romantic escape from Turkish hands in 1918. Only those who were privileged—as were many members of this Society—to enjoy his friendship after his retirement in 1932 knew the breadth of his outlook and the sincerity with which he strove to disentangle the growing complexities of the situation in the Arab world in the years before the Second War, and to find a solution for the problem of Palestine. It was to this intractable problem that he devoted a great deal of time and effort during and after the War. He enjoyed the respect and confidence not only of all his own countrymen with whom he came into contact but of many Arab and Jewish leaders. In his work as Honorary Secretary of the Royal Central Asian Society he showed his appreciation of the importance to the Society of regions outside that in which his special interests lay and was tireless in promoting the interests of the Society as long as it was possible for him to do so.

K. B.

NOTICES

The Council are pleased to acknowledge the following gifts and other additions to the Library :

A plan of Peking hand-drawn and painted with Chinese characters, presented by the widow of the late Lancelot Giles. Date unknown.

A number of books and pamphlets in Turkish, presented by Captain Neish.

Through Deserts and Oases of Central Asia, by Ella and Sir Percy Sykes, presented by Colonel Cobb.

The Duab of Turkestan, by W. Rickmer Rickmers, presented by Ronald Sinclair.

Pamphlets: *A Central Asian Study*, by R. N. Mirza, presented by the author.

Iraq, a Plan for Development, by Lord Salter, presented by the Iraqi Embassy.

Al Iraqi. 1956. Baghdad College, Iraq.

Bibliography, 1926-55, by Henry Field. December 31, 1955.

Bibliography on South-western Asia: III, by Henry Field. University of Miami Press, Florida. 1956.

Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists. No. 4. March, 1956. The Hague, Netherlands.

East-West Fire: Schopenhauer's Optimism and the Lankavatara Sutra, by Charles Muses. The Falcon Wings Press, Indian Hills, Colorado, U.S.A., and John M. Watkins, 21, Cecil Court, Charing Cross Road, W.C.2. 1955.

The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East. A series of addresses presented at the Ninth Annual Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, sponsored by the Middle East Institute. March 4-5, 1955. Edited by Harvey P. Hall. The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.

The Frontier in History, by Owen Lattimore. The Johns Hopkins University. X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, Roma 4-11 Settembre 1955. Relazioni, Vol. I. Firenze, 1955.

H. A. Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 4. Abstracts 2451-2535, December, 1955. Vienna and New York.

Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. II, July, 1955, No. 2. University of Hong Kong.

List of Documents Microfilmed, 1941-55, by Henry Field. January 1, 1956. Two copies. Presented by Henry Field.

Problems of Food and Agricultural Expansion in the Far East. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome, November, 1955.

The Proceedings of the First Muslim-Christian Convocation, Bhamdoun, Lebanon, April 22-27, 1954. Published by the Editors, Continuing Committee on Muslim-Christian Co-operation.

Revue Internationale d'Ethnopsychologie Normale et Pathologique. Vol. I, No. 00. Société Internationale d'Ethnopsychologie Normale et Pathologique. Tangier. 1956.

Report of the International Congress of Jurists, Athens, June 13-20, 1955. The Hague, March, 1956.

Studies in History. Bulletin of the Faculty of Literature, Kyushu University No. 3, Fukuoka, Japan, 1955.

In addition, the following are received regularly as published and are available in the library for reference :

	<i>Published in</i>
The Arab World - - - - -	U.K.
The Caucasian Review - - - - -	U.S.S.R.
Central Asian Review - - - - -	U.K.
Central Asiatic Journal - - - - -	Netherlands
The Eastern World - - - - -	U.K.
Far East Trade - - - - -	"
Far Eastern Quarterly - - - - -	U.S.A.
Foreign Affairs - - - - -	"
Geographical Review - - - - -	"
Great Britain and the East - - - - -	U.K.
Himalayan Journal - - - - -	U.K./India
The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society - - - - -	U.K.
The Middle East Journal - - - - -	U.S.A.
The National Geographic Magazine - - - - -	"
Pacific Affairs - - - - -	"

Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published, and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual contributors.

GREAT FIGURES OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY HIMALAYAN EXPLORATION

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL KENNETH MASON, M.C.,
late Professor of Geography at Oxford University

A lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 28th, 1956; Mr. C. A. P. Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

When introducing the lecturer, Mr. C. A. P. Southwell, Vice-Chairman of the Society stated :

It gives me great pleasure to welcome Professor Mason. We are honoured to have so distinguished a geographer to address the Society.

It is a long time since Professor Mason was awarded the Founder's Gold Medal of the Royal Geographical Society. He is already known to many here as Founder Editor of the *Himalayan Journal* and a member of the pre-war Mount Everest Committee.


Professor Mason has recently written the only completely authoritative book on Himalayan Survey and climbing (see footnote). Until recently he was Professor of Geography at Oxford University after his retirement from the Army and 25 years service with the Survey of India : Professor Mason.

YOU will not expect me before this audience to give you a geographical account of the Himalaya. Many of you have doubtless travelled there. I will therefore merely introduce my talk by saying that geographers divide these great ranges into three zones from the Ganges plains to Tibet: (i) the Siwaliks and Duns; (ii) the Lesser Himalaya; (iii) the Great Himalaya. For convenience, partly geographical and partly historical, we also divide them between the Indus on the west and the Tsangpo Gorge on the east into five sections: (i) the Punjab Himalaya; (ii) Kumaun Himalaya; (iii) Nepal Himalaya; (iv) Sikkim Himalaya; (v) Assam Himalaya.

The Karakoram, generally associated with the Himalaya, is strictly speaking trans-Himalayan, but its exploration and history is so closely allied to the Himalaya that it is included.


Himalayan exploration is interwoven with the political history of the British in India, and by this I mean British officials, both civil and military, on duty and on leave, have been largely responsible for it. It is quite time (now that the task of the British in India is finished) that some tribute is paid to them. So many of their doings are hidden in departmental files and official reports that the traveller and mountaineer of today and tomorrow can hardly be blamed if he does not know how much he owes to the pioneers.

One has only to look at James Rennell's Map of Hindoostan, first published in 1782, or his subsequent map of "The Countries situated between Delhi and Candahar," ten years later, to see how little was known at the end of the eighteenth century. This was because these maps were still based on the old d'Anville Atlas of China, in which the Himalayan and Tibetan geography was the work of Chinese lamas sent out by the Emperor Kang-Li between 1705 and 1717.



THE DIVISIONS OF THE HIMALAYAS

By the beginning of the nineteenth century only six journeys by British officials had been made into the Himalaya—four into western Bhutan and two into southern Nepal. Two of the former, under George Bogle (1774) and Samuel Turner (1783) had reached Shigatse in Tibet. The whole of the Himalaya (1,500 miles long and about 100 miles wide throughout) was virgin country to the geographer, in the truest sense. The courses and sources of the great rivers, the giant mountains, their positions and heights



THE KARAKORAM

were totally unknown; and Rennell himself recorded his belief from Indian sources that the Ganges itself forced its way by a subterranean passage through the Himalaya.

The first sixty years of the nineteenth century changed all this. By 1863 we had maps—not, of course, perfect but adequate for British administration and interests—of the whole of the Himalaya west of Nepal, and an outline knowledge of the mountain alinements in Nepal and Sikkim from distant trigonometrical observations.

1ST PERIOD: (UP TO 1845)

First in my story comes Charles Crawford, who commanded the first Resident's escort to Katmandu from 1801-03, and brought back a rough

map of central Nepal; he was the first to suspect the great height of the Nepal Himalaya. But it was William Spencer Webb, of the 10th Bengal Infantry, who first traced in 1808 the course of the main Bhagirathi branch of the Ganges to within forty miles of its source, and who first took observations to the high peaks. He had been chosen to command the escort of Robert Colebrooke, Surveyor General of Bengal (1794-1808), and when the latter's health broke down, was sent on this pioneer exploration. Webb's rough calculations made the snowy peaks higher than expected. In 1809-10 he took further observations from four more stations, and calculated the height of Dhaulagiri, one of the great Nepalese peaks, to be 26,862 feet. When his results were announced they were ridiculed in England, where it was held that the Andes were supreme. In actual fact Webb's figure is only 67 feet higher than the accepted figure today, 26,795 feet. It is the seventh highest mountain in the Himalaya and is not yet climbed.

Two political events in the first twenty years of the century were to influence the further course of Himalayan exploration. The first was Napoleon's threat to India in 1808, which led to Charles Metcalfe's mission to "the Lion of the Punjab"—Ranjit Singh—and to the treaty in 1809 by which British influence was extended up the Indo-Gangetic plain to the Sutlej. The second, as a direct result of the first, was the Nepalese war of 1814-16. With this extension of influence the East India Company had to consider its Himalayan flank, and here it came in contact with the warlike Gurkhas, who were expanding westwards into Kumaun and encroaching southwards into the Indian plain.

But before the war broke out I must record the adventurous journey of William Moorcroft, and that strange individual Hyder Jung Hearsey, who, disguised as fakirs, explored Kumaun from south to north and reached Manasarowar and the Sutlej source in Rakas Tal in Tibet. Hearsey was a natural son of an officer in the Bengal infantry and had taken service with the Mahrattas, changed sides, and then commanded irregular cavalry against the Mahrattas. He had also accompanied Webb on his exploration of the Ganges in 1808. Moorcroft was a Liverpool man who, having been appointed veterinary surgeon to the Bengal Government, held charge of the Company's stud farm at Pusa, near Patna. He was already forty-seven when he slipped off with the approval of the Company's agent at Fatehgarh—and the Bengal Government were too late to stop him.

This journey of Moorcroft's is of particular interest because he was detained by Tibetans at Daba Dzong, a few marches west of Manasarowar, and was helped there by two Bhotia Rawat brothers, Bir Singh and Deb Singh, later the fathers of four of our most distinguished pundit explorers, about whom I shall speak later.

Moorcroft was also responsible for our first knowledge of the Karakoram Pass, because he sent his agent, Mir Izzet Oolah, over it to Yarkand and Kashgar in 1812-13; and after the Nepal war he spent five years exploring Ladakh and Baltistan with the Company's geologist, George Trebeck. He was the first to indicate the layout of the Karakoram mountains. He died at Andkhui, about 200 miles south of Bukhara, in August, 1825.

There were two important results of the Nepal War. One was the fixing of the western boundary of Nepal at the river Kali, which opened up the whole of the Kumaun Himalaya to British administration. The other was the closing of Nepal by treaty. Throughout the whole period of British administration in India no British Expedition entered Nepal—that is from 1816 until after the Second World War. There were British Residents and Ministers at Katmandu, but even they were not permitted to explore the country.

On the other hand the fixing of the western boundary at the Kali enabled Kumaun and Garhwal to be fully explored. Much of the early exploration was done by John Anthony Hodgson and James Herbert, both of whom had been on service during the war. Hodgson was in charge of the survey of the "North-west Mountain Provinces," but he suffered so much from illness that Herbert took over. Officials appointed to the new districts must also have had a wonderful time. The country north-east of the "middling-sized village of Simla" was explored in considerable detail by the Gerard brothers, Alexander and Dr. J. G., who were the first to cross many of the passes into Bashahr. G. W. Traill, the civil commissioner of Kumaun from 1817 to 1835, was also a great traveller in his domain: in 1830 he was the first to cross the watershed of the Great Himalaya at the head of the Pindari glacier, between Nanda Devi and Nanda Kot, by the difficult glacier pass, 17,700 feet, still known by his name. Knowledge of Kashmir was gained by G. T. Vigne during his explorations, 1835-38, and there were other travellers of note.

The death of Ranjit Singh of the Punjab in 1839 and the Sikh wars which followed were responsible for the next step forward, since once again it became necessary for the Company to learn as much as possible of the States in the mountains of the Punjab. Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, now independent of the Punjab, had conquered Ladakh and Baltistan, and it became necessary to examine his frontiers with the British districts. Alexander Cunningham (who was appointed Commissioner for this purpose) had with him Henry Strachey, who had already reached Manasarowar in 1846, and Dr. Thomas Thomson. All three made great names for themselves. Together they covered much of Zaskar, almost the whole of Rupshu and eastern Ladakh and much of Baltistan. Cunningham was the first to sort out the tangle of mountains known as the Zaskar range, south of Leh, and to distinguish it as a branch of the Great Himalaya. Henry Strachey discovered the Siachen glacier in the Karakoram, though he was unaware of its great length. Thomson was the first to cross the Saser pass between the Nubra and the Shyok, now one of the main passes on the Yarkand trade-route. Their collected writings on the physical geography added enormously to our knowledge and were an indispensable foundation to the detailed work of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India which was about to begin in Kashmir. There were other travellers of note also, the three Schlagintweits, employed by the Company for several years on scientific exploration, and Sir Joseph Hooker, the great botanist and naturalist who first explored Sikkim, to mention only four of them.

Up till now all this exploration had been rather individual and piece-

meal. It was not easy to tie together the route-sketches and reports. I have mentioned it since not only is much of it now forgotten but also because there is a thread of continuity that runs through the accumulation of all knowledge. I have nothing but admiration for the endurance and devotion of these pioneers and I still find their writings and their experiences fascinating to read. Remember that they had no special equipment and knew nothing about mountaineering. They had to learn all about the vagaries of Himalayan ice and snow and weather by the hard and painful way.

TRIANGULATION AND SURVEYS 1845-68

I now come to the period of the first accurate surveys, due in the first place to Sir George Everest's methodical work. Coming out to India as an artillery cadet in 1806, he had succeeded William Lambton as Superintendent of the Great Trigonometrical Survey in 1823, and from 1830 to 1843 was Surveyor General of India. He conceived the gridiron system of triangles and quadrilaterals which covered the whole of India. His great Arc of the Meridian, stretching from Cape Comorin in the south to Banog near Mussoorie in the north, was completed by him and from it he calculated the figure of the earth on which all subsequent observations were computed. It was this accurate framework of stations and triangulation series that enabled his successor, Sir Andrew Waugh, to observe additional stations along the Himalayan foothills north-westwards and south-eastwards, and from these stations to cover the mountains with a network of triangles and stations whose precise positions and heights were known. By 1862 the whole of the Himalaya west of Nepal was covered by this accurate framework and on it was based the detailed topographical survey. During these operations heavy instruments were carried up the mountains and observers camped at great heights. By 1863 no fewer than thirty-seven mountains over 20,000 feet had been climbed and observed from with theodolites and five above 21,000. There are instances of cairns and poles erected on other high points as survey marks.

During the observations of the North-East Himalayan series a peak, designated XV, was fixed. When the observations were computed in 1852 it was found to have the height of 29,002 feet, the mean of a number of observations from six distant stations. It took the place of Kangchenjunga, 28,146, observed about the same time, as the highest mountain in the world.

The survey of Kashmir was organized and carried out by a Bengal engineer, Captain T. G. Montgomerie. Much of the reconnaissance was done by him personally, and it was from the survey station at Haramukh, 16,002 feet, which stands north of the Sind valley towering above Gandarbal, that he, in 1856, first saw the giants of the Karakoram. In the following year George Shelverton first observed them from the same station; and in 1858 the great pyramid of K₂ was computed at 28,250 feet, so displacing Kangchenjunga to third place. In these observations thirty-two peaks of the distant Karakoram were observed. They were recorded as K₁, K₂, K₃, etc., up to K₃₂; no names could be given them at the time, and some have none. Nineteen of them are above 25,000 feet and, of these, six are over 26,000 feet.

It is interesting to record that the Kashmir survey continued throughout the period of the Indian Mutiny at the express wish of Sir Henry Lawrence, the wise Governor of the Punjab.

The best-known of Montgomerie's assistants was Captain H. H. Godwin-Austen, of the old 24th Foot (now the South Wales Borderers). He was the topographer who first discovered and surveyed the great system of Karakoram glaciers in 1861, including the Baltoro glacier approach to K₂. He was probably the greatest mountaineer of his day. When the Kashmir survey was completed he was sent to the eastern Himalaya and surveyed with the Bhutan field force, but he suffered much from fever and eventually was invalided home. He drew a pension for over forty years and died in 1924 at the age of 90. He was a great man and I, like many of my generation, benefited from his advice.

But, though he was a great mountaineer, K₂ was not discovered by him, and is not named after him. In 1888, General J. T. Walker, at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society in London, proposed that K₂ should be named after him. But the suggestion was not approved by the R.G.S., the Survey of India, or by the Government of India. The mountain remains K₂, and when I was in its neighbourhood many years ago I found that even the nearest people who had carried loads to it knew it as Kechu or Cheku!

The problem of Himalayan names is a very difficult one. But with the exception of Mount Everest, the name of which was not sanctioned until eleven years after its discovery and then only when no native name could be found for it, no personal names have been given to any Himalayan mountain.

PUNDIT EXPLORERS AND THE LAST FORTY YEARS

I come now to probably the most romantic period of Himalayan Exploration.

By 1864 the surveys west of Nepal had reached the borders of Tibet, and because of the disturbed state of the frontiers British travellers and surveyors were forbidden to go further. Yet our trans-frontier maps were still almost blank. Gilgit, Chilas and Chitral on the north-west were unexplored, Yarkand, though visited, was a hundred miles out of position, Central Tibet was quite unknown, as was the course of the Tsangpo.

Chinese Turkistan was in a turmoil, Tibet exclusive and watchful, the border states on the extreme north and north-west were openly predatory, Nepal was barred by treaty, Bhutan suspicious and Sikkim sulky. And beyond the Hindu Kush Russia was in motion, and the Great Game in Asia was "on." It is the period of Kipling's masterpiece *Kim*, in which every character is true to life.

Walker and Montgomerie set about training Indian explorers to carry on the work. Through Major Edmund Smyth, the British Education Officer in Kumaun, two Bhotia Rawats, Nain Singh and his cousin Mani Singh, sons of the two brothers who had helped Moorcroft and Hearsey in 1812, were brought to Dehra Dun and given two years' training in route survey. They were taught the use of the sextant and compass, how to recognize and observe the stars, how to obtain rough heights by boiling

water and to count and record their distances. On his first journey in 1865 Nain Singh passed through Nepal into Tibet, disguised as a lama, and, having joined a caravan going to Lhasa, reached that place in January, 1866, counting and recording his paces all the way and surreptitiously observing latitudes with his sextant. He returned with the same caravan to Manasarowar and crossed into Kumaun, having left his servant Chumbel and his watch with the caravan, to be collected later. The details he brought back enabled Montgomerie to construct a map of the southern trade-route, a distance of 1,200 miles. Much as I should like to do so, time does not permit me to describe many of these explorations. Nain Singh helped to train others, amongst them AK, his cousin, who was responsible for several daring journeys. Almost always he assumed the guise of a Tibetan lama, with prayer-wheel and rosary. His journeys covered the period 1872-82, and on his last journey he was absent from India for four years. After reaching Lhasa he went right through Chang Tang and reached the extreme north-west of Kansu, though robbed and beaten-up on the way by bandits. Yet he returned with his servant Chumbel and with complete records of his journey.

All these journeys were secret and the men's names were not known outside the Survey of India. Most went by initials—*e.g.*, AK, GK, MH; generally, but not always, the last-sounded letter of the name followed by the first. MH, Hari Ram, was the first to make the circuit of Everest in 1871; RN, Rinzin Namgyal, the first to make that of Kangchenjunga. Kinthup was the first to trace the course of the Tsangpo from Tibet to within forty miles of the plains of India and so to prove its identity with the Brahmaputra.

At the other end of the Himalaya and on the North-West Frontier where the explorers were Moslem, Ata Muhammad, "the Mullah," explored the wild gorges of the Indus below Chilas. Mirza Shuja gave us details for the first map of northern Afghanistan and the Pamirs. While still in the Survey of India he became tutor to the sons of Sher Ali at Kabul. He was afterwards murdered in Bukhara.

These men set an example to many who afterwards joined the Survey of India, and in my own work I often used to remind my men of the courage of these old explorers. Though it is now more than twenty years since I retired from the Survey of India, I have, since last Christmas, received letters from two of AK's descendants, to whom I sent copies of my book; one, Indra Singh Rawat, is still in the Survey of India, and the other, Ranjit Singh Rawat, a captain in the Indian Artillery.

It must not be thought that British officers and civilians themselves were idle during this period. During a residence of nearly nine years in Kashmir, from 1862 to 1871, F. Drew travelled extensively and described the whole country in great detail. In 1868 G. W. Hayward crossed the Lingzi-tang plains to Shahidulla and reached Yarkand, and the following year explored the sources of the Yarkand river. He was murdered in Yasin in 1870 in an attempt to explore the Pamirs and the Oxus sources. Robert Shaw also reached Kashgar in 1869, and Douglas Forsyth led two British missions to that place in 1870 and 1873-74.

A great deal of administrative and settlement work in Himalayan dis-

tricts was also carried out in this period, while there were a number of small military expeditions to little-known parts of the North-West Frontier. Much exploration was carried out here, but little has been given to the public and much is still hidden in departmental archives. Paget and Mason's *Records of Expeditions on the North-West Frontier* (published in the early nineties) was the Bible of the frontiersman in those days and is a mine of information, but it was published confidentially and is not a personal record of individual achievement. Sir Thomas Holdich had an almost unbroken record on this frontier from 1878-98. Adventurous officers, among whom was an uncle of mine, passed among the tribes in disguise (his daughter is with us today), and William Watts McNair penetrated Kafiristan in the guise of a Moslem doctor. It must all have been enormous fun!

A landmark in the history of exploration is Younghusband's great journey in 1887 from Peking to India by the Gobi desert and Yarkand. He crossed the Karakoram by the disused Muztagh pass, without tents or mountaineering knowledge or equipment of any kind and had to sleep in the open for fear of being seen by Hunza raiders. This northern frontier was causing great concern to the Government of India partly because of Russian activities and their intrigues with our border states of Chitral, Hunza and Nagar. Major Biddulph had been at Gilgit for a year or two before 1880 but it was not until 1889 that Algernon Durand established a permanent Agency there. Younghusband was sent on two further missions to the Hunza frontiers and Pamirs during which he encountered the Russian Cossack explorer Grombchevsky, and was detained by Russians on the Pamirs in 1891.

In the same year the Hunza-Nagar campaign was caused by the continued intransigence of the two rulers of those states. The settlement of this border now led to its complete pacification and the exploration of the remaining territory within our boundaries.

These were the foundations on which were built the exploration in detail of the great mountains. These were the men who paved the way. In the present century we have tried to carry on their traditions. I left India before the great ascents were made or were even possible. We had neither the equipment nor the knowledge.

"The Abode of Snow," by Kenneth Mason, was reviewed in the last number of the R.C.A.S. Journal.

THE OUTLOOK IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA

By HAROLD INGRAMS, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 18, 1956, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Ingrams, who has kindly come to talk to us today on "The Outlook in South-West Arabia," is well known to most of you as a colonial administrator of great experience and widely travelled, who has written much and who was lately Adviser on Overseas Information at the Colonial Office. Amongst Mr. Ingrams's achievements is a dual achievement by himself and his wife: they were jointly awarded the Lawrence Memorial Medal of this Society; and that is unique.

Mr. Ingrams then delivered his lecture as follows:

FOR a long time we used to regard the Middle East as being an area in which trouble was not to be unexpected; and in the Colonial sphere we are now becoming accustomed to having crisis hover from one territory to another. Aden belongs to both these fields but until recently has been very free of trouble.

PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA

Now, there is a quite deplorable situation, even in Aden Colony itself. Some of the strikes have come to an end recently, but there are or have been strikes among refinery workers, bus and taxi drivers, Aden Airways employees, and lightermen. The Protectorate is no longer the happy place it was a few years ago. Innumerable small incidents have been taking place there. There have been about 1,000 over a period of a year or so, and some have involved British lives. Some of them are internal incidents, but a great many have been instigated from the Yemen.

Of course, we have always been used to a suspicious atmosphere with the Yemen, but after the 1934 Treaty there was for long a fairly reasonable state of affairs. Now, the Yemen is thoroughly estranged from us.

In these conditions there was, of course, no hope of us getting oil concessions in the Yemen. They have recently given one to the Americans and the other day they made a claim to Kamaran because we had given a concession there to a British Company. Kamaran is administered by the Governor of Aden, but it is completely separate from either Aden Colony or the Protectorate. It is in a special position of its own. It belongs to the allied and associated powers of the first world war. Somebody had to run the quarantine station, and so we did it. Now, by usage, sufferance and other lawful means, we administer the Island.

Then again, in the Yemen the internal situation is again uneasy, and it is quite possible that there will be further insurrections there against its unpopular rulers.

A new factor in the Aden Protectorate is that the Saudis are giving arms to the Protectorate tribesmen and stirring them up, and, curiously

enough, collaborating in doing so with the Yemenis, whom they can hardly be said in the ordinary course of events to love very much. In addition, there is Egyptian propaganda—the notorious Saut el-Arab which is continually abusing us.

I was told the other day by an officer from Aden that nowadays when he travels round the Protectorate and sees the usual groups of bedouins sitting round thorn bushes with their goats, he often finds a radio-set hanging in the thorn bush. They are listening, of course, to the Saut el-Arab. As often as not it is declaiming about the iniquity of the *Mustamaraat* of the English. The meaning of the word is “colonization.” The bedouins have no idea what *Mustamaraat* is. They just know it is something very bad because the Saut el-Arab says so. Since they dislike British interference with them they are very ready to listen.

On top of that, as you will know, Russia has been making greater advances as part of a general Middle-Eastern and African propaganda offensive: it has renewed its treaty with the Yemen and this has been followed up by a mission from the Czechs. One from the Poles is also planned. As far as I can see, there is nothing to choose between the type of propaganda that comes off the Saut el-Arab and the type that comes from Moscow. That, then, is a rough idea of the general unsatisfactoriness of the position.

BASIS OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN SOUTH-WEST ARABIA

Arab friendship in South-West Arabia is particularly important to us. The Aden Protectorate was built up by treaties with the chiefs to provide a *cordon sanitaire* round Aden. It is important from the point of view of Aden's security that Arab friendship should continue. This friendship is even more important now, because there are still chances that oil may be found in the Protectorate—oil which we need so desperately.

In the past, the friendship with the Arabs in the Protectorate had always depended on the guarantee they had of their independence. We had treaties of protection with them and we never interfered with their internal affairs. They were perfectly happy always to leave their external relations, such as they were, to us and were extremely glad to have our protection, because the Yemen had always tried to claim their territory and had often attacked them. Yemeni rule had very rarely been fully effective, but there had been about 100 years of fairly effective Yemeni rule over what is now the western part of the Protectorate down to about 1728.

Friendship with the people of the Protectorate has never before been seriously affected by outside events. Even the business of Palestine did not greatly disturb it. There were anti-Jewish riots in Aden itself, with serious loss of life, after the partition of Palestine, and there were demonstrations against the partition of Palestine in parts of the Protectorate, but these events had no real effect on our relations or on the personal relations between those of us who worked with the Arabs and the Arabs themselves. Relations were always good.

Nor is it necessarily to be expected that outside propaganda will affect relations with South-West Arabia. I remember that when I first started work in the Hadhramaut there was an outcry in Egyptian and Iraqi papers and

in Arab papers in the Far East. This died down when it was seen that we were not engaged in an imperialist effort, but that we were really trying to help the people and that, in fact, they were getting no less independence and a great deal more peace than they had had before. When that was understood, the references in Arab papers became friendly.

In the Colony there had always been a very friendly atmosphere from soon after our taking Aden in 1839. There had been some misgivings at the start because the people felt this was perhaps the beginnings of a Western expansion in South Arabia, but the misgivings were allayed when they saw that we went no further than Aden and that we were really trying to make friends with the Arabs in the region. They saw, too, the kind of *laissez-faire* policy which was followed in Aden. Aden was taken in 1839 and Hong Kong in 1840, and a *laissez-faire* policy was then the fashion. It was followed in both these places with very great success until very recently. Arabs were perfectly free to come in and out as they liked. There were no immigration controls or anything tiresome like that. In 1850 Aden became a free port and Arab trading flourished, free of irksome controls.

But, of course, inevitably the changes and events since the war have made some unrest to be expected, because Aden has rapidly got into a very overcrowded situation. A lot of industrial undertakings of one sort and another have grown up, and this must inevitably lead to some unrest.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARABS IN CLASSICAL TIMES

It helps in understanding the position as it is now to cast an eye back to the ancient incense trade. There are very interesting parallels between what happened in the story of the incense trade and what is happening now in the story of the search for oil. The people in South Arabia had a practical monopoly of incense, and on that and on their overland trade everybody through whose country the incense was carried, up to the modern Jordan, lived and built up a civilization. Places like Petra, for example, flourished on the trade from the south. Quite early on there were colonies of Greeks, and they all got on very well with the local people. They quarrelled among themselves but not much with the local people. They did not attempt anything in the nature of political or military control. Alexander, of course, had ambitions to conquer Arabia, but he died before he could undertake that.

The Romans followed the Greeks and things went on fairly well as long as they confined their activities to trade, but during the time of Augustus they started political and military activities. They started "tidying up" the small States which had formed under the influence of Hellenism, and in 25 B.C. they sent the 10th Legion overland to try to conquer South-West Arabia. That expedition was a disastrous failure, but in the middle of the First Century A.D. they discovered the changes of the monsoon in the Indian Ocean and that led quite soon to the transport of incense by sea.

Everybody wanted to get their incense cheaper. The Arabs, having something which they knew everybody else wanted, not unnaturally

wanted the highest price they could get for it. The discovery of the changes of the monsoon resulted in the destruction of the overland trade, and thus the ancient South Arabian civilization. Perhaps it was not very much of a civilization, because it was largely imitative, borrowed from Hellenic and Iranian sources. As the funds dried up, so the civilization died away and the Arabs returned to their desert life.

It was the Roman colonization and aggression which marked the emergence of the xenophobia that the Arabs have always felt to the West since, and also the peculiar kind of Arab nationalism.

I think there is a considerable difference between Arab nationalism and the kind which is now so familiar to us in Africa. When we went into a country in Africa during the last century, our arrival meant an expansion of freedom. We stopped tribal fighting, the slave trade and that sort of thing. It was only when people began to feel that they were not getting the things they wanted to get, like sufficient education or opportunities for making money, or when they felt irked by colour questions, that they felt frustrated and demands for political freedom arose. The demand for political independence is quite inevitable, but I think it only comes naturally as the last demand. In the Belgian Congo, for instance, there is no particular sign of the emergence of nationalism, because no frustrations have yet been felt.

Arab nationalism seems to appear, and it is certainly so appearing now in South Arabia, at even a threat to so-called independence and the Arab way of life and to their rather meagre resources; Arab nationalism is, therefore, a defensive reflex.

If an Arab country comes under foreign rule there is quickly nationalist trouble. That happened very early on in South Arabia. In the sixth century A.D., the Emperor Justinian instigated the Christian Abyssinians to conquer the Yemen. The Yemenis immediately felt their nationalist feelings arise and the nationalist leaders went off eastwards—significantly—and got help from the Persians. The Persians came and turned the Abyssinians out, but they stayed themselves. The Yemenis might profitably remember that today, but man is notoriously insensitive to the teachings of experience.

We got on very well in South-West Arabia for over 100 years. Then, recently, came a change of policy. We have a very real desire to try to improve the lot of the people there and it is really that which has caused the trouble. There are more Europeans in the Protectorate than there were before the war—more than the Arabs would really want to see. Above all, there was this very well-intentioned proposal for Federation.

It was quite obvious to Colonial-trained administrators that the tiny States of the Protectorate could not do any good by themselves, and it was proposed to them that they should think about federating. A picture was also built up of an administration, on rather the Colonial model, which would have had to be run by Europeans. As one Arab ruler put it to me, "After we had been getting closer to each other with the growing peace, we were frightened by federation. We knew it was good in principle, but when we began to look round we could look at each other and say: 'He is going to be more important than me,' and so on. You have always

been kind and friendly with us, but we know what you are when you are running things. You will be running us before long."

Federation was seen definitely as a threat to independence. You might say, in other words, that during the first 100 years or so of our occupation of Aden, the Arabs saw and liked the Greek side of us, but that when the Roman side appeared, they did not like it.

Oil has not yet been found in the Protectorate, but to complete the parallel with the old days of the incense civilization, there is now a civilization and culture growing up in the Persian Gulf States, borrowed this time from the Europeans and the Americans. But I do not think it has any deeper roots than that of the old incense civilization.

The money has been spent, as far as it can be, wisely in the Persian Gulf States, but the trouble is that there is just too much money and that the rulers are taking fantastic sums for their own use, and the people are just not learning to produce by their own efforts.

REACTION TO FEDERATION PROPOSALS

The Federation proposals in the Protectorate led to a chain reaction.

They were regarded by the Yemen as a breach of the 1934 Treaty. That was on their interpretation of the Treaty. They thought that the *status quo* meant that everything in the Protectorate was to remain as it had always been. But perhaps there are other fears stronger than even these legalistic objections, because the Zeidi rulers are always afraid of their Shafis. We usually estimate the Shafis at two-thirds of the population of the Yemen and the Zeidis at one-third, but I notice from an account of the late Imam's tax books that he estimated that there were 55 per cent. Zeidis and 45 per cent. Shafis.

In the old days, the Shafis used to be encouraged by the Turks, but when the Zeidis took over, they oppressed the Shafis. During late years, one of the things that has annoyed many people has been the royal monopoly of trade. It had something to do with the assassination of the late Iman Yahya and the attempted *coup d'état* on the life of the present Iman Ahmed, his son. All these things, and the general fear of what is happening in the Protectorate, make the Yemeni rulers uneasy.

There followed the encouragement given to the Yemen by Egypt and the Arab League, and now there has come this active participation by the Saudis. In addition, one cannot neglect the fact that the Russians are now involved.

I do not want to be too gloomy about this, but Communism really does seem to be making much more impact recently than it has done before. Syria seems to be riddled with it, and it is getting worse elsewhere in the Middle East. There is the great expansion of diplomatic and trade activity on the part of the Russians and their satellites in the Sudan, in Libya, in Ethiopia, in Liberia and in the Yemen. They have, of course, had an Embassy in Addis Ababa for a very long time but nothing particular seems to have come out of it. Indeed as far as their African activities are concerned, they have had extraordinarily little to show for all their effort. Even when they shifted over to the use of the World Federation of

Trade Unions as their main instrument and extended its activities, I do not think they got on much faster. There is no real Communist Party in any Colonial Territory yet except, of course, Cyprus and Malaya. In Africa, I think there is only one party that has Communist aspirations, and generally they have very little result from all their propaganda.

In the case of Aden, it is worthwhile remembering what happened to Jordan. It was a happy, paternally ruled country under King Abdulla, but in 1948 there was the great mistake of taking in a large piece of Palestine, with a different type of inhabitant. There were also the refugees. Most of the Communism in Jordan has come not so much from the activities of these refugees but from the intelligentsia—as it usually does in this kind of expansion—from doctors, teachers, lawyers, and so on.

When we compare that with the picture of Aden, I think it will be seen that Aden too had that happy kind of “backwardness” until fairly recently. It has, however, trebled its population since 1931: there is the great oil refinery and there are other undertakings, and these have resulted in the creation of an industrial proletariat. It is connected, of course, with the Protectorate and the Yemen because that is where it is recruited.

There has been the usual lack of contact which occurs when a place grows too fast for the administration to be able to keep in touch with the people. There has been a consequent lack of intelligence and the growth of an intelligentsia. There have not been enough well-qualified local teachers, and teachers from Egypt and Syria have been recruited. No matter how much they have been vetted, they naturally must have Arab nationalist feelings. Aden is completely free of Communism at present, but I suggest that it is a possibility that one has to look for.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

As regards the present political situation in the Protectorate, the governor has recently had a meeting with the rulers and there are rather better prospects. He told them that the British Government was convinced that it was only by some form of closer association that they could expect to strengthen their internal economy and social organization, but he also said categorically that they were entirely free to negotiate among themselves what form of association they wanted. If they wanted British advice it would be available, but they could accept or reject it as they liked, and whatever course they chose, the British Government would continue to help in the way it had always done. If there were combinations of States, it would help the combinations of States; or it would continue to help individual territories.

The rulers expressed their appreciation of these assurances and said that they would increase their confidence in and strengthen their friendship with Her Majesty's Government. They said that their discussions “about a more acceptable organization of their countries should be in accordance with the public spirit as crystallized and developed in the aims and objects of Arab nationalism.” The real substance of these assurances was in the references to confidence and friendship; it meant that they saw a return to

the period when they had lived in independence and friendly relations. I know that some of them had been unhappy that relations had suffered. I think this means that as far as they are concerned, they do not now regard their independence as threatened. If the tribesmen can think the same, I do not believe that any amount of hostile propaganda will have effect.

The rulers of the Aden Protectorate have never been masters in their own houses. They do not expect to be, because Arab tribes do not willingly accept rule. You will remember what Ibn Khaldun said: that every Arab regards himself worthy to rule and is not prepared to listen to either his father, his brother or the head of his clan. It is a very common proverb down in the Aden Protectorate that every tribesman considers himself a sultan.

On the possibilities of closer association, I do not think one can be very optimistic. The Arabs have never achieved an administrative federation. You may remember the remarks of Lawrence: that to talk about Arab federation was fantastic; if they were going to progress they would have to have it, but it would have to come from within. So far, the Arabs have achieved unity only under strong rulers.

There have been federations of tribes in South Arabia but, I think, always arising from weakness. When a tribe has been on the decline, it has sometimes had an arrangement with its neighbours to join together for defence, but that is a very different thing to uniting and subordinating themselves in a common administrative federation.

As far as we are concerned, we are under one or two disabilities in our approach to this question. Psychologically, we find it extraordinarily difficult, especially in the Colonial sphere, to regard self-government and independence in terms other than those of Western institutions, such as Parliamentary democracy, local government, and so on.

Then, of course, we have a certain measure of responsibility for these peoples under our protection, and I think we are handicapped by a feeling of conscience in respect of them. We do not feel nearly so free, for instance, as the Americans must do over their oil endeavours. I dare say the State Department in Washington gets a good many headaches at what happens in Arabia. We have always the feeling that the money that comes from any oil which may be found in the Aden Protectorate must be used to the best advantage of the whole territory and that attitude is a feature of our colonial policy.

It is extremely difficult for us who live in fertile lands to understand the philosophy that comes out of the deserts. Our Græco-Roman-Christian civilization stems essentially from fertile lands. It is because of this that we develop ourselves and expand and are constructive. Our environment has made us creative and given us an appreciation of law and order and a social conscience. The effects of living in deserts, however, are necessarily quite different. I got this feeling very strongly living amongst people in the Aden Protectorate, which is essentially a desert region. In the latest Aden Biennial Report the maximum amount of land estimated to be cultivable in the 112,000 square miles of the Protectorate is given as one per cent.

The well-known Arab individualism is essentially a product of the desert, and so are the exuberant ideas of freedom and independence as well as a very highly developed sense of cupidity. Desert dwellers cannot produce anything, so they cannot respond to ideas of change and progress as we do. Naturally, if people do not have property and feel that it is necessary to raid their neighbours, law and order cannot have much appeal. Further, as history has shown, Arabs do not seem to have any real staying power when they get into settled conditions. They lose the virtues that come with them from the deserts.

In general, there has been a failure of democracy as we know it throughout the Middle East. I would attribute a lot of it to individualism and to the general desert conditions of the region, the enormous size of the areas, scattered populations, low income, and so on.

I think it will take time to re-establish a satisfactory state of affairs in South-West Arabia, but I think that essentially the right kind of line is the policy which Lawrence described in the 1920s as being the British policy for Arabia—to keep a ring-wall round it and to allow the people to fight out their own complex and fatal destiny; to keep it as an area of Arab individualism.

In these days, of course, it is not quite so easy to do that literally as it was before, but the nearer we can keep to it, the better. I do not regard that myself as a pessimistic policy. Arabs can be persuaded to do things for their own good if one works with them from within and sees things through their eyes: it needs a lot of persuasion but it is said that the ancient Arabs developed eloquence because they would listen only to persuasive leaders. The important thing is to see whether Arabs, with their outlook on life, can make a success of the proposals for betterment we put to them.

If we are to maintain the influence we have had there, I think it is most important that we should show strength. One thing that is necessary in these Middle-East countries, I think, is to show that we have got a great deal of strength and that we are prepared to use it, but to use it in accordance with the general trend of what the people feel is right.

A chief who recently came to see me was talking of these small affairs in the Protectorate and he said, "You will remember that when my father was alive, you and he used to sit on the floor discussing affairs. My father knew that you knew what he could do and what he could not do with his tribesmen, and he knew also that you respected the Arab way of looking at things and did not want to disturb it. But he also knew that you had by you a big whip and that if it was necessary you would use it, and you would use it justly. There is not the same kind of intelligence about doing these things today."

Speaking of the earlier days, I would say that the Royal Air Force is *par excellence* the right kind of force to use. I think it is a great mistake to put in a lot of ground troops. "Face" is enormously important with Arabs and they are almost bound to fight with ground troops. The Royal Air Force was in a very strong position. It was extraordinarily good and friendly with the people on the ground, and its friendliness did not interfere with any action it had to take from aloft. No face was lost by the

people by giving in to air action. They could not reply—there was no reasonable reply—and so nobody blamed anyone who gave in.

In pre-war days, if highway robberies took place, we did not resort to direct punitive bombing. We used what was called blockade bombing [which avoided casualties] to make things uncomfortable and to make the tribe concerned come in and have its case heard and, if it was found guilty, pay a fine. If, however, we had tried to use air action to bring dissident tribes into subjection to rulers whom they never really accepted, we would not have had public opinion behind us. There was nothing shameful in highway robbery—it was good old-fashioned raiding—but at the same time it was recognized as a nuisance; and so we had public opinion behind us and we had also the support of those who were bombed. Not infrequently they came to the Royal Air Force and said, “Thank you very much for coming and bombing us. You saved our faces.” I have seen that happen myself once or twice. The Arab idea of rulers and tribesmen is quite different from ours of monarchs and subjects.

The point I wish to make is that there must be a good show of force and that air-force is psychologically better than ground-force, especially European ground-force.

There is a great need for what I call empathy. One must have not only sympathy with these curious people and like them, but one must be able to see things through their eyes. If we can do this, we can generally lead them along to something that is at least a tolerable compromise between us and them.

I go rather further than that. We must be extremely careful about things like education. I did a great deal in starting education myself in those parts, but it must always be done with the background in view. One must think of the kind of life to which the people are returning. I remember years ago being impressed, for instance, with what Dr. De Lacy O’Leary said in *Islam at the Cross Roads* about the misuse of Western education in Arab countries. That influenced me rather in determining the kind of Arab education we would have in these bedouin areas.

A large primary and secondary school system, all tied up with Western examinations, will end with the creation of a disgruntled intelligentsia. There is not the right background for Western-type educational systems when only one per cent. of the land is cultivable.

The best way of helping these Arabs is to help them to develop in the framework of their own institutions. Progress may be slow but friendship will be maintained.

The CHAIRMAN: We have about ten minutes, and Mr. Ingrams has said that he will kindly answer any questions or comments which anyone cares to make.

Mr. LANGE: One of our most staunch and faithful rulers in that part of Arabia was the Sultan of Lahej. I am quite sure that there are a good many other as staunch and faithful chiefs, particularly those who, during Mr. Ingrams’ time in Arabia, accepted the position of England. Is there much possibility that these faithful people are much swayed by the present propaganda which goes out from Egypt and possibly from Russia?

Mr. INGRAMS: The Sultan Abdul Karim of Lahej died some years ago, and his son is not at all the same kind of character. Sultan Abdul Karim was a great personality himself, a very wealthy man, and he had no formal treaty of protection with us. He was nominally an independent ruler. All these things combined to give him influence and make him the premier chief of the Protectorate. His son, now in his place, is, of course, much younger and inexperienced. He has no particular personal influence and he has signed a treaty which not only puts him under protection, but compels him to accept advice.

One subtle feature which I think affects the position is that the family of the Sultans of Lahej is not a very old one. The Sultan descends from a governor appointed by the Imam of the Yemen in the eighteenth century. I remember that some years ago the Sultan of Lahej wanted to contract a marriage between his own family and that of another family, whose pedigree dated back to the gods of ancient Himyar and had been on the seat, for a couple of thousand years or more. The Sultan with the longer pedigree was very much of a bedouin and the Sultan of Lahej was a very wise, statesmanlike person, but the proposed match was too much of a *mésalliance* to be considered.

To some extent, some of these chiefs who have been such great friends of ours are getting into the same position as the chiefs who have been our friends in other parts of the world. They have identified themselves too much with us. We have done a lot in supporting them, even in some cases bombing their tribes into submission to them. There is rather a danger of their being regarded as Imperialist stooges and not being able to give the help they used to give, for they lose influence with their people. In what they do, however, they are very loyal to us.

Lord BIRDWOOD: Was there a time when the Yemen held the territory down to the Aden coast?

Mr. INGRAMS: Yes. Throughout a good deal of the time of the Rasuli dynasty, Aden was a Yemeni port, down to about the middle of the eighteenth century. Pretty well the whole of the Western Protectorate was at one time, in the Arab sense, in their control. It is only occasionally, once or twice, that the Yemen has had any control in the Hadhramaut. But over the length of history control was not often very effective.

Colonel GUERRITZ: How far can the rulers command the loyalty of their people, and how far are they willing to subordinate their independence to a federation?

Mr. INGRAMS: As I tried to indicate, probably every sensible Arab would say that he agreed that unity was necessary, but when it came to the point they would be unlikely to achieve anything. When one is thinking of tribes, the tribal system in South Arabia is entirely different from the African idea of tribes. In Africa there is a corporate body and a corporate mind. In South Arabia a man only accepts his so-called ruler—he is not really a ruler, but a sheikh—if he can persuade him that it is the best thing to do, and in certain cases of danger.

Sir JOHN TROUTBECK: Why do the internal stresses between the minorities in the Yemen affect the Aden Protectorate?

Mr. INGRAMS: The whole of the Protectorate is Shafi, and there is a

large Shafi element in the Yemen. The Yemenis have felt that they can keep their own Shafis more or less in order in the usual oppressive ways which they have always used, but they are afraid that if the Aden Protectorate people get too forward and develop, and combine with their own Shafis, they will be overthrown. I think that eventually that is probably what will happen. If that did happen I do not think the rest of the Middle East would shed any particular tears over it, but it must clearly come about by Arab action and we must not be involved in it.

Colonel GUERRITZ: If the Yemenis are so hostile to us, could we not encourage the Shafis to take up that attitude against them?

Mr. INGRAMS: I do not think we could consider that. It would do much more harm than good.

A Lady MEMBER: In 1950 relations with the Yemen were much better. What was the immediate cause of the deterioration?

Mr. INGRAMS: The proposals for federation.

Mr. HAMILTON: Is any effort made to broadcast on an equivalent scale, to compete with these people at their own game?

Mr. INGRAMS: There are the B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts and Aden's own broadcasting station. I do not know about "on an equivalent scale," but I think the station is doing reasonably well. Aden is now being listened to quite a lot by the people in the Protectorate. The station uses a lot of local music, which attracts audiences, and I think that, provided straight news is given and a feeling of sympathy with Protectorate feelings is engendered, progress will be made. With the ordinary rank and file of the listeners, however, it is emotions which play so much more important a part than reason.

In the Hadhramaut, when I was there a year or two ago, some of these people at a dinner party said, "You know how it is with us. We much prefer listening to Syria and Egypt, because the people are Arab and independent, but we always listen to the B.B.C. to check whether they are saying the right thing." Other people are not quite so discriminating as that.

I remember also that the last time I was there, I was speaking to the Arab Director of Education in the Quaiti State. During the war there had been a big famine. Government servants and merchants had agreed to set aside a little from their salaries to help in famine relief. He told me what they were doing with it now. Most of it was being used to provide money for students to go to Egypt, Syria, Iraq—all the independent kind of places. When I queried this, he replied: "You know how it is. We know they get a good education in your places, but our heart must naturally be on the other side."

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is up. We have had a most interesting lecture from Mr. Ingrams. The part that I personally enjoyed so much is the way he has brought out, in this age of mass production and Communist theories, the vital part of the wise dealing with the human factor in all these things. He has given us a very good picture, and on your behalf I thank him very much indeed. (*Applause.*)

THE WEST AND THE MIDDLE EAST

BY MR. BICKHAM SWEET-ESCOTT

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on **Wednesday, April 25, 1956**, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bickham Sweet-Escott, who has kindly come to talk to us this afternoon, is well known to many here for his talks on the radio. He was in the Middle East during the last war and has travelled there considerably since. Amongst his other qualifications and talents, he has produced a book on Greece which was published by and for Chatham House. Today Mr. Bickham Sweet-Escott is going to speak about "The West and the Middle East." Mr. Bickham Sweet-Escott.

FOR the first forty years or so of this century, Central Europe and the Balkans provided the great powers with the raw materials of their principal quarrels. It is beginning to look as if during the second half of the century the Middle East is going to take the place of the Balkans in this respect. One thing at least I am sure of is that the conflict between the interests of the great powers of the West and the interests of the local people in the Middle East is at least as complicated as it was in Central Europe between the wars. What I propose to try to do today, therefore, is to set out some of the more important interests and aims of the peoples concerned, and to show how they are related to the main issues involved. This will mean a number of glimpses of the obvious—perhaps even close-ups of the obvious—but I make no apology for that, because in a situation so confused as the situation in the Middle East is today, it is very easy to lose sight of the basic facts which must determine policy. It is just as well, therefore, to remind ourselves of them from time to time. I do not pretend that a survey of this sort will point the way to any solution of the difficulties which we have to face in the Middle East. On the contrary it is as well to remember that it is not a law of nature that there is a nice, neat little solution to all the problems with which man is faced. I think, however, that my survey will not have been a complete waste of your time—at least I hope not—if it reveals some of the directions in which no solution can be found.

I will begin with the objectives of the Western Powers in the Middle East. There are two points on which, I think, all members of the Western Alliance would be agreed, but that is just about all they are agreed upon. First, they would agree, I think, that it is essential to preserve peace in the Middle East and to prevent the Middle East from going the way of Czechoslovakia or China and disappearing behind the Iron Curtain. Secondly, they would agree that the West must, if possible, continue to have access to the oil of the Middle East, and to have access to it on present terms. That mysterious character Mr. Richard Strong reminded Sir Anthony Eden in the *Evening Standard* last night, and so I hope you will not mind my reminding you today, that seventy per cent. of the world's proved reserves of oil comes from the Middle East. What is more, three-quarters of the oil that we consume in Western Europe also comes from the

Middle East. In the case of the United Kingdom 83·6 per cent. of the oil we consumed last year came from the Middle East. If that oil were denied to Western Europe and it were possible to find a substitute for it elsewhere, which personally I doubt, one thing which is practically certain is that the new suppliers of Western Europe's oil would require Europe to pay for it in dollars. This would make nonsense of the efforts which Western Europe has made since the end of the war to produce equilibrium in its balance of payments and to save dollars. And even if the oil of the Middle East is not denied to the West, it is, for the same reason, essential, as I have said, that we should continue to get it on the present terms: that is to say, for payment in sterling. So far, I think, all the Western Powers are agreed, but it is at this point that the interests of the individual Powers in the Western Alliance begin to diverge.

Take our own position first. To start with, our scope for manœuvre is limited by a network of treaties and alliances. There is, first of all, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 by which the Americans, the French and ourselves guarantee, if that is the right word, the present frontiers of Israel. Then there is the Agreement with Egypt whereby we may re-occupy the Canal Zone if Turkey or any of the Arab States are attacked. Under the Baghdad Pact we are allied to Iraq, Persia and Pakistan, and, of course, Turkey, with which all the other members of N.A.T.O. also are allies. We are still allied to Jordan and we are still paying her a large subsidy each year. We have a similar arrangement with Libya; and in the Persian Gulf we are responsible for the foreign affairs and defence of the vastly important Sheikdoms and Principalities of Kuwait, Bahrein, Muscat, Oman, and so on. Finally, we occupy bases in Aden and Cyprus. In most of these arrangements the emphasis is on defence and on the military action which would have to be taken in certain circumstances. All these arrangements are relics of an age in which we physically dominated the whole of the Middle East. But they are survivals which mark out the British interest in the area as different in kind from that of the rest of the Western Powers.

There is another survival from the recent age of British Imperialism which differentiates our interests in the area from those of the rest of the Western Powers. Quite apart from our enormous financial investment in oil, we still possess vast investments in the area—investments in static, immovable installations and industries—for instance, the Suez Canal Company, out of which Her Majesty's Government gets an annual tax-free revenue of £3 million. There are a few French banks in the area, and recently one or two of the American banks have opened in Cairo, Beirut and elsewhere, but by far the greater part of the foreign banks operating in the Middle East are British. In some of these territories it is still the case that the only banks are British. It is the same story with the insurance companies, with most of the airlines and with many other important industries. Then again, Jordan, Iraq and the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf are members of the sterling area and they keep their sterling reserves in London, so that we have a vested interest in seeing that they follow a sensible monetary policy. Finally, our trade with the Middle East is immense. Last year, some £200 million worth of British exports went to the Middle East,

which is rather more than the sterling value of all our exports that year to the United States. There can be little doubt that our economic interests in the Middle East are far and away greater than those of any other Power. So we have every interest in preserving the *status quo* in the area. This is exactly the result which the unique network of treaties and alliances by which we are bound is designed to produce.

The history of American interests in the Middle East is rather different. In fact, during the war I saw an American State paper which boasted that whereas the Arabs knew all about the material interests of the British in the Middle East, and were therefore always very suspicious of British policy, they recognized that the Americans had no such interests, and accepted American help in education, technical assistance, and so on, at its face value. It is true that American institutions such as the Roberts College in Istanbul or the famous university in Beirut have done a great deal in the past to induce the people of the Middle East to believe that the American interests there are purely philanthropic and humanitarian—and; of course, to put across the better aspects of the American way of life.

But there have been a great many changes in American interests in the area during the last ten years. There was, first of all, the establishment of the State of Israel, the driving force in which was supplied by Washington, just as the finance without which the new State would have collapsed was provided by New York. Although the Arabs blame the British as well as the Americans for Israel's existence, they are all of them aware of the way in which the Jewish voter in the United States can tie the hands of the State Department, particularly in an election year. The other thing which has changed the nature of America's interests in the Middle East during the past ten years is, of course, oil. American companies have long held an interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company and in the companies operating in the Kuwait and Bahrein oilfields, and more or less the same group of companies have for a number of years controlled the Aramco concern in Saudi Arabia. In fact, the only big new investment by the Americans in the oil of the Middle East recently has been in the company formed two years ago to operate the Persian fields. What has changed the nature of American oil interests is that the United States now has to import more oil than she exports. As the result there has been an immense increase in production by Aramco, and the Americans now find themselves under the necessity of appeasing—or, at any rate, not antagonizing—King Sa'ud and his family, at a time when the policy which the family are pursuing is contrary to Western interests. These difficulties in Saudi Arabia are aggravated by the leasing of the great air base of Dharhan, the nearest American military air base to Russian territory. The lease was signed during the honeymoon period of American relations with Saudi Arabia, and it expires in a few weeks' time. American policy is, therefore, paralyzed, at any rate at present, by the need to reconcile the irreconcilable: namely, to avoid antagonizing the Jewish voter at home and at the same time to keep King Sa'ud sweet. On top of this their relations with Saudi Arabia, which is bitterly opposed to the Baghdad Pact, have prevented the Americans—at any rate, until last week—from doing anything more than holding out a rather flabby hand of welcome to the Baghdad Pact.

Finally, there are two things which make it difficult for the Americans to give British policy in the Middle East any very substantial backing. One is the traditional American inhibition about colonialism, which is inevitably aroused by the action we feel ourselves bound to take from time to time, for instance in Cyprus or Jordan or Bahrein. The other is a feeling which seems to be growing in Washington that the British are not necessarily good people to back, because in spite of all the knowledge and experience that they have of the area, they do certainly seem to make from time to time some very remarkable mistakes—as, for example, over Jordan. For all these reasons a combination between British experience and American power has so far not been practical politics.

Besides ourselves and the Americans, a number of other members of the Western Alliance also have important interests in the Middle East. But the only other countries whose interests have any practical importance are France and Germany. The French have never forgotten the special position they have occupied since the Crusades in Syria and the Lebanon, and they have never forgiven the British for the part they think we played at the end of the last war in tearing these two countries away from them and establishing them as independent States. What is more, they seem to be afraid that behind the Baghdad Pact there lurks the danger that the British intend to further the realization of Greater Syria, the federation between Iraq, Jordan and the two Levant States which the French have fought for so long, and which, if brought into being, would be yet another blow to France's special position in the Levant.

That is one of the reasons why France has refused to have anything to do with the Baghdad Pact. Another reason is certainly the very understandable obsession of the French with the desperate situation with which they are faced in North Africa. Their troubles in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have not been created by the Egyptians, but the Egyptians are certainly doing all they can to help the people of North Africa achieve their independence from the French. It could very well be that if the French were to upset the Egyptians by joining the Pact, the Egyptians would redouble their efforts against the French in North Africa. At the same time the French have, like ourselves, important static economic interests in the Middle East—in the Suez Canal, for instance, and, of course, in the Iraq Petroleum Company—but even these interests are completely overshadowed by their preoccupations in North Africa; and it is easy to understand why in Paris at the moment North Africa should come before the Middle East.

As for the Germans, there was a time towards the end of the Wafd regime in Egypt in 1951 when there were so many Germans in Cairo in the employ of the Egyptian Government that to some of us it seemed on the cards that the Germans might be able to establish themselves very shortly as the dominant Western power in Egypt, although there was no evidence that that was ever the policy of the German Government. In any case, the Egyptian revolution of 1952 put that out of the question. Since then, however, the Western Germans have captured a very large part of the trade of Egypt and of the rest of the area, and their engineers and contractors have been particularly active and exceedingly successful in the Middle East. It is significant that, during his recent visit to London, the

West German Minister of Economics, Dr. Erhard, expressed concern at the competition which the West is meeting from Russia and her satellites in practically every market of the Middle East. He even suggested that the West should consider seriously an international effort to outbid the Russians, but nothing more was heard of the suggestion. Apart from her commercial interests in the area, Western Germany has few if any static investments such as we or the French have. It is, however, important to remember that Germany has been one of the instruments for keeping the new State of Israel alive through the enormous volume of exports she is sending to Israel under her reparations agreement with that country.

Generally speaking, therefore, it would be fair to say that the West might be reasonably happy about its interests in the Middle East if the existing order of things in the Middle East were left as it is—or let us say as it was until a few months ago. Unfortunately, there are several important reasons why the Arabs are not satisfied with things as they are. The most important is, of course, Israel. The Israelis themselves having, in the teeth of all the probabilities, succeeded in establishing their bridgehead in the Middle East eight years ago, now have one concern and one concern only: that is, to hold on to the bridgehead, threatened as it is politically by the arms which the Russians are supplying to the Egyptians, and economically by the doubts as to how long American help will continue. All that the Israelis think about is how to stop the new State of Israel from going the way of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the twelfth century, the other bridgehead which the West once established in the Middle East. In other words, unlike the Arabs, the Israelis have a vested interest in the *status quo* and it is not surprising that one of the means they have canvassed—I will not say more than that—for preserving the *status quo* is the possibility that they might join another body which has an interest in the *status quo*—namely, the Commonwealth. Obviously, that is out of the question, for the time being, at any rate, because of the vital interest which the Commonwealth has and will continue to have in getting oil from the Arab countries. But the Israelis might be forgiven for thinking that if they cannot secure their position in that way, the only other feasible way of preserving it would be to start a preventive war before the odds against them get too heavy. On top of this, it must be remembered that there is an important group of Zionists who recognize that Israel's economy would collapse at once but for the help it gets from the West and that her only hope of survival lies in territorial expansion. As Sir Reader Bullard has recounted, when in the 1930s Dr. Weizmann was being criticized by some of his Zionist supporters for proposing to give away to Jordan rather more of Palestine than they thought was fair, he observed to them, "Well, it will not run away." In other words, it would still be there for the taking.

The Arabs, therefore, do have grounds for fearing that Israel might one day try to expand her territory at their expense. But to say that, conveys no idea whatsoever of the intensity of Arab feeling about Israel, and it is the one thing about which the Arabs are all agreed. In the West we often talk as though the problem of Israel consists of finding a method of arriving at an agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis about the frontiers or about the treatment of the refugees—in other words, of finding a com-

promise between the Arabs and the Israelis. To the Arabs the only problem is how and when Israel can be eliminated altogether. The question of a compromise is something they simply do not even begin to consider. In the West we tend to forget that for the last eight years every Arab State has behaved as though Israel did not exist. There has been a complete economic boycott of the country, and the state of war with Israel has been continuous ever since 1948. We are apt to forget also that Israel's Arab neighbours and Iraq harbour a million homeless refugees from Palestine, whose only hope in life is that one day they might be able to go back. Nearly half of them live in Jordan, and there can be no doubt that the reason for the recent upheavals in that country was largely that the Government of Jordan looked like doing something which was unpopular with the refugees. There is no doubt also that the refugees have been used quite heartlessly for political purposes by some of the countries which harbour them. They have, for instance, been discouraged from accepting resettlement, because if they did agree to resettlement schemes they might lose interest in the possibility of a return to Israel.

The truth is that the Arabs are so obsessed with their hatred of Israel that they are almost totally blind to anything else. And the determination to remove Israel from the map is the first and most important way in which the Arabs wish to change the *status quo*. The second arises from the nature of Arab nationalism. This has been given a tremendous impetus by the Bandoeng Conference last year between the Afro-Asian nations and the consequent promotion to dirty word status of expressions such as "colonialism," "imperialism," and so on. But Arab nationalism had its origins far back in the last century, and the feeling is all the bitterer now because of the frustrations the Arabs met with between the wars, when instead of obtaining the independence they thought they had been promised they found that all that had happened was that they had exchanged Ottoman domination for domination by the British or the French.

Since 1945, the complete withdrawal of the French and the gradual withdrawal of the British has given the nationalist movements a great deal more encouragement. Now that the British really are almost out of Egypt, the pressure to remove all that remains of foreign political influence is becoming exceedingly great, in Jordan, for instance, or in Aden, and possibly later on in Libya, or even in the Persian Gulf. This does not by any means necessarily mean that the Arab States wish to eradicate foreign economic interests. On the contrary, most of the Arab States seem to recognize that they will need foreign techniques and foreign finance for many years to come, although Syria for one has refused to accept Point Four aid from the Americans for fear that this might lead to American political influence. What it does mean is that any attempt by the West to exert control over policy—as, for instance, through the Arab Legion, or through a position such as the French occupy in Algeria—is bound to be bitterly resented and actively resisted. Here is a translation of a recent broadcast on the "Voice of the Arabs" transmission from Cairo:

"We want for you life, life with us on an equal footing, without imperialism, exploitation or enslavement. Do you hear, O Britain—do

you hear our call to live? Only give up your imperialism, and we shall ensure for you your interests, your reputation and everything that is dear to you."

One thing which is often forgotten about the Arab nationalist movement is that the various Arab States which now exist have all been created in the last generation and there is, therefore, a great deal less loyalty to the State as such than there is to the idea of Arab unity. This feeling of unity among the Arabs is a very real thing and it transcends most, if not all, of the man-made artificial frontiers which the West has drawn across the map in that area. After all, these people have a great deal in common—in their language, their religion and their way of life—though it is true that their way of life is being rapidly distorted by the new wealth that oil is bringing. And it is important to remember that Cairo is in many ways the centre of the Arab world. Egyptian newspapers, Egyptian films and Egyptian radio transmissions get a wide dissemination throughout the area, which cannot be said of those of any other Arab country. One of the reasons why the Egyptians were so bitter about Nuri es-Said's decision to join the Baghdad Pact was that it constituted a real breach in this unity of the Arab world. At the same time, although Islam is one of the principal reasons for the strength of this feeling of unity among the Arabs, religious differences may well have contributed to the defection of Iraq, for, as you know, a large proportion of Iraqis follow the Shia persuasion, whereas in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, Sunnis predominate; and it is among the Sunnis that the Muslim Brotherhood has made its greatest progress. Although the Brotherhood has now been driven underground in Egypt and in other countries too, it has, potentially, immense political importance, for it is a revivalist movement like the Wahabi movement in the eighteenth century, and its adherents believe passionately in a return to the strict teaching of the Koran and the complete rejection of the Western way of life. So the strength of religious emotion tends to make the Arabs feel different from the West, sustains the feeling of Arab unity, and fortifies the objections of the Arabs to any kind of foreign political control.

The leaders of the Egyptian revolution are making the fullest use of all these feelings in their present attempt to create an Egyptian hegemony and to build up a kind of nationalist Arab Third Force in the area. Up to the present, their policy has been exceedingly successful throughout the Middle East, with the solitary exception of the Sudan. The Egyptians have broken the power of the British in Jordan, they have made it difficult for any other Arab country to join the Baghdad Pact and they are actively assaulting the British position in the Persian Gulf and Aden, which is evidently the reason for the latest move over the Yemen. They are carrying out a campaign of political warfare and subversion against the British in Tanganyika, Kenya, Zanzibar and Uganda, and it is worth noting that an Egyptian radio transmission is about to begin to Nigeria, if it has not already begun. In addition, they have given every possible support to the rebellion against the French in North Africa. The remarkable success which the Egyptians have achieved by this policy has for the moment

completely hypnotized the Arab world, and as a result the Egyptians are at present the main obstacle to Western plans in the Middle East.

But the Egyptians have had to pay a certain price for their success. One of the things which it has involved is the exploitation of old feuds which, so far from furthering the object of Arab unity, makes that object more difficult to attain. For instance, one of the methods they have used to keep Syria and the Lebanon out of the Baghdad Pact is to remind them of Iraq's ambition to achieve a greater Syria, and so they have set the Levant states against Iraq. The policy has meant also the exploitation of the traditional feud between the descendants of Ibn Saud and the Sherif of Mecca, whose family occupy the thrones of Iraq and Jordan. It has demanded the closest *entente* with Saudi Arabia, which is apparently acting as the paymaster to the bloc of powers which Egypt has built up for the costly campaign of political warfare and subversion that the policy requires. This also may lead to difficulties, for there is a contradiction in terms between the internal policies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. After all, Colonel Nasser is engaged on a social revolution, and to my mind one of the most admirable things about the present regime there is its determination to improve the standard of living of the *fellahin*. The first act of Nasser's predecessor, Neguib, was to try to divide up some of the big estates, and the whole object of Colonel Nasser's cherished plan to realize the High Dam scheme at Aswan is to revolutionize Egypt's economic position. But a social revolution is the last thing which is in the minds of the rulers of Saudi Arabia, where social and economic conditions can be described only as feudal. The things which Colonel Nasser is out to destroy in Egypt are just the things which in Saudi Arabia it is the interest of the ruling classes to preserve. I find it difficult to believe that an alliance which is based on a union of opposites can have any lasting value—like the alliance between Hitler and the Russians in 1939.

Then again, the leaders of Egypt's revolution have certainly got big ideas about the future of Egypt and the part that their country is likely to play in the councils of the Middle East when foreign influences are finally withdrawn. Memories are short in the Middle East, but I do not think people have altogether forgotten the Empire which Mehemet Ali carved out for himself in the Middle East 140 years ago and they are therefore well aware that there can be such a thing as Egyptian imperialism. I see no reason why Egyptian imperialism should be any more popular in the Arab world than any other kind of imperialism, and the more successful Egypt's policy is, the greater will be the local opposition that it is likely to build up against itself, even among those who at the moment are Egypt's closest associates.

Above all, the policy has given the Russians their chance to intervene in the Middle East. All Oriental Powers dream of being able to play off one great Power against another and, sure enough, in this case the policy has paid at least one handsome dividend over the High Aswan Dam scheme, because I very much doubt whether the World Bank would have agreed with such alacrity to finance the scheme if the West had not been afraid that if they did not do it, Colonel Nasser would very soon find somebody else who would. Here, again, there may be serious difficulties

ahead if the policy of bringing the Russians into the Middle East is pursued much further. After all, there is a fundamental difference between the Moslem way of life and the Communist way of life—probably a greater difference than between the Moslem way of life and the Western way of life. For one thing, Islam is a religious movement and is based on spiritual values, whereas, if it is right to call Communism a religion at all, the Communist believes that all spiritual values are illusory. And the acceptance of Russian help requires the Egyptians and their friends to accept at its face value the Russian assertion that there are no strings attached to Russian help. It requires also an implicit belief that there is no such thing as Russian imperialism and that the Communist threat to the Middle East is simply a bogey invented by the West to frighten the Arabs into falling in with Western plans.

It is their freedom from illusions of this kind about the Russians that has brought the non-Arab Moslem countries of the Middle East together in the Baghdad Pact—together with Iraq, the only Arab country which is a member of it. The Turks have had a long history of resistance to Russian expansionism, and in any case they are members of N.A.T.O. The decision of Pakistan to join the Pact was no doubt reached on rather different grounds, for the deciding factor in this case was probably the sense of isolation that Pakistan felt through the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan on her western frontier, and on the eastern frontier the Soviet support for the Indian case over Kashmir. The Persians, like the Turks, have for centuries had to struggle for their existence against the Russians. All the same, the Persian decision to join the Pact meant the abandonment of Persia's traditional policy, which she has constantly pursued for the last 150 years, of not committing herself either to Russia or to any of the great Powers of the West. I think that the Egyptians and their friends would do well to reflect that Persia is the only country in the Middle East where people know from their own experience what a Russian occupation can be like, and that it was not until the Russians had shown their hand and made it clear through the Czech offer of arms to Egypt that they intended to intervene in the Middle East, that the Persian Government decided to come off the fence and join the Pact. It may be that the decision was forced on them by the British and the Americans and bore no relation to public opinion in the country, if it is right to speak of public opinion at all in Persia; but even if that is so, I can hardly believe that the Shah would have dared to join the Pact if the Russians had not first shown their hand.

The position of Iraq as a member of the Pact is particularly interesting. There is no doubt that to an important section of public opinion in Iraq the idea of Arab unity makes an immense appeal. Iraqis who think this way are convinced that the only thing which matters to a good Iraqi is Israel. They feel that their own Government has made a mistake in joining the Pact, and they sympathize with the view of the Egyptians that foreign political influence should be removed from the Middle East. If anybody is inclined to doubt the strength of this feeling, I would remind him of the fiasco of 1948, when the Iraqi Prime Minister came to London with an overwhelming vote of confidence in his favour and signed with

Mr. Bevin the famous Portsmouth Treaty, but found when he got back to Baghdad that anti-imperialist feeling in the country was still so strong that the Treaty could never be ratified. These feelings are being fomented by the immense effort being put out in Iraq by Saudi Arabia propaganda. When I was in Baghdad recently someone said to me that Iraq now has two sources of wealth—the royalties from the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Saudi Arabian gold which is spent in Iraq on subversion.

On the other hand, Iraq is the nearest to Russia of all the Arab States, and she has always been exceedingly sensitive to the possibility of Communist penetration. The present Government of Nuri Pasha—who, incidentally, is himself of Turkish origin—is evidently convinced that Iraq could not do without the West, even if this means, as it has meant, splitting the Arab League and destroying the unity of the Arab world. It is probably true that Nuri has been able to get away with this only because he knows how to govern. Indeed, I was told in Baghdad that Iraq can almost be classified as a police state, although that is almost certainly an exaggeration. But one cannot fool all the people all the time, even in Iraq, and there is certainly a good deal of support for Nuri. The trouble is that he admits to sixty-eight years of age, and what will happen when he goes is anyone's guess. There is an obvious risk that there might be a complete swing of the pendulum and that Iraq might once again declare herself against the West.

Whatever may happen to Iraq, the fact remains that today the Middle East can be divided into those to whom fear of Russia means something—namely, the members of the Baghdad Pact—and the Egyptian bloc. As for the Russians, anything that one says about their intentions is bound to have a very large element of guesswork in it, especially at a time like this, when Stalinism has been rejected and the policy of the Kremlin is obviously in the melting pot. All one can do is to look at the facts. It is, for instance, a fact of geography that the long frontier which Russia shares with Turkey and Persia could be the approach to the vital industrial centres she is building up in Central Asia, and that the Russians have every right to feel sensitive about that frontier. It is a fact of history that since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has had a warm water port on the Persian Gulf on her shopping list. It is unfortunately also a fact—indeed, it is a commonplace—that economic and social conditions in the Middle East are so desperate that the whole area is in what the Marxist textbooks call a pre-revolutionary state. It is equally undeniable that if one day the Russians were able to bring about a Communist revolution in the Middle East, it would not only provide Russia with a protective belt along that very important frontier and give her a position on the Persian Gulf, but the loss of Middle Eastern oil, which might be the consequence, would mean the economic collapse of this country, if not of the whole of Western Europe. Such a result could be brought about by subversion, and military action might not be necessary at all.

It is in the light of these facts that we have to judge the steps Russia has taken in the Middle East during the past year, namely, the sale of arms to the Arabs and the opening of a major economic offensive throughout the area. As for the arms deal, there is no doubt in my mind that it had two objects. One was to break the Baghdad Pact, which the Kremlin

thought was directed at the soft under-belly of Central Asia, and the method was simply to offer arms to the Arabs on condition that they did not join the Pact. The second was to force the West to recognize that Russia has the right to be consulted about the Middle East, and I should not be at all surprised to hear that if, as a result of the present negotiations in London, Russia is asked to join the great Powers of the West in a guarantee of peace in the Middle East, the supply of arms by Russia and her satellites to the Arabs had suddenly and mysteriously ceased. If so, it will certainly cause a good deal of disillusionment in the Arab world. But the process of agonizing reappraisal of Russian intentions by the Arabs has already begun, particularly in the reaction of the Egyptians to the Russian support for Mr. Hammarskjöld's mission to the Middle East. In any case, I do not suppose that that would worry the Russians very much. It will certainly be uncomfortable for us to have to work with the Russians in the Middle East after the area has been so long a close preserve of the West. But it is difficult to challenge the right of the Russians to be in the Middle East, and in any case, it is now quite impossible to keep them out.

The economic offensive which the Russians and their satellites are waging in the Middle East is to my mind a much more serious matter. The method is to offer Russian aid by way of Russian economic and technical assistance and so on; and for the past six months hardly a day has passed without bringing news of yet another development in this direction. The economic interest which Russia has shown in this area is so sudden and so intensive that one is bound to conclude that behind it there is a carefully co-ordinated plan. And although it is the invariable refrain of the Kremlin that there are no strings attached to Russian aid, there has been nothing to show that the ultimate object is not just as political as the similar economic offensive carried out by Dr. Schacht in South-East Europe between the wars—in other words, political domination through economic penetration. If that is so, the protection of Western interests has ceased to be a purely military problem. I am not saying that it is unnecessary to consider military measures to protect Western interests in the Middle East—far from it. What I am saying is that military measures may not be enough.

Faced with this challenge, the West has shown a singular lack of unity about the Middle East. We in this country lack the power to act, and for the present the Americans, who have the power, are paralyzed. It was stated in the House of Commons only a few weeks ago that the two cornerstones of British policy in the Middle East were the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 and the Baghdad Pact. The Tripartite Agreement seems to have been flung in the waste-paper basket by the decision of the Americans and the Russians to try to settle the question of Israel through the United Nations; and for months the Americans have refused to join the Baghdad Pact, although they gave it all their support in its early days. Their decision to join the Economic Committee and the other Committees last week is certainly an encouraging sign, particularly because it will provide an answer to the critics of the Pact, who from the start have complained that the Pact was merely a militaristic anachronism and was a proof that the West was thinking in military terms only. But the difference between the

British and the American view of the Pact has persisted for so long that the rift between our two points of view is plain for everybody in the Middle East to see. The net result is that although the Arabs constantly talk of Western policy in the Middle East as though it were a common policy, the only thing that seems to be common about it at present is an agreement to differ in public on nearly all the major issues.

But the importance of the Middle East to the West is so enormous that somehow or other the West will have to agree among themselves about it. It is not for me to say how this is to be done. All I can say is that any Western policy for the Middle East will have to satisfy one or two elementary requirements. One is that it will have to be a policy on which all the Western Powers are agreed, because faced as we are with the Russian challenge we are none of us strong enough individually to go it alone. Another is that we shall have to face the problem of Israel, instead of trying to ignore it, as I think some of us did during last year's orgy of pact building. Yet another is that we must realize that the defence of Western interests in the Middle East is not exclusively or even mainly a military problem. On the contrary, the more we talk of military measures the more the West lays itself open to the charge of imperialist war-mongering. Finally, the Russians have told us that in the Middle East and in all the other uncommitted parts of the world they intend to proceed by the process of competitive co-existence. If competitive co-existence means anything, it surely means that the West will have to *compete* with the Russians—that the West will have to make an immense effort to improve on the Russian offers of economic and technical assistance, so immense that it will have to be a co-ordinated effort on an international scale. For unless the West is able to show that it can compete with the Russian challenge, the future it faces in the Middle East is gloomy indeed.

WARIS AMEER ALI: Did I understand the Lecturer correctly to say that in his opinion the Russians had a right to be consulted about matters in the Middle East? If so, why?

Mr. SWEET-ESCOTT: I do not think that is quite what I said. What I meant to say was that the Russians are in the Middle East now and it is exceedingly difficult, when they say they must be consulted about the Middle East, to see why they should not be consulted. We have got to face the fact that they are there, whether we like it or not. It may not be a very agreeable thing to have to do, but the fact remains that they are there and we cannot turn them out.

AMEER ALI: Are they there except for an adequate supply of Czech arms, which I understand have also been supplied to Israel in the past?

Mr. SWEET-ESCOTT: They are getting in commercially in a very big way. As I said in my talk, hardly a day passes without some indication of yet another move by Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia or the Russians themselves offering contracts, loans or technical advice of one kind or another—for instance, the nuclear laboratory that the Russians are setting up in Cairo. A large part of the Egyptian cotton crop this year might have had to be carried over but for the fact that the Russians, the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Roumanians bought it at the Egyptian Govern-

ment's price. The curious result of that is that they have bought a great deal more than they need; and now, if a Central European wants to buy Egyptian cotton, he can buy it in Hamburg and Zurich for a good deal less than he would have had to pay for it if he had bought it direct from Egypt.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid our time has come to an end. We have had a most interesting and astonishingly clear analysis of this most important problem from our Lecturer, and on your behalf I would thank him very much indeed for all the trouble he has taken in preparing his talk and for coming and giving it to us in such a clear manner. Thank you very much.

April 25, 1956.

THE EDUCATION OF ENGINEERS IN RUSSIA

By B. L. GOODLET, O.B.E., M.A., M.I.C.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 9, 1956, Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my very pleasant duty to introduce the lecturer, Mr. Goodlet, who has many distinctions. Firstly, he had the unusual fate to be born in St. Petersburg as it then was, the Petrograd of today. He knew Russia in his youth. He returned to Russia in 1955. Meanwhile, he was trained with Vickers and Metropolitan Vickers and later became engineer in charge of the Million Volt Research Laboratory of the Metropolitan Vickers Electricity Co. Then he became Professor of Electrical Engineering at Birmingham University and afterwards Professor of Electrical Engineering at Cape Town University and Dean of the Faculty of Engineering there. In 1952 he was Chairman of the Naval Education Advisory Committee at the Admiralty. Until recently he was deputy chief engineer, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell. He is now chief engineer and a director of the Brush Electrical Engineering Company, Ltd. Mr. Goodlet has also been responsible for various technical publications. We are extraordinarily fortunate in having such an authoritative and distinguished person with us, and evidence for that is shown by the fact that there are present many distinguished members of the engineering profession.

Mr. Goodlet then delivered his lecture as follows:

I WOULD, first, like to express my appreciation of being asked to address this distinguished Society. Secondly, I must explain that I was born in Russia; I learned my arithmetic in German; my algebra in Russian and my calculus in English. I left Russia in 1918 and, as the Chairman has told you, returned there in November, 1955, as one of eight members of a British Atomic Energy team, the Russians having invited us to go and see what they were doing. After thirty-seven years out of Russia I found myself in Moscow. Our team had a very full programme. I was taken with two others to the N. E. Baumann Technical Institute where we spent an afternoon. My sole qualification for talking about Russian education is therefore a good deal of family background and a quick visit to one particular institution. The actual factual information I collected during the course of my visit in 1955 was published in a two-page article in *Engineering* on February 10, 1956. Therefore I am not now going to repeat all the detailed figures and so on, but endeavour to give you something of the background of Russian technical education as I took it up and pieced it together from my historical and general background.

I would like to suggest that our profession of Engineering has two distinct traditions—engineering as an empirical craft and engineering as a science. The science as distinct from the craft of engineering was cradled in eighteenth-century France. The first trained professional engineers were the officers of the Corps du Genie formed by Marshal Vauban. Engineering science was first taught in the military schools of France founded in 1720 and the first treatise on Engineering Science was Commandant Belidor's "La Science des Ingenieurs" published in 1729. The Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees was founded in 1747, and by the time of the revolution

two traditions had been firmly established in France: *First*, that the engineer was an officer rather than a workman; *Second*, that the engineer received a scientific education.

This was the system which produced the engineer officer Charles Augustin Coulomb, whose pioneer work on friction, on earth pressure, on torsion and on electricity and magnetism endures to this day.

In the year 1793 the French military schools were disbanded as both pupils and teachers were suspected of counter-revolutionary tendencies. In the same year Gaspard Monge, Professor of Mathematics of the Ecole de Marine, proposed to the new Government that an engineering school of a new type be organized to replace all those which had existed under the old regime. This proposal was approved and instruction in the new school began in 1794. In 1795, the school was given its present name—L'Ecole Polytechnique.

The system of instruction in the new school, planned by Monge, differed substantially from earlier practice. In the old schools the design of each type of structure had been treated as a separate and distinct problem. If some special bit of mathematical or scientific knowledge was needed, it was taught as part of the design process.

In the new school it was assumed that the different branches of engineering required the same preparation in the general subjects—mathematics, mechanics, physics and chemistry. It was also assumed that a student well grounded in these fundamental sciences would find it easy to acquire the specialized knowledge pertaining to any particular branch of engineering. In accordance with this conception the first two years of the course were devoted exclusively to the fundamental sciences, while engineering was studied in condensed form only in the third year. Later on the engineering courses were discontinued and the Ecole Polytechnique became a school for fundamental science only, training in engineering being given subsequently in the resurrected monotechnic schools—the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, the Ecole de Mines, etc.

The Ecole Polytechnique was exceptionally fortunate in its initial teaching staff and evolved methods of instruction, including laboratory work, that were revolutionary for the time.

The Paris Ecole Polytechnique set the pattern for the engineering schools of continental Europe which has endured to the present day. Polytechnics were founded in Vienna in 1815; in Karlsruhe in 1825; in Munich in 1827; in Dresden in 1828; in Hanover in 1831, and so on. However, since no special engineering schools were in existence the Germans reverted to the original plan of two years' general study followed by two years' study of some special branch of engineering *taken in the same school*.

This meant the addition of several specialized engineering departments to the original scientific corpus of the Polytechnic.

I will now pass on to developments in Russia. It is a mistake to imagine that medieval Russian technology was primitive. The work of the Russian armourers was always of high quality, being influenced by Swedish, Byzantine and Mongol techniques. In the year 1586 the gun founder Andrei Chohov cast in Moscow a bronze cannon of 89 cm. bore and 534 cm. long, weighing over 40 tons, which can be seen in the Kremlin

today. The corps of Streltzy or Musketeers, suppressed by Peter the Great at the end of the seventeenth century, were well equipped with fire arms made in their own armouries.

Peter the Great reorganized the whole machinery of the Russian State and founded a salaried civil service having a prescribed rank structure. He paid great attention to problems of supply and organized the work of mines, metal production gun-founding, gunpowder manufacture and musket production to a definite pattern. The technologists working in these places were state servants holding ranks equated with those of the army and civil service. The standard of attainment in many of these places was high. For example, the first steam engine to work in Russia was built between 1760 and 1763 by Ivan Polzunov in a metallurgical works near Lake Baikal.

Polzunov was born in Siberia, educated in a military school there and trained as an ironmaster at the works in Zlatoust. He visited Europe only once, quite late in life. When he had reached a rank equivalent to Army Captain he read Leopold's book on the Steam Engine and asked permission to build one. He got this permission from St. Petersburg, 3,000 miles away, within eighteen months—our own Ministry of Supply took much longer to make up their minds about Whittle's jet engine! This engine had two cylinders and was used for working the blast furnace bellows. An amusing sidelight on working conditions is a station order in Polzunov's biography saying that pupil engineers were not to wear their swords in the workshops. Evidently the French tradition that an engineer is a member of the officer clan rather than the working class was established in Russia quite early.

The Organization of Science in Russia goes back to 1725, the founding date of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. It is worth noting that the mathematician Euler was a member of this body from 1727 onwards and spent a total of thirty-one years working in St. Petersburg, where he wrote the first treatise on Mechanics in which the calculus was applied to moving bodies.

The first technical school in Russia was the St. Petersburg Naval Academy, founded in 1715. This was followed by the Engineer School in 1719 and the Artillery School in 1722. Two schools of hydraulic engineering were founded in 1767 and 1768 in connection with canal projects, while the year 1773 saw the foundation of the St. Petersburg School of Mines—the first higher technical institute in the country.

A significant advance was made in 1809 when the Institute of Ways of Communication was founded as a school for training civil engineers.

The first director of the Institute was the French engineer Betancourt who, being a graduate of L'Ecole Polytechnique, modelled the Institute on the same plan. The St. Petersburg Technological Institute was founded twenty years later.

I myself received my early education in pre-revolutionary Russia. I was therefore very interested in everything I saw when I visited Moscow last November and managed to have included in my programme a visit to a school training mechanical engineers. I have recorded my impressions in an article published in *Engineering*, but I will summarize them again.

First, the Russians train their Civil, Mechanical and Electrical Engineers in separate schools. The total duration of the course of instruction is about 4,870 hours, spread over five and a half years. For comparison the usual three-year engineering course at a British university totals some 2,500 hours, but from a rather higher entry standard.

The general plan is that all students take the same courses in the first three years, have some common courses in the fourth year, and during the fifth and sixth years concentrate in some specialized branch of mechanical engineering; the last half year is spent on a design project in that branch. A list of some of the specializations available is given in my paper.

This list shows that the degree of specialization required of a Russian engineer is much greater than would be regarded as proper at any British University. It should, however, be noted that these twenty-three specializations are achieved by a longer period of study and does not imply that insufficient time is spent on teaching fundamentals. The common courses taken by all students occupy some two-thirds of the total teaching time, and the time spent on basic subjects is as great as in British University Courses.

I have no reason to think that the Russian graduate engineer is less well grounded in fundamentals than our men. I am quite certain that he gets a better grounding in engineering drawing, design and manufacturing technology and is therefore useful to his employer with less further training than our men need. Finally, he makes a pretty thorough study of some particular branch of mechanical engineering. Once admission is gained to an Institute of Higher Learning, a University or Monotechnical Institute, the entrant is exempt from military service—that is to say, two years. There is no military service for those who take higher education.

This curriculum with its heavy lecture load is obviously designed to cater for the large number of average men who can be turned into useful engineers by good teaching. The man with research ability has to pursue his particular bent *after* going through the mill—or study science at a university.

The Russians aim at teaching everyone to be useful.

I would like now to draw some comparisons and conclusions. If it has to be admitted that engineering science was cradled in France it is equally true that craft engineering was cradled in England. The early British engineers were mostly rough, untutored and self-taught workmen, but nevertheless they led the world for 150 years.

We can be proud of this and we are perhaps justified in concluding that when scientific knowledge in a particular field is inadequate and imperfect, practical experience and the intuition of genius are dominating factors.

On the other hand we would be wise to distinguish between Civil and Mechanical engineering, in which the untutored intellect can comprehend a good deal, and Electrical, Chemical and Nuclear Engineering which stem from scientific research and are incomprehensible without a good scientific background. We would do well to remember that at no period have British engineers led the world in these more scientific branches of engineering.

The weakness of British engineers on the theoretical side was noted by

the ex-millwright Sir William Fairbairn after the Paris exhibition of 1855 who then wrote :

“ I firmly believe from what I have seen that the French and Germans are ahead of us in technical knowledge of the principles of the higher branches of the industrial art; and I think this arises from the greater facilities afforded by the Institutions of those countries for instruction in chemical and mechanical science.”

I have not gone into the history of engineering educations in Britain very thoroughly, but I think I am correct in saying that there was no school of engineering in existence until 1796. In that year an institution for the instruction of artisans—the Anderson College in Glasgow—began to offer lectures on natural philosophy and chemistry. In 1799 George Birkbeck began to lecture there on mechanics and applied science, and after a time Mechanics Institutes were founded in other cities. Some of these institutes later became the nucleus of a provincial university.

It is, I think, therefore correct to say that whereas the continental tradition is to create an officer class of engineers well grounded in fundamental science and instructed in the practice of some branch of engineering, the characteristic British tradition is rather to teach artisans a little mathematics, geometry and science to help them better their station in life. This difference in outlook has survived to the present day.

At the present time we in the United Kingdom are producing two different kinds of engineer—the University Graduate and the man with a Higher National Certificate.

The University Graduate gets a fairly adequate three years' course on the applications of mathematics and science to engineering problems. It is, however, generally admitted that he leaves the university weak on drawing, design and workshop technology and, unless his subsequent practical training is unusually good, he often remains weak in these fields. He gets very little instruction in the practice of any particular branch of engineering—it is, for example, not possible anywhere in England to get hundreds of hours of teaching on, say, Boiler Engineering or Electric Traction, as in the case of Russia.

The philosophy underlying the British University Engineering Course is, in fact, that of the founders of the Ecole Polytechnique—that is, that anyone well grounded in fundamental science will find it easy to acquire the specialized knowledge pertaining to any particular branch of engineering, so that instruction in engineering proper is almost unnecessary.

My own opinion is that this philosophy is incorrect, and I would point out that it was in fact abandoned quite early on the Continent, where it is well established that instruction in some branch of engineering must follow instruction in principles and fundamentals.

MANUFACTURE IS THE AIM

I would in particular plead for much more teaching of drawing and machine design. In mechanical engineering in particular the nub of the matter is the conversion of ideas into sound designs and designs into hardware. Until this process is completed, the best ideas are only hot air and waste paper.

The conversion of ideas into designs requires much more than knowledge of engineering science; it needs the ability to produce good drawings and a wide acquaintance with design precedents which are the well-trying solutions devised to meet similar problems in the past. The designer must also know a lot about materials and shop processes, otherwise his designs will be awkward to make. The final stage of converting design into hardware demands a wide knowledge of materials, processes and machine tools and, last but not least, the ability to organize and administer large works. Quite a lot of this knowledge can be taught.

I must insist that engineering has no meaning without a useful end product. It would be a great mistake to regard the corpus of knowledge required for machine design and manufacture as some kind of narrow specialization. It is, on the contrary, basic to our mechanical civilization and extremely general since it enables its possessor to participate with almost equal facility in any branch of mechanical engineering.

Specialization begins when some other kind of knowledge—*e.g.*, thermodynamics—has to be added to the basic disciplines of machine design. The principles of manufacture remain much the same irrespective of what is made; even watch making and turbine manufacture have many principles in common.

The proposition that every mechanical engineer should be well grounded in the basic arts of mechanical design and processes of manufacture will be hard to refute. Let us turn to the question of how this knowledge can best be acquired—by “picking it up” or by being taught?

The writer’s opinion is that picking knowledge up by experience unaided by teaching is not a good way of learning an unfamiliar subject. Most people would agree that medical men at least should not be trained that way! One spends too much time deciding what is relevant and what is not and in repeating other people’s mistakes. In actual fact the graduate apprentice in a works learns by being told as well as by seeing and doing. The draughtsmen and craftsmen he works with are his teachers—unpaid and unco-ordinated; the knowledge he acquires is unsystematic. Might not results be rather better if graduates were given some systematic instruction in machine design and manufacturing processes? And if so, should this instruction be given in the teaching institution before graduates or in a works afterwards?

The practice in Europe, especially in Germany, Switzerland and Russia, is to give pretty thorough instruction in the teaching institutions. When the writer was in Moscow recently he discovered that the syllabus laid down for Russian undergraduate mechanical engineers included the following:

<i>Subject</i>				<i>Hours of Instruction</i>
Engineering Geometry	90
Drawing and Machine Drawing	188
Details of Machines	215
Technology of Metals	182
Metallurgy and Heat Treatment	96
Interchangeable Manufacture	48

This time is additional to that spent in instructional workshops.

Besides this general training, some 1,000 hours is spent in studying in detail the problems of some *one* branch of mechanical engineering; for example—Boiler engineering Optical-mechanical instruments; Foundry design and management; Turbine engineering; Compressor engineering and so on; and also twenty weeks doing a design project related to that branch. One cannot help feeling that the Russian graduate mechanical engineer probably starts his career with as good a knowledge of fundamentals and with greater capacity to be useful than many of our men.

The writer's guess is that the Russian graduate may well be as useful after one year in industry as our men are after two or three. If this guess is accepted the picture is as follows :

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Age at Entry.</i>	<i>Military Service.</i>	<i>Period to Graduation.</i>	<i>Further training in Works.</i>	<i>Age at which fully trained.</i>
Russian :	17 plus	Nil.	5½	1	24
British :	18 plus	2	3	2	25 plus

Needless to say instruction at the required level can only be given if there are professors and departments covering each one of the subjects listed and maintaining close consulting connections with the appropriate works and industries. These necessary conditions do appear to obtain in the Russian monotronics; in England a single Professor of Mechanical Engineering is expected to look after everything.

How in fact do our mechanical engineering graduates learn the practical side of their profession? After an initial period in the shops those few who wish to specialize in works management may be made foremen's or planning officer's assistants and so be introduced to all the troubles of the shops. Design is taught by giving the man a board and a problem and tearing up his first half-dozen solutions. The man who after this still wishes to be a designer will probably be a good one, but some will undoubtedly become disheartened. Recently one or two large concerns have started advanced engineering courses for their graduate apprentices, but most of the instruction seems to be concerned with recent advances in engineering science rather than bread-and-butter design and manufacture—which is, of course, very difficult to teach.

The Higher National Certificate man gets his theoretical knowledge by part-time study during an apprenticeship. The Higher National Certificate courses are neither as long, as stiff, or as wide as degree courses, and the theoretical knowledge of the Higher National Certificate man is often very superficial. On the other hand, his outlook is practical, and he often has drawing office as well as workshop experience by the time he qualifies. He also does know something about the practice of the particular branch of mechanical engineering which concerns his firm.

For these reasons many firms find Higher National Certificate men more useful than University Graduates.

THE GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER

The recent Government White Paper proposes to increase the national output of this kind of man and to give him a better education. This is to be done by starting sandwich courses lasting four to five years from O.N.C./G.C.E. level and involving alternate periods of theoretical education in a technical college and specially designed practical training in industry.

These proposals must be welcomed because they represent something which can be achieved in a reasonable time, building on what already exists. On the other hand, five years divided between Technical College and Works is at best only just equivalent to three years at a University and two years at a Works, and neither alternative in my opinion reaches the level of the five-and-a-half-year Russian courses. For this reason I would say that the Government proposals are "too little and too late." We are chasing our problems of technological parity from behind instead of boldly jumping ahead of them.

In conclusion I think we should remember that no system of education can teach all the knowledge that the recipient will need in forty years of professional life, and that we should therefore not be too depressed about our imperfection. The real job in education is to stimulate our students so that they go on learning for themselves all their lives—and our British system has not done this job too badly.

What impressed me very much in Russia was the high standard of machine drawing, a standard better than we had in Cape Town University. The students produce beautiful drawings; also they work out in considerable detail how things will be made. For example, in the drawings for a motor-cycle the transmission from the engine to the driving wheel was shown, and the student had also not only worked out all the technical details of the design, but what kind of machines, lathes and so on should be used in the making of the motor-cycle. All sections of the work were laid down in the drawing. That would not be done in Cape Town or in any English university I know of.

Insistence on workshop technology is a strong point in the Russian engineering course. After all, the workshop is the home of the proletariat who occupy such a strong position in the Russian hierarchy. Everything to do with the workshop is put on a pedestal. I think the Russians score by insistence on good fundamentals, which we do also; then on good drawing and workshop technology, which is done very sketchily here in England; finally, there is in Russia specialization in one branch of engineering, which cannot be got here.

I came away from my visit to the Moscow Higher Technical Institute with a large collection of books. There is a friendly atmosphere; all concerned are glad to see visitors from abroad and they are most helpful. We collected a large amount of information. I would say that at the present time the Russians must be turning out of the engineering schools between 50,000 and 60,000 engineers of various kinds per annum, all of whom would, I believe, have been through the five-and-a-half years' course. The latest figure I have for English production of engineers is between 3,000

and 4,000 in 1954. In addition to the Institutes of Higher Learning the Russians have the technicums which are, I think, producing as many technicians as do the technical schools.

I believe there is in Russia a very well-developed system of correspondence schools. I did not visit any of them but collected a large amount of literature. The whole standard of text-book production in Russia is very good, and the text-books are always bought up. They get out of print very quickly.

From what I have told you you will, I think, see that there is very good foundation laid in Russia of higher technical education, going back to L'Ecole Polytechnique of one hundred years ago. This nucleus existed before the Revolution. From 1922 onwards the Russians have been trying to double technical education every five years. I believe they now have thirty-five years of very solid experience and are turning out excellent engineers. I do not think one should underrate Russian technical education. I hope, in fact, that we shall get going in this country something which is equal to it.

Asked at what age trainees went through the technical high schools in Russia,

Mr. GOODLET replied: They enter at seventeen plus, about a year earlier than our young men, but they have not done calculus while at school, so that I reckon they are a year behind our students. Taking seventeen plus as the starting age for training and adding five-and-a-half years, that will bring the trainee's age to about twenty-four before his training is completed. These trainees do not do military service. Our young men enter at eighteen years of age and are probably a year ahead in their school work; they do military service for a period of two years; they get a three-year university course and finish at about the same age as the Russians; because the latter get a good deal of their drawing, design and so on at the schools; they probably pick up the workshop end more quickly.

Asked if he could give any information on Russian methods of teaching the technique of engineering design apart from the basic subjects underlying it,

Mr. GOODLET replied: The Russians have Professors of Machine Tools, Professors of the Technology of Machine Construction, Professors of Horology, Professors of Transport Machines, Professors of Hoisting and Conveying Machinery, etc. Each of these is a specialist whose business is to study one branch of machinery and act as consultant in that field, and he therefore does not consider things not obviously necessary for the job with which he is concerned. Secondly, there are consulting sections. It was explained to me very carefully that the Russian system of education not only comes under the Ministry of Education but also has a tie-up with the various Ministries—the Ministry of Electric Power, the Ministry of Machine Production, and so on; in fact, there are sixty Ministries in the Russian set-up and all have scientists and research workers attached to them. Some have educational sides as well. The Ministry of Heavy Machine Production would have factories which would probably rely on the M.V.T.U. staff for consultation.

Asked whether the professors undertook any research work,

Mr. GOODLET replied: Research does go on in the M.V.T.U., where there are 10,500 students, 700 members of the staff, and 200 people working on various research problems. My impression was that at teaching institutions they do much research, though most research is done in special research institutes which do not teach.

Colonel G. ROUTH: I have been told by a friend who knows Russia fairly well and who recently conducted Malenkov round when in this country, that the senior engineers, a very good lot of men, are rather bored with the Central Government and its tyranny and restriction; that the possible change in Russia which would come about, perhaps not soon but in time, would be some sort of managerial revolution in which all the trained personnel who know all about how things are done will get on top of the Government and get certain things altered. Did the lecturer notice any such tendency when recently in Russia?

Mr. GOODLET: I had not time to do so. I also met Malenkov when in this country. I thought him an extremely bright and intelligent man. I believe he had a technical education, possibly in a technicum. He certainly asked some very pertinent questions.

Major E. AINGER: Are the students all Russian or of various nationalities?

Mr. GOODLET: I do not really know. Entry is a result of passing an entrance examination, and about one-third of those who apply are taken. I do not think in Russia they take in all the odd nationalities; in Siberia, where there are large technical schools, they probably take more. It is easier to get into the Faculties if one does not want to be a white-collared designer.

Asked whether the Moscow and the Petrograd institutes worked to a higher standard than the Siberian schools,

Mr. GOODLET replied: I imagine so.

Asked what proportion of the 4,800 odd hours spent in specialized study were devoted to the teaching of mathematics,

Mr. GOODLET replied that he had not a time-table handy, but he thought, from memory, between 400 and 500 hours.

The CHAIRMAN: When I was in Moscow twenty-five years ago all mechanical apparatus was in bad repair: lifts in hotels would not work, and one heard of all sorts of breakdowns of farm machinery and so on. Certainly twenty years ago mechanical apparatus generally in Russia seemed to be in a very poor state. Has there been a terrific upsurge of instruction and improvement of knowledge?

Mr. GOODLET: I think it is true that at one time mechanical apparatus in Russia was in a bad way. The Russians have been turning peasants into workmen, and that is why they concentrated on teaching workshop technique in the technical schools. In addition to turning out engineers they also have to produce craftsmen. I have no doubt that twenty years ago the craft position in Russia was very poor indeed. There is still a good deal of shoddy stuff round about Russia. For instance, in a number of the high-grade research institutes I visited the doors did not fit; faulty timber is used and it warps. Sanitary arrangements are very primitive. Much of this

is accounted for by the fact that the Russians are choosy as to what they spend money on. Important projects have a large amount of money voted to them. Unless something is important enough to appear in some plan it is neglected and falls to pieces.

Asked if in the industrial areas of Russia there was any part-time education and, if so, up to what standard,

Mr. GOODLET replied: I am certain there is part-time education. There are the correspondence schools which cater for the people. Secondly, a lot of the Faculties have evening departments; thirdly, I believe there are works schools in large factories, some of which are affiliated to training centres which probably give specific training. There is very good vocational guidance, in the form of a number of books describing various careers—choice of careers for young people. When any particular industry is short of labour there are booklets issued setting out the attractions of that particular industry.

Asked if he could give any comparison between Western Germany and Russia,

Mr. GOODLET said: I have not been in Western Germany since 1945. I knew Western Germany schools fairly well in the late 1920s, and would say that work done in three that I knew was as good as anything I saw in Russia. Whether that is so today, I do not know. I think the German and Russian education stems from the same Paris Ecole Polytechnique as I have described, with the same duration of courses.

Asked if students could choose the branch into which they wished to go,

Mr. GOODLET replied: Entry is by competitive examination, but a winner of a gold medal at school can get admission to an institute without examination. Students receive grants which vary between 300 and 600 roubles a month. An artisan receives 900 roubles per month, so the student gets one-third or two-thirds an artisan's wage. Students live in hostels or at home. I do not think they pay the full amount the hostels cost. I gather that students are turned out if they fail twice in an examination. The examinations, as far as I could judge, do not make the same call on the scholar as does the Cambridge tripos. That does not imply that Russian engineers are inferior. There are a very large percentage of women in training.

Asked what was the Russian attitude towards sandwich courses—six months in industry and six months in college—becoming more into vogue in Great Britain,

Mr. GOODLET replied: I do not think the Russians have considered such courses. In many ways they are still living in Victorian days. All the standards of behaviour, good manners and so on are pre-World War I; they have always had a five-year course and do not think anything less always had this educational system of technical schools, though there has been a slight alteration in that there are now monotechnic instead of polytechnic schools. The Russians have an old-fashioned respect for learning; they have always had a five-year course and do not think anything less would be sufficiently good. They have technicums for training technicians as foremen and so on.

Mr. J. H. W. TURNER: One of the great difficulties in Great Britain in obtaining more engineers arises from competing demands from other

sources. If we succeed in bringing more young men into engineering, then some other profession or industry will go correspondingly short. In Russia is engineering being given priority above all other subjects or with their huge population can the Russians produce large numbers of engineers and still meet all the other requirements for trained workers?

Mr. GOODLET: The Russian population is four times that of Britain. The Russians turn out ten times as many engineers and must be producing two-and-a-half times as many per head of population in comparison with Britain. The Russians design the engineering courses to make the best possible use of men of average ability. The average man gets a better grounding in Russia than he does here. The percentage of bright young people in Russia and in the English population is probably the same content. I cannot believe that their ability content is two-and-a-half-times as great as ours. About two-thirds of the students in the Institute of Higher Learning are studying some kind of applied science, technology or engineering; in England the proportion is about one-third. In Russia everybody wants to be an engineer. The brake is not put on by direction but by propaganda.

I came to the conclusion that the scientist in Russia occupies the same position as a film star does. There is glamour about being a scientist or an engineer which does not apply in Britain. These people live extremely well. In Moscow an artisan's wage is about 900 roubles a month. In Central Asia he would receive twice that amount. An engineer leaving a university to take his first job receives approximately the equivalent of 2,000 roubles a month; ordinary engineers earn between 2,000 and 4,000 roubles a month. Professors in the teaching institutes receive 6,000 roubles a month. Very eminent men are paid a separate rate. Fellows of the Russian equivalent to the Royal Society receive a pension of 5,000 roubles a month instead of having to pay a subscription to the Society. Many of the higher office holders are supplied with cars and chauffeurs. Russian scientists are really very well looked after, and that is something to be borne in mind when wanting to become a scientist.

Asked was it not unwise for Russia to be turning out such a large number of engineers,

Mr. GOODLET said: We could use the number very well in Britain. Every engineering industry here is short of such staff. We plan a job, the material arrives, but often the staff is not there to cope with what has to be done, often quickly. The Russians, when they make a plan, look after the personnel end as well as the finance and bricks and mortar. Engineering can be an extremely dull subject; some make it so, but it need not be. If I were founding a technological university in England, I would go back into history and say that whereas medieval universities took as their thesis the relation between God and man, and man and man, and founded Faculties of Theology and Law, a modern engineering university might take as its slogan "Man in relation to his Means of Subsistence and Natural Resources." I would have a Faculty of Geography to deal with rainfall and crops; a Faculty of Economics; a Faculty of Transport dealing with communications all over the world; there would have to be a Faculty of History to tell of what happened in the past; also a Faculty

of Law. If one takes a broad view, it will be realized that engineering covers everything except Theology. It has different approaches. I think the Russians are half-way there. I said all this five years ago in a valedictory address on the occasion of leaving Cape Town. But nothing on those lines is being done in England yet.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we have all enjoyed the lecture and discussion. My only duty now is to thank Mr. Goodlet for coming and giving us such an extraordinarily interesting talk. It is always a great treat to listen to a complete master of his subject. We certainly have had that treat and also that privilege today. On your behalf I thank Mr. Goodlet very much indeed for his talk. (*Applause.*)

ANNUAL MEETING

THE Annual General Meeting of the Society was held at the Royal Society's Hall, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on Wednesday, June 13, 1956.

The Chairman of Council, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., presided, and the Anniversary Lecture was given by Sir Harry Luke, K.C.M.G., D.Litt., whose subject was "The Middle East, Then and Now."

The CHAIRMAN regretted having to open the proceedings by offering, on behalf of the President, the Earl of Scarbrough, an apology for his absence, he having been taken ill on his return from Nepal. He had written to say he had not yet sufficiently recovered to be able to attend the meeting.

The CHAIRMAN added: During the past year the Society has continued to flourish. The number of new members, of which there is a steady stream, has happily exceeded the losses sustained through resignations and death. There have been some very regrettable losses through death, on which I would like to touch. We lost Mr. Alistair Gibb, who had only recently been appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council; his tragic death on the polo field was a great blow to all of us. Other distinguished members lost through death include Lord Altrincham, Sir Ronald Storrs, General Sir William Benyon, General Sir Mosley Mayne, and Major-General Haughton. These were all outstanding personalities who had contributed much to the work of the Society, and they and their expert knowledge and experience will be greatly missed.

However, in spite of losses, we go on, and one of the encouraging features during the past twelve months has been the large attendances at the various lectures. It is interesting to note that at pretty well every lecture the audience varied according to the subject, which, you will agree, is just what we really need: that the lectures should appeal to a very large section of our members. On two or three occasions we were, I regret to state, flooded out because more came to the lectures than there were seats for, so that many stood. I apologize to any members who suffered inconvenience in that way. We should have foreseen that there might have been a larger than usual attendance of members and have cut down the usual number of guests from two to one, but one does not like to do that and then, perhaps, have empty seats. However, we will try to do better in future.

I now call on Group-Captain Smallwood to present the Honorary Secretaries' Report.

HONORARY SECRETARIES' REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1955

The year under review can be regarded as satisfactory. The losses sustained by the Society by deaths and resignations were slightly less than

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1955

	LIABILITIES		ASSETS	
1954 £	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
I. Capital Funds:				
Life Subscription Account	1,369	347 5 0	Persia Fund:	
Entrance Fee Account	850	8 0	537	1 6
Add: Amount recd. 1955	74 0 0	1,442 8 0	1965-75	
Legacy Account	850 0 0	
Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund	87 0 6	General Funds:	
Less: Medal awarded in 1955	9 12 9	1,112	18 6
Persia Fund	77 7 9	283	18 7
Sykes Medal Fund	578 4 10	£1,354 15 11 3½% War Stock	
Add: Accum. Interest	150 0 0	£280 12s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds	
	19 3 10	1965-75	
	169 3 10	£1,939 7s. 11d. British Gas 3½%	
Less: Medal awarded in 1954	4 12 3	Guaranteed Stock 1969-71	
Investment Reserve Fund	500 0 0	£1,000 0s. 0d. Aden 4½% stock 1972-74	
	164 11 7	P.O.S.B. No. 2 a/c:	
	500 0 0	Sykes Medal Fund	
	3,959 17 2	Persia Fund	
	1,119 11 8	General Funds	
	191 1 4	
	164	
	1,310 13 0	
	2,150 0 0	
	766 11 10	
	853	
	1059	
	6,927	
	£8,187 2 0	
	393 3 6	
	5,205 3 11	
	110 19 3	
	58 3 6	
	169 2 9	
	675 0 0	
	13 13 2	
	2,124 2 2	
	£8,187 2 0	

Note: The Market Value of the above Investments at 31st December, 1955, was approximately £4,667.

II. Fixed Assets:
Society Premises Account:
Balance as at 1st January, 1948 110 19 3
Add'l Expenditure since that date 58 3 6

III. Current Assets:
Income Tax Repayment Claim 675 0 0
Payments in advance 13 13 2
Cash:
P.O.S.B. No. 1 a/c 1,488 8 0
At Bank and in hand 635 14 2

AUDITOR'S REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as shown by the books of the Society.

DASHWOOD HOUSE, OLD BROAD STREET, LONDON, E.C.2.
March 21, 1956.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.
(Chartered Accountants)

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED, DECEMBER 31, 1955.

	EXPENDITURE												
1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954
£	£	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Office Expenditure:	Office Expenditure:	2,346	1,346	4	11	11		2,346	1,346	4	11	11	
Salaries and National Insurance	Salaries and National Insurance	415	184	3	11	11		415	184	3	11	11	
Rent, Light and Heat, Rates	Rent, Light and Heat, Rates	171	21	15	4	4		171	21	15	4	4	
Telephone	Telephone	585	115	19	5	5		585	115	19	5	5	
Stationery and Printing	Stationery and Printing	413	63	19	11	11		413	63	19	11	11	
Postages	Postages	3	268	10	5	5		3	268	10	5	5	
Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises	Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises		10	10	0	0			10	10	0	0	
Audit Fee	Audit Fee		6	0	0	0			6	0	0	0	
Insurances	Insurances		11	16	5	5			11	16	5	5	
Bank Charges and Cheque Books	Bank Charges and Cheque Books		22	8	11	11			22	8	11	11	
Sundry Expenses	Sundry Expenses												
2,134	2,051	9	3	3	3	3	3	2,051	9	3	3	3	3
Less:	Less:												
Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund	Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund		205	4	0	0			205	4	0	0	
1,929	1,846	5	3	3	3	3	3	1,846	5	3	3	3	3
Journal:	Journal:												
Printing	Printing												
Postages	Postages												
Reporting	Reporting												
Lectures and Study Group	Lectures and Study Group												
Library	Library												
Legal and Professional Charges	Legal and Professional Charges												
Persian Fund Lecture and Subscription to "Iraq"	Persian Fund Lecture and Subscription to "Iraq"												
Transfer to:	Transfer to:												
Reserve for Contingencies	Reserve for Contingencies												
Investment Reserve Fund	Investment Reserve Fund												
420	845	17	5	5	5	5	5	845	17	5	5	5	5
3,654	4,114	13	11	11	11	11	11	4,114	13	11	11	11	11
Excess of Income over Expenditure carried to Balance Sheet	Excess of Income over Expenditure carried to Balance Sheet												
279	191	1	4	4	4	4	4	191	1	4	4	4	4
3,933	£4,305	15	3	3	3	3	3	£4,305	15	3	3	3	3

the number of new members. From the new Members' List it will be seen that there are just over 1,700 members, and, in addition, no less than 125 libraries and colleges in various parts of the world now take our Journal. Many of the colleges and libraries are in the United States of America and seven in the U.S.S.R.

In our most successful series of lectures, six were on Central Asia, despite the difficulty of access and, therefore, getting lecturers to speak on that subject. All areas of Asia were covered from Egypt to Turkey, also the Bandoeng Conference, Malaya, South India, Kashmir, the Yemen, Lebanon, and the Middle East. It is of particular interest to note that, of the twenty lectures, no less than fifteen were given by members of the Society, among them Miss Freya Stark, Mlle. Ella Maillart, Mr. Philips Price, M.P., Brigadier Longrigg, Lord Birdwood, M. Emile Bustani, and H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece.

Illustrations in the Society's Journal have been much appreciated, and we hope to include illustrations as and when occasions arise.

New Members' Lists, just published after the usual interval of five years, are still available for those who have not yet applied to the Secretary for one.

The CHAIRMAN, in the absence of the Hon. Treasurer, Major Ainger, called on Mr. J. M. Cook to present the financial report and move the adoption of the accounts.

Mr. J. M. COOK then presented the

HON. TREASURER'S REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1955

as follows :

The Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended December 31, 1955, and the Society's Balance Sheet have been circulated.

I think you will agree that both make satisfactory reading, particularly the subscriptions, which are slightly up on 1954; but we should all like to see an increase in the Society's membership, because that, apart from donations received, is the real figure which gives the key to the Society's value to the country.

On the expenditure side there is little on which to comment, except that there is the unavoidable increase in the cost of printing the Journal. That is a cost we must face. The figure is one which cannot be kept down if the Society is to continue prosperous, but that increase in cost can be offset by increased membership, as Group-Captain Smallwood has indicated. In addition to the increase in the number of subscriptions, the Society can greatly benefit by subscriptions being covenanted. If members would fill in the necessary form, which is included in each Journal or can be obtained from the Secretary, it will be greatly appreciated.

The fact that expenditure has not risen as is generally the case is largely attributable to the Secretary having managed to keep the Society's expenditure well below the figure for last year—something quite unexpected. It must also not be forgotten that from June 1, 1956, our postage bill will be much heavier than hitherto.

On the Balance Sheet the figure for contingency reserve has risen slightly, and the Honorary Treasurer feels this is desirable and entirely

necessary, as it is difficult to see what is in store in the light of present trends. Our position in regard to housing is quite satisfactory, but it is impossible to foresee the future with certainty. That is one of the reasons why the contingency reserve has been raised. On the whole, the accounts present a healthy picture, and I now move their adoption.

Lieut.-Colonel E. H. GASTRELL formally seconded the motion, and the accounts were adopted without discussion.

ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS FOR 1956-57

The CHAIRMAN announced that the Council had elected for the ensuing year: as Vice-Chairman, Mr. C. A. P. Southwell, C.B.E., M.C.; as Vice-Presidents, the Rt. Hon. Lord Birdwood, M.V.O., and Mr. V. L. Walter, C.B.E.

The Chairman further announced that the Council had recommended the following to fill the vacancies for the ensuing year: as Hon. Secretaries, Colonel H. W. Tobin, D.S.O., O.B.E., Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., Mr. J. M. Cook; as Members of the Council, Lieut.-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., and Mr. L. W. Amps, O.B.E.

General Sir JOHN SHEA proposed that those named be elected *en bloc*.

Sir EDWARD PENTON seconded, and the proposition was carried unanimously.

PRESENTATION OF THE PERCY SYKES MEMORIAL MEDAL FOR 1955

The CHAIRMAN: I have now a very pleasant task—the presentation of the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal for 1955 to Mr. Douglas Carruthers. The Medal is awarded, at the discretion of the Council, to any traveller, author, or such other persons who have distinguished themselves in the field of exploration and so have stimulated interest in or increased man's knowledge of Asian countries and peoples, thereby furthering the cultural relations between peoples of the Commonwealth and Asiatic countries. Incidentally, the Medal, designed by Mr. Eric Kennington, A.R.A., is a replica of one on show now in the Summer Exhibition of the Royal Academy. The Medal bears on one side the portrait of Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.B.G., and on the reverse a design of Marco Polo dictating his book, with the legend "What thou seest write in a book."

Mr. Carruthers, whom the Council selected as the recipient of the Medal for 1955, is, as most of those present know, an author, naturalist, and explorer who has visited Syria, the Congo, Russian Turkestan and Bokhara, North-West Arabia, Mongolia, and Central Asia. His books are available in the Society's library. The information he has given to the world continues to be of the greatest assistance to our young people today, especially when going to the countries I have named. It was that which in particular appealed to the Council and makes us so very glad to be able to present this Medal to Mr. Carruthers. The Royal Geographical Society similarly honoured him as long ago as 1912, so I feel that we are rather adrift in our award!

Mr. DOUGLAS CARRUTHERS: Mr. Chairman, My Lords, Ladies and

Gentlemen,—When I saw the list of previous recipients of this Medal, I was filled with a strange feeling of awe and pride. All seven of them are pre-eminent in their own special line of knowledge or endeavour. You have now made me the eighth to receive the Medal.

Sir Percy Sykes and I, of course, were old friends. He had followed me, or I had followed him, all the way from the Persian-Russian frontier beyond the Caspian to Bokhara, Samarkand, Kashmir, and farther still. We had this in common: he and I had the run of the Middle East, the free run of the whole of Central Asia, at the best moment. Everything was more or less as it was in the days of Marco Polo. There were no 'planes dropping in from Moscow or Peking and no motor-cars. It was a case of travelling by camel, cart, or on donkey, pony, or mule. Travel was travel. In fact, it was a matter of the good old days, or the bad old days: whichever they were, they were certainly days to remember.

I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned the help and inspiration I have been able to give to younger men. What I may have done was probably due to the fact that when I set out at the tender age of twenty-one I had no guide or helpful friend and precious little money. But I got there. Some time ago I received a presentation copy of a book, a beautiful book, very well written and very well illustrated. It was written by one whom I had known when still a schoolboy at Winchester. Inside the cover was inscribed: "Douglas Carruthers—in gratitude for the interest shown and the encouragement given to me in my very earliest days." That was a great tribute, but this Medal is a bigger and better one. I thank you for your appreciation of my contributions to knowledge.

THE MIDDLE EAST, THEN AND NOW

THE ANNIVERSARY LECTURE

BY SIR HARRY LUKE, K.C.M.G., D.LITT.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is, ladies and gentlemen, almost an impertinence on my part to introduce Sir Harry Luke to you, as he is so well known; but for those who are meeting him for the first time perhaps I might say that he has served all over the world, including being a Commander in the R.N.V.R. in the 1914-18 War. He has travelled all over the world and has written most entrancingly of so many things that he has seen and learned, including cookery. His third book of memoirs has just been published.* It is very good of him to come and deliver our Anniversary Lecture.

SIR HARRY LUKE: In thanking the Chairman for the all too generous terms in which he has introduced me, I feel that, in a way, I shall be returning evil for good. I had better warn you at once that you are not going to hear from me an analytical disquisition on the political and psychological changes in the Middle East. I am having the effrontery to take up your time—not much of it—this afternoon with an indication of some of the major changes in boundaries and way of life that I have encountered since I began travelling in Middle Eastern areas fifty-two years ago. When I first went to the Near East—the Levant we used to call it in those days—there were still being read by those interested in that part of the world the works by a very distinguished French man of letters, a traveller and a member of the Académie Française, the Vicomte de Voqüé. I would like to begin by reading a quotation from one of his works, written about the turn of the century:

“The East, which no longer knows how to make history, has the noble privilege of preserving intact the history of other days.”

At the time when the Vicomte de Vogüé uttered these words they appeared to be so obvious as to be accepted not only as an epigram but as a truism. For the Ottoman Empire, which in effect largely coincided with what was then known as the Near East, had changed little since the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II in the eighteen-twenties and thirties. There had been, it is true, some shrinkage of territory in the Empire's European provinces, but at the turn of this century it was still an Islamic autocracy whose frontiers ran from Yanina to the Yemen; it still conserved the forms—and to some extent the pretences—of an earlier age, even if the reality of the Padishah's authority had departed from such provinces as Bosnia, Herzegovina and Eastern Rumelia, which had come to owe him only a nominal allegiance.

My first journey in these regions was made in 1904; I returned from my latest one three weeks ago. In the interval I have had many years of

* See reviews, this Journal.

official service in Cyprus, Palestine, Turkey and Transcaucasia, and have made numerous private journeys, both before and after my retirement from the Public Service, to the territories of the Ottoman Empire and its Succession States. Indeed, there has been hardly a year between 1904 and now when I have not been there except for the period 1938 to 1942, when I was marooned in the Pacific. I have therefore been well placed to note how the Near East (or Middle East if you prefer it), far from being static, has become exceedingly dynamic. The Vicomte de Vogüé was an eminent Academician and a delightful writer, but he was no prophet.

When I was first in Constantinople—in those days Stambul meant, of course, not the city as a whole but only the predominantly Turkish quarter, the ancient Byzantium—Sultan Abdul Hamid II had left to him another five years of his long reign. Even so, there was still living in strict seclusion in the capital, in one of the Bosphorus palaces, his predecessor, Sultan Murad V, whom he had caused to be deposed as far back as 1876. Abdul Hamid was one of the most baffling of the personalities who have had a share in shaping the destinies of the modern world, for he was a blend of qualities difficult to reconcile in one individual. Astute yet credulous, well informed but a seeker of counsel from his Interpreter of Dreams; apprehensive to the point of neurasthenia yet a player for high stakes; callous in allowing the shedding of human life in the mass, yet so sensitive as regards its individual extinction that he could scarcely bring himself, and then only after hours of painful deliberation, to confirm the death sentences pronounced by his courts; the master of an Empire that was still wide if it was no longer great, and of a Court synonymous with lavish ceremonial, yet simple in his attire and a man to whom personal display was utterly foreign; the lord of a harem well stocked with women who, in the words of Sir Charles Eliot's *Turkey in Europe*, "would account his slightest and most transient favours her highest glory," yet a scorner of pleasure whose mode of life was that of an overworked Civil Servant.

As he grew older, Sultan Abdul Hamid grew more and more suspicious. No Minister felt secure in the service of his Padishah, no official of importance but was under close observation by the spies set on him by the morbidly distrustful monarch and was heavily out of pocket by having to bribe these spies into harmlessness or by having to maintain a staff of counter-spies. This was the period of the exploitation of the Turk by Western concessionaires and of the dazzling rather than sound finance of European banks in Turkey not inaptly known as "Bosphorescence." It was the period when the dynamos sought to be imported by the concessionaires were regarded with extreme disfavour by the Ottoman Customs, not only because they tended to be confused with dynamite but also on their own demerits as producing revolutions more rapidly than any other known agency.

It was the time when, by the censor's order, a French-Turkish and Turkish-French dictionary compiled by a distinguished Moslem savant had to omit the words "conspiracy" and "deposition"; when the only meaning it was allowed to give the word "revolution" referred to the movements of the solar bodies; when Bibles imported into Turkey were

delivered with the name "Armenia" carefully blocked out—a sign of painstaking staff-work, since the name appears in the Bible only twice. It was the time when text-books on chemistry were liable to be confiscated because they contained, and not only contained but repeated, the subversive formula H_2O , H_2 , obviously referring to Sultan Hamid II and the O indicating that His Majesty equalled zero.

It was the time when a French theatrical company on tour in Constantinople could undergo the following trying experience. The company proposed to perform an historical play entitled "Richelieu," but the Turkish censorship promptly vetoed the appearance of a crowned head on the stage. King Louis XIII was accordingly disrated to a duke, but this did not satisfy the censor. He next objected to the presentment of an ecclesiastical personage of high rank; and, as the Cardinal could scarcely be turned into a layman, he was left out altogether. The play could not now very well be called "Richelieu," so the title was dropped, the love interest was heightened, and the play ultimately presented as a sentimental comedy under the name of "Mademoiselle de" something or other.

One last illustration of the official psychology of the period. When the Empress Elizabeth of Austria was assassinated at Geneva in 1898, the Turkish censorship allowed no reference to the manner of her death, which might have put ideas into the heads of subjects of the Sultan. So the announcement in the Turkish press began with the bare statement that Her Majesty had died suddenly on September 10. But at this point the censor's thoroughness broke down, for he forgot to prevent the announcement from going on to say that the news had evoked universal horror and execration.

My second journey, which began in 1907 and ended in May, 1908, was made at the close of an epoch—an epoch interpreted politically by the Treaty of Berlin. Within two months of my return to England there had broken out in Macedonia the revolution of the Young Turks which in 1909 was to dethrone Abdul Hamid; but he was still in the full exercise of his autocratic powers when in the spring of 1908 I stayed in the Castle of Masyad, the home of the Syrian branch of the Ismailieh Sect, to whom the Crusaders gave the name of the Assassins. For during the Middle Ages this now entirely harmless and inoffensive sect was an organization of hired murderers which perpetuated in half the languages of Europe the sinister associations of its name. But in 1908 it was a downtrodden little community, persecuted by Abdul Hamid and his officials because it insisted—despite its desperate poverty—on sending its little offerings to the Aga Khan in India. Abdul Hamid resented these Moslem "Peter's Pence," pitifully small though they were, leaving Ottoman territory to go to a wealthy and distant dignitary living on foreign soil. From what I heard of them last year when revisiting the neighbouring Crusader castle of Krak des Chevaliers, I gathered that they were reasonably contented; but the interesting thing about them is that they owe spiritual allegiance to the same Aga Khan today as did their grandfathers in 1908, the only difference being that while His Highness was then being weighed in silver, he has now advanced through gold and platinum to diamonds. The next weighing will presumably have to be made in uranium.

While on the subject of living links with the past, may I mention one of which I became aware when staying in Baghdad in April of this year. And to explain it I must go back a little, to a previous experience of mine in 1913. In January of that year, suddenly and unexpectedly, there arrived in Cyprus, where I was then serving, Mehmed Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Old Man of Turkey, four times Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire and a lifelong friend and admirer of this country. At the age of eighty-two his fourth Ministry had just been violently overturned by the Young Turks, and the old man was unceremoniously bundled out of the country and sought asylum in Cyprus, which was his birthplace. I might add that he had not seen his native island since he had ceased to govern it as far back as 1864.

Five weeks later—that is to say, in February, 1913—his Young Turk successor as Grand Vizier, General Mahmud Shevket Pasha, was assassinated in the streets of Constantinople. Now the point of my story is this, that two months ago my hosts in Baghdad, Sir Michael and Lady Wright, took me to a luncheon party given by Mahmud Shevket's brother, a delightful elderly gentleman called Hikmet Suleiman Bey, a well-known Prime Minister of Iraq in the reign of the late King Ghazi. There must have been quite a span between these brothers, almost as big a span as between the eldest and youngest sons of Kiamil Pasha, who had settled down in the house next to mine in Nicosia. In the mornings I used to find it a sight of considerable piquancy to watch from my windows Kiamil's eldest son, one Said Pasha, a decrepit roué and invalid of sixty or thereabouts, being wheeled up and down the ramparts for his morning airing in a bathchair, side by side with the push-cart containing His Highness's youngest son, aged five or six. An unusual pair of brothers.

I might add that in the Ottoman Empire three great dignitaries of State were honoured with the title of "Highness": the Grand Vizier, the Sheikh ul-Islam (who was the chief Islamic authority, a member of the Cabinet and a close equivalent to our Lord Chancellor), and the Chief of the Eunuchs, whose Turkish title was *Qizlar-Aghasi*, "the Master of the Girls." The first two kept their rank until the end of the Empire, but the Chief Eunuch was demoted at the fall of Abdul Hamid.

Let me try in a few sentences to summarize the major changes on the political face of the Middle East since I first knew it. That vast and diverse region was then shared between two Emperors, the Sultan and the Shah. Iran remains as it was save for a change of dynasty; but let us see what has happened to the Ottoman Empire, beginning with Turkey in Europe.

In 1904 Ferdinand of Coburg was still Prince of Bulgaria, still made his annual *salaam* in Constantinople—his visit *ad limina*—as the Sultan's Vali of Eastern Rumelia, wearing a fez to indicate that in this capacity he was just an Ottoman functionary. Albania was an integral part of Turkey and had yet to see that transient and embarrassed phantom, its first Mpret, William of Wied. King Zog was a little boy of nine, son of a mountain chief, and who could have foretold that the King of Italy would one day add the crown of Skanderbeg to his own before Albania disappeared behind the Iron Curtain and the ancient monarchy of the House

of Savoy gave way to a republic? Mount Athos, that venerable Byzantine republic of monks which bans everything female from its territory, had not yet exchanged Turkish for Greek suzerainty; and when I stayed there with the Sultan's representative at the little port of Daphne until the melting of the ice on the mule-tracks enabled me to ride up to the monastic capital of Karyaes, the only other member of the house-party was a heavily overworked gynæcologist from Salonika. This specialist, described on his visiting card as "*Le Docteur Nissim, gynécologue-accoucheur,*" was recuperating from a nervous breakdown in the only part of the world where he could be quite sure he would not be called upon to exercise his professional skill.

As for the islands, Thasos, although within swimming distance of the coast of Turkey in Europe, had emerged only two years previously from the administration of the Khedive of Egypt; Samos was an autonomous principality under Christian princes appointed for five years by the Sultan; Crete was being governed—and had been since 1898—by Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner for the Concert of Europe, a term which has now acquired an almost archaic flavour. It is interesting to note amid all this change that Prince George is still alive at the age of eighty-seven. A Turkish Vali governed the Dodecanese—then the Ottoman Vilayet of the Archipelago—from Rhodes; another governed what has now become the kingdom of Libya from the ancient citadel of the Deys in Tripoli in Barbary. Cyprus, administered by Great Britain since 1878, was still under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and so remained until November 5, 1914, when Turkey was reluctantly drawn into the European War on the side of the Central Powers. It fell to me to announce to the Turkish notables of Nicosia, assembled that evening for the engagement ceremony of one of their number to the Mufti's daughter, that the political link that still bound the Island of Aphrodite to her Moslem overlord had been severed.

As for Turkey itself, Kiamil and Küchük Said were its elder statesmen; Enver was an obscure staff-captain and Talaat was earning four pounds a month as a telegraphist in Salonika. In Athens the Diadoch Constantine was smarting under his defeat by the Turks in 1897, while Mustafa Kemal, his victor of a quarter of a century later, had not yet loomed on the horizon. Venizelos was a village politician unheard of outside his native Crete.

Husein, the future Sherif of Mecca, a hostage at the Court of Abdul Hamid, could not in his wildest dreams have imagined that within a few years he would become for a while His Hashemite Majesty, dignified with the portentous title of Jelaletkum; that he would see one of his sons succeed him as King of the Hejaz before following him into exile, another pass by the transitory throne of Damascus to that of Iraq, a third renew in the Amirate of Transjordan, under a British Mandate, the Crusaders' Principality of Oultre-Jourdain, with the Cross and the Crescent cooperating in developing a territory once fiercely contested between the two.

Ibn Saud, the powerful Wahhabi king, was then a cloud no bigger than a man's hand; and a revived Arabian Empire was as little thought of as was a Turkish Republic in conjunction with a Turkish Khalifate. More

improbable than either would have seemed a laicized Turkish Republic divorced from the faith and hierarchy of Islam and contradicting in almost every respect the principles on which the old Turkey had been based. Who then anticipated seeing a Turkey that had rid itself of its Christian *millet*s, to emerge from the crucible as an almost homogeneous Turkish State?

The French would have been surprised to learn that soon they would be singing again "Partant pour la Syrie"; Dr. Herzl's programme, "the creation in Palestine of a home for the Jewish people secured by public law," was an aspiration that seemed far indeed from realization. The most likely heir-apparent to the Sultan in Palestine was Nicholas II. An independent Israel was undreamed of, or perhaps I should say was then no more than a dream. That the Ottoman provinces of Syria and the Jezireh would before long proliferate into five independent states would have seemed fantastic nonsense.

So much for the major political changes; the psychological changes in the peoples of the Near East form too complex and uncertain a subject to be touched upon here. The future has yet to reveal what will be the development of the new Turkey, from which the inspiration and creative element of past Turkish greatness—that of Islam—have been deliberately excluded. Nor is it possible to assess completely as yet the effect on the Persians of their transition from the rule of the effete and degenerate Tatar dynasty of the Kajars to that of an indigenous House. But let us hope that the visible and external manifestations of these changes are no indication of the inward change, for these manifestations would suggest, if taken alone, that Eastern peoples were losing their individual characteristics and were aiming only at a drab uniformity with the West. The cheap and nasty billycocks and felt hats, the nastier cloth caps, for which the Turk has had to exchange his becoming if unpractical fez, strike the most depressing note in those who could enjoy in the old Turkey at least the picturesque variety of appropriate and æsthetically satisfying clothes; it is difficult to see what the Persian has gained by the loss of his black astrakhan or felt bonnet and its replacement by the képi of field-blue which Rîza Shah prescribed as his contribution to that "bowlerization" (if I may so term it) of the East which was imposed on their respective subjects by the Duci of Hither Asia. It is a curious thought that only in British Cyprus can a Turk now wear a fez (though few do today) and can still write his language—if he wants to—in the Arabic script.

It is not possible in a brief address of this sort to do more than skim rapidly over the surface of what is a very big subject. The region under discussion has probably changed since I first knew it in more directions and more surprisingly than any other—and is continuing to do so. Who, for example, would have expected to see a revolutionary republican Egyptian Government teaming up with the most feudal and medieval monarchy in the world today, that monarchy whose sandy wastes are being so plenteously irrigated by generous streams of gold? Who, in another order of ideas, would have expected a generation ago to find the muezzins of mosques no longer climbing to the tops of the minarets for the call to prayer, but sitting comfortably below and doing their stuff into the

“mike.” Nor is this the end. In some mosques gramophone records now take the place of the live muezzin, and effect a consequential economy in the budget of the parish council.

But even that is not the end. Some people believe that history is a process of continuing change, others that it revolves in circles. Those who hold the latter view may be confirmed in it by hearing that in at least one quarter of Baghdad the Mayor has now prohibited the call to prayer being mechanized, as being too disturbing to those of the inhabitants who are not affected by the summons. So those particular muezzins may no longer sit at their recently acquired ease at the foot of the winding staircase of the minaret, but must resume their laborious climbs to the top. I think I found the real answer to their problem this spring in the Moslem Sultanate of Brunei in Borneo, where the Sultan is now building what will be the biggest mosque in the Far East. He is equipping the minaret, a lofty and square one, with an express lift.

The CHAIRMAN: On your behalf, ladies and gentlemen, I offer thanks to Sir Harry Luke for a most delightful talk. The contrast between those early days and these is quite remarkable. As to whether the change has been a good or bad one, we can all make up our own minds. At any rate, the delightful manner in which Sir Harry has dealt with his subject has proved a wonderful wind-up to our Annual General Meeting. We thank you very much indeed, Sir Harry. (*Applause.*)

ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner of the Society was held at Claridges, London, W.1, on Wednesday, July 11th, 1956. Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B. (Chairman of the Council) presided and 228 members and guests were present. The guests of the Society were Lord and Lady Godber, Sir David and Lady Kelly, Lt.-General Sir John Bagot Glubb.

The toast to Her Majesty the Queen was loyally honoured.

“ THE GUESTS ”

In proposing the toast of “ The Guests,” Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B. (Chairman of the Council), said :

I, first of all, have to apologize for being in the chair tonight. The President of our Society, Lord Scarbrough, right up to last week very much hoped that he would be able to be with us. That has not been possible, and he has asked me to express his very deepest and most sincere regret that he is not here—regret which I am sure we all share. I assure you no one regrets our President’s absence as much as I do.

At this Dinner it is a tradition that the President reviews the situation in Asia, though I had hoped that this year Lord Scarbrough would break with that tradition and give us an account of his very colourful visit to Nepal for the Coronation. That is not to be; but I want to put your minds at ease : you have not to sit and listen to a peroration from me on the state of Asia. Our President, like all his distinguished predecessors, is very well qualified in every way to do that, but for one like myself, whose practical experience of Asia is entirely confined to a few bases round the coast of that great continent, to attempt it would be presumptuous. I am not going to be guilty of such folly. Happily, however, we have with us two guests who are also well qualified to speak on the subject—Sir David Kelly, who is going to propose the toast of “ The Royal Central Asian Society,” and Sir John Glubb, who is to reply to the toast of “ The Guests.” At my request they have kindly said that they will speak briefly as to their particular spheres of interest, and I am most grateful to them for undertaking to do so.

My task remains that of the usual task of the Chairman of the Council, and that is the pleasant task of proposing the toast of “ The Guests.” Although I have said it is a pleasant task, it is sometimes a difficult one, especially when there are so many distinguished guests as we have with us this evening. If I did refer to all our distinguished guests we should be here too long, but there are some to whom I must refer before asking you to honour the toast.

I start with our principal guest, Lord Godber, who is best known for all his activities as Chairman and Managing Director of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, that great organization whose labour force is, I believe, in the nature of one-third of a million, of all colours and shapes, and whose annual budget is greater than the budgets of some

self-governing countries. I welcome Lord Godber in two different categories: first, for himself and, secondly, as I will explain, if I may digress for a moment. This Society was founded at the beginning of this century. During the first fifty years or so the great majority of the members of the Society came from those great administrative services manned by the British in Asia, the Indian Civil Service and so forth. In those days the officers of this Society were ex-viceroys and governors of great provinces, and the membership largely consisted of young men, some of whom were going eventually to fill those administrative offices. That membership has ceased and now those people from this country who go and work in Asia are the staffs of our great industries, including the oil and engineering industries. I am grateful to be able to add that these industries have recognized the work done by the Royal Central Asian Society and have very kindly and most generously helped us in our work by finance and other means of encouragement. (Applause.) We in this Society are most grateful to those industries, and we have in Lord Godber a most distinguished representative of those industries. I would like to say to him as their representative: "Thank you very much indeed for all that you are doing for us." (Applause.) I am glad to say that Lord Godber is very well supported tonight by his own particular industry. I gather there is one complete table from Bahrein and four tables from Kuwait, as well as many others, and we are all very glad to join in welcoming them.

Also coming from that same part of the world we have with us the Minister from Iraq, Mr. Tarik Al Askari, to whom we also extend a warm welcome.

Then we have with us Sir David Kelly, and he also I welcome under two hats: firstly, as Chairman of the British Council. The British Council and the Royal Central Asian Society work together quite a good deal; in fact, we have a representative of the British Council on the Council of our Society. We are especially glad to see the Chairman of the British Council here tonight. Secondly, I welcome Sir David as one who has had a most distinguished diplomatic career, during the latter part of which he was British Ambassador in Moscow. I feel sure that many here, like myself, read his most interesting and instructive articles which appear from time to time in the Press on the question of Russia, as well as some of the books which Sir David has written.

Before going to Moscow, Sir David Kelly was the British Ambassador in Turkey, and I personally have the most pleasant recollection, when going to the Bosphorus with a squadron of the Mediterranean Fleet in which I was serving, of the most delightful and generous hospitality we then received from Sir David and Lady Kelly. It is a pleasure to see Lady Kelly here because she also is a writer and lecturer, and in 1949 kindly came and gave one of the Society's Wednesday lectures. With great pleasure we welcome Sir David and Lady Kelly. (Applause.)

Next, we join in welcoming Sir John Glubb. (Applause.) Sir John is an old member of our Society, but he is dining with us tonight as a guest of the Society. I do not propose to tell you anything about Sir John; you all know it all too well. I am, however, very glad to have this opportunity of paying a tribute to his conduct and bearing when he was summarily

dismissed from the command of the Arab Legion. The dignity with which he conducted himself, without any rancour or resentment, was an example to the whole world, and we are very proud to have him with us tonight. (Applause.)

Amongst those who have served in Asia I would mention Sir Arthur Lothian, who has a long and distinguished career in the Indian Civil Service; also Sir Adrian Holman, who in the course of his period in the diplomatic service served in Asian spheres as far apart as Peking, Baghdad, and Teheran.

Turning to the home front, I start with the Treasury—a very good place to start from. Probably some of you have had experience with the Treasury; indeed, most of us at some time in our lives have been pretty livid with them, but I have always found that when one was livid and went to try to see the officials personally, one was received so charmingly and they were so nice that one had completely “had” it. Tonight I warmly welcome Sir Alexander Johnston, the Third Secretary of the Treasury. Like many of our distinguished public servants, and as his name implies, Sir Alexander comes from Scotland, from which country we have another distinguished guest to whom I also extend a welcome, Sir Cecil Weir. (Applause.) Sir Cecil, amongst other things, is a member of the Transport Commission, and during the last war he held several most important appointments in what I call the great Battle of Supplies in order to keep this country going and provide the Armed Services with what they needed. We are indeed glad to see Sir Cecil here tonight.

To wind up, I come on to the home ground to welcome a most distinguished archæologist who is known all over the world, but particularly well known recently by television viewers in this country, Sir Mortimer Wheeler. (Applause.) I had the pleasure of welcoming Sir Mortimer on the occasion of our Annual Dinner last year; the fact that he has come twice running means, I hope, that he enjoyed himself last year, and I hope he is enjoying himself on this occasion also.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I have talked long enough, but before sitting down I would like to welcome every single guest here tonight, even though I have not managed to mention as many names as I would have liked. If I might digress for a moment, I would also like to welcome the members of the Society who are attending this Dinner for the first time.

And now I ask the members of the Royal Central Asian Society to be upstanding, and I give you the toast of “The Guests.”

Lieut.-General Sir JOHN BAGOT GLUBB, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., in replying to the toast, said:

Talking about two hats, when the Chairman asked me to reply to the toast of “The Guests” I protested on the ground that I was a member of the Society, but he said that did not matter, I had to do it. So I appear to be batting on both sides on this occasion, and on behalf of my fellow-guests I have great pleasure in sincerely thanking my fellow-members.

The past year has, I am afraid, been rather disappointing to some of us who have the interest of the peoples of Asia at heart, particularly to myself; but, looking at the major picture, one has to realize that in these days it

is the bad things which get all the publicity. We hear nothing of our happy relations with India, Pakistan, Iraq, and many other great Asian countries; it is the things that go wrong that command the headlines.

I have always found it rather helpful to compare nations to people. Nations do start off young, grow up, become old, and do the many things which we attribute to individuals, and of course one of the commonest uses of this simile is to describe Britain as surrounded by her daughter nations. Perhaps in the case of India and Pakistan we are scarcely justified in doing that, because their civilizations are much older than ours; but still, without offence, the fact remains that, as modern states anyhow, we had something to do with their entry into the world. We are all familiar with the kind of possessive parent who resents the young people of the family growing up or not taking orders in the way they used to. We even know, perhaps, people of forty-five or fifty years of age who have spent their lives looking after their own mother and father. But surely the wise parent makes allowances and realizes that when the boys and girls get big they do not want to be bossed about the whole time? I think that is the line we should take. The most fatal thing to do when a son or daughter is showing signs of independence is to show resentment when the son or daughter desires to go away. We are entirely committed to the course of creating more and more young nations, and nothing, I am sure, can be more fatal than to combine with this generous policy a feeling of resentment that they should want to leave. Therefore we should find our pride in the success of the nations when they leave us and go out into the world, rather than endeavour to keep them back as our own children for too long.

But when we look at the Middle East the picture is not such a happy one. Of course, we have only been there in the flesh for thirty or forty years, and we started off by making one or two tremendous mistakes from which we have never succeeded in recovering. But all this has become infinitely worse during the last year or two because other people have been trying to make it so, and whatever we may have made in the way of errors, they were errors, though our enemies have during the last year or two turned them into crimes. The result is that now these people whom we loved, and although unconsciously, unintentionally, we injured some of them, yet we worked for them; these people are now becoming increasingly convinced that we are the villains of the piece, that we are inspired solely by greed and by reactionary and tyrannical objects. Such stories are in daily and hourly circulation in Asian countries, and when one is there one can see such libels daily gaining more and more credence, and the query that struck me most forcibly, that made me feel the most frustration, was, Why cannot we answer? All we have to say is the truth. Surely our record is not one of greed, of exploitation and reaction? Even in the Middle East itself, but certainly in the world as a whole, our record is one of which we have no need to be ashamed. ("Hear, hear.") When I ask in England, "Why cannot Her Majesty's Government explain its policy?" people reply, "That's obvious, old boy; the Government has not got a policy." I do not mean to be disrespectful, because I understand that Her Majesty's Government is proud of not having a policy, not

necessarily the present Government; the idea that it is grand not to have a policy has been going on for generations. And the explanation that has been given me—I do not promise it is a correct explanation—is that it is a terrible mistake in a democracy to say what you think you are going to do because then, if you do not pull that off, the Opposition are in the strong position of being able to say, “Yeah.” If you never pronounce yourself at all, then whatever happens either you say, “We did that” or else at least you say, “We always foresaw that this was inevitable.”

The trouble when dealing with the peoples of Asia is that they do not believe we have no policy at all. If one says, “The British Government have not a policy,” their first reaction is, “Well, of course they have got a policy, but it must be so disgraceful that they cannot reveal it.” If you pass that stage, the common impression is that the British are so frightfully clever that nobody can ever fathom the depths of subtlety with which their policy is conducted!

But in these days of mass propaganda can this time-honoured practice continue? It seemed to me when I was out in Jordan that we cannot go on in that way; we have got to say something as to our objects. I do not think it necessary to go into a lot of minor details as to what is to be done, thereby giving the Opposition the opportunity of making the remark to which I have just referred. But surely the general lines along which we are working can perfectly well be explained to the world? What I mean is what I said at the beginning, that we do not want, and we do not propose, to attempt to keep any other nation in a position of subservience; that we do not want to exploit anybody; that we visualize the future as a time when all these other peoples will be growing up into modern nations, regardless of their country or their colour.

Now, when that is said, many people reply: “Oh, well, that is just a platitude, isn’t it?” Or others say: “Well, that’s what we are doing.” We may know that we are doing that, but one has to realize that those other people do not realize it; in fact, they absolutely believe the contrary: people believe to this day in many countries in the Middle East that Britain is still dodging about seeking some method of snatching away their independence and annexing them to the British Empire. After all, propaganda consists not in saying tremendously subtle, clever things, but in saying really obvious things, saying them frequently and repeating them and making them into slogans. That is what every successful propaganda campaign has done.

Perhaps we can put it in another way. Some people say, “All this sort of well-wishing to other peoples is a bit flat, isn’t it? It’s rather dull, you know.” But are not so many relations in life like that? It does make life happier to be polite, to be tactful; it does make a difference when you meet people if they say how delighted they are to see you. It is only the cynic who says, “I know they are not really delighted.” But it does give one a pleasurable feeling to hear that said. I do not know why we cannot do it to other peoples. Actually when I was in Jordan I frequently made suggestions or dropped hints that Jordan for thirty years really was a most faithful ally of Great Britain. It would have meant so much during that time if occasionally a Minister in the House would have mentioned it; if

there could have been a letter from somebody; if there had been a telegram to the Prime Minister of Jordan on his birthday, or anything like that. These are human factors which win people's affection and gratitude. I feel sure that an enormous amount could be done by a perfectly public cordial attitude and by explaining again and again that there is nothing in this perpetually repeated libel of the wickedness of British imperialism.

I read only yesterday in the daily papers that the Prince of Cambodia, whom I do not know, was convinced of the selfless desire of Russia to assist the peoples of Asia. Presumably, he was convinced because they told him so. We never do that. It is most extraordinary to what extent talking is more effective than action. I have told many audiences since I have been in England that Britain and the United States of America between them spend £14 million a year on Jordan, and yet they have recently been losing ground rapidly to Russia. Russia has never spent a brass farthing in Jordan, but Russia professes to be a friend; and we do nothing about it.

Finally, in this age of propaganda and advertisement it seems extraordinary to me that every firm, every business, has its advertising manager, its public relations officer, and all the machinery for making known its aims and objects, but the British Government appears to have no such machinery. Even cinema stars, as far as I understand, employ publicity agents to show them to the best advantage to the world. But Her Majesty's Government has no such system.

So what I am pleading for is that something should be done to explain to the world, and particularly to Asia, in Africa and in other continents; what we are doing everywhere, this wicked British Empire which everybody denounces; how the people are going ahead in every country, going ahead in education, in development, in building up their political institutions. You have only to tell the truth, but there seems to be no way of doing that. I personally am not sufficiently well versed in the machinery in London to know exactly how it should best be done, because my experience has not been at this end, but at the other end. I can, however, assure you that the effect at the other end is devastating, with everybody else praising up their goods; everybody else advertising their neighbourly selfless conduct, but from Great Britain no answer. I feel sure that if only we would exert ourselves to do it, we could before too long return once more to those happier years which many in this room remember, years when there was real co-operation and understanding between Britain and those Asiatic peoples who are so dear in the memory of many of us. (Applause.)

“THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY”

The toast of “The Royal Central Asian Society” was proposed by Sir DAVID KELLY, G.C.M.G., M.C., who said: The Chairman of your Council has told me that your Society now covers Asia “from Palestine to the Pacific.” This is rather a big subject to review in ten minutes, and I propose to refer only to some of those countries of which I have some personal experience. Unfortunately, my intimate knowledge is partly out of date, while my recent experience was crowded into a very short time.

To be precise, my experience of what we used more logically to call the Near East and the Middle East, but which it is now the fashion to lump together as the "Mid East," has been limited to four years in Egypt before the war, when I also visited Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan; a period of three years after the war in Turkey as Ambassador; a visit to Turkey two years ago as guest of the Turkish Government, and the other day a visit to Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, on behalf of the British Council. It is only fair to claim that during a week's visit of a semi-official kind one may make more contacts and learn more than in six months', or indeed several years', ordinary residence. It's not just a question of how long you stay in a country, but which people you meet and talk to.

Well, let us start with Turkey, Iran, Iraq—countries of the Baghdad Pact, which, by the way, seems to be developing in a more balanced way than N.A.T.O. has been able to do. They have taken very seriously the Baghdad Pact equivalent of N.A.T.O.'s Article Two.

When I went to Turkey in 1946, Lord Attlee, the Prime Minister, gave me a message for President Inonu that we regarded Turkey as one of the great factors of stability. My visit in 1954 convinced me that is still true. I know Turkey has grave financial problems, graver than ten years ago. Yes; but she has also a new road system, a population of peasant proprietors vastly more prosperous and ambitious than ten years ago, more than half mechanized, with new houses and village shops stocked with goods as never before. She has a state-owned heavy industry with a great emphasis on welfare, and a network of new light industries in which the welfare element is even more noticeable. She has a modern mobile army in which the toughest soldiers in the world have at last the equipment they deserve. Above all, the Turks have retained their ancient qualities of solid character and loyalty to their friends.

About Iran, or Persia, I don't feel competent to make any predictions. I can only say that among the fourteen countries I have visited for the British Council in the last nine months I nowhere had a more cordial reception. My wife and I were offered hospitality in Teheran by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the University; when we visited Shiraz and the lovely city of Isfahan we met a similar welcome, and the Provincial Governor who called on me at our hotel in Isfahan strongly urged the restoration of the Council's activities there. When the Council's Centre reopened in Teheran last year there were four times as many candidates for the English classes as could be accepted. The long queues of would-be students, and lively competition to get to the head of them, created quite a serious traffic and police problem.

Turning to Iraq, we are reminded that the apparent unity, some years ago, of the Arab League under Egyptian leadership no longer exists. Its only common basis was the general resentment caused by the plight of the Palestinian refugees, and, though this resentment is very real—in Jordan the refugees are said to outnumber the original population—it has proved insufficient to outweigh the radical differences between the interests and outlook of the various members. Contrary to the view of a recent writer on the Middle East (Mr. Laqueur), Iraq aroused in *me* the strongest feeling of optimism. The vast oil revenues are being invested in real

public works which will transform this undeveloped land. The atmosphere is one of confidence and realism. Twenty-five years ago, cholera and typhus were endemic; today you can drink the water from the taps. But I would insist, above all, on the immense desire for closer relations with Britain. I was received by H.M. the King, nearly all the ministers, the leaders of the opposition, the university and medical authorities—always there was no mistaking the sincerity of this desire. It was sometimes embarrassing, for I was asked, for example, to fill hundreds of teacher posts for which we have hardly any candidates. This is a world-wide problem, for as a nation we have never troubled to make it possible for our teachers to go abroad on contract without risking their future careers at home. Among many other things, we are asked to set up an English secondary school to enable the future leaders to get into English universities—and the Iraqi Government have offered a site worth five figures. This school, like the already existing English primary and kindergarten schools, will be controlled by a representative very high-level Iraqi association. (Incidentally, the Iraqi authorities reported that the standard of the Arabic teaching in the British primary school run by the Council is higher than that in the state schools.)

I have time only for a brief reference to the darker side of the picture. Over great areas in the Near and Middle East there is a terrifying lack of stability. The old Stalinist theory was that Communism must start in great cities. The new Chinese theory—and today it is Chinese, not Soviet, propaganda which matters in Asia (the output of the State Publishing House in Peking is said to be as large as that of its opposite number in Moscow)—is that the ideal conditions are provided by a landless hungry peasantry and an uprooted, frustrated class of intellectuals—in what they call the “semi-colonial, semi-feudal” societies. Well, this is an exact description of a large part of Western Asia. In large areas there is no hereditary responsible governing class, no solid, responsible middle class: side by side with the illiterate proletariat is a mass of students who constantly sacrifice their work to strikes, demonstrations, processions. Religion is no longer a factor of stability; on the one hand, it has partly lost its hold on the intelligentsia; on the other hand, it has revived in the form of the primitive fanaticism of the Moslem Brotherhood and similar societies, closely allied with extreme nationalism and dictatorship and using assassination as a regular weapon.

I said that in Asia Chinese propaganda is more dangerous than Russian. The recent Soviet diplomatic-commercial offensive, arms for Egypt, Mr. Shepilov's visit to Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and so on, was really a reaction to the Soviet failure at Geneva to get their way in Europe—for the cardinal interest of the Soviet Union is not at present in Asia but in the West—to prevent Germany rearming, to dismantle N.A.T.O. and get the American and British troops out. The danger of Communist revolution in Western Asia is not created by the Soviet Government; it is there already, it is created by local conditions.

One last point. Our Government is gravely handicapped by the disappearance of the old Levant Consular Service, abolished at the end of the war in the interests of standardization, instead of improving the conditions

to revive recruitment. We had an incomparable corps of experts who gradually acquired a sort of intuitive "sixth sense" about the reactions and real feelings of the peoples among whom they spent their careers. Of course, this was basically part of the ever-flowing tide of bureaucracy and planning so alien to the traditional British reliance on personal initiative and experimental methods. The British Empire was built up by the men on the spot; it looks like being unimaginatively pulverized by the Planner in Whitehall!

I think this mere enumeration of some of the problems facing us in one part of Asia should be sufficient to bring out the infinite field of discussion and study which is the concern of your Society, and I very much hope you will be able to take a still more active and public part in interesting and informing public opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: I just wish to thank Sir David Kelly very much indeed for his most interesting address and for the way in which he has proposed the health of our Society. I would also like to thank Sir John Glubb for his very interesting talk. Both speeches were delightfully made.

And, in conclusion, as this is the end of the official side of our proceedings, I wish to thank our Secretary, Mrs. Putnam, and her assistants for all the trouble they have taken in making the necessary arrangements.
(*Applause.*)

LEVANT DUSK: THE REFUGEE SITUATION

By STEWART PEROWNE, O.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 16, 1956, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Stewart Perowne, who has kindly come to talk to us this afternoon, has as the title of his lecture "Levant Dusk," the subject is the Refugee Situation, and it will be illustrated by slides. Mr. Perowne, who is known to many here, first went out to Jordan about thirty years ago, and he has been for most of that time in Arab lands. He is now working with the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem in an endeavour to help the refugees. Mr. Perowne has recently written a book on the subject, *The One Remains*, giving an account of the situation, which today he will bring up to date. Shortly, I understand, another book by him will be published with the title *The Life and Times of Herod the Great*. Mr. Perowne.

DURING the past four years I have been working in Jerusalem with the Anglican Bishop, as one of his assistants on schemes for the welfare of the Arab refugees. I want to tell you today, as best I can, something of the present condition of these unhappy people. Then perhaps some of you may be interested to hear of a small experiment which the Bishop has made, not in providing a future for these people, but in trying to ensure that whatever their future may be, they may face it with confidence, self-respect and peace of mind. I should like to tell you of other enterprises, particularly those undertaken by Arabs for Arabs, such as those of Musa Alami, Mrs. Antonius, Miss Husseini and Miss Nasir. If I speak of the Bishop's work, it is because I have been closest to it.

The refugee problem was created in 1948 when, during the war with the Zionists, nearly one million Arabs fled from their homes. The massacre of Deir Yassin, the latest link in a chain of terror, had struck fear into the hearts of those civilians whose homes lay in the path of the Zionist forces. Just as in 1940 Frenchmen in their thousands fled before the advancing Nazis, so in 1948, before the Zionists, thousands of Arabs did the same, and for the same reason. As General Spears has put it in a letter published in the *Daily Telegraph* of November 16 last: "That an honest person should be expected to believe that anything but force or fear for their lives would drive peasants from their age-long holdings is an affront to common sense." I have talked to many refugees during the past four years. They all support General Spears' view. And I think they should know.

So there were these hundreds of thousands of peasants, with their wives and children, suddenly uprooted from the homes and lands which had been theirs for generations, and the quiet and peaceable possession of which Great Britain had repeatedly guaranteed to them. Overnight they became outcasts, and outcasts they have remained ever since. America recognized the new Zionist state almost before it had uttered its first cry. England,

playing a role sadly reminiscent of that of Aaron in the creation of the Golden Calf, of which we read in the 32nd chapter of Exodus, followed America. Nothing was done by either to obtain redress for the Arabs, whom they were, I repeat, solemnly bound to protect from wrong. To this day the Arab refugees have neither been permitted to return to their homes, nor have they received one penny in compensation for what has been taken from them by alien force.

“ In the corrupted currents of this world,
 Offence’s gilded hand may shove by justice;
 And oft ’tis seen, the wicked prize itself
 Buys out the law.”

So there they are, this million of victims, “ Strangers and afraid in a world they never made.” For eight years they have waited, for eight years they have endured. Not one jot nor one tittle of justice have they received. Do you expect them to kiss our hands, to give three cheers for democracy, and to praise the policy of the United Nations?

As is well known, many of the refugees live in camps. But it is a mistake to think that they all do. In fact, only just over a third live in camps. Let me repeat that: only just over a third of the refugees—by which I mean registered refugees recognized as such by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency—live in camps maintained by that Agency. The remaining two thirds live in caves, with relatives, or anywhere they can find to lay their heads. But camp dwellers and independents alike, they are refugees and depend on their ration cards for their livelihood.

This picture is black, and I hope that no one thinks there is any way round the problem of the guilt of the West in having created it. There is not; but there is a compensation in this thought, that if we have done nothing to solve the problem, we have done a good deal to palliate it. I refer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, generally known as UNRWA. To this agency the United Nations vote a large sum every year. It does not come out of the general budget, but is made up of special contributions voted for the purpose by certain nations. America pays the greatest part, between three- and four-fifths. England comes next, but with a far smaller contribution. How is this money spent?

First, on the issue of rations to all those refugees who hold cards, wherever they may be living. Secondly, on the maintenance of camps. Thirdly, on education and health. The Agency is very well run. It must be one of the best-administered organizations of its kind in the world. It has a few foreign officers, American, French and English among them; but the great majority of its staff are Arabs, themselves refugees. It is, in fact, the limbo of that excellent administration which the mandatory government built up over thirty years and abandoned in a night.

The health services deal with sanitation and the care of “ all women labouring of child, sick persons and young children ”—to use a phrase which, even in these days, cannot be bettered. The education department provides excellent schools, excellent buildings, that is. The mandatory government never built anything half so fine. In or near every big camp

you find them; and outside Jerusalem there is the best Trade School (only, of course, it has to be called a Vocational Training Centre nowadays) that Palestine has ever known. In days gone by it was hard to induce people to send their children to a trade school because, in Palestine as in this country, no one wanted to work in a shop who could work in an office. But now things have changed. Offices pay very poorly in Jordan. Oil companies pay very well. So it is better to train as a welder, or an electronics expert than to become a clerk. Or a teacher, either. And that has had a bad effect on the schools. The cadre of teachers trained under the Mandate were the *corps d'élite* of the Levant. But they have all been scattered now. A few do remain in Jordan, but of those not all are in education. The rest have sought and found fortune in other lands. So their place has been taken perforce by untrained tiros, little more, often, than schoolboys themselves. Not all of them have resisted the blandishments of Communism. But, let us beware of cant: is it natural that they should? What must be the attitude and the feelings of those who for eight years have had nothing to do but brood on their wrongs, men and boys alike, without work, without hope? Think of them, looking daily across the truce line at their own lands, on which grow their own trees—the trees they planted with their own hands. Into their own houses where they were born and lived they see the stranger enter. Will these people, so used, and so circumstanced, praise the policy of the nations who drew that line? Will they not rather be inclined to favour the adversaries of those nations?

The Jordan Government absolutely discourages any attempt at individual revenge. When you read of frontier incidents, and, mercifully, during the last eighteen months they have been very, very rare on the Jordan frontier, remember this. The Tel-Aviv régime has repeatedly been rebuked by the Security Council—in fact no Government in the world has been censured more often—for permitting its armed forces to infringe the truce. On the other hand, such incursions as there have been from the Jordan side have been only the work of individual, dispossessed, privateers, seeking what, in their eyes, is still their own. You appreciate the difference? Remember this, too: that last year the Jordan Government imprisoned more than 900 of its own citizens who had been arrested trying to cross the truce-line.

Yes, the bitterness is there and the causes of it. A little over a month ago I was walking near Jericho, a town in the vicinity of which there are some 70,000 refugees living in three vast camps. Slums would be a better word. The squalid huts, the arid, listless streets, the daily round of nothing—no wonder that, despite UNRWA, they have created among a people famous, almost notorious, for its patience, a sense of despair which in the early days of this year showed itself in an outburst of destructive violence. (In the camps in the hills, where tents are still to be found as homes, the atmosphere of squalor, the awful contrast between school and home, are even more depressing.) As we were walking, we came up with a little lad who was conning his book. (This always has to be done in the open country, because there is no privacy in a camp, so that young wandering scholars are a common sight.) He asked me where I came from. He

was reading an English primer but we talked in Arabic. As soon as I told him, he loosed off a stream of abuse of England such as after thirty years of growing realization that we are not universally loved, took me quite aback. This boy had clearly listened to the Egyptian wireless and to nothing else, for a very long time. He had believed, or pretended to believe, all it told him. Finally, after tearing Britain to shreds, he said: "And then that Baghdad Pact . . ." "Listen," I said. "Mohammed, how old are you?" "Sixteen," he said. "Well, then," I said. "You come back in ten years' time and we'll have a good talk about the Baghdad Pact, because I don't talk politics with children." He laughed and, in that irresistible Arab way, said: "But can't we just be friends, we Arabs and you English?" That encounter ended in smiles; but I am convinced that Mohammed is only one of thousands who have been brought up to regard England as a villainous power, and who see around them no evidence which would persuade them to the contrary.

Which means that, after eight years, the refugee problem is not only no better: it is actually a good deal worse. The refugees are fed and housed and looked after; many, but by no means all, of those squalid, tattered tents have gone, but only to be replaced by hopeless little huts. Meanwhile, the original refugees have become a grave social problem, not least for the Jordan Government, whose subjects they are, and their children, who increase rapidly every year, have been born and brought up to a life of aimless, resentful idleness.

I hope that no one will ask me "Why have the Arab Governments not solved the problem?" The answer is that they did not create the problem, we did. Every Arab, be he statesman or peasant, regards the refugees' problem as part of the Palestine problem in general. Without restitution of some kind, without either return or compensation—and by compensation I mean the payment of a just price for each piece of property alienated from its lawful owners—the problem never will be solved. That is our responsibility; so why should we try to shuffle it off on to the shoulders of the people whom we have wronged? It makes neither sense nor justice.

Now, I have said enough about the problem in general. I want to let you look at some of the facts of the case through the eyes of an artist, Mr. David Brewster, who has taken the pictures we are now going to see. Mr. Brewster is the representative on the Bishop's staff of the Cambridge Undergraduate Committee for Arab Refugees, and is at present a teacher and scoutmaster at St. George's School in Jerusalem.

[Then followed a number of slides.]

Given the fact that the refugees are peasants; given the second fact that their plight is a problem which can only be solved as part of a major political solution of the Palestine problem, the commanding question is: How can these people be helped? It is not a question of "Who is my neighbour?" There he is, wounded by the roadside: it is a question of "How can I help him?"

It was in this light that the Bishop of Jerusalem, among many others, both Arabs and their friends from other lands, viewed the problem.

First of all there was education to be thought about. St. George's School is famous. It has produced many of Jordan's best sons and is now

training many more. Education is the one door which may open on to a life of hope and self-respect for many a refugee, provided he can afford to obtain a good one. I have spoken of the UNRWA schools, of their merits and drawbacks. Many parents would prefer their children to grow up in the proven atmosphere of St. George's. So the Bishop set out to raise funds for bursaries to enable deserving boys to go to St. George's. And that scheme for bursaries is still, ladies and gentlemen, one of the most rewarding of the Bishop's contributions to the refugee problem. It is also one of the most expensive. Two-thirds of St. George's boys are now refugees.

Then, thought the Bishop, what about those who had nowhere even to live, except some dank cave? Could something be done for them, and even more for their children, so that in due time these same children might grow up healthy boys and girls, and perhaps become scholars of St. George's?

At this point the Bishop and Mrs. Stewart consulted a friend of theirs, someone with a long connection with St. George's, where his own first-born and many of his family are now at school. He is called Mahmud Abu Rish. He lives at Bethany, the village, you remember, in which the story of the Good Samaritan was originally told, the village which stands at the head of the very road in which that story is set. Mahmud is the head of a very ancient family, and he is a Muslim. So are all the refugees in the camps, every one of them. There are Christian refugees; but, as it happened—largely owing to an accident of geography—the chief centres of Christian residence and industry were untouched by the disaster, and so have been able to absorb a great number, in fact the majority, of their fellow Christians. Mahmud felt he had some responsibility towards, first of all, certain friends who arrived in his village. He soon had them looked after. Then his interest spread, and with his friends—the Bishop and the Bishop's wife, Mrs. Stewart—he decided that something might be done to make the lot of other refugees more stable and more hopeful. Mahmud is one of eight brothers. They are a typical Palestine family. One was killed in the Zionist war. One lives in Haiti, one is the representative in Beirut of a world-famous American newspaper, one works for the Jordan Government, one for UNRWA. That leaves three—Mahmud, Musa and Daud. They live at home in Bethany and devote their time and talents to work for their fellows.

So there was the team: the Bishop, Mrs. Stewart, Mahmud and the two brothers. They decided to help a group of villagers from the plain—who were living in such filth and overcrowded squalor that they could not, tough as they were, long survive in such conditions—to build some houses. The villagers saw no objection. After all, they said, the Bishop was a man of religion and he had nothing to do with their future, which was the business of the politicians (you see, this attitude is universal); all he was offering was the means of facing the future, whatever it might be, as healthy householders, with healthy children. Why not do it? That was how the Bishop's housing scheme originally started, and that is how it works today. The first village was built nearly four years ago, with funds raised in England in response to a letter in *The Times*. Since that small beginning, the Bishop and Mahmud Abu Rish have built five other villages.

The general idea was that the new villages should be built so as to harmonize with the existing ones. Funds for them have been contributed by individual friends, in England, America and Canada, by Arab refugees who have made good in other lands; by the Arab statesman and businessman, Mr. Emile Bustani, and by three Oil Companies—the Arabian-American, or ARAMCO; the Iraq Petroleum Company; and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company, or TAPLINE. The American Episcopal Church and the American Congregational Church jointly have given one village. The American Gulf Oil Company, which is one of the owners of the Kuwait Oil Company, has recently given the Bishop a sum of £2,000, a large proportion of which is being devoted to the afforestation of the villages with fruit trees, vines and shade and fuel trees. Altogether this project has received a sum of some £35,000 with which it has been possible to provide decent homes for some 1,000 souls. This is not a big achievement; but it does show that homes can be provided—and the sort of home that seems to meet the wishes of the people; and the individual cost is not high.

First a site is bought, and surrounded with a ring-wall, to protect it from goats. Then the building begins. From the start, the new villagers help to build their own homes. Here is a Bedu, a refugee from Beersheba, and his little boy. You can see from his face how earnest and anxious he is: is it really possible that, after shivering for eight winters on these cold hills, he is to have a house to live in? Yes, if he helps to build it. So he sets to work.

The stonemason is a professional. Here he sits under his improvised sun-shade, cutting with a practised instinct the stones which are to form the new house. They are soon laid in position, and the walls begin to rise—with astonishing speed. For before the eyes of the workers are the finished houses in the background: when are WE going to have houses, they say? As soon as you finish them, is the answer.

Soon the house looks like this. It is a two-roomed block, each room about 13 feet square. Each room will house a couple, and adjacent rooms are occupied, of course, by members of the same family, who will not mind sharing the verandah and the kitchen—which, like the verandah, they will build themselves to the design of the head of the house, or more likely of his wife.

At last the top course is reached, the stones being passed up from hand to hand and shoulder to shoulder.

The mortar is made of earth and lime mixed. Cement is used to point the outside and to make it watertight. Here is a load of mortar being brought up by one of the younger generation. He will always remember the day he helped to build the house. Whatever the future may be for him and his children, whatever other dwelling, old or new, he may acquire, this will always have an appeal for him.

The house is measured for its doors and windows. When it is finished it looks like this. The roof is corrugated iron on a wood frame, coped with stone. The group grows until it begins to fit into the landscape. When the ground round the houses—and there is half an acre to each block—is cultivated, and when the hundreds of trees which have been planted round the walls and along the streets of the villages come up, the

houses will look even more appropriate. You notice that they are not set in straight lines, but in groups, which is the way houses are in Palestine.

Finally comes the day when the stone of dedication is engraved and set up. This one is an old Roman pillar which gives its name to the village. The inscription starts, as all of them do, with a verse from the Quran. It reads: "God is the surest protector." Then "Al-'Amudiya" (the name of the village, meaning "the Village of the Pillar.") "It was founded by the American-Arabian Oil Company." And then comes the date according to the Muslim and the Christian calendars—1374 and 1955.

And here is a mother at home in her house with her baby. It is one of the oldest and best pictures in the world, so I will say no more about it. Only that the rolls of mattresses in the alcove, neatly stowed away by day, are the family's beds at night. They are, of course, exactly the same as they were in the days when the once lame man was told to take up his and walk.

In the older established villages it has been possible to provide communal amenities. This is the inscription of one of them. It reads: "The Children's House" (between two dates, 1374 and 1955). "It was given to the model villages of Al-Mansur, Al-Bustan and Al-Manara by the employees of the Near-East Arab Broadcasting Station, themselves children of this land." The last phrase is a modest cloak for the fact that although they are all refugees, they wanted to help their less fortunate countrymen and so contributed the very considerable sum of money necessary to build this infant welfare centre.

This is the inside. The blackboard shows the number of children who have on that particular day come to the centre for their daily ration of milk.

Another amenity, particularly loved by the ladies, is the communal oven, or *furn*. In biblical times, as still in most villages, the pots had to be made hot with thorns, which means this particular thorn. It takes hours and hours of arduous work for the women to go out on to the hill-sides and gather enough fuel even for one week. And think of the harm it does to the countryside by encouraging dessication and denudation. How much better and more convenient to have a general oven, which can be lighted with just one bit of thorn, like this, and then fired with *jift*—the residue left after the olives have been crushed; such a good, oily, hot fuel. All the ladies now have to do is to take down each her own prepared dough, made from the flour which UNRWA provides, and the baker does the rest of the baking. The gossip is the province of the ladies, and I assure you they do it to perfection. This bakery was the gift of two English friends whose names I should like to tell you, only I know they would not wish me to.

There stands a finished village—our second, Al-Mansur—with Bethany in the background.

Here is a group of villagers in the neighbouring Al-Bustan, three generations of them.

This is a picture of the headman of Al-Bustan.

And this is the baker's father, from down near Hebron. He has known bewildering changes in his life. Born under the Turks; seeing the coming of the English as a young man. And now, in his old age, a refugee. What

do they think of, these men? What do they look forward to? I do not know all their thought. But I can tell you this: they are never vindictive. Critical of governments, yes. But you never hear them—at least I have never heard them—say one revengeful word as individuals about those who now occupy their homes and lands. They think of them not in the mass, as Zionists, but individually, as Jews; which is a wholly different thing. It is also an extremely important thing. It was Weizmann himself who said that the ultimate test of the Zionists would be their ability to get on with the Arabs. In the long run, it cannot be alien arms that can maintain a minority amid a majority of different race and religion. It can only be civility and decency and sympathy. My own belief is that if ever the Zionists come to realize that, and act towards their neighbours as man to equal man, they will find that reciprocal sympathy will not be lacking.

But what these people chiefly think about is work. How can they get a livelihood? It is remarkable how the mere fact of once more possessing a home stimulates this desire to be independent and self-respecting. Even more remarkable is their success. They travel all over the kingdom, these men, to find work, and every cultivable inch of the gardens is planted. The result is that the first village is to all intents and purposes now an independent community, as the Bishop always hoped it would be. The second has gone a long way in the same good direction. The third and fourth in a lesser but encouraging degree. There is every prospect that, in a matter of a few years, these people will be as stable as their neighbours, and that their children will grow up free—loved and happy.

Here is one of them. He is called Faris, which means knight or horseman. He is known as the Crown Prince, and is a great character. If only for his sake, and the likes of him, surely the Bishop's work is worth doing.

Somehow, in Palestine, life always renews itself. Here in Jericho, today's refugees are at work bringing to light the oldest town yet known to have been built by man, 8,000 years ago.

Here, in the forsaken street of Jerash, the hyssop still springs from the wall.

Here, in the Garden of Gethsemane itself, are the sweet flowers of this very spring. However hard it may be at times to hope, it is far harder to despair.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid we have no time left for questions and, in any case, as Mr. Perowne has wisely said, he does not think he should be asked political questions on this subject, and it certainly would be difficult to ask any questions which are not political. Therefore, it is my very pleasant task to thank Mr. Perowne on your behalf. We have spent a most wonderful hour listening to very forthright speaking. I feel most of us agree that in these days there is need for a good deal of straight speaking, whether we agree with it or not. We have also listened to a most wonderful description of the generous voluntary work being done to help these unfortunate people, unfortunate not through their own fault but through outside influences. What Mr. Perowne said at the conclusion of his talk was most encouraging. I thank him very much indeed for what he has said and for the pictures he has shown.

THE END OF PASHADOM

BY GERALD DE GAURY

SIR JOHN BAGOT GLUBB, recently and suddenly dismissed from his service by the King of Jordan, received under the King's father the title of Pasha, one that is used by custom after the surname. He was the last of the Western Pashas to hold an executive position in the East; and since the power of Pashas was traditionally subject to sudden eclipse, Sir John, if he has a strong enough historical sense, may almost feel, in one way, gratified that he has been treated in accordance with centuries-old precedent.

The word Pasha (the tonic accent is on the last syllable) dates at least from the early thirteenth century. Its precise origin is obscure, though both Western and Eastern scholars have tried to find it. The concensus of their opinions is that it probably comes from the Mongol term for a military commander, *baskak*. By the late thirteenth century it was in use by the petty Turkish and Turkoman dynasties in Asia and was adopted by the Seljuk Turks for the Governors of provinces and for Wezirs, or Ministers, in their capital. Their successors, the Ottoman Turks, took it into full use, giving it to governors of provinces, naval and military commanders and high officials. At the height of the Empire there were in the neighbourhood of forty active Pashas at any one time. The very names of some of the lesser pashalics give an idea of the extent of the Empire and its power; Larnica in Cyprus, Tchildir in Georgia, Rumelie or Rumania, Temeswar in Hungary, Bosnia, Theodosia in Crim, the Yemen in Arabia, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in Barbary, all seats of lesser Pashas. The three great pashalics were those of Babylon, Grand Cairo and Buda, the holders being Pashas of three tails, and the others of two tails or one tail. At the ceremony on their appointment all the Pashas had had carried before them a stave decorated with the appropriate number of horses' tails according to their grade and were afterwards so known and treated. Their pashalics, however, were seldom lasting in tenure and scarcely ever hereditary.

Paul Rycaut in his *State of the Ottoman Empire*, written in the mid-seventeenth century, expressed some astonishment on discovering among them a few exceptions, like the pashalics of Gaza and Kurdistan, which were then held hereditarily. Their holders were probably tribal rulers, too shrewd and able to be easily supplanted by officers from Constantinople. "But not only," adds Rycaut, "in Pashaws and great men is care taken to clip their wings, which hinder them from soaring too high, but also in the Ottoman (*i.e.* Ruling) family itself, greater severity and strictness is exercised than in others . . . to keep them from growing great whereby to have possibility of aspiring to supream power."

In the Arab world the sudden fall of great men was by no means uncommon and the classic example is that of the Grand Wezir Jaafar al

Barmaki under the Caliph Haroun al Rashid of Baghdad. He was not a Pasha but he fell as suddenly as they were to do, for without warning he was executed and his vast fortune sequestered. Incidentally the word *barmaki* is used to this day in Baghdad to mean a man lavishly generous who oversteps prudence.

While the destruction of hereditary power and the use of officers, many of them born as Christians and conscripted in the annual levy of Christian youths, had value to the Ottoman sovereign, the system also had in it a source of weakness, which in the end largely contributed to the Empire's fall. The very insecurity of their tenure made Pashas hasten to accumulate fortunes by extortion while they could do so.

Because the Ottomans formerly ruled, or strongly influenced, Egypt and all the countries of Northern Africa, the title Pasha was in use there and given by the successors of the Ottomans until very recently.

A review of the great Ottoman Pashas and of all the foreign Pashas appointed in the last century would entail writing a history of Turkey and the Middle East. Even arbitrary selection of a few must inevitably omit famous names, ones that made men tremble in their day. Take, for example, great Ali Pasha of Yannina. The poor son of a brigand chieftain, who acquired some usefully large loot early in life and raised men for the Ottomans, he became an autonomous and finally an independent ruler of Epirus. Visited by Byron and Hobhouse and many French and English travellers he was courted by the governments of both countries, was usually inimical to the Russians, and in the end suffered defeat by the Ottomans, was carried off to Constantinople and there executed, at the age of eighty, in February, 1822, his head being exposed on the *Sublime Porte*. His portrait is to be seen in "Voyage d'Athènes a Constantinople," by L. Dupré (1817), reproduced in S. Sitwell's *Truffle Hunt*. It is a charming composition, showing him being rowed across Lake Ochrida, and well conveys the Pasha-like aplomb. Ali the Lion, as he was nicknamed, certainly qualifies for selection as the archetype of a Pasha.

The great Ali Haidar Midhat Pasha (1822-83) should not be omitted from even a short list of famous Pashas. Born in Constantinople, he became a civil official and first came to notice for clearing up troubles in the administration of Damascus in 1851. Soon he was sent wherever there was trouble, as Vali of Baghdad, or Iraq, where the tribes were in revolt, in 1869, subsequently touring the Persian Gulf and restoring Bahrain to the Ottoman sphere. As Court Wezir he brought in a new constitution. He was the great reforming Pasha, under whom, incidentally, a number of cities lost their walls and gained a tramway. As Wali of Syria he was so successful and popular that the Sultan Abdul Hamid began to suspect that he intended to rule autonomously. He was transferred to Smyrna and there arrested, being sent in exile to Taif, near Mecca, where he was assassinated by orders from Constantinople at the hands of Turkish officers and soldiers using their bayonets.

Among the foreign or Western Pashas appointed in Egypt outstanding names were those of an Austrian officer, Slatin Pasha, Governor of Darfur and twelve years a prisoner of the Mahdi; of Edward Schnitzler, a native of Prussian Silesia, better known as Emin Pasha, who held Equatoria

against the Mahdi until against his will he was extricated, through East Africa. General Charles Gordon, killed on the steps of his palace at Khartoum, who had nominated both men for their appointments, was himself a Pasha of Egypt. The eccentric Gordon had wished to take with him on his last expedition the former slave-trader Zobair Pasha, for the sake of his very great influence in the Sudan and with a view to leaving him there as Governor-General. Although the British Government, under pressure from the Anti-Slavery Society and the public opinion aroused by it, at first hesitated and finally refused to agree, Gordon's telegrams from Khartoum repeatedly renewed his request. Gordon had defeated Zobair's rebel son, causing his death, and it seemed strange that he should have thought of trusting Zobair, but he was the only man for the task and might have prevented disaster had he been sent in time.

In Egypt the great Albanian rulers in the first half of the nineteenth century, Muhammad Ali (Mehmet Ali) and Ibrahim, ancestors of ex-King Farouk, cannot be forgotten.

After the conquest of the mamlukes of Egypt by Sultan Selim the Grim of Turkey in 1516, the Turkish Pashas of Cairo were still held in check and often deposed by the Council of Mamluke Emirs, if not by the intrigues of their own mutinous soldiery. Muhammad Ali and his adopted son Ibrahim, who were to alter all that, had both been born in Kavala, in Thrace (now part of Greece), the former being a small farmer and tobacco merchant, who in 1798 became second-in-command of a regiment of bashibazouks, engaged to fight Napoleon in Egypt. He was present at the battle of Aboukir Bay and was driven back into the sea, being saved from drowning by British sailors in the gig of Sir Sidney Smith.

In 1801 he returned to Egypt where, as leader of the only compact body of Albanians, he was in the best position to draw power from the struggle between the *Sublime Porte* and the mamlukes, casting in his lot first with one side and then with the other; until finally the Shaikh of Cairo, in a hope of ending anarchy, engineered his election as Pasha. A massacre of the remaining mamlukes, in 1811, left him in supreme power and soon he invaded Arabia, sending Ibrahim, accompanied by French officers (one of those who helped him Europeanize his armies was Colonel Sève, known as Sulaiman Pasha) and a battery, to bombard and destroy Daraya, the central Arabian capital of the Saudi dynasty. He is described by British officers at this time of his life as being enormously fat, short and pock-marked, but ferocious and energetic. Ibrahim's agents reached Kuwait and the Persian Gulf and Egyptians stayed there until his death, though he himself was far away, defeating the Greeks in Morea, administering in Egypt, or fighting in the Levant. Meanwhile, from the north the Sultan endeavoured to bring Muhammad Ali to heel. By 1833, nevertheless, Muhammad Ali's army was nearing Brusa, in western Turkey, and the Sultan gave way to Russia's pressing offer of intervention. The British and French became alarmed, and it was thus that the Pasha of Egypt drew upon himself greater forces than he could withstand. Cut off by the British and Austrians on the sea, he withdrew to Cairo, his brief dream of Empire at an end; but when he and Ibrahim died, in the same year, 1848, they had founded a dynasty which lasted for a hundred years.

In the nineteenth century in Egypt there comes, among others, Nubar Pasha, the Jesuit-trained Armenian politician, a pliant negotiator who successfully extracted a number of concessions from the Sultan, one regarding the Suez Canal, another admitting a greater degree of independence and the use of the title "Khedive" (instead of Pasha) for the ruler of Egypt. Later, his opponent, the nationalistic Arabi Pasha, the son of a fellah who had risen through the ranks, drew upon himself defeat at the hands of Sir Garnet Wolseley at Tel el Kebir in September, 1882. Though a national hero, it is clear that he was an instrument of others rather than a truly exceptional man in his own right. At the end and the turn of the century, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, there are numerous British Pashas; such men as Valentine Baker, Spinks and Watson, and the upright and brilliant engineer officer, Ralston Kennedy, founder—under the ægis of Lord Kitchener—of the fabric of the Sudan, who selected and built Port Sudan, who rebuilt Khartoum, who foresaw and designed irrigation works and many other projects carried out then or by later generations. He died young, a broken man, in 1924, caught up in unforeseen eddies which led to distasteful enquiries and law cases.

A strange case is that of the traitor P. Bolo, a Pasha created by Abbas Hilmi, the Khedive of Egypt in 1914. During the 1914-18 war, Bolo succeeded in buying a very large holding in *Le Journal* of Paris, where he was living as a man of considerable standing, and he was expecting to take over, in return for payment of very big sums, other leading newspapers of the French capital. This he was able to do through having had huge amounts placed at his disposal in neutral countries by the German Foreign Minister. Discovered and prevented from pursuing his plot to undermine France and obtain a separate peace through her press, he was arrested and tried by court-martial, being shot in the moat at Vincennes, the traditional execution ground for traitors, on April 17, 1918.

Among Egyptians, the names of politicians like Boutros Ghali, assassinated on a railway station while Prime Minister; Muhammad Mahmoud; Sa'ad Zagloul; Ali Maher and others will be recalled.

Only recently the Pasha of Marrakesh in Morocco died, after having to make a public and humiliating obeisance to the Sultan of Morocco a short time before his end.

Among the last great and military oriental Pashas were Field-Marshal Muhammad Pasha Daghestani of the Caucasus, killed by a British shell at the battle of Kut-al-Amara; Jaafar Pasha al Askari of Iraq, an Ottoman Pasha and a soldier-politician, who was killed during a *coup d'etat* in Iraq; and his brother-in-law, the famous Nuri Pasha al Said, now Prime Minister of Iraq, created a Pasha by King Hussain of the Hejaz.

Trans-Jordan was the last country in the Middle East to abolish the grade of Pasha, other Middle-Eastern countries having done so in turn, following its abandonment by the Turkish Republic in a law dated November 26, 1934.

The true Ottoman Pashas, in the heyday of the Empire, had been grim and powerful. No doubt there were a few with other characteristics, Pashas who were gay; and Pashas young as well as old; Pashas virtuous besides Pashas vicious; Pashas diligent and Pashas less so; but the term

“Pasha-like ” has passed into the English language as meaning an ardent man, one dominating his harem.

At the height of Pashadom they were always fine-feathered and mostly from Albania and Circassia, while in the more sober days of this and the last century quite a few of them were drawn from European countries. Generally speaking they were military men whose careers ended suddenly.

THE SPITI VALLEY TO-DAY

By ALASTAIR LAMB

The Imperial Gazetteer of India described the Valley of the Spiti River as being "beyond question the most inaccessible part of the British dominions in India." Today this ludicrously named wedge of territory, on the Tibetan frontier between Kashmir and the State of Bashahr on the Sutley, still possesses a fascinating remoteness. The Spiti River is a tributary of the Sutlej, and its lower reaches form the boundary between India and Tibet, one of the few stretches of that frontier which does not follow the crest of a mountain range between divergent river systems. It rises at the Kanzam Pass, dividing the Spiti system from that of the Chandra, or upper Chenab, at an altitude of about 14,500 feet, and flows for 90 miles to the South-East into the Sutlej Valley in Bashadr State. Unlike most mountain rivers, its bed is extraordinary wide, in places over a mile from bank to bank, a field of shingle through which the water flows in a maze of divergent and convergent channels, and which has sunk deep into the valley floor so as to leave high ledges on either side. The ledges, often several hundred yards in width, are bounded on one side by cliffs descending to the river bed, and often eroded into deep gullies and fantastic pinnacles of conglomerate capped by an enormous boulder, and on the other sheer rock faces rising out of banks of scree and towering three thousand feet above the valley floor, through which tributary streams have carved deep gorges. On the ledges lie small villages, clusters of square mud and stone houses, two stories high with a courtyard on the top floor open to the exterior on one side. Walled fields surround the villages, adding splashes of emerald green to the pinks and yellows of the rock faces, and the mottled grey of the rived bed. Down stream, and many miles away, stretch a line of snow-capped peaks outlined against a sky of the deepest blue. It is a most dramatic landscape, rarely visited by the casual traveller.

This is the home of some 5,000 people, Buddhist in faith and Tibetan in race and culture, living in more than fifty villages. The Tibetan character of Spiti is apparent in first entering the valley by the Kanzam Pass, the summit of which is marked by a cairn gaily decorated with flags forever fluttering their message of Om Mane Padme Hum to the mountain winds. It is confirmed by the domestic architecture; by the characteristic chorten to be found in most villages; by the long lines of the prayer walls, heaps of inscribed stones which lie beside the track; by the temples, monasteries and shrines; by the dress and speech of the villagers. The long journey from the Kulu Valley, over the Rahtang Pass and up through the desolation of the moraines of the Chandra Valley in Lahul, has served to preserve the people from the cultural influences of the foothills.

Now that Sikkim and Ladakh have been closed to the European, and Tibet has passed under the control of Communist China, Spiti has become one of the few places where the Tibetan way of life can be watched and studied. It was for this reason, together with the fact that Spiti boasts a rich and celebrated source of fossils, and possesses several unexplored tributary valleys and unclimbed peaks, that a small expedition from Cambridge, of which I had the good fortune to be a member, visited the valley last summer. Our visit coincided with the beginning of a project on the part of the Indian Government to bring to this remote district the benefits of modern civilization and progress. We were thus afforded an opportunity to watch an old way of life in the process of transformation.

In the past the Spiti people have been at various times under the rule of Ladakh, of Tibet, of the Rajas of Kulu and of Bashahr, and of the Sikhs. Generally the invader was content with plunder and tribute and showed little inclination to impose an alien government upon the district. There was at one time a Ladakhi Governor of Spiti but it is doubtful whether he ever remained in the valley for more than a few months during the summer. When the British acquired Spiti from the Sikhs in

1846, together with the neighbouring districts of Lahul and Kulu, they followed a similar policy. British interest in the district lay entirely in its geographical position, which, it was thought, could provide a direct route to Western Tibet, the home of "pushm," or shawl, the raw material of the renowned shawls of Kashmir. The trade in this commodity was then a virtual monopoly in the hands of the first Maharaja of Kashmir, Gulah Singh.

Under the British Spiti was settled and incorporated into the Kangra district of the Punjab and its government lay mainly in the hands of a local chief, the largest landholder in the valley, referred to as the Nono. This title, which is common in Ladakh, signifies nobility, and there are at present four Nono families in Spiti, who appear to have settled there when it was under Ladakh rule, and who still marry in Ladakh when they can. To avoid confusion the ruling Nono is often called the Kuling Nono, after the village in which is his palace, or simply Nono Sahib. The Nono has certain judicial powers and is responsible for the appointment and payment of the headmen of the five Kothi, or smaller administrative divisions into which all the villages in the valley are gathered, often in a most arbitrary way, a village of one Kothi being surrounded completely by villages of another. Since 1951 the Nono has been assisted by a Government appointed secretary.

The present Nono has little interest in the business of government. He is a friendly man, about forty-five years old, and very shy. In his appearance he is like the ordinary Spiti landholder, except that his hair is slightly less unkempt, and that beneath his red dressing-gown of a robe can be detected the collar of a Western-style shirt. He rarely leaves the confines of the valley, being quite content to pass his days in his palace. This is a building somewhat larger than the normal Spiti house, with a flower garden in front over which look glazed windows in half-timbered bays reminiscent of the Tudor style, and boasting a private temple and a small room reserved for the entertainment of guests. This room is the nearest approach to luxury to be found in Spiti, with its red and yellow Tibetan carpeting, glowing in the light from a large bay-window lined with the sides of Standard Oil kerosene tins, its long, low, red-lacquer tables, and its copper and pewter samovar. Here the Nono keeps many of his treasures: a pair of bright blue anodized aluminium thermos flasks hang from the rafters: garish lithographs of Buddhist scenes are nailed to the walls of pink plaster: a photograph of the late Panchen Lama escorted by two Tibetan Lion-dogs is prominently displayed: an ancient shot-gun leans in one corner beside several bottles of an oily yellow spirit to which the Nono is most partial.

The Nono is advised by a council of five local worthies, two of whom are elected and three nominated, although in Spiti this distinction is not very great. The people of Spiti are classified as a Scheduled Tribe, which means that their interests are watched over not only by the Punjab Government, but also by the Centre in the person of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to whom the Nono and the Council have the right of direct access. This places considerable influence into the hands of the most literate and energetic member of the Council, one Nono Tashi Nana, the second largest landholder and head of one of the four Nono families.

In their carefully irrigated fields the people of Spiti can grow sufficient wheat, barley, peas, and mustard seed (as a source of vegetable oil), to supply their needs. Their economy is mainly based on barter, and the few imports from Kulu, kerosene and Tiger-Brand cigarettes, are paid for with the Rupees earned by the wealthy from the sale of Spiti ponies, much valued for hill work, and by the poorer villagers from labour by some of the younger sons in the foothills during the long winter months. The land is inherited in a manner that seems extraordinary to the plainsman. The head of the family is always the eldest married son, who lives in the family big house and tills the bulk of the family holdings, aided by his landless brothers and relatives. When his son marries, he hands over to him the care of the family holding and retires to a smaller house with a plot of land attached sufficient for his needs, displacing his father who may either retire to a second, and smaller, dower house or remain with his son as a working guest. Despite its complexity it is a system which keeps intact the family holdings, and ensures that the land is tilled by a man most fitted by his youth to do so.

The majority of the villagers are landless. Some are junior members of land-

holding families who work in the family fields for their keep. Others are labourers paid in kind. In each village there are specialists, such as the blacksmiths, millers, entertainers and animal doctors, who are kept by the community in return for their services. And inevitably, in a Tibetan population, there are the monks.

Spiti possesses five monasteries; four of the celibate Yellow sect, and one of the Red sect, whose monks may marry. Ki Gompa, with about two hundred of the total of four hundred monks in the valley, is the largest of the monasteries. Built upon the summit of a pinnacle of rock rising from the bank of the Spiti River to a height of nearly one thousand feet above the village at its foot, it dominates the scene and suggests the ubiquitous part played by religion in the lives of the people. Unlike the communal establishments of Europe, the Tibetan monastery does not usually feed and clothe its inmates. The monks are supported by their families and live in a style which varies with their wealth so that a monk from a rich family may well keep several poorer monks as his servants. In addition, the monasteries still collect a tithe on the village crops—a "pun" this tax is called. In the summer months the monasteries are almost empty, their occupants having either returned to their villages to help with the tilling of the fields, or set out on begging journeys through the valley and further afield. There can be no doubt that the monasteries act as a conservative force in Spiti; by absorbing young men from the marriage market they help to keep the rate of population increase low; they are bound to oppose any challenge to their influence and must therefore resist any social and economic changes in such a closely integrated society; and by storing wealth which might otherwise be put to more productive uses they help to keep the economy static.

The monasteries have the closest affiliations with Lhasa and Shigatse. Ki, for example, is a daughter house of Tashilhumpo. It is the ambition of every monk to visit Lhasa; a journey which can offer more than spiritual reward, since the carpets, coats, and saddlery of the Tibetan capital are in such demand in Spiti that the enterprising monk can always turn his pilgrimage to good profit. Of late, however, the journey to Lhasa has become more difficult, a fact which causes some monastic discontent. When we visited Ki we were told that its abbot had been away in Lhasa for several years, and was likely to remain there, since the monastery was unable to afford the cost of his return journey. Not only the monks were affected by the increased difficulty of Tibetan travel, which now necessitates the obtaining of passports and permits. The products of Lhasa have become increasingly harder to obtain in Spiti, and recently the number of Tibetan traders who visited the annual fair, usually held in July or August in a wide, grassy meadow at over 16,000 feet, had decreased considerably. I found no evidence, however, that the remaining contacts between Spiti and Tibet had been used by the Chinese for political ends.

No one could call the standard of education in Spiti high. Despite the presence in Rangring, its largest village, of a "middle school" for over thirty years, and of ten "primary schools" in other villages, the population is virtually illiterate. The schoolmaster of Rangring, who combined this function with that of postmaster, a charming young Bashahri named Amar Chand, married to a Spiti girl, confessed to the greatest difficulty in obtaining pupils in the face of local prejudice and monastic opposition. The schoolhouse was generally used as a rest-house for travellers. The status of Scheduled Tribe has conferred many advantages on any Spiti man who can attain to the most elementary heights of literacy; a wide range of opportunities in the public service are reserved for such as he. However, the record to date has been discouraging. There is one man of Spiti so employed; a supervisor of a road construction gang in a neighbouring valley. In Lahul, where the Moravian Mission for many years conducted schools, until the anti-missionary climate of Independence obliged them to leave, the rate of literacy is relatively high. Amar Chand, who was himself missionary educated and spoke good English, much regretted their departure and that they had not extended their influence into Spiti. At present the people of Spiti can have little idea of the India to which they belong; some of them may have gone down to the plains to labour during the winter but they can hardly have understood much of what they saw there. One can see small encampments of Spiti people at Manali in the Kulu Valley, withdrawn from the bustle and noise of the bazar, representatives of an alien race and culture.

The physical strength of the inhabitants of this valley is remarkable; the loads

which the men, and even more the women, are able to carry up the steep mountain slopes defies belief, and it is probably on this account that most writers on these people have described them as a healthy race. It is true that those who are fortunate enough to survive childhood often seem to live to a ripe old age; the number of weatherbeaten old men and wrinkled and toothless crones seemed remarkable. But the entire population is infected with that scourge of hill peoples, venereal disease. The stigmata are all too apparent; the noses that have lost their bridges, the dessicated and yellowed gums, and the teeth widely set apart, one from another, like a row of pegs, all point to congenital syphilis. Figures of the rate of insanity and infantile mortality are, of course, unobtainable, so that it would be impossible to state more about the affect of this affliction upon the community other than to surmise that it must weaken its mental vigour and prevent it from evolving further by its own efforts.

Despite dirt, disease, and ignorance, all too apparent to the casual observer, the achievements of Spiti are not to be scorned. The irrigation system, a most complex arrangement of channels and reservoirs whereby water is carried to the enclosed fields from mountain torrents, often several miles away, has proved adequate. Famine is unknown. Spiti has no rainfall to speak of, the rain-heavy clouds of the monsoon being blocked by the mountains to the south. It is only by the communal effort of the villagers that the fields are prevented from reverting to the stony barrenness of the surrounding uncultivated land. The population is increasing very slowly as compared to the increase in the plains—from 3,700 in 1900 to 4,800 today. Only a fraction of the land available is under cultivation, and this the villagers seem quite competent to extend in time to the slow population rise, avoiding the chronic land-hunger of the plains. This fact alone might be an argument against a development project, since the introduction of Western methods, however diluted, in other parts of Asia, has always been accompanied by a disastrous dislocation of the demographic balance. The people seem happy enough with their present state. Nor do they seem liable to exploitation, as any who have tried to sell surplus stores to a Spiti man will soon appreciate. Even the prevalent venereal disease may play its part as a check on population increase.

It is among these people that the Indian Government have recently embarked on an ambitious plan of administrative, economic, and social reform. In 1954 it was decided to spend as much as five lakhs of Rupees on the development of Spiti, provided equally by the Punjab and the Centre, to coincide with similar projects in neighbouring Lahul. Some preliminary exploration was carried out in that year, and in the summer of 1955 Indian officials visited Spiti in force. In August the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes visited Lahul, holding in the village of Koksar a conference of the chief persons of Lahul and Spiti to explain the intentions of his Government. We met the Commissioner on his way to the meeting and were much impressed at the cheerfulness with which he was facing the prospect of the long grind up the Rahtang Pass, well over 13,000 feet high, and not to be taken lightly by a man of fifty-nine. The effort spent in crossing this very pass nearly a century earlier caused the death of the first Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India. When I pointed this out to him, the Commissioner was undismayed; he observed that the following day was the fifteenth of August and he could think of no better place to celebrate his nation's Independence than among the peaks of the High Himalaya by the sacred source of the River Beas.

The improvement of communications is an essential part of the plan and in Delhi I was assured that by 1958 there would be a jeep road over the Rahtang and Kanzam passes. There was less optimism on the spot: the engineering problems involved in such a task seemed almost insuperable and there was great difficulty in obtaining the necessary labour; especially in Spiti, where the villagers, to the despair of the thrifty Sikh engineer of the Punjab Public Works Department, preferred to pay cash fines rather than engage themselves in such unfamiliar and arduous tasks. Much, however, has been achieved; a good track from the foot of the Rahtang to the foot of the Kanzam up the Chandra Valley was well under way when we left the mountains in September; a bridge had been built over the Chandra and another was under construction, no mean task when it is remembered that every steel girder has to be transported on human backs over a pass with an ascent of 7,000 feet. Once this

road is complete it is intended to carry over jeeps piece by piece. There can be little doubt that the next few years will see the construction of a similar track along the Spiti Valley, enabling, in the summer months, the Tibetan frontier to be reached from Manali in Kulu in a single day, with a relay of three jeeps.

The administration of Spiti is already undergoing a radical transformation. In a district where the policeman did not come for years at a stretch there has been stationed a permanent detachment of the Punjab Armed Police, certainly over sixty strong, though its Inspector was most reticent about its numbers. The police have made their headquarters at Kaza, a village occupying a central position in the valley, to which the seat of government, now at Dankhar in the southern part of Spiti, is to be moved. The Tibetan frontier, in the past quite open from the Indian side, at Lari on the lower Spiti, is now watched by an armed Indian guard, looking out towards an outpost of Chinese troops a few miles downstream.

The Nono is fast becoming a cipher. The Indian officials we met in Spiti looked on him as rather a joke. The voice of the Spiti people is now expressed through the more active members of the Advisory Council who have been co-operating with the Government in the execution of the plan. We met a Panchayat Officer in Spiti who was busy replacing the old Kothis, with their headmen appointed by the Nono, by village council of the type common in the plains, and selecting the headmen himself.

A Land Settlement Officer was already concluding that the peculiar local customs of land tenure operated unfairly against the younger sons of landholding families, and was advocating the equal division of property among all male heirs. There was an Agricultural Inspector who was seeking to introduce cash crops into the Spiti economy. He was hard-put to it to find a crop that would both grow at the mean altitude of 13,000 feet and find a ready market in the foothills. When I last saw him he had decided that the cultivation of almonds was a promising suggestion. Propaganda on the new Indian way of life was included in the plan. An official had been provided with a magic lantern illuminated by kerosene, and a set of slides of the work of Le Corbusier in the new East Punjab capital, which he was diligently projecting every evening onto the white-washed wall of a house in one of the larger villages, much to the wonder of the inhabitants, who must surely have interpreted the honeycomb-like façade of the High Court building as the most recent development in the science of apiculture.

A doctor had been sent to Spiti, whom we frequently met as he travelled up and down the valley with a caravan of two orderlies and fourteen mules, trying to dispense DDT, sulfa drugs, and vaseline. The DDT was scorned. The sulfa drugs, intended as a cure for gonorrhœa, were accepted as a kind of sweet, so that wherever he went he was mobbed by small children demanding the pretty white pills. The vaseline, however, was the greatest attraction, since the Spiti people have learnt to appreciate its merits, when applied to face and feet, as a protection against the icy winter blizzards; a fact which the Government seems to have considered when it provided this unguent in two forms, scented for the face, and plain for application elsewhere.

What are the motives behind the proposed development of Spiti? Undoubtedly there is the desire to improve the condition of a backward community. But this does not entirely explain the jeep road. Nor does it explain why so many police have been sent among a timid people who could easily be kept to the straight and narrow path by two or three armed constables. Two reasons suggest themselves.

In the first place, from Spiti and the upper Chandra Valley there are routes to Ladakh and the troubled State of Kashmir. Readers of "Kim" will doubtless remember that it was by way of Spiti that the two foreign agents had travelled down from the Frontier en route for Simla when they met with and maltreated Kim's Lama, and were frustrated in their nefarious designs by Kim and Babu Hurry Chunder Mookerjee. None of the officials connected with this project to whom I talked, either in Spiti or in Delhi, denied that they were greatly interested in improving communications with Kashmir in this way, although they felt that in this respect Lahul was of greater significance than Spiti, since the Parang La, the main pass from Spiti to Ladakh, is over 18,000 feet high, and could never compete, except in an emergency, with the Bara Lacha Pass at the head of the Chandra River in Lahul.

In relation to Tibet, Spiti occupies a position of greater strategic significance, and this must be a second reason for Indian interest in the district. Despite the workings of Pan Shilla few will deny that the presence of the Chinese Communists in Tibet, a country with so many miles of frontier shared with India, has a profound, if inarticulate, influence upon Indian policy. The danger of Chinese infiltration, however remote, is a possibility which cannot be ignored. The main task of the Punjab Armed Police in Spiti was to guard the frontier against any attempt at infiltration, and to prevent the sort of incident that might arise if, for example, a European mountaineer should wander on to Chinese soil and be arrested. Behind the present strictness with which Europeans are now prevented from crossing the "Inner Line," so irritating to the climber excluded from so many promising peaks, undoubtedly lies the determination on the part of the Indian Government that they should not be held responsible for any such misfortune as that which last year befell two Welsh climbers on the Nepal-Tibet border, and which might be given an embarrassing construction in Peking. The police in Spiti were in wireless contact with headquarters in Kulu and their frontier post was carefully checking every traveller who entered or left India. Firmly, but with the greatest of tact, they saw to it that we did not transgress the limitations of the "Inner Line."

A corollary to the possibility of Chinese infiltration is the risk of disaffection among the population of Spiti, so much closer in religion, race, and culture to Chinese Tibet than to India. This may explain the desire to create closer economic links between the valley and the foothills, and the attempt to spread the knowledge of Indian power and Indian achievements. It is clear that the revenue from Spiti will never cover the cost of the police, let alone the road-building projects.

A road through Spiti and along a stretch of the Tibetan frontier, involving transshipment from jeep to jeep across high passes, can never be of great economic importance. It is clearly intended to facilitate the rapid movement of police and troops to the frontier zone, and this is symptomatic of the changed significance of the Tibetan border. In 1858, for example, Lord Canning, argued against the extension of the Hindustan-Tibet road right up to the Tibetan frontier on the grounds that Indian frontier policy demanded that the Himalayan range should remain as much as possible a barrier to the passage of troops; and, in general, this was the policy of his successors.

The people of Spiti seemed much perturbed by the mass of officialdom that had so suddenly descended upon them. In many small ways they were failing to cooperate in the projects planned for them. In some small measure this was the fault of the officials, many of whom had little sympathy with the life of the hill people, since they personally loathed the climate of the mountains and longed only for their return to the heat and bustle of Amritsar or Ludhiana. In part this was the fault of the strong conservatism of Spiti, often expressing itself in roundabout ways. An experience of ours illustrates this attitude. We had occasion to hire two local porters from the village of Rangring, through the agency of the schoolmaster, and with the consent of a benign old gentleman who had just been appointed headman of the newly established panchyat in the village, and was, therefore, its constitutional head. No sooner had the porters set out with our party than opposition began to appear in the village, under the leadership of a wild-looking youth, who, it later transpired, had formerly held the office of headman of the Kothi by virtue of his position as the largest landholder. The families of the two porters were ejected from their homes, and I found them sitting in the middle of a village street, filling the air with a piteous wailing. There was quite a tense atmosphere among the villagers, who were only soothed by the prompt return of the two porters. The ostensible reason for all this fuss was the claim that our destination, up the gorge of a tributary of the Spiti River, was a sacred spot whither a Spiti man could not venture without incurring the wrath of the gods; an unlikely tale, we felt, since this very valley was daily visited by herdsmen and fuel-gatherers. Our real offence lay in engaging the porters through the new panchyat instead of through the headman of the traditional Kothi. One could notice opposition being expressed in other minor ways. Many Indian officials, including the Inspector of Police, complained that they experienced great difficulty in obtaining information from the local inhabitants. The doctor, too, had his troubles. During the whole of his time in Spiti he had been unable to

look beneath the grimy garment of a single villager. Only one person, a member of Nono's family, had submitted to a medical examination. In these circumstances it is not surprising that his efforts against venereal disease had been rewarded with no success.

We received the impression, however, that such opposition was not likely to have much effect or be long lived. There would be no outbreaks of the kind that have so marred Indian attempts to carry out similar proposals among the Nagas. The people are not given to an open resistance to authority. The few murders of travellers that have taken place in Spiti in recent times do not argue against this conclusion, since the travellers in question were inevitably alone and in circumstances which rendered retribution most unlikely. Several of the leading landowners in the valley have seen that their best interests lie in wholehearted co-operation with the Government. It is inevitable that the society and economy of Spiti will undergo a profound change in the next few years, and much of the quaintness of the valley and its people will disappear. In Spiti, as in Lhasa, the Tibetan people are at last succumbing to influences from the outside world, which for so long they have succeeded in excluding.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor.

SIR,

Dr. Lockhart has kindly drawn my attention to an error, which I very much regret, in my review of Professor Guillaume's translation of the *Sira* of Ibn Ishaq. The first printed edition of the Arabic text was, of course, edited by Wüstenfeld, not Wellhausen.*

C. F. BECKINGHAM.

SIR,

In his review of "Asia East by South" (R.C.A.S. Journal, January, 1956), Mr. W. E. D. Allen says: ". . . nor are cormorants encountered in the Khyber." Now, I don't know about the actual Khyber, but I can definitely say that his statement does not hold for neighbouring Afghanistan, because I have myself seen a cormorant in one of the very highest passes of the country.

In 1953—on Thursday, July 30 exactly, I see from my diary—with the other members of the Danish Scientific Mission to Afghanistan, 1953-54—Klaus Ferdinand and Peter Rasmussen—I was encamped at Tang i Azao, a narrow defile situated on the road between Obek and Daulat Yar in the Kashamurgh range of mountains, south of the Hari Rud, in the easterly part of the Herat province of Afghanistan. The highest point of the mountains here is marked on the map (Afghanistan sheet of the Southern Asia series, scale 1:2 million, Survey of India, Calcutta, 1932) as being 11,229 feet.

We had risen early, and had walked into the Tang i Azao defile itself to inspect a Syriac inscription of which my friend M. Girshman, the French archæologist, had vainly attempted some years before to take an imprint in latex rubber. Much of the latter had remained encrusted on the letters, and I sent one of the Afghans with us to fetch a tin of petrol with which to wash away the stains.

It must have been about 8 a.m., and I was sitting on a rock, in the sun, just south of the defile, where it broadens out again into a wider valley, with fields on either side and with a cave situated far up in the cliffs above, where, it is said, Abder Rahman, a former Afghan minister of Public Works, tried to find a hidden treasure.

As we sat there, a black bird came flying down from the river above and, without circling or hesitating at all, flew straight through the narrow passages of the defile. Both Klaus Ferdinand and myself recognized it for a cormorant, and this was confirmed when, a few minutes later, it came back again, flying in the opposite direction. It was obviously search-

* R.C.A.S. Journal, Vol. XLIII, Pt. II, p. 151.

ing for fish in the river, and as these abound in the streams of Afghanistan it certainly had no difficulty in finding some.

I was so intrigued by this cormorant in central Afghanistan that I asked our interpreter, Dr. Karim Nouchy, if he knew these existed here. He replied that there were many and that they presumably came up from the sea at Karachi (?).

I wonder if any reader can tell us something more about these birds in Central Asia. It would be most interesting to know if others have seen them, where, and if they live always so far inland, or only come up to the mountains in the summer.

Yours, etc.,

PETER, PRINCE OF GREECE AND DENMARK.

THE honorary secretaries are always glad to receive unwanted back numbers of the Journal.

REVIEWS

Kuwait and her Neighbours. By Lt.-Colonel H. R. P. Dickson, C.I.E., F.R.G.S.
London: George Allen and Unwin. 1956. Pp. 627; glossary, index, maps, illustrations. 75s.

Many Englishmen have served with distinction in the Arabic-speaking countries, leaving friendly and honoured memories behind, but few have integrated themselves so completely into the local background as Harold Dickson and his wife, Violet. The Dicksons have now lived continuously in Kuwait for twenty-seven years, and both of them have recorded their extensive knowledge of the people and the surroundings of the area in which they have spent so many years, in previous books.

Kuwait and her Neighbours falls into three parts and an epilogue. Firstly, we have a description of Kuwait and its Arabian hinterland and the people who inhabit it; secondly, a record of the historical events of the area in the last fifty or sixty years, with the writer's experiences in Iraq during the First World War; thirdly, reminiscences and anecdotes, including some interesting folklore; and finally, a short chapter on the oil developments and their impact on the area.

This book, though discursive, is never dull, and contains a fund of interesting and amusing information about the way of life of the inhabitants of Kuwait and the neighbouring parts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The writer is at his best with the subject in which he has always been most closely interested, that is the daily life of the people amongst whom he has lived for so long. His descriptions form a valuable contribution to the social history of the area during the period immediately preceding the discovery of oil. This record is all the more valuable because the customs and way of life it describes are rapidly disappearing in the process of the revolution in the life of these people caused by the sudden transition from poverty to wealth, through the discovery of oil.

Colonel Dickson does not deal at any length with the social and economic changes now taking place in the Persian Gulf area as a whole, and Kuwait in particular; his instinct and experience alike cause him to deplore the disruption of tribal life and the materialism created by the impact of Western habits—the motor-car, radiogram, cinema, alcohol, female emancipation, and all the other incidentals of Western civilization. These things to him and his old Arab friends, are the inventions of the devil, which can only lead to downfall and ruin. It is obviously distressing to him to see a new set of loyalties and values, based upon wealth and commercial enterprise, replacing the age-long qualities of courage, endurance, austerity and pride of race, which formerly dominated the desert life.

In his enthusiasm for the past, the writer finds more to praise than condemn in the nomad life, although examples of the feuds and privations which accompanied it continually recur in the pages of this book. That fresh vistas have now been opened to these formerly backward people, in the form of free education for boys and girls, adequate water supply, medical care, and above all, a proper standard of housing and nutrition, is often overshadowed by the aura of romanticism created by chroniclers of the desert life.

But the writer is much happier in his treatment of the past than the present. The book contains a wealth of most interesting information derived from the personal experiences of the writer and his wife, and many tales of stirring events and local legend and tradition heard over the Bedouin camp fire and in the diwans of the Arab princes and the merchants and mariners who form the backbone of the population of Kuwait.

The Dicksons have identified themselves so closely with local life, feelings and manners, that they have had access to a wealth of intimate information which is barred to the Westerners who associate chiefly with their own countrymen when they live in these countries. It is a tribute to their affection and their generosity, and their

freedom from prejudice and conceit, that they have mixed so happily and so intimately with the local inhabitants. By doing so, they have kept their interest alive and enjoyed to the full their life in one of the more arid and less scenically attractive parts of the world.

By sharing the joys and sorrows of the people amongst whom they have lived so long, and by appreciating their virtues and their weaknesses, they have developed a passionate interest in their surroundings and affection for their simple friends, which is reproduced most vividly in these pages for the enjoyment of untravelled readers.

From so much that is interesting, it is difficult to single out items for special mention. Colonel Dickson's experiences as a Political Officer in Southern Iraq during the First World War are vivid and picturesque. They do much also to explain the affection and respect in which he is held to this day, by the Muntafiq tribesmen who never fail to call on their friend and protector, "Abu Saud" as he is affectionately known to them, in the course of their annual migration to Kuwait.

To students of the recent history of the Middle East, the accounts of the 'Uqair Conference of 1922 and the Ikhwan rebellion of 1929-30, will do much to clarify the causes of the differences between Iraq and Arabia which have so much bearing on this present situation in the Middle East.

The book is well produced and contains an excellent glossary and index; the illustrations are mainly of important personages and the writer's Arab friends, and some pictures of the town and recent developments would have been interesting to those who follow current developments in the area.

The appendix includes an official map and a useful road map of Hasa and sketch of Kuwait town. It would have added much to the interest of the story if maps of the area just before and just after the First World War, and showing the developments following the discovery of oil, had been included.

The importance of the book, however, lies in its record of times and customs which are being changed with great rapidity by the impact of industrial development. The book will, therefore, be read with interest and pleasure by many people who are interested in the changes caused by the discovery of oil, and also by students of history and anthropology now, and for many years to come.

E. A. V. DE C.

The Development of Iraq; a Plan of Action by Lord Salter. Printed for the Iraq Development Board by the Caxton Press Ltd., London. [Presented to the Society by the Iraqi Embassy.]

This valuable work, running to 250 pages, appears not to be "published" in the normal manner, but printed, for official use, by the Iraq Development Board, and is not on sale to the public. It is a work of great value to the serious student of present-day Iraq, and it is little disadvantage that its appeal to the general reader would be limited since the latter is unlikely to see it.

Lord Salter, who was engaged in 1954 by the Government of Iraq to assist them in the formulation of their development policy, has stuck strictly to his terms of reference; it results that this report is far from covering the whole field of Iraq interests, or even its whole economy, but is restricted to its actual or potential development activities as these are conceived and administered by the Development Board. Nevertheless, much ground is covered (with interesting references to other relevant reports within the last two or three years) and the student can inform himself fairly fully both as to recent achievements and future plans, and the economic and social considerations which Lord Salter considers should condition these.

The author himself is known as a man of outstanding ability, and he has added to this a remarkably long and thorough experience of economics, government and public affairs. Although no orientalist, his analysis of Iraqi conditions is sound and penetrating; he has evidently within a few months equipped himself with a complete knowledge of present circumstances and recent events.

The report now under review is indeed a remarkable *tour de force*, containing much which is enlightening and helpful and, within the knowledge of the present

reviewer, nothing that is foolish, superficial or unsound. The immense advantages which Iraq enjoys, and the prosperous future which to all appearances (and subject to its own wisdom and tranquility) it can anticipate, emerge clearly from these pages.

S. H. LONGRIGG.

Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. By Walter Z. Laqueur, and Kegan Paul. Routledge, 1956. Pp. 376; Index and Bibliography. 32s.

No doubt the State Department and the Foreign Office (and presumably the Kremlin too) contain vast files about the growth and importance of Communism in the Middle East. But until the appearance of Mr. Laqueur's book the student without access to official records had no general work of reference to turn to on this subject in spite of its vital interest to the West. For this reason Mr. Laqueur's book is of the highest importance. In it he traces the history of the communist parties of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, the Lebanon and Iraq. (Persia is omitted altogether for good reasons which he explains, and there is nothing about the Arabian peninsula.) Several fascinating chapters are added on Communism and minorities such as the Kurds and Armenians, on the Moslem Brotherhood and similar organisations which might be used by the Communists for the deeper penetration of the Middle East, and on the Russian intervention in the area which began last year. There can be no doubt that Mr. Laqueur is well equipped for his work. For it is evident that he has a knowledge of Arabic, Hebrew, Yiddish, Turkish and Russian. Furthermore he has consulted a mass of documents, many of them clandestine publications—made available to him by the Israeli authorities? And his scholarship seems throughout to be of a high order.

Mr. Laqueur is of the opinion that it is wrong to suppose Islam can provide a bulwark against the spread of Communism in the Middle East. On the contrary he points out that because of the decay of Islamic society and the failure of parliamentary democracy in the Middle East, "political figures and whole parties have switched their allegiance from one totalitarian system to another because the differences between Communism and Fascism . . . are less weighty than those between them and democracy." His general conclusion therefore is that in the Middle East "capitalism was identical with imperialist rule, and democracy was something the imperialist powers . . . practised at home. Democracy was not a militant creed . . . and it did not provide the answers to many specifically Asiatic questions. Democracy could not inspire the masses, and it did not give firm spiritual support to the élite. It could not promise a much better life in the immediate future nor could it put on a spectacular show in which everybody was to be told just what to do—whereas Communism had all the force of a secular religion—in Asia even more so than in Europe." Hence the failure of the West in the Middle East, and the immense progress made by the prophets of competitive co-existence in the Kremlin. In fact, Mr. Laqueur thinks that the only two countries which can hope to resist Communism are Turkey and Israel. On Iraq he is particularly gloomy: "The present régime is doomed; by clinging to power long enough it may make Communism the only alternative. The Iraqi Communists have revealed . . . an unusual degree of incompetence and disunity. . . . But it looks as if they may mend their ways sooner than the rulers of the country. Their inefficiency has been the main safeguard of the West for a number of years—it would be unwise to expect it to remain so for ever."

Mr. Laqueur has evidently regarded it as his main function to analyse and describe, and those who look to him for a solution of Western difficulties in the Middle East will be disappointed. All the same he has performed a most valuable task in providing the student for the first time with a comprehensive and detailed exposition of the problems with which the West is faced. There are, of course, several opinions he expresses with which not everyone will agree. For instance it does not follow that because Islamic society is in decay the philosophical bases of Islam and Communism are reconcilable; indeed it may well be the task of those who are opposed to the spread of Communism in the Middle East to point out and disseminate the fundamental differences which exist between them. Then again, it is surprising to read that the Soviet trade offensive in the Middle East should not be

compared with the German drive in the Balkans between the wars, for it has yet to be shown that the Russian objective is not political domination through economic penetration. It is perhaps slightly unfortunate that his account of the Communist movements in Iraq and the Levant States should seem to stop short in 1954, whereas in the other countries the story is taken up to last year. And there are a number of corrections which should be made in the next edition of this most valuable work. Mr. Hankey was never "British Ambassador in Cairo." The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (not Treaty) was signed in October, not July 1954. Mr. Sharett did not use the name until well after 1941. It is a little misleading to describe Mr. Emile Bustani as merely the "owner of the largest Lebanese bus company." And please, need we have "political tightrope walking which frequently boomeranged?" But these are minor blemishes in a book which has broken entirely new ground, and which no student of the Middle East can possibly afford to be without.

B. S. E.

A Manual of Lebanese Administration. By George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi. Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon. 1955. Pp. 101.

This manual falls into three parts: (I) pp. 1-17, a descriptive history of the development of Lebanese administration since 1920; (II) pp. 19-90, a diagram and short description of each major division of the administration of Lebanon, as it existed in January, 1955; (III) pp. 93-101, an annotated bibliography of works on the government and administration of Lebanon since the First World War.

The treatment is strictly factual, with no attempt at any political, social, or cultural judgments. Consequently there is little appeal to the non-specialist, but the work will be welcomed as a work of reference by students of comparative public administration, and as a model for similar studies on other Middle Eastern countries.

There is no index, which was presumably deemed unnecessary on account of the full table of contents and the systematic character of Part II, the major section of the book. However, the space given in the historical section to the Bureau of Accounts suggests that a cross-reference between pp. 15-16 and 48 would have been useful.

The excellent schematic diagrams of each ministry give the Arabic as well as the English title of each department or section. Since, however, the Arabic is not transliterated, it is unfortunate that the photographic reduction of the complex diagram of the Finance Ministry (p. 46) has made the Arabic titles barely legible to a non-expert without a magnifying-glass. In a revised edition this diagram should be given a double page.

GEORGE KIRK.

Muhammad at Medina. By W. Montgomery Watt. Clarendon Press. 1956. Pp. 418. Map I. 42s.

After removing to Medina Muhammad lived in the limelight so the sequence of events is usually certain; pious tradition has generalized or even universalized some happenings and practices because the records were put into their final form by men who had grown up in established Islam and had forgotten the conditions in which Muhammad lived. What happened is fairly clear, but the reasons for it have to be divined. One would like to call this book an "imaginative reconstruction" of the career of Muhammad, but that inevitably suggests "history written by a novelist," which it is not. Dr. Watt has tried to put himself in Muhammad's place and see things as he saw them, and has largely succeeded. The uncertainty of Muhammad's position during the first eighteen months after the flight is made real: everything combined to make his position difficult, the uneasy alliance between Aws and Khazraj with the old quarrels ready at any moment to break out afresh, opposition whether open or concealed, rivalry of would-be chiefs, the poverty of the emigrants, relations with the Jews (direct or through their Arab confederates), and his apparent failure to advance his cause during those months. He had to walk warily and win his way by persuasion. But it was a case of the man and the situation meeting. The old Arabia

was beginning to change, religion had largely lost its hold, the solidarity of the tribe was challenged by individualism, and into the chaos came Muhammad with a solution which satisfied the people.

Muslim historians imply that all Arabia was converted before the death of Muhammad. This is far from the truth. Close to Medina some tribes were almost wholly Muslim, but beyond these narrow limits the further a tribe was from Medina the fewer the converts in it. With the most distant relations were political or economic only. At one time Muhammad was more concerned that a tribe should be on his side than that it should be Muslim. Dr. Watt advises the general reader to skip judiciously the chapter on the unification of Arabia; his book is a solid contribution to scholarship, though most of it makes no exorbitant demands on the general reader. Throughout the story the emphasis is on change, so what Muhammad did is set against what had been and was; so details of raids and fighting are tabulated in an appendix. In the light of the changes the appendix on the family is interesting.

The estimate of Muhammad's character is favourable; he believed sincerely in his mission, and was a wise and far-sighted statesman—from an early date he looked forward to an expansion of the Arabs northwards and planned accordingly. He was humane, by the standards of his day, and when he shocked his compatriots (by fighting during the sacred months) he shocked a pagan prejudice and soon realized that he offered something better, a truce of God that lasted twelve months and not four. It is not stated that he suffered from a common human weakness, he did not believe that death might come sooner than he expected, so did not appoint a successor. It is hard to believe that this omission was deliberate. Strangely, Dr. Watt hardly mentions the death of Muhammad.

A. S. T.

Cities and Men. (Volume III 1924-54). By Sir Harry Luke. Index, cover maps. Ill. Pp. 247. Geoffrey Bles. 25s.

All those who love travelling and visiting strange parts of the world will envy Sir Harry Luke his good fortune in having been given the opportunity of seeing so many places and people and will admire his ability to interest himself in such a wide range of subjects. This volume of his memoirs, which covers the eventful years from 1924 to 1954, recalls many crises, which are almost forgotten in the more disastrous state of affairs which exists to-day. For this reason his story, however, is valuable in that it reminds us of events from which stem many of our present troubles. In this book of light reminiscences he does not discuss politics in any detail, but it is as well that we should remember how these problems arose and the lessons which our administrations should have learnt. If, by recalling early days in Cyprus and the Near East, Sir Harry can encourage the study of recent history by our leaders as well as by the general public, he will have done a good work. It is perhaps one of the lessons that his book can teach that governments very rarely seem willing to learn from past experiences and commit again and again errors which can only lead to disaster.

Sir Harry has written in a conversational style and interspersed his memories with anecdotes and comments on local conditions and customs. In particular his account of his travels in South America is sufficient to whet out appetites for more information about the ancient civilizations and the dying races of that great sub-continent. On other subjects also we would like to know more and it is no consolation to be told that Sir Harry has written elsewhere about them.

His style is as usual readable, though sometimes marred by repetitive use of certain adjectives. One of these, "delicious," occurs so frequently as to be a little irritating, especially when it is not entirely apt. In addition some of his digressions are rather long and not always quite relevant. An example of this is the account of the Don Pacifico episode, which is surely sufficiently well known to need only a passing reference to make his point. Sometimes also there seem to be slight inaccuracies, such as the description of the "Black and Tans" in a foot-note as the Royal Irish Constabulary, when surely they were auxiliaries and not members of the regular Police Force.

In his remarks upon his visit to Dubai, Sir Harry refers to the service he attended at the United States medical mission, and comments that the combination of prayers

for the Ruler, the Queen of England and the President of the United States of America would be heard "nowhere else in the world." However this combination is not so uncommon as he thinks and can be heard in various places in the Middle East where conditions are similar.

In making these few criticisms it is not suggested that Sir Harry's story does not carry the weight which his experience warrants, but it seems a pity that a very readable book should contain matter, which may annoy the reader or suggest that references have not been carefully checked.

Sir Harry Luke's travels during the thirty years he describes in this book cover countries in which he served as a member of the Colonial Service or which he visited while on leave or after retirement. The diversity of his interests are shown not only in his account of his official duties, but also by his service as a member of the British Council in the Caribbean and as a Knight of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. As a result of this he has met many personages of interest and importance and his remarks frequently throw interesting side-lights on their character. The hospitality he received wherever he went and the wonderful facilities he was given to travel widely are an indication of the impression his enthusiasm for life and his vast interest in all matters made upon the people he met. Only a man of Sir Harry's character could have achieved so much and absorbed so great a volume of information about the countries he visited.

The maps which serve as end-papers give a wonderful indication of the distances he travelled in these thirty years. No obstacles were too great for him and he is fortunate that he achieved so many of his ambitions, visiting Pitcairn Island, Easter Island, Alaska, the country of the Lapps and other little known parts of the world. It seems that only Russia, the Far East and parts of Africa remain beyond his scope.

This book can be recommended for anyone who wishes light reading covering a range of subjects from anthropology to the problems of dealing with rival Vichy, and Free French administrations in the Pacific. It will no doubt stimulate many to study in greater detail one or more of the multifarious matters which Sir Harry Luke deals.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

A History of Turkey. By M. Philips Price. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1956. Pp. 219. Illustrations, index, map. 20s.

In all the spate of modern literature that has appeared on the Near East, Middle East, Far East—in fact, on anywhere from Eastern Europe to Japan—for the enlightenment of the average reader; it is remarkable that Asia Minor has remained such a *terra incognita*. For this the blame must be laid on the Turk himself as viewed by Western eyes through "classical" spectacles. His first crime was the supplanting of an effete Greek culture in Eastern Europe; the second, the effective resistance which he offered to the bellicose and internecine Crusades. Couple to this the *coup de grâce* which he administered to the degenerate Byzantine Empire (largely through their own duplicity) and you have the reason why he was "written off" for the next 450 years!

Mr. Philips Price, with his intimate knowledge of the country and the people, has done a belated and praiseworthy service in writing *A History of Turkey*, which should be read and re-read by those interested in this historic and little-known country, and should be an obligatory book for all those who air their opinions in public on the Near East.

It is not sufficiently realized that the Seljuks migrated westwards under Slav pressure in the twelfth century to establish their empire first in the Balkan Peninsula; and that it was from Europe that they expanded their power eastwards into Asia Minor—in other words, that they had become European before they became Asiatic. They were then, as they are to-day, a tolerant, agricultural people who, in the Middle Ages, had evolved a system of land tenure which bears a marked resemblance to our own present-day conditions under N.A.A.S. local committees! Like us, they suffered from the migration of peasants from the land to the attractions of the towns. They lacked the ephemeral brilliance of the Arab, but provided a common-sense, practical

development in its stead. They evolved an architecture based on the Byzantine; but the capture of Byzantium proved their downfall, for they absorbed its vices to the exclusion of their own rugged native virtues. They were further handicapped by the excessive rigidity of Islamic thought, which retarded their development by comparison with their Western neighbours under Christian institutions; whilst to the East and North they were faced with the competition of Slav serfdom coupled with unlimited manpower.

It is not sufficiently realized that between 1672 and 1914 they had fought no less than twelve times against Russia. Peter the Great and Catherine had successfully curtailed their empire. They were bolstered up by the Western Powers, but Russia was able to exploit the religious differences of their minorities with success for her own ends.

From the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, Kemal Ataturk evolved a totalitarian state. If his methods were unorthodox, they were effective; and, phoenix-like, a united nation was created from the ashes; still with the Western outlook inherited from the Seljuks, for they can have little love for the Slav.

Their economy to-day is based soundly on agriculture, and 90 per cent. of their agricultural holdings average no more than 16 acres. In this has lain their strength in the days of the ox—but will it remain so with the tractor? Progress has made the Turk tractor-minded, and 16 acres is scarcely an economic unit for a tractor. The ox and the wooden plough were local products, but tractors involve foreign currency and imported spare parts, particularly in rocky country. The illustration on page 161 of a crawler tractor operated by three men to pull a combine drill on flat, rocky land is not altogether happy from the point of track-wear or man-power. A wheeled tractor could do the job more expeditiously and cheaply.

The illustrations are good and make one want to see more; but the ubiquitous felt hats and cloth caps are much to be regretted. The Turk is sufficiently national and practical to have evolved something better than these two Western hideosities. The map is rather inadequate and difficult to locate for reference, besides showing no lines of communication. An end-paper map on twice the scale would have been more convenient.

The bibliography is excellent, and Mr Philips Price is to be congratulated on a clear and concise work which should incite its readers to a further study of this too little-known nation and country.

A. M. B.

The Lycian Shore. By Freya Stark. John Murray. Pp. 195; index, ill., maps. 25s.

The southern shores of Asia Minor have been little known to the outer world for centuries. Once the outpost of the Greek world on the east and the suzerains of the Great King in his western dominion, the people of Caria, Lycia and Pamphylia played an important role in the civilisation of the East Mediterranean. With the decline first of Persia, then of Greece and finally after the breakdown of the Roman Empire the curtain was drawn over these parts. The invasions of the nomads from Central Asia completed the picture, though in the great days of the Ottoman Empire the Sultans kept their navies on the south shores of Asia Minor and the Greek population continued to live there side by side with Turks till the Graeco-Turkish war of 1921-22 when the great exchange of population took place. But meanwhile the monuments of Greek civilisation fell into decay. Sheep now graze over the amphitheatres where Aeschylus was once played, goats drink from the sarcophagi of Roman senators and Turkish villagers carry away for their farm houses the stones of the temple of Jupiter and from the colonades of the market place.

The Republican Government of Turkey in its efforts to modernise and open up the country have been active in building roads along this coast in recent years. Roads now run from Seyhan to Antalya and from Smyrna southwards. But still considerable stretches of coast have been left untouched so far by the material progress of these times. One part of it is the protruding territory just east of Rhodes and west of Antalya. This was the ancient Greek province of Lycia when it was

under the kings of Persia and here is a rich mine of the monuments of ancient Greece, which few people of modern times have seen. There is the ruin of the ancient city of Halicarnassus where one of the seven wonders of the ancient world could be seen, the great mausoleum. There is Pinarus, Patara, the Xanthus Valley, Phineka, the Chimaera and Olympus. Up till now it has only been possible to reach much of this by boat. A few British naval officers came there early last century. But now this romantic shore has been visited by Freya Stark, who with Mr. David Balfour, the British consul in Smyrna sailed these waters in the motor yacht, *Elfin* and the account of this is published in a book of some 177 pages.

Miss Stark's treatment of her subject is unusual but none the worse for that. Her narrative of the journey is interspersed with dissertations on the events on these spots in classical times. She has read extensively in the classics and there is a list at the end of authorities consulted. The result of course is a little curious. The reader gets an account of how the *Elfin* rounds a cape in difficult weather, lands at a tiny place and ties up at the ruins of a Greek temple and then is suddenly switched to an account of how Conon in 396 B.C. persuades Rhodes to revolt from Sparta, while he manoeuvres Agaesilaus out of Asia Minor in 394 B.C. There are also accounts of how Alexander the Great conquered Lycia and Pamphylia and then we suddenly find ourselves back in a description of the Yuruks or modern Turkish nomads and finally talks with a local Turkish Kaimakam. The method has its advantages because it does show the contact between the ancient and the modern world. One also learns a few things which have not been clear to people other than scholars. For instance, there is much evidence that the Persian kings interfered little with the Greek cities under their control, as long as tribute was paid. In fact the Greeks seemed to welcome Persian suzerainty, as long as they were able to carry on their civilisation in their own way. This gives one a different idea to that of the clash of power as seen at Marathon and Salamis. Again Alexander seems to have progressed in a leisurely way down this coast after the battle of Granicus, for he seems to have been attracted by the people here and to the problem involved in securing his rear and his seapower along this coast.

At the same time one puts down the book with a slightly dissatisfied feeling. One would like to know a little more, but the narrative suddenly stops at an interesting point and goes off into a long meditation on the philosophy of the ancient and modern world, and then passes over into a description of sunrise off Phineka and the caverns of the Cheledonian Cape. We are told about Chimaera which was visited and the flame was seen but there is no account of what it is. This sort of thing makes the reading a little irritating.

Yet the book has a very distinct fascination and Miss Stark has rightly picked on a bit of the East Mediterranean where rich rewards should follow the archaeologist and historian. She and Mr. Balfour have pioneered the way to the still hidden secrets of the Lycian shore.

M. P. P.

A Selected Bibliography of Articles dealing with the Middle East. Vol II, 1951-54. Jerusalem: The Economic Research Institute, The Eleizer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University. 1955. Pp. ix + 83. 10s. 6d. or \$1.50.

This second volume of the Hebrew University's bibliography of the Middle East will be a useful addition to any library dealing with this area. Articles on each country dealt with are divided into the following sections: General; Geography; Modern History; Politics and Government; Society, Religion and Culture; Economics; Finance; Arab League; Regional Organizations.

There are numerous cross references, an author index and a list of periodicals reviewed.

ERIC MACRO.

Law in the Middle East. Edited by Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny. With a Foreword by Justice Robert H. Jackson. Vol. I. Origin and Development of Islamic Law. Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute. 1955. Pp. xviii + 395. Glossary, bibliography and index. \$7.50.

War and Peace in the Law of Islam. By Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. Pp. 320. Bibliograph and index.

These two new legal books from American presses will be of special interest to students of the Middle East. Both are authoritative and learned and are the product of much hard work. The first, the larger of the two, introduces the reader to the general principles, history and the development of Islamic Law, and may well become a standard textbook for serious Arabic students. The editors, themselves authorities, have enlisted contributions from an imposing array of Islamic legal specialists of many nationalities.

The book from the Johns Hopkins Press is narrower in field but no less erudite than *Law in the Middle East*, Vol. I. Dr. Khadduri deals in some detail with Islamic constitutional law, its origin and development, and goes on to show how modern impacts with the United Nations has tended to change the Islamic attitude towards international dealings both in peace and war. His sources are primarily Muslim.

ERIC MACRO.

Byzantium and Istanbul. Robert Liddell. Jonathan Cape, London 1956. Pp. 239; Ill., map, appdx., index. 25s.

In the lives of all of us there are dramatic impressions which burn themselves in our memories for all time. The writer will never forget his first morning in Istanbul; the sparkle of the morning sunlight on the Bosphorus which gave a dream-like quality to the Scutari shore, and the amazement that Nature should have penned in most of the waters of Eastern Europe to provide such a dramatic setting for a lovely city. Mr. Robert Liddell has captured much of this sparkle in his book, *Byzantium and Istanbul* in which he happily combines the best qualities of a detailed guide-book and a concise history; leavened with the personal impressions of its visitors of various periods concerning the life and customs of its inhabitants.

It is difficult to imagine two more perfect sites for two cities that were destined to play such a prominent part in the history of mankind than Venice and Byzantium. It was the removal of the Roman Emperors to Byzantium which gave the Papacy its opportunity to seize temporal power in Rome for the Western Church. It was Rome that organised the Crusades—Venice that operated a dubious, but profitable “visa and shipping” racket in transporting them eastwards; and Byzantium that suffered from their zeal almost as much as their avowed foes when the proselytization of their fellow-Christians on the Bosphorus seemed of paramount importance as an objective.

The amount of research involved in this book must have been immense. Mr. Liddell deals faithfully and deftly with her sixteen hundred years of history, in which she had over one hundred and twenty rulers. Nearly ninety of these were Byzantine emperors, from Constantine I to the ill-starred Constantine Palaeogolus; and for the author to have so deftly drawn out a clear thread from this tangled skein is an achievement in itself. The occupation of the throne was not conducive to longevity and one is left wondering why there was such competition for the honour as there were very few restorations! The Turkish Sultans, however, had a better expectation of life. On their accession, all collateral branches were promptly strangled; and the heir was posted to govern Magnesia, where he would have little opportunity of accelerating his own accession. It might be summarised as “The Era of the Bowstring”!

Mr. Liddell knows and loves the churches and mosques, and takes the reader conscientiously round them in some detail. Where criticism is merited, he gives it; and he contrasts the helpfulness of their custodians with the difficulties that he

experienced in parts of the Seraglio Palace and in getting empty tombs unlocked for inspection. There can be scarcely a monument in the city that he has not adequately described, yet his touch is light enough to sustain one's interest all the time.

Byzantium's outstanding contribution to Architecture was the discovery of how to place a dome on a square building, a problem which the Romans had never been able to solve. This was so notable an achievement that the Seljuks, who had no native architecture of their own, promptly adopted it; but the effect must have been rather heavy and monotonous until they relieved it with the graceful and elegant minarets which add such charm to the city's skyline. It is in the interiors rather than the exteriors that both excelled.

Mr. Liddell's illustrations are admirable and convey not only the architecture, but the light and atmosphere to perfection. Nevertheless, it is always preferable to view Byzantine and Ottoman architecture from ground level upwards against the skyline rather than to look down upon it as it was never evolved for the aerial view. In proof of this, his illustration of the Ortaköy Mosque is breath-taking in its beauty, whereas the Sultan Ahmed Mosque, viewed from above, vaguely suggests (though it ought not!) an oil refinery.

It seems strange that such a lovely city should have been such a centre of human barbarism, intrigue and squalor which sapped, in turn, two great empires: and sad to read that the Golden Horn, for all the romance of its name, is still tarnished, as then, by the refuse thrown in it.

Mr. Liddell's book is one to be treasured on one's shelf, where it can be read and re-read; but it should never be lent—it might not return!

A. M. B.

The Mountains of Pharaoh. By Leonard Cottrell. Published by Robert Hale, London. 1956. Pp. 272; illustrated, index. 16s.

One might think he would be a brave or presumptuous man who chose to write yet another book about the Pyramids. The literature so far published on this subject might out-top in bulk the Great Pyramid of Giza itself. And one of the most recent additions—Mr. I. E. S. Edwards' *The Pyramids of Egypt*—could hardly be bettered as an introduction for the general reader.

Mr. Cottrell was nevertheless justified; for his book *The Mountains of Pharaoh* (the Arab name for the Pyramids) is an unusual one. It is not a history of these great monuments themselves, but the story of the men who over the centuries probed, penetrated and interpreted their mysteries—often in conditions of the most acute discomfort and the greatest physical danger. And what a fascinating collection of men they were! Between them they present every facet of human character. Herodotus "the father of history," an acute and widely travelled observer, revelling in the juicy snippet of scandal or court gossip; Pliny, who first advanced the theory that the Pyramids were the depositories of the treasure of the Egyptian monarchs, and who actually entered the Great Pyramid and measured (though inaccurately) its exterior; the Arabs, "sold" as one might expect on the "treasure-house" idea, elaborated around the Pyramids a wealth of fantasy worthy of anything in the *Thousand and One Nights*, complete with mechanical sentries, bottomless wells to trap the unwary and a naked supernatural enchantress "with large teeth" to seduce the rash intruder and drive him insane; and, finally, the many European explorers, the account of whose adventures, trials and eccentricities comprises the most entertaining part of this extremely entertaining book.

These dauntingly solid mountains of stone have in their time been subjected to a variety of outrages proportionate to their own age, dignity and immensity. The Arabs, we are told, attacked the Great Pyramid with battering rams and "used hot vinegar to crack the huge stone blocks." One Caliph even attempted to demolish the Third Pyramid altogether. After eight months hard labour at vast expense his engineers decided to call it a day. They had made almost no impression at all. Colonel Richard Howard-Vyse went a few steps further and in 1837 assaulted in military fashion with gunpowder. He could write, too, in his account of his attempt to remove the granite portcullis in the Second Pyramid, ". . . we lowered the

portcullis in order to break it, and in doing so endeavoured to shut in two of the Arabs, that they might work the harder to effect their escape; but no persuasion could induce them to remain . . ."

Many of the other pioneers are mentioned too; including Pococke, Davison, Borchardt and Perring, but it is the brief but graphic portrait of Sir Flinders Petrie that most impresses; for, apart from his great achievements in the field of archeological exploration, there was, as Mr. Cottrell says, an heroic quality about him; he had a burning faith in his work combined with great physical courage and complete integrity. These qualities stand out in the extracts from Petrie's writings that Mr. Cottrell quotes with advantage.

But if Petrie impresses, there is much also to instruct and amuse the reader in this book. Instruct, because Mr. Cottrell knows his subject; amuse, because he is evidently a man with both an engaging humour and a fund of human sympathy. The writing of this book has, unless I am much mistaken, given its author as great a pleasure as others may expect from its reading.

GAVIN YOUNG.

The Trail of Marco Polo. By Jean Bowie Shor. London: Frederick Muller. 1956. Pp. 251. Maps, illustrations. 8" x 5½". 16s.

An old, old story, but one that is ever new, that of the Venetian boy, young Marco Polo, destined to eternal fame as "incomparably the greatest traveller of the Middle Ages." Now he has captured another admirer, or rather two, for *The Trail of Marco Polo* is a racy account by two bright young Americans who were imbued with a desire to follow in the footsteps of the great medieval explorer. And follow it they did: from Venice to the borders of Cathay.

The itinerary embraced, as it should do, Jerusalem, Acre, Mersin (Ayas), Erzerum, and Tabriz. Omitting the section across Persia to the Gulf (Hormuz) they continued eastwards from Tehran, through Meshed to Herat; hence again on Marco Polo's tracks through Afghan Turkestan and finally through Wakhan until the Great Wall of Communist China stopped them.

The Shors travel enthusiastically; everything is fun; even the worst difficulties, the most filthy quarters, the most maddening delays are taken as part of the trip. But, of course, they do in a day what would have taken young Polo some years to accomplish. The book is not all ancient ways and toils of travel in backward countries, for there is a very modern ring about, and pictures of, their picnic with the Shah of Persia, and their contact the King of Afghanistan.

To us Central Asians, the most appealing section is that which relates the passage eastwards from Kabul through Faizabad, Zebuk, and Wakhan. And this, luckily, takes up nearly half the book. Here mechanical transport fades out, and the travellers are reduced to four-legged animals. The narrative likewise reduces its frantic tempo, and we get nearer to Marco Polo.

Any traverse of this section of the great transcontinental trade route of ancient days is of interest. Few have seen it, and the authoress is doubtless correct in her assertion that she was "the first woman to traverse it." Mrs. Littledale had, of course, *crossed* the corridor diagonally, with her husband, in 1890; and Tilman had forestalled the Shors by walking *down* it in the opposite direction in 1947.

On entering Wakhan the authoress immediately became alive to the beauties and romance of her surroundings. "The scenery was fantastically beautiful—jagged mountains and wild rivers, roses and buttercups defiantly displaying their loveliness in rocky crevices, a valley of purple rocks, a hill of garnets, and lonely floating eagles" . . . "I was immersed in admiration of the grandeur of the Hindu Kush" —Tilman says there are summits of 19 and 20,000 ft. hereabouts.

There is no doubt that the upper reaches of the Oxus, "in its high mountain-cradle of Pamere," are among the most entrancing regions on this planet; full of wild beauty, romance and legend.

"To our north, rising abruptly from the Oxus, was the Nicholas range, the ramparts of Tadzshik Soviet Socialist Republic." I think she means the Shakh dara, for Nicholas (I wager its name today is not so aristocratic) used to stand for the range between the Great and Little Pamir Rivers—right affluents of the main stream above Kala Panja;

half of which forms the frontier line, the other half being in Afghan territory. The Shakh dara, however, rises sheer from the Oxus over a stretch of seventy miles, and is a much more imposing rampart of Russia, for it runs up to a magnificent summit of nearly 23,000 ft., which rejoices in the name of Karl Marx! But perhaps even that has been repudiated of late.

Apparently the Shors had no idea of the swift advance of Communist China westwards, for they had hoped to cross the Wakhjir Pass into Singkiang. Luckily for them their guide, seeing a Chinese patrol ahead of them on the Pass, switched them off southwards to the nearest pass leading over into Pakistan. Otherwise we should not have had this book, and perhaps never heard of the Shors again. They had a very rough time hereabouts, but finally they gained "the summit of the 20,000-ft. Delhi/Sang Pass" and found that they were safely within reach of Misgar in Hunza territory. It is not given to everyone to make a new crossing of the Hindu Kush without knowing it. But that is what the Shors did. There is no known pass over this thirty-mile-long eastern end of the range, between the Irshad and the Kilik Passes. The Shor's pass, no doubt, felt like 20,000 ft. to them in their somewhat delapidated condition, but actually it cannot be more than 18,000 ft. and is probably around 17,500 ft. The name, presumably given to them by their guide, relates to the 20,000-ft. summit Delhi Sang-i-sar, which rises ten miles to the west. But the pass is really *nameless*. The crossing of it led them down probably to Udarkhun in the Derdi Nullah, which joins the main Kilik valley a few miles above Misgar. To them, of course, the safety and seclusion of antique Hunza was a veritable Shangri La, and it made a pleasant ending to their escapade, which so very nearly ended in disaster. I take off my hat to Jean for nursing an apparently dying husband, with a temperature of 104 degrees, in a rock shelter at 15,000 ft., and getting him on to his legs again. Some girl! I hope we hear more of the Shors; for two so young and so full of grit and go there must indeed be a future.

I am indebted to Prof. Kenneth Mason for his opinion on this matter of the unknown pass, for he covered this particular area of the Hindu Kush as leader of the expedition connecting the Indo-Russian surveys in 1913 and therefore knows the neighbourhood better than any other living man. He entirely agrees with my conclusions and fixes the pass at (roughly) lat. 37° 0', long. 74° 26', which is at a point practically due south of the Wakhjir.

DOUGLAS CARRUTHERS.

Kazak Exodus. By Godfrey Lias. Evans Bros, London. Pp. 230; 25 illustrations and maps inset. 8½" × 5¾". 15s.

This is the story of twenty-five years struggle and war waged by the Kazaks of the Altai and Tien Shan to preserve their way of life against domination and absorption by the Communists, first of Russia and later of Red China also. As the story unfolds it will be seen that these Kazaks, who claimed descent from Genghiz Khan, from Tamerlane and Attila possessed, like their ancestors, the qualities of endurance, ambition, determination, ruthlessness, albeit tempered by warm hospitality. As far as is known, the Kazak version of nomad life has never been fully described in English. And it will be seen that until the Communist intrusion they had lived, probably since the days of Abraham and Isaac, much as did the children of Israel. And their mass migration (chosen rather than domination by men of far different ways and religion), was almost certainly the only counterpart in history of the Exodus from Egypt. Their choice was unhesitating and as one of their leaders aptly said, "the proffered co-existence with Communism would be just another instance of the other nestlings being pushed out of their own nest by the growing cuckoo."

The earlier chapters tell of their lives of the nomads, with the seasonal moving of tents and herds to and from the higher pastures, of hunting and hawking—with the training of eagles therefore—and also of the Kazak way of war: guerilla war of which they were truly masters.

During the early thirties the Kazaks looked on the Chinese as their enemies and the Russians as their friends. But before long their leaders came to realize that the true Soviet policy was one of bedevilment, designed to create such chaos that acquisition of all Eastern Turkestan, with its riches would, in the name of law and

order be justifiable. Soviet preoccupation with the Germans merely postponed the inevitable outcome, and in the autumn of 1946 the invasion of the Altai began. The Kazaks now realized that they were fighting against Communism and they strove desperately to defend themselves against attack from three sides; north, east and west. They were able, at times, to stem these attacks, but were never strong enough to pursue. In most cases it was a running fight, involving women, children and beasts as well as the men.

In the spring of 1949 they began to withdraw to the southern slopes of the Tien Shan. And this turned out to be the first stage in their long exodus. They drove their heavily laden beasts over the great mountain wall, most of which was above 15,000 feet in altitude. By now the Kazaks alone were left to the common Moslem front, their allies, the Tungans having quit. Their numbers had dwindled to some 15,000 combatants from a strength of 40,000. The strategic withdrawal became a fighting retreat, and the Kazaks were forced out of the mountains wherein they had been more than a match for the Chinese. But there was never a thought of giving in, though at times, they had to attack fortified positions to obtain water for the animals. Their traverse of the "Thirsty Mountains" (deemed by the enemy as impossible, and so safer for the nomads) involved incredible hardships. Journeying day after day, south-eastward towards Tibet, where they hoped for asylum, they reached Gezkul, some 600 miles north of Lhasa as winter was setting in. Here they met grave disaster, losing two of their principal leaders. After crossing the eastern Kuen Lun in full winter, they found the Tibetans suspicious and hostile. So they turned westward for another 150 gruelling marches and reached the India-Tibet frontier post, near Rudok, on the Hindustan-Tibet road. Still full of confidence they sought permission to enter Kashmir, but were roughly ordered away. They had to wait here for fifty-two days longer, during which they fought six more battles with the Communists. Not till the Indian guards witnessed the beheading of eleven Kazak prisoners was the band of refugees allowed to cross. It is estimated that, in all, some 1,700 Kazaks reached Kashmir by diverse routes. Some indeed had been as far as east Calcutta. But their asylum in Kashmir proved only temporary, even among their co-religionists. For the Pakistan-India dispute made for so much uneasiness that they could not settle down. However, after fifteen months (apparently forgotten by the free world), the Turkish Government offered them homes and land, and the United Nations arranged for their transportation to Turkey.

Thither went Godfrey Lias to get this story out of their leaders, a story which, for obvious reasons the Communists had wished, and had managed for some time to conceal from the free world. He heard there, from their own lips how this proud and intensely virile nation had been mutilated but how their heads are still unbowed. He has given us a wonderful story of courage and endurance, and that deserves to be widely read and studied.

H. W. T.

Caucasian Review, published by the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich, 1955. Pp. 229.

Caucasian Review is a publication of the Institute for the Study of U.S.S.R. Its aim is to acquaint western readers with the historical development and contemporary political, economic and social structure of the Caucasus. The Institute was formed in Munich in July 1950; it is a free corporation of scientists and men and women of letters who have left the Soviet Union and who continue to interest themselves in research on their countries of origin. The purpose of their work is to present to the free world scholarly analyses of life in the Soviet Union. This work, properly conducted, can be invaluable, since it can help to inform the intellectuals of other and neighbouring nationalities who are interested in the great Communist experiment on the realities of life and ideas in those countries which have already been incorporated in the Soviet Union.

The sponsors of the review are to be congratulated on a scholarly and competent production which deserves a wide distribution. It is not, perhaps, as "objective" as a similar review on Central Asia now being published in England. But in a world of ingenious propaganda techniques, a liberal objectivity can sometimes be overdone, and it is useful to have an organ which gives free scope to the views of non-

Communist (dare we say anti-Communist) scholars from the homeland of the late J. V. Stalin.

Georgian contributions are well represented. G. Uratadze, a former minister of the Georgian democratic government, and a signatory of the treaty by which Moscow recognized Georgian independence, writes interestingly on the progressive elimination of elements of independence in the Georgian economy since the country became associated as a Soviet Republic with the Great Russian economy. D. Sagirashvili discusses other aspects of the same theme; and M. Lashauri examines the remoulding of Georgian historical studies in terms of Marxist principles.

Djeyhoun Bey Hadjibeyli, the doyen of Azerbaijanian studies, treats of the 1937 purges in Azerbaijan. This article will be read with particular interest in view of the recent execution of Mr. Bagirov and some of his associates and the nervousness about Caucasian nationalism displayed by Mr. Krushchev in the course of his lengthy attack on Stalin and all his works.

The Armenian view is examined in S. Kocharian's study of "Soviet National Policy in Armenia." The cynicism of Lenin's attitude to the Armenians is emphasised and the author recalls that "in his own words he (Lenin) was willing to sacrifice a million Armenians for the world revolution." It is useful to read Kocharian's article in the context of N. Beglar's paper on "The constant factor in Moscow's Turkish policy."

The history of the Circassians and other mountain communities in the Caucasus has always been a study neglected outside Russia. Here P. Kosok writes on "Revolution and Sovietization in the Northern Caucasus" and I. Natirboff on "The Circassians' part in the Civil War." The first article, particularly, may be commended to Kurdish intellectuals who find interest in the Soviet experiment.

Historical and linguistic studies are well represented. The veteran Circassian historian, A. Namitok, contributes a brief but learned essay. It is to be hoped that future numbers of the review will carry some of his important materials on the history of his people. K. Bouda writes on "Language Problems of the Caucasus"; and R. Jordania has a paper on "Georgian Folk Music and its importance in European Folklore." "Ethno-Musicology" is becoming an important technique in the study of folk origins, and the Caucasus is one of the most valuable repositories of materials in this fascinating subject. R. Traho provides a valuable bibliography on the Circassians.

It is sad to see among the obituary notices in the review the names of M. E. Resulzade, S. Kocharian, A. Abegian, and A. Terterian, all fine scholars in their respective fields. They maintained and developed the traditions of the vital and original cultures which they represented under the most adverse conditions, and they set a high standard to the younger generation of Caucasian scholars who are showing their paces in *Caucasian Review*.

W. E. D. ALLEN.

Oracles and Demons of Tibet. The Cult and Iconography of the Tibetan Protective Deities. By René de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, Ph.D. Lecturer at the University of Vienna. Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London, and Mouton and Co., 'S-Gravenhage. 1956. Pp. xiv+666; 20 plates, 25 text illustrations. £5. 5s.

The iconography of the deities worshipped as protectors and guardians of Buddhism by the Tibetans belongs, as Dr. Nebesky-Wojkowitz says in the foreword to his massive handbook, to the least known field of Tibetan studies. The names of many of these deities are of course to be found mentioned in other studies of the lamaist pantheon, but only in the present work has a comprehensive listing and description been attempted. No wonder the field has been neglected so long; the first of the eight full and valuable indexes which the author has appended to his study consists of no less than thirty-two pages of double columns of "Names and Classes of Deities," each page containing rather less than a hundred entries. This fantastic proliferation of divinities has as its *raison d'être*, in the author's words, "to protect the Buddhist religion and its institutions against adversaries, as well as to

preserve the integrity of its teachings." But how far this "Buddhist religion" lies from the simplicity of the primitive philosophic teachings of the Buddha!

The author first gives a general classification of the protective deities (in Tibetan *chos skyong* or *srung ma*), and notes some of the most prominent features of their appearance and attributes, and then in the following sixteen chapters he describes in great detail, basing himself on iconographical texts, the constituent members of the various groupings of deities. For the painstaking factuality of these chapters the student will indeed be grateful, for they form a very complete handbook of reference. The general reader may find them hard going. The repetitiveness of the grotesque and macabre descriptions makes it very difficult to read through this part of the book and come away with a clear conception of the differences between the various deities. But this is no criticism of the author or of his method. The very abundance of his material imposes such a confusion, and the carefully compiled indexes are a comforting guide through this jungle of demons and demonesses with their garlands of severed heads, their sacks of diseases and other even less pleasing decorations.

The second half of the book is devoted to the cult of these protective deities, and here the author has been able to draw more fully on his personal experiences. Of especial interest are his account of a ceremony of prophesying performed by an oracle priest which he witnessed in 1952, and the accompanying illustrations which show the priest at various stages of his trance. The author describes in great detail the various sorts of magic involved in the cult of the protective deities—divination, weather making, destructive magic and rituals for protection against evil. This cult is Buddhist by courtesy only. The author does not go deeply into its origins, though in a final chapter he does give many instances of similarities between lamaist practices and those of the shamanistic cults of central and northern Asia.

It is a pity that there are, amongst the Tibetan words and phrases which occur in the text, so many which are left untranslated. Not everyone will be in the position to search out meanings, even of single words, in a dictionary, and it is irritating to be faced with such a sentence as (page 4): "Also the following three terms, apparently referring to various orders of legendary descent, are rarely used: *phyi rabs brgyud kyi srung ma*, *dmu rabs brgyud kyi srung ma* and *gtsug rabs brgyud kyi srung ma*." That the author has written in a generally excellent English is a matter for which his public outside his own country will be truly grateful.

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to the wide scope and care for detail of Dr. Nebesky-Wojkowitz's scholarly book. As a reference work it will be indispensable, and the indexes and list of Tibetan sources alone will be of considerable value to the student of lamaism. It is a small matter that the author has not given a bibliography of European works; those which he has consulted are mentioned in footnotes, but the value of his book lies primarily in the use he has made of Tibetan source material and the explanations given to him by the Tibetan informants.

C. R. BAWDEN.

Martyr au Thibet. By Robert Loup. Editions "Grand-St.-Bernard-Thibet," Fribourg (Switzerland). 1953. Pp. 280. Sw. Fr. 6.90.

This book is an account of the life of Father Maurice Tornay, a Swiss Roman Catholic missionary who was killed in south-eastern Tibet in 1949. Born in one of the high valleys of the Valais in 1910, Tornay enjoyed a vigorous rural childhood and youth, helping in all the activities of his industrious family household—vine-tending, tilling, haymaking and cattle-herding in the high summer pastures. Encouraged by his family to follow an early inclination to devote his life to the Church, he became a novice of the Hospice Grand-St. Bernard in 1931. Here, at the head of the historic pass which leads from Switzerland down to Italy, Tornay prayed, worked and studied and became canon of the Order of St. Bernard in 1935. Soon afterward, the possibility of undertaking missionary duty in Tibet presented itself. Young Chanoine Tornay responded with enthusiasm. He and two of his colleagues of the Order departed for Tibet in February, 1936.

The missionary efforts of the Order of St. Bernard formed part of the French-sponsored Catholic missionary effort in the Yunnan-Sikang-Tibetan border region which had its beginnings in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first four St. Bernard missionaries had gone out in 1933. Tornay and his two colleagues were reinforcements for this group. It seemed appropriate that monks from the famous Swiss monastery located on a barren pass among the highest mountains of Europe should have a special role to play in evangelizing the high mountain valleys of Tibet.

The St. Bernard group had its headquarters at Wei-si, in the upper valley of the Mekong in north-western Yunnan. When Father Tornay arrived here in May, 1936, the region was already suffering intermittent civil disturbances. Conditions remained unstable during the decade and a half that followed. One is amazed that these diligent Catholic missionaries were able to accomplish as much as they did in terms of building schools, subsidiary mission stations and hospices in such troubled surroundings. The brothers of the order of St. Bernard could not be accused of lack of optimism. They learned Chinese and Tibetan rapidly, and gradually accustomed themselves to native ways.

The major portion of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the missionaries' work from 1936 to 1949. Much valuable information on political conditions in this region naturally comes to light as the story unfolds. This account again reaffirms the fact that the Central Chinese government was able to exercise only the loosest sort of authority in western Yunnan and Sikang. The Tibetans of the region lived in a state of quiet anarchy punctuated by occasional outbursts of violence among local chieftains. The central Tibetan government in Lhasa was anxious to reassert its authority over the regions to the east of the Mekong and the Yang-tse which it regarded as unjustly detached from its territories by the Chinese. The missionaries felt that the Dalai Lama's government was eager to see a Japanese victory during World War II because it hoped thereby to regain legal title to its lost territories. All these things, including the appalling confusion that prevailed as the Communists advanced in 1949, are described vividly, if not always with as much reference to the broader sweep of world events as one would like.

These Catholic missionaries, though concentrating much energy on converting Chinese, regarded Tibet as their real target. Father Tornay seems gradually to have been drawn more and more toward Tibet. In 1945 he established himself at the furthest outpost of his order in the region, at Yerkalo (Yen-tsing) on the upper Mekong, even then within the borders of Tibet proper. His stay there was short and hectic. He was expelled by the local Tibetan chief—with the encouragement of the local lamas—in early 1946. There had been a few Christians at Yerkalo for some time. They were now subject to persecution. The fate of these people seems to have weighed heavily upon Father Tornay's mind. He was tireless in his efforts to return to Yerkalo and resume his work. He sought the support of whatever Chinese authorities he could find. He travelled to Nanking and to Shanghai to attempt to enlist Swiss or other Western support and bring pressure on the Lhasa Government to permit him to return. Noble as these efforts were, they were naïvely conceived and doomed to failure by events of far larger import that were already changing the destiny of China.

Father Tornay remained undaunted by the setbacks he had received in his efforts to penetrate Tibet. He resolved to journey to Lhasa himself, and set out with a small caravan on July 10, 1949. Travelling in disguise and with perhaps more faith than careful preparation—he was bound sooner or later to be discovered. Before the end of the month he was forced to turn back, and on August 11, within sight of nominally Chinese territory again, he was ambushed and shot. The author implies that the lamas of the neighbourhood inspired the assassination.

To the author, the Buddhist lamas are the incarnation of evil, and he would have us believe that the missionaries regarded them in the same light. One gets the unfortunate impression from this book that the Catholic missionaries made very little effort to understand the state of mind of the people they were trying to convert or the nature of the lamaist Buddhism they were trying to supplant. This is probably more of a shortcoming of the author than a failing on the part of the missionaries themselves. Neither Father Tornay or any of the others, however, seems to have understood sufficiently the fact that the success of missionary efforts usually depends not

only on social and psychological factors, but above all, on favourable political conditions. It is true that the missionaries made many conversions, but these conversions were among people on the fringes of established society and political life. In China, and in most other parts of Asia, experience seems to have demonstrated that successful Christian communities cannot be established and maintained unless political conditions favouring their maintenance also exist. The fathers of the Order of St. Bernard were by no means the only missionaries who failed to appreciate this important fact. It has been a frequent failing among Catholic and Protestant missionaries alike. Modern missionaries, in seeking inspiration from the example of their predecessors of the first several centuries of the Christian era, often overlook the fact that the most successful of these men often had to prove themselves as politicians before they could become harvesters of souls.

The present book, unlike many missionary accounts, is extremely well written. There are passages of great beauty in the excerpts from Father Tornay's correspondence which are frequently quoted. The more recent second edition includes an annex which summarizes events in the Tibetan border region from 1949 to 1952, when the last missionaries of the Order of St. Bernard arrived in Hong Kong. They have since been working on Formosa.

PAUL B. HENZE.

Tibetan Skylines. By Robert B. Ekvall. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1952. 12s. 6d.

This small volume is a most worthy addition to the body of Western travel and missionary literature on Tibet. It is also refreshingly different from other recent books on the subject. It deals almost entirely with the Tibetans themselves, and treats them not as curiosities but as thinking, acting, feeling human beings.

The book is not a travel account in the strict sense. It is rather a series of sketches on Tibetan life in the region of Amdo—the north-eastern part of the country, where the author and his family spent a number of years as missionaries in the 1930s. Ekvall learned to know his Tibetan friends well, and came to be regarded by them as one of them. He shared their lives in all respects, and acquired that genuine understanding of them which has often characterized the best type of missionary in Central Asia. Like many of the others, Ekvall seems to have made very few actual converts: but he would probably admit readily that formal conversions were one of the less important aspects of his work.

A dozen or so very human and for the most part likable Tibetan herdsmen, monks, women and bandits are the principal characters of the book. The author follows them through changes of season, through family quarrels, tribal raids, love affairs, death, feud and pilgrimage. He frequently plays an important role in the tales he tells and usually seems to be much more a Tibetan than a foreigner, so well did he become integrated into the local scene.

Though the book is called *Tibetan Skylines*, far fewer pages are devoted to the landscape than the title would indicate. Nevertheless, what there is is excellent. Every chapter has a paragraph or two which catches the full spirit of the fresh and rugged landscape by day, by night, and through changes in weather and season.

On finishing this book, one cannot help having the feeling that Tibetans, for all their quaintness and strange customs, are after all basically rather like other human beings the world over. This is an impression few other books on Tibet manage, or even try, to convey.

PAUL B. HENZE.

Himalayan Circuit. By G. D. Khosla. Macmillan's, London. Pp. 231; 23 illustrations and a map. 9" x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". 18s.

This is a pleasant, unpretentious account of a trek by the author, through Spiti and Lahoul. He is a judge of the High Court and was accompanied by the Chief Producer of Documentary films, Mr. Mohan Bhavnani, the District Commissioner, Mr. Shrinagesh, the sub-divisional officer, Mr. Bachitta Singh, a Doctor Massey, visiting medico to Spiti, Mr. Bhavnani's enterprising wife and two young Indians. Judge

Khosla is evidently a keen Himachal lover, and indeed hardly one of the party lacked enthusiasm. As it happens, Spiti has not been much written up, for it is a bare, sparsely inhabited country with little of interest, save for its people, who have certain curious habits. But the author has the faculty of keen observation and has wide knowledge of human nature. These qualities, together with a real sense of humour have enabled him to produce a very readable book.

H. W. T.

The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobči. By C. R. Bawden. Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Band 5; Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. 1955. Pp. x + 205.

No one who did not know the facts could have guessed that this remarkable critical edition and translation of a difficult and highly confused text was the first venture of a young British Mongologist (if there is such a word). British scholarship in the classical field has always been distinguished by certain eminent, if austere, qualities, great industry, strict accuracy and attention to detail, and remarkable ingenuity in elucidating obscurities, coupled with realization of the fact that it is sometimes necessary to look them squarely in the face and, pending further enlightenment, pass by on the other side. It is encouraging to find that Mr. Bawden has carried these typically British qualities into what is, for British scholarship, a new field, and in particular that if on one or two occasions he finds a word or sentence that he does not understand, he says so manfully and does not try to slip by under a cloud of verbiage. If any justification were required for the enlightened policy of Her Majesty's Government in providing funds for the education of young British scholars in branches of knowledge, the material value of which is not immediately assessable in terms of cash return, this is it.

Of the value of the *Altan Tobči* as serious history, perhaps, as Mr. Bawden himself says, the less said the better. For the record, it is the second oldest Mongol chronicle at present known. The oldest, the famous *Secret History*, compiled in about A.D. 1240, partly from earlier material, although it was rediscovered only recently, has deservedly been given great attention; several editions of it, and translations in several foreign languages are now available and work on it is still going forward. The *Altan Tobči* is very much later; it was compiled in the first half of the seventeenth century from extremely miscellaneous earlier sources. Its contents can best be described as a disorderly pot-pourri. It includes genealogies and lists of kings, some of them completely bogus; anecdotes, many of which would not feel out of place in the *Arabian Nights*; snatches of Mongol folk poetry, mostly of an elegiac character, and some of remarkable quality; and a certain amount of more or less serious history. As might have been expected, connoisseurs of the preposterous will find in it rich and varied feeding. As Mr. Bawden points out, the real value of the book lies in the light which it throws on the obscure history of the Mongol tribes after the Yüan Dynasty had collapsed and the hordes had withdrawn into Mongolia. But that light is a dim and fitful one. It will take the historians a long time to disentangle from this and other Mongol and Chinese sources a coherent history of one of the most confused periods of tribal warfare in a part of the world where confusion has always been the normal situation.

The present phase is one of making available really reliable critical editions and translations of the primary authorities so that the historians can do their stuff. Mr. Bawden's contribution to this task is a valuable one. The standard criticism to make of works of this kind is that they would be less unintelligible if they included a map; but it would perhaps be a counsel of perfection to ask for a map to accompany what is in essence no more than a source book for the historians.

GERARD CLAUSON.

Japanese Literature in the Meiji Period. Compiled and edited by Okazaki Yoshie, translated and adapted by V. H. Viglielmo. Tokyo: Obunsha. Pp. 673; illustrations, index. £3 12s.

To mark the centenary of the opening-up of Japan by Commodore Perry in his "black ships," there has appeared in Japan a series entitled *Meiji-bunka-shi*, "A Cultural History of the Meiji Era," in fourteen volumes. It is planned to issue

English translations of all of these, and the book under review, the translation of the one devoted to the literature of the period, is the first to appear. The author is Professor Okazaki Yoshie, of the Department of Literature of Tōhoku University in Sendai, in Northern Japan. The translator is V. H. Viglielmo, a young American scholar.

The Meiji era extended from 1868 to 1912, and corresponds to the reign of the Emperor of the same name. The Japanese system of dating by year periods brings along with it a tendency towards an artificial division of the time-scale in many fields. At least the beginning of the Meiji period has a historical reality, for it is the formal boundary between the old "feudal" Japan and the modern state. The end of the period, however, has only the death of the Emperor to mark it, and the various sections of the book thus merely come to an end with no climax reached.

After a general introduction, the book goes on to have sections dealing with the novel, poetry, drama and "non-fiction." The author's main object seems to be to omit nothing. We are thus given lists of works, of literary magazines, and dates, all of which demonstrate the assiduity with which the book has been assembled. Professor Okazaki is said to have been greatly influenced by German writers, and the painstaking thoroughness of the present volume gives support to these reports and shows how far he has passed on his way of thinking to his students, whose assistance in the undertaking is acknowledged on the jacket.

Unfortunately, the book was written for Japanese consumption. Little or no attempt is made, for example, to define the aims of the various schools of novelists, which go under such names as "Romanticism," "Naturalism" and "Realism." Ostensibly they have the same significance as the same terms applied to French literature, but in fact the differences are considerable. The cultured Japanese reader is not embarrassed by this, but the Western reader of the translation is somewhat at a loss. The result is that the book is of use chiefly to students of Japanese literature with some knowledge of the language and the works treated, who are relieved by Mr. Viglielmo's industry from undertaking the slow task of reading this or some similar work in the original Japanese.

The translator's work is admirable in its accuracy. A comparison with the original make one wonder at the patience of the detailed rendering. It is a pity that the style of the original is dull; Mr. Viglielmo's translation cannot faithfully be otherwise. He worked under great pressure of time, which doubtless is why a slip on p. 47, where Bakin's *yomihon* are referred to as *tokuhon*, was not amended, although the correct term is used later in the book.

One cannot help feeling that a far better result would have been produced if Mr. Viglielmo had had a freer hand and had not been restricted to the Japanese text. Perhaps it is not too late for him to write his own history of the literature of the period, with due explanations for the uninitiated Western reader.

C. J. DUNN.

The Art and Architecture of China. Laurence Sickman. Alexander Soper. (One of the Pelican History of Art Series, published by Penguin Books. Pp. 318; Bibliography, 190 plates, Index. 45s.)

Part one. Painting and Sculpture is by Laurence Sickman and will live for a long time as a valuable book of reference. The maps on pp. xxiv and v and the chronological table are of considerable value. The latter covers the Shang or Yin Dynasty from 1523 B.C. to Republican days of A.D. 1912 taking one through the great days, in an artistic sense, of the Tang, Han, Sung and Ming periods.

How true it is to say that the Chinese possess the longest continuous cultural history of any of the peoples of the world, a record which today has given way to a deadly level of mediocrity.

In the second century B.C. a poet of the day, after seeing the wonderful frescoes of an old Palace in Shantung wrote:

"And here all Heaven and Earth is painted, all living things
After their tribes, and all wild marryings of sort with sort;
strange spirits of the seas,

Gods of the Hills. To all their thousand guises
 Had the painter formed.
 His reds and blues, and all the wonders of life
 Had he shaped truthfully and coloured after their kinds."

How impossible for a Chinese poet or artist today to draw such pictures!

During the Tang period a marked change came over painting technique. Subject matter altered. Dragons, gnomes, witches and the supernatural faded before the rationalism of the day: portraiture of emperors, court ladies, high-bred horses, took their place. Yen Li-pen painted a famous scroll entitled "Portraits of the Emperors" representing thirteen emperors from the Han to the Sui periods. Fortunately plates 62 and 63 show some of the work, virile and characteristic.

The plates illustrating part one are fascinating and depict carvings in white marble, in wood and other media. The lion in white marble of the early eighth century is the most living thing in stone that can be imagined. Plate 30 shows a Bodhisattva of the early sixth century, with an expression of tolerant amusement as if she was chiding a disciple who had just told her a risqué but amusing story.

Plates 19 entitled "Procession of Dignitaries of the 2nd Century A.D." might almost be a representation of a trotting race in France today.

Plate 92 (10th Century) might be an oriental conception of a Victorian musical evening or a cocktail party of 1956.

Some of the delightful paintings were seen at the Exhibition of Chinese art at the Royal Academy in 1936, one of them (plate 100) by Li T'ang "Man on Buffalo returning from a Village Feast" gives the impression of the aftermath of a very satisfactory party. The delicacy of the river scenes gives one the desire to visit the Art Galleries in Washington, Boston, Peking, Kansas City and all the other homes of artistry where these delights are displayed.

It is curious that a book entitled "The Art of Architecture of China" should omit entirely anything of ceramics. Lacquer, bronzes, carvings, are all exhaustively dealt with but the porcelains which have delighted so many generations have been omitted entirely—one must imagine with intent. One plate (no. 22) however, gives an example of painted pottery from the Han Dynasty which is now in the Nelson Gallery of Art in Kansas City. This single example only whets the appetite for more examples of the potter's art.

Part two. Architecture. This part consists of 84 pages only and takes only a secondary place in the whole book. The plates are equally as good as those of the Art Section. For grandeur allied to simplicity, the Grand Ancestral Shrine—the T'ai-Miao—in the Peking palace takes pride of place. The coloured tile gateway in the Pei Hai is a fine example of the art of the Ch'ing Dynasty. The marble bridges over the Golden River (plate 188a) and the T'ai-ho-tien finely illustrate the dignity of the Forbidden City.

The final plate of the Imperial throne seems to express centuries of Oriental art. Grand and great as are these, they do not rival in size the audience halls of the past, such as Wei-Yang, which was said to have been 500 Han feet in length, 150 in depth, and 350 high. These dimensions influenced Japanese building, e.g., the Buddha Hall at the Todaiji Temple is 290 feet long.

The technical details of roof construction will no doubt appeal to the architectural student, though rather above the heads of the general reader. As the book is called "Art and Architecture of China" perhaps Part II gives too much space to Japan, already exclusively dealt with in a companion Volume.

H. St. C. S.

The Empress Wu. By C. P. Fitzgerald. Published by the Cresset Press. Pp. 251.
 Notes, Chinese and English index, maps. 25s.

This book, written by an acknowledged expert, is a serious contribution to the recording of Chinese history. Possibly it may not attract a large general public, but to students it is of considerable value.

The author has spent most of his life in China, and as Professor of Far Eastern

History in the National University he has had unrivalled opportunities of studying the Tang period to which the Empress Wu belonged. Her balanced political judgment ensured a long reign. Though her ruthless elimination of all those who came between her and her objectives resembled the policies of the Tsarist Emperors, her subjects appeared to have pardoned these excesses because of her skill in government. It is true to say that the rulers of her period were weak and unself-reliant, but perhaps they would have taken more upon their shoulders had they not had the qualities of the Empress to fall back on.

As in many other Chinese courts ruling was largely in the hands of palace favourites, some of them vicious and brutal. Few of the Empress's supporters were without self-interest, though there are glimpses here and there of a pure patriotism.

To the layman the large number of Chinese names to memorize make the book rather difficult reading and might discourage the casual reader.

The maps at the end and the Chinese index are valuable.

The author comes to the conclusion that the Empress Wu was amongst the greatest of the *heroic* figures of Chinese history. The use of the word "heroic" may be criticized, as many of her actions appeared to deviate widely from heroism.

Ruthless she was and successful, perhaps in Tang days those qualities might be mistaken for heroism.

H. ST. C. S.

Imperial Woman. By Pearl S. Buck. Methuen. Pp. 433. 16s.

No living author could have produced this book except Pearl Buck. Her own long residence and upbringing in China gives her an insight into the Chinese mind possessed by few. Her researches into the background of the Dragon throne enable her to present a picture fascinating and authoritative. Though written in the form of a novel it is perhaps more accurate than many avowedly historical and factual lives of that highly interesting character, the Empress Tzu Hsi. The author is able to present her as woman as well as Empress, and her long romance with Jung Lu is sympathetically and graphically portrayed.

Just over a hundred years ago Yehonala was born in the third month of the Moon Year, daughter of a respected Manchu Bannerman—few would have dared to prophesy what the future held for her. The paternal house was in Pewter Lane, a pedestrian address for a future Empress. The picture of Irchid—the heroine of the story—is a charming one. She was evidently highly domesticated and possessed leaf-shaped eyes; above them moth eyebrows, a slim poise which caused her to look taller than she was. One of the serving women in the house in Pewter Lane considered that her destiny was a high one when the summons came to present herself at the Palace for inspection as a possible concubine for the Emperor's harem. The news was brought to her by her kinsman and life-long lover, Jung Lee; a self-effacing suiter who was a trusted guardsman at the gate of the Forbidden City.

Yehonala was one of sixteen Manchu virgins to be inspected; her cousin, Sakola, being among them. Registered at the age of fifteen, she was seventeen at the time of her presentation at the Palace for inspection by the Emperor and the Dowager Mother.

A difference of opinion was voiced between Emperor and Dowager, but the Emperor's will prevailed, and after gazing at Yehonala for some time he said, "This one I choose."

Her Palace life had started. Yehonala's success in the Palace was ensured by her personal care of the Dowager Mother, and she did not have to wait long before she was summoned by the Emperor. The Eunuch, Li Lien Ying, who served her, personally warned her of the approach of the Emperor's desire for her in the words:

The Dragon awakes,
The Day of the Phœnix has come.

Yehonala went to her Emperor accompanied by her little lion dog despite the protests of women and Eunuchs.

The union was only consummated by the aid of aphrodisiacs, but owing to a private meeting between Yehonala and Jung Lu it was never established if the Emperor or he was the father of her coming child. This doubt persists throughout the book.

As time went on Yehonala's influence over the Emperor became stronger and stronger and her share in the government more important. Before long she became the *de facto* ruler of the Empire and evinced powers of ruling which partly justified her usurpation of power.

Her mind, so steeped in Oriental lore, refused to acknowledge the power of the West. Only late in life did she realize that change was inevitable. She carried her people with her, and her epitaph is perhaps best expressed in the words of her people when they learned of her death, which took place six years after Queen Victoria's:

"Who will care for us now."

This, despite her methods of removing her enemies by murder or banishment. Her love for Jung Lu persisted throughout her life. Perhaps if she had never been chosen as an Imperial concubine, and had never succeeded to the power that was hers, she might have been the happy consort of this trustworthy guardsman.

Those interested in the Manchu Dynasty will find this an absorbing story.

H. ST. C. S.

East and West. Some Reflections. By S. Radhakrishnan. George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 131. Appendix, index. 6s.

In a foreword Dr. Radhakrishnan writes that if these reflections stimulate thought he will be amply rewarded. It is certainly to be expected that his work will serve to draw increasing attention to mystical religion and the perennial philosophy recently discussed by Aldous Huxley.

He rightly suggests the impossibility of dealing adequately with his subject in three lectures; and the form of these reflections is conditioned by the fact that they are, in substance, the inaugural Beatty Memorial lectures as he delivered them at the McGill University in 1954.

His subject embraces the common ground on which the traditions of all the great religions rest and the problems which both East and West are now facing in the light of all their past history and the latest developments of science and technology. This leads him to argue the "need for a creative religion," but without insisting on "an objective, universally valid doctrinal content." "Where everybody thinks alike," he says, "nobody thinks at all. In a world community each individual will have freedom to evolve his own realisation of the supreme and the historical faiths will remain free to grow according to their own genius." His creative religion is to be scientific, empirical and humanistic, fostering "the full development of man, which includes the spirit in man."

It is not possible to summarize the reflections, which cover the widest field. He insists on the importance of devotion, contemplation and detachment as against the intellectual acceptance of dogma. He points to the universality of the mystics of the Christian, Buddhist, Brahminical and Islamic religions. He brings an understanding of these to the study of the New Testament with an insight which will be new to many Christians. He appears to accept the validity of the teaching of Jesus. He re-interprets the Fourth Gospel and the Greek doctrine of the Logos which it contains in the light of the principles underlying Hindu ideas about contemplation (yoga) and those of universal mysticism. He points also to the important influence of the Orphic and Eleusinian mystery religions which, he suggests, are to be associated with the pre-Indo-European religions of the Eastern Mediterranean based on the worship of a Mother goddess; and he also suggests that some features of the Orphic religion, including the belief in the possibility of union of man and God, may indicate Indian influence.

This not unnatural tendency to emphasize the possible importance of Indian thought is open to critical, but sympathetic, examination. It recurs in his suggestion that the pre-Indo-European civilization of the Indus (Mohenjo-daro) goes back a thousand years further than the best critical opinion would place it (*cf.* his 3500-2250 B.C. against the beginning after 3000 B.C. or about 2500 B.C. of A. L. Basham). It may be that a complex of religious ideas, including the worship of a Mother goddess, arose out of the beginnings of agriculture and was common to a wide area from the Ganges to Greece, Italy and beyond. It was not specifically Indian, and presents

a contrast to the conceptions of the Father gods of later comers into Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, Persia and India, including the Aryans of the *Rg Veda*.

His sympathetic insight into, and his acceptance of, much in the New Testament have been indicated. In the light of this, reference may be made to a small, but important, misunderstanding. He quotes the words at the crucifixion, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me," in evident unawareness that they are themselves quoted from the first line of one of the greatest of the Psalms of David, the whole purport of which is of faith and trust as against despair.

J. C. CURRY.

The Scrolls from the Dead Sea. By Edmund Wilson. London: W. H. Allen. 1955. Pp. 159. 10s. 6d.

The Dead Sea Scrolls are news. Mr. Wilson, who is neither an archæologist nor a Semitic scholar, but an American journalist and literary critic, has cashed in on this most sensational of archæological discoveries, and has written a lively account of the strange drama of the amazing find. The book is recommended by the Book Society, and is no doubt already a best seller. Archæologists generally write very dull stuff, but Mr. Wilson is not dull. He is a skilled craftsman who has exploited to the full the dramatic and picturesque possibilities of his subject. He has been quick to seize on the explosive element contained in these ancient documents—namely, the fact that they disclose the existence of a community whose practices and beliefs bear so much resemblance to those of the first Christians, as to present an apparent challenge to the uniqueness of Christianity. The members of this sect, whether rightly designated as Essenes or not, were living a monastic form of life near the Dead Sea during a period which saw the rise of Christianity and the extinction of the last remnants of Jewish national existence. When, after the defeat of the last Jewish revolt under Bar Cochba in the time of Hadrian, the members of the community were scattered or slain, they left their library concealed in various caves near their centre at what is now known as Khirbet Qumran. There the scrolls have remained throughout the centuries until the chance discovery of a bedouin shepherd brought them once more into the light. The documents consist of biblical scrolls, one of which is a complete scroll of the book of Isaiah, and a vast number of fragments, representing most of the books of the Old Testament. The non-biblical scrolls consist of a document called the *Manual of Discipline*, giving the order, mode of life, and rituals, of the sect; a collection of hymns used in the worship of the community; a commentary on the book of Habakkuk, and a book called *The War of the Children of Light against the Children of Darkness*. There are also fragments of other non-biblical books. The languages represented are Hebrew and Aramaic. While there are still a few scholars who maintain that the scrolls are medieval forgeries, most scholars accept a date for the scrolls between the middle of the second century B.C., and the middle of the second century A.D. Mr. Wilson's account of all this is reliable and accurate so far as accuracy is possible about the circumstances of the actual discovery. When, however, he comes to discuss the significance of the discovery his competence may be questioned. On p. 142 of his book we find the statement, "It would seem an immense advantage for cultural and social intercourse—that is, for civilization—that the rise of Christianity should, at last, be generally understood as simply an episode of human history rather than propagated as dogma and divine revelation." The Christian position is that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus are not "simply" an episode of human history, but the central event in history, the point of time when the Word became incarnate. The Dead Sea Scrolls cannot affect this position in the slightest degree. The most that can be claimed for them in the uncertain state of their interpretation is that they throw fresh light on an obscure period of Jewish history, and make more clear the extent to which in the development of Judaism the way was being prepared for the appearance of Christianity. The debt which Christianity owes to Judaism has never been underestimated by the best Christian scholarship.

S. H. HOOKE.

It has been suggested that the following may be of interest :

A. VAMBÉRY

The strenuous advocacy of Britain as against Russia throughout the East in the nineteenth century by Arminius Vambéry is common knowledge to students of Asiatic history. The political attitude of this celebrated Hungarian traveller and Orientalist is well illustrated by the two following letters, which have recently come to light in a Yorkshire bookseller's portmanteau and now belong to Mr. C. J. Heywood of Cottingham. Both letters are dated 1891, when Vambéry (born *circa* 1832) was approaching sixty. They were written to an unnamed British officer, of whom the only available data are that he had been in Baluchistan and written to Vambéry from Cairo before April, 1891, and that he was apparently a Scotsman.

LETTER 1

BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY,

April 14, 1891.

MY DEAR CAPTAIN,

I was on the point to answer your first letter dated Cairo, when I was favoured with your second note introducing Major Creagh, whose arrival I was waiting for untill [*sic*] now. Unhappily the Major did not touch Budapest and I lost a good opportunity of having a talk with an Anglo-Indian officer, of [*sic*] whom I always learn a good deal.

How I envy you for your stay in Beluchistan! That part of Asia had always a particular charm for me, and if my pronounced political writings would not be in my way, I certainly would have made a trip to Quetta and to the Khojak Tunnel. I do not conceive the reason of the objecting power in London, for their saying: that Russia is now peaceful and ought not to be made angry by my presence in India, is really too much of friendly regard.

In a few weeks I shall be in Scotland lecturing in various places and rousing the attention of your able countrymen for Asia, which begins to be superseded by the dark Continent and by the noise of the still darker heros [*sic*] of exploration.

Be so kind, drop a line from time to time, you bestow a great favour by it upon,
Yours sincerely, A. VAMBÉRY.

LETTER 2

BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY,

Dec. 7, 1891.

MY DEAR CAPTAIN,

Many thanks for your kind remembrance. I am exceedingly glad to see that you have got the same opinion on the Pamir question as I published in *The Times*. You have done great service to our mutual cause by pointing to the energetic opposition against this new step of Russia. Public (opinion *supplied*) at home is rather too confident in the peaceful policy of the Czar and an occasional stir will do much good. Capt. Younghusband is a capital fellow, and I trust the Government will lend an ear to his advices. Was it not a wretched trick on the part of Russians to creep furtively over the Pamir [*sic*] with the intention to approach the outlying district of British influence in Asia? You are quite right when you allude to the probable change of Ministry in London, I am prepared for it, I shall take my own measures by coming at once to England and to denounce [*sic*] in all parts of the country the Liberal policy tending towards indulgence in this grave matter. Yours very truly, A. VAMBÉRY.

The Captain Younghusband named in Letter 2 is evidently the late Sir Francis Younghusband, one of the founders of the Society.

Letter 1 appears to refer to the return of H. M. Stanley after the relief of Emin Pasha.

Vambéry's command of English and his, so to say, complete identification of himself with this country, as revealed in these letters, are remarkable. It is also striking that the imminent change of government, from Tory to Liberal, which actually took place in July, 1892 (Gladstone's last administration), is spoken of by Vambéry as enough to bring him at once to England. Whether this visit and the visit to Scotland mentioned in Letter 1 actually took place is unknown to the present writer.

[The contributor would be glad to hear of any other unpublished letters, MS. or material relating to Vambéry in existence in this country. Letters should be addressed to D. M. Dunlop, Esq., Trinity Hall, Cambridge.—EDITOR.]